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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Caroline R. Lundquist 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2013 
 
Title: Impossible and Necessary: The Problem of Luck and the Promise of Kindness 
 
 
My dissertation explores the promise of kindness as a response to the problem 
of luck which confronts both ancient and modern visions of the moral life. A rich 
articulation of kindness in the light of historical moral theory reveals that, far from being 
a trifling, merely and purely sentimental phenomenon, kindness involves many of the key 
ethical commitments that distinguish both Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. More 
importantly, at the level of individuals kindness has the power to mitigate the toll of bad 
luck on agents and to yield the types of judgments that dissolve the problem of moral 
luck. Where it finds expression at the institutional level kindness has tremendous 
ameliorative potential. I therefore contend that kindness is to be esteemed above all other 
modes of comportment; in a world that is not up to us, our greatest hope for flourishing 
lies in being kind and in remaining graciously open to the kindness of others. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: ETHICS IS IMPOSSIBLE AND NECESSARY 
“Can the soul be entirely remade by destiny and become bad if that 
destiny is bad? Can the heart become warped and catch incurable 
diseases and turn ugly under the pressure of some abnormally great woe, 
the way the vertebral column becomes warped under a too-low ceiling?” 
-Hugo (77) 
Prologue 
 
 When first we meet Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables, he is a broken 
man. Long oppressed by wretched circumstances, his character has been stunted, his 
reasoning dulled and his compassion dimmed. He has lost, through the worst fortune 
imaginable, so much of what once defined him that he scarcely knows how to conceive of 
himself. “If the millet seed under the millstone had thoughts,” writes Hugo, “it would 
doubtless think exactly what Jean Valjean thought (79). Nineteen years of imprisonment 
and harsh labor have instilled in Valjean two moral capacities: the capacity to commit 
“some swift, unpremeditated act fully of frenzy, performed entirely instinctively as a sort 
of reprisal for the wrong endured,” and the capacity to perform “some serious criminal 
act, consciously meditated and mulled over with the false notions such misery can give 
rise to” (80). He has become, in short, a morally corrupt and truly dangerous man. 
 Just released from prison, yellow passport in hand to mark him as a criminal, 
Valjean struggles to find work. He labors for half a day before being identified by his 
employer as a former criminal, whereupon he is cast out with only a portion of his 
earnings. Valjean wanders on, and eventually comes to the small town of Digne. He has 
some money— the meager sum earned during his years of prison labor— but finds that 
he and his money are unwelcome at the local inn. The innkeeper not only denies Valjean 
a room and a meal, but even denies him a bale of straw in the corner of his barn to sleep 
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on. Valjean wanders the town, hunger gnawing at his stomach, as night begins to fall. He 
looks for any dive, any ill-reputed tavern that might accommodate a known criminal. He 
stumbles into a tavern and is welcomed warmly until the taverner—alerted by a patron to 
Valjean’s background— casts him out. In some desperation, Valjean makes his way to 
the local prison and begs entrance of the doorkeep. “This is a prison,” the guard replies,  
“not an inn. Get yourself arrested. Then we’ll open up for you” (56). In hopes that a 
kindly citizen will take pity on him, Valjean knocks on the door of an idyllic residence, 
begging for a bowl of soup and permission to sleep in the shed out in the garden. The 
homeowner is ready to accommodate until he recognizes Valjean as “the man” of whom 
the townspeople have been murmuring. His wife in a panic, the owner pulls his gun off 
the wall. “For pity’s sake,” begs Valjean, “a glass of water;” “I’ll give you a bullet!” the 
man replies. Convinced that he’ll find no meal, Valjean desperately seeks any kind of 
shelter. He finds a ramshackle hut in a backyard, and is about to collapse there when he 
realizes he has entered a dog kennel. Valjean escapes the yard, but not before his already-
tattered clothes are torn to shreds. He is heard despairing, “I’m not even a dog!” (59). 
 Exhausted and past all hope, Valjean slumps onto a stone bench in the town 
square. Before sleep takes him, a kindly old woman emerges from the adjacent church 
and approaches Valjean to ask, “What are you doing there, my friend?” (59). Irritably, 
Valjean recounts the day’s events. “You knocked,” the woman asks, “on every door? […] 
Did you knock on that one?” she asks, indicating the small house of the local bishop. 
“No,” replies Valjean. “Knock there,” she offers (59).  
 The events that follow mark a turning point in Valjean’s moral existence. 
Through the extraordinary kindness of one man, Valjean will begin a remarkable and 
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previously unimaginable transformation. He will come to question all that others have 
assumed and articulated about who and what he is, and will in time become capable of 
that very kindness through which his own character is to be transmuted. Valjean will 
ascend from the depths of despair to affirm his dignity and worth, and in so doing remind 
us of the profound moral significance of a phenomenon that has too long been 
underappreciated— the transformative virtue of human kindness.  
 
The Problem of Ethics 
Walk between dark and dark—a shining space 
 With the grave’s narrowness, though not its peace. 
-Robert Graves 
 
 
From the perspective of theoretical ethics, the human situation is best construed as 
a tension between what is morally required and what is possible; between the demands of 
morality and that which nature or circumstance allows. We feel obligated to abide by 
certain principles of conduct, but find our ethical activity disrupted by circumstances 
which we do not control. From the perspective of agency, this situation is tragic insofar 
as our desire to achieve morally legitimate ends, including and especially the desire to be 
ethical, is at odds with a world that is not up to us. As an attempt to navigate this intrinsic 
tension the history of ethics is a series of variations on a constant theme: ethics is both 
impossible and necessary. The Greeks speak to this dyad in their tragedies, the Christians 
invoke it via the concept of sin, Kant evades it with the Moral Law, and the existentialists 
highlight its inescapability. Just as all theoretical ethicists toil within the constraints of 
this paradox, we who would be ethical must find a way to dwell within it. 
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To deem the human/ethical situation tragic is to confess that we are, as moral 
agents, vulnerable to luck, or to those circumstances beyond our control that are more or 
less favorable to us.1 The problem of luck haunts the human situation in at least two 
fundamental ways, the first belonging to the human situation itself and recognized within 
the Aristotelian ethical worldview, the second emerging in the light of moral 
responsibility and the presumed autonomy of the Kantian agent. First, inasmuch as the 
world which in many senses constitutes us is not of our own creation, whether or to what 
extent we are able to flourish is not entirely up to us. We did not create the natural world 
from which we emerge nor did we produce the social and political institutions that inform 
our being. Second, from the moment we attach moral responsibility to human actions and 
traits, we are confronted with the problem of moral luck, namely, that it is often 
appropriate to morally assess agents for traits and actions which they are at best 
ambiguously responsible for. At the level of the individual, luck threatens to undermine 
any attempt to flourish and to frustrate every attempt to live a moral life. At the 
theoretical level, luck in both forms poses a serious threat to agency, and thus to the 
ground of most ethical systems, both ancient and modern. The problem of luck is the 
most existentially pressing problem in ethics; if we are morally serious, then whether as 
discrete agents or as ethical philosophers, we must reconcile the human desire to morally 
flourish with a world that is decidedly beyond any agent’s power to control. 
In the light of human vulnerability to luck, I will argue that kindness emerges as 
the most natural yet still the most praiseworthy ethical posture. In a world that is not 
within our control, it is only natural that we should admit to our radical interdependence 
                                                           
1
 A key characteristic of luck, as opposed to mere chance, is that the former is bound up with the desires of 
its recipient: luck is deemed “good” or “bad,” whereas chance is understood simply as what occurs. 
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and need for each other’s help and care. Too often, though, we moral agents are reticent 
to acknowledge the shadow side of the Stoic distinction— that some things are not up to 
us.
2
 Steeped in the modern ethical tradition that privileges autonomy, it is difficult to 
admit that many things simply are not up to us.3 We are equally loath to admit to the 
existence of what Kantian philosopher John Hare terms the moral gap— that chasm 
which so often divides the demands of morality from our ability to meet them.4 To 
acknowledge our vulnerability to luck, and the often inevitable failure of our discrete 
ethical aims, would require a tremendous amount of moral courage. Such an admission 
would be easier, no doubt, if we could be assured of others’ willingness to help us in our 
times of need, and not to judge us harshly when we find that the moral gap is simply too 
wide to breach.  
As a stable ethical posture, kindness is premised upon the admission that all 
agents are subject to circumstances beyond their control and thus at times in need of each 
other’s help and compassion. Too often depicted as a trifling, purely and merely 
sentimental phenomenon, kindness is a virtue of serious moral worth, and is so primarily 
                                                           
2
 The Handbook of the stoic philosopher Epictetus begins with the following distinction: “Some things are 
up to us [eph' hêmin] and some things are not up to us” (1.1). The key to happiness, in Epictetus’s view, 
lies in the cultivation of moral character, which is within agents’ control, and in detachment from externals 
such as wealth, reputation and health which agents do not control.   
  
3
 Conversely, our eagerness to render the moral life immune to luck may emerge out of an awareness that 
so little is, in fact, up to us. Perhaps we find comfort, as Bernard Williams suggests, in the thought that 
what matters most about us— our moral worth— is within our control. As Williams writes, “Such a 
conception […] offers an inducement, a solace to a sense of the world’s unfairness” (Statman 2).  
 
4
 Here, a Christian philosopher, identifies the moral gap with the chasm between nature (or sin) and 
morality, defining it as “the gap between the moral demand on us and our natural capacity to meet it” (Hare 
1). Hare points to three strategies conventionally used to address the gap: (1) “to keep the moral demand as 
high as Kant said it was and to exaggerate our natural capacities,” (2) to reduce the moral demand by 
agreeing that “there is no gap,” and (3) “to concede the gap and find a naturalistic substitute for God’s 
assistance in bridging it” (Hare 1). Hare argues that each of these strategies ultimately fails, thus God is 
needed to bridge the moral gap. My approach relates most closely to (1), but involves a strong interpersonal 
element. My claim is that we can only hope to abide by high moral standards if we can trust to the kindness 
of others.  
6 
 
because it involves a courageous acknowledgement of the problem of luck and of the 
resultant vulnerability and interdependence of all moral agents. As both a way of helping 
and as an approach to moral assessment, kindness not only acknowledges luck but also 
has the power to ameliorate it. As a way of helping, kindness can to some extent mitigate 
the toll of bad luck on agents. As a way of morally judging, it offers a way to maintain 
moral seriousness in the face of an uncertain and unjust world. Where it finds expression 
at the level of institutions, kindness has the power to remove obstacles to individuals’ 
freedom and flourishing. In sum, whether at the individual or social level, kindness has 
the power to make a better world both by increasing agents’ resilience in the face of bad 
luck, and by ameliorating to some extent those forces that impede their flourishing.    
This dissertation responds to an unfortunate blind spot in both historical and 
contemporary ethics: a pervasive failure to attend to the nature and moral significance of 
kindness, especially as it relates to the problem of luck. The robust articulation of 
kindness I offer here is intended to clear up the confusion that plagues both historical and 
contemporary philosophical discussions of kindness, and to reveal in the process the 
tremendous moral significance of a mode of comportment which has for too long been 
undertheorized and underappreciated.  I contend that kindness has the power to address 
the problem of luck as it confronts the Aristotelian conception of ethics, and the problem 
of moral luck that plagues Kantian moral theory. I argue that kindness is best conceived 
of as a principled virtue—  a stable inculcatable trait of character involving a conscious 
conviction that all persons are intrinsically valuable, as well as a courageous 
acknowledgment of human finitude and interdependence. As a stable mode of 
comportment, kindness entails a readiness to raise, to help, and to cheer that risks 
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offending at every moment, but bears this vulnerability with courage and grace. In 
whatever gesture it finds expression— as material gift, as needed help, as encouraging 
word— kindness is fundamentally ameliorative. I maintain that in a world that is not up 
to us our best hope for flourishing and for maintaining moral seriousness lies in being 
kind and in being graciously open to the kindness of others. 
Contemporary Philosophy and the Neglect of Kindness 
  That kindness has moral significance is hardly worth debating; it is one of the 
most widely appreciated moral characteristics in our society today.5 But it is also, perhaps 
surprisingly, among the least theorized. Although contemporary philosophers have a 
great deal to say about violence, cruelty and oppression, they rarely spare a thought for 
the nature and moral significance of kindness. This inattentiveness should merit pause; 
before commencing an inquiry into the nature of kindness it would be wise to attend to 
some potential reasons for the neglect of kindness as a serious subject of ethical inquiry. 
There are a number of likely reasons for this neglect: first, kindness may be perceived by 
moral theorists as a trivial attribute, vaguely associated as it is in the popular imagination 
with bumper-sticker sentiments and a low degree of intelligence. Second, kindness is 
often presumed to be quite impotent in the face of its foil, cruelty.6 Third, perhaps we 
intuitively recognize that an honest appraisal of kindness would force us to confess the 
                                                           
5
 And perhaps more universally; one of my favorite anecdotes to this effect: in one study involving sixteen 
thousand subjects from around the world, men and women both listed kindness as their most desired 
attribute in a mate, above intelligence, attractiveness and wealth (see Buss, David M. 1994. The Evolution 
of Desire: Strategies of Human Mating. New York: Basic Books).  
 
6
 As Phillip Hallie contends, kindness cannot be the opposite of cruelty because, although they are opposed 
in a certain way, cruelty carries a much greater moral weight. In Hallie’s view, cruelty is more a substantial 
ethical phenomenon than kindness not only because the former undermines agents’ dignity, but also and 
more importantly because it can be perpetuated at the level of institutions; there can be, Hallie argues, no 
institutions of kindness. 
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high degree to which our flourishing as moral agents depends upon the kindness of 
others, where such a confession entails a vulnerability that we who inherit the Kantian 
ideal of autonomous agency cannot bear to acknowledge. Fourth, it seems that there is 
little enough precedent in the history of philosophy for such inquiry; as William Hamrick 
remarks, “philosophers have only seldom shown any interest in pursuing a more 
reflective understanding of kindness” (Hamrick xi). Each of these potential explanations 
give rise to important questions which may guide the present inquiry; taken together, they 
betray a general confusion regarding the nature of kindness. Let us, then, consider each of 
these beliefs in turn.  
Belief 1: Kindness Is Trivial 
Kindness may strike the moral philosopher as a flimsy virtue, associated as it 
popularly is with saccharine-sweetness and Hallmark-card sentimentality. Though in our 
personal relationships we may wish to be perceived as kind and to have others be kind to 
us, as philosophers we may dismiss kindness as a relatively insignificant ethical 
phenomenon, paling (as it presumably does) in comparison to such conventionally lauded 
attributes as courage and dignity.7 Reluctance on the part of contemporary philosophers 
to appreciate the moral weight of kindness should be attributed in part to philosophy’s 
historical failure to provide a robust account of what kindness is and how it functions in 
the moral life. One facet of this failure involves an inattentiveness to relevant points of 
comparison between conventionally recognized virtues and the phenomenon of kindness. 
Since scholars may have failed to attend to kindness in part because they assume 
                                                           
7
 Kindness compares unfavorably to such virtues in the light of three enduring prejudices: first, the 
prejudice against “feminine” traits or virtues, second, the prejudice against “sentimental” virtues, and third, 
the prejudice against virtues associated with powerlessness or the “slave morality.” I speak to the first and 
second of these in Chapter Five when I place kindness in dialogue with Kantian moral theory.  
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unreflectively that kindness is made of flimsier stuff than other morally significant 
phenomena, it behooves us to test this belief by comparing the relevant features of 
kindness with the relevant features of phenomena that have received more scholarly 
attention.  
Belief 2: Kindness Is Impotent in the Face of Institutionalized Cruelty 
 Even if the moral significance of kindness as a personal attribute could be firmly 
established, moral philosophers might remain reluctant to attend to it. The world is wide 
and rife with injustice, and kindness seems like a thing of trifling consequence in the face 
of political institutions that perpetuate cruelty. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
kindness cannot remedy cruelty, and to further assume that kindness cannot take hold at 
the level of institutions where cruelty can; as will be seen, philosophers appear to have 
made both assumptions thus far. If these beliefs withstand philosophical scrutiny then 
even where the moral worth of kindness is uncontested, its relevance in an era where 
philosophers increasingly turn their attention to liberatory theory might well be doubted. 
It could be established, however, that kindness has the same power to heal that cruelty 
has to harm, and that kindness can function in and as political institutions, then scholars 
concerned with institutional injustice and cruelty could better justify devoting their time 
and attention to kindness. 8  
 
                                                           
8
 In either case, there is a place for kindness within liberatory theory. As Lisa Tessman notes in Burdened 
Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles, much of recent liberatory theory focuses on “what is the 
best way to live or act under oppression or in opposition to oppression” (5). Even if kindness cannot oppose 
oppression, we could explore the possibility that kind comportment might be a valuable as a way of coping 
with or subtly resisting oppression.    
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Belief 3: Ethics Demands Unadulterated Autonomy 
  Another potential explanation for the scholarly neglect of kindness involves a 
general reticence on the part of many moral philosophers to admit to human vulnerability 
and interdependence. An accurate characterization of the nature and significance of 
kindness would require us to acknowledge the tremendous extent to which we, as moral 
agents who operate in a world not of our own creation, need each other. Steeped in a 
moral tradition that places the highest premium on autonomy, perhaps we are reticent to 
admit the profound extent to which our flourishing depends on the way that people treat 
us— whether or not they help us materially when we are in need; whether or not they 
comfort us when we mourn, or cheer us when we feel disheartened; whether or not they 
awaken us to talents and moral capacities which we do not initially recognize in 
ourselves9; whether or not they see beauty in us;10 whether or not they see us at all. 
Perhaps we intuitively grasp the truth that our need for others’ kindness is so profound 
that without it we could not possibly flourish, and so turn from that truth into the 
comforting illusion of self-reliance.  
                                                           
9
 The kindness of teachers is especially important because it involves showing students the talents and 
character traits which they have not yet recognized in themselves. Case in point, last term one of my 
students wrote an apology for his final essay, which read “I am a bad writer, and not that smart. I never 
have been, and I know that.” His final essay was one of the most touching, insightful, well-crafted papers 
of the term, and I was shocked to learn that he had such a low estimation of his abilities. He said none of 
his teachers has ever praised his writing before.    
 
10
 Which is, we must acknowledge, connected to our feelings of self-worth. I have in mind Toni Morrison’s 
The Bluest Eye, in which the character Pecola believes she is “ugly,” since the terms “black,” “bad,” and 
“ugly” are, in her world, synonymous. But there is more to say about the connection between aesthetics and 
kindness. Aesthetic differences have long eased the way for cruelty, and in some cases have been explicitly 
used to justify it. It is admittedly easier to be kind to people whom we find ‘attractive’ than to those who 
repulse us, and this is a point which Kant, Hugo, Hallie and Hamrick all acknowledge. I believe that 
kindness which disregards or acts in spite of immediate aesthetic revulsion has a special moral worth. 
When people are in a compromised state aesthetically (though, for example, illness, injury or entrenched 
racialized ideals of beauty), they are more easily convinced that they are worthless, and may even welcome 
cruel treatment; cruelty towards them, which would further diminish their feelings of self-worth, is 
therefore especially contemptible.  
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Our ability to flourish— to live rich and meaningful lives— depends in important 
ways on the kindness of others, and admitting to this takes tremendous courage.11 But it 
takes more courage still to recognize how moral agency itself may presuppose some 
degree of kindness from others. Although prima facie it appears that expressions of 
kindness presuppose autonomy, ultimately it seems truer to say that autonomy 
presupposes expressions of kindness. It is in and through the kindness of others— and 
especially the kindness of parents and teachers— that we first come to recognize our own 
moral worth and our capacity for goodness. As our personal character develops, the 
moral assessments of our friends, family members, peers, employers and even strangers 
continue to inform our beliefs about who we are and what we are capable of. Certainly 
there are ways to resist being persuaded by the harsh assessments of others, and in the 
course of our inquiry we may find that it is possible to be kind to ourselves when no one 
else is kind to us, but it is difficult to imagine any agent having a limitless capacity for 
such resistance. We must confess that key beliefs we have about ourselves that help or 
hinder our ethical decision-making are profoundly impacted by how others treat us, 
including and especially the “truths” they tell us about ourselves.12 
Belief 4: There Is No Historical Precedent for Caring About Kindness 
 While Hamrick laments philosophers’ historical inattentiveness to kindness, 
Adam Phillips and Barbara Taylor raise a different concern. In their short treatise On 
Kindness, Phillips and Taylor argue that for most of Western history kindness was not 
only widely recognized but also held a prominent position both in the popular 
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 Here the neglect of kindness clearly coincides with the denial of luck: this is in essence an admission that 
we are vulnerable to luck, since other people are for us part of that which “is not up to us.” 
 
12
 A truth that Kant himself appreciates, as will be seen in Chapter Six. 
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imagination and in the arena of ethical theory. The trivialization of kindness is, they hold, 
a comparably recent and decidedly bewildering phenomenon. On the face of it, these two 
assessments of historical philosophy are incommensurable: it cannot be the case that 
moral philosophers have failed to attend to kindness and that kindness has, until recently, 
played a central role in ethical discourse. These views are brought into tension, however, 
when we ask what these authors mean by kindness. 
Phillips and Taylor make little effort to distinguish kindness from what they take 
to be a family of related phenomena including “sympathy, generosity, altruism, 
benevolence, humanity, compassion, pity, [and] empathy,” to name a few (6). They claim 
that although the precise meanings of these terms vary, they are properly understood as 
instantiations of a general disposition termed “open-heartedness” by the Victorians, and 
which we know by the name of kindness. It is entirely possible that kindness 
encompasses or is in some other way related to these other phenomena, but the strong 
claim that such is the case would require more analysis than Phillips and Taylor offer.  
Here a key justification for the present project emerges: before we can lament the 
historical and even contemporary neglect of kindness, we must attempt to articulate the 
nature of kindness in a way that would that would justify its being brought into dialogue 
with historical philosophy.     
 Conclusions 
The above reflections go far in explaining why contemporary philosophers might 
feel reluctant to pursue a critical engagement with the phenomenon of kindness. That we 
understand the reasons behind this reluctance does not, however, entail that we should 
share it. Indeed, if our characterization has been fair, then the resistance to taking up 
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kindness in a serious way is premised upon questionable assumptions; only by critically 
evaluating these assumptions can we determine whether or not kindness ought to be 
dismissed as a subject of serious philosophical reflection.  
 
Guiding Questions and Approach 
 The most promising moments in any discussion of kindness, as I suggested above, 
are those moments when we disagree about what kindness means or ought to mean. In 
my above attempt to account for philosophers’ inattentiveness to kindness I described 
what I take to be four common beliefs about the nature and meaning of kindness. These 
beliefs give rise to a collection of closely related questions which will help to guide the 
present inquiry; viz.: 
1). Kindness is trivial. Does kindness merit serious philosophical 
reflection? What does kindness have in common with phenomena (such as 
courage, benevolence and compassion) that have received sustained 
philosophical attention? 
2). Kindness is impotent in the face of cruelty. How should kindness be 
contrasted with cruelty; are cruelty and kindness diametrically opposed? 
Can kindness function at the institutional level, as cruelty can and does?  
3). Kindness implies a high degree of human vulnerability and 
interdependence. How might the scholarly neglect of kindness reflect a 
denial of luck as a threat to ethics? How might our reticence as agents to 
admit to vulnerability and interdependence prejudice us against a genuine 
appreciation of the moral worth of kindness? 
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4). There is no precedent in historical philosophy for appreciating 
kindness. Where and how do kindness and/or the morally relevant 
features of kindness appear in historical moral theory? 
 
By way of engaging these beliefs and their accompanying questions, this 
dissertation responds to what I take to be the most pressing question in ethics, namely, 
how should we, as moral theorists and as morally serious agents, best respond to the 
problem of luck?13 My project explores the hypothesis that the twofold problem of luck is 
best answered via the phenomenon of kindness. In one sense, then, my project should be 
understood as a contribution to the growing literature on moral luck. However, as the 
bulk of my inquiry has more to do with kindness than with luck, and the novelty of this 
project lies primarily in its treatment of the former, this dissertation is at heart an 
exploration of the nature and significance of kindness.  
What Is Kindness: Begging the Question? 
 Any attempt to construct a sufficient description kindness confronts the 
paradoxical truth that we must have some conception of a phenomenon in mind before 
we can properly inquire into its nature; we must know, as the ancient truism holds, what 
we are looking for before we can seek it. To whatever extent the present project claims to 
be descriptive, therefore, it might be accused of begging the question— of simply 
designating those principles, tendencies, sentiments and acts that we are keen to associate 
with kindness as facets or instantiations of the same. However, there are two key points 
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 In Chapters II and III I work to illustrate why luck and the related phenomenon of moral luck pose such 
serious threats to ethical theory and practice. As Aristotle reminds us, luck has the power to upset most any 
attempt at human flourishing. As Williams and Nagel illustrate, luck undermines the practice of moral 
judgment which underlies most systems of ethics, threatening to reduce agents to mere things and acts to 
mere events.  
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to keep in mind where such a suspicion arises. First, the fact that kindness is widely 
recognized and appreciated in our society reveals that we have some collective 
conception— albeit an imprecise one—  of what kindness is. Second, this project is 
intended to be both descriptive and normative, with the normative elements coming 
increasingly to light once the descriptive elements have been established; I do not believe 
that these elements can be fully disentangled, nor do I wish them to be. I will elaborate on 
both points briefly.  
We seem to know what we mean, more or less, when we refer to a particular act 
or person as kind. This belief could easily be verified were one to offer Joseph Stalin as 
an exemplar of kind character, or the act of slamming a door in a stranger’s face as an act 
of kindness; suffice it to say such claims would be met with resistance. The exemplars 
and examples of kindness that ground the present project are, I believe, relatively 
uncontroversial; that I use them to clarify what we mean when we refer to persons or acts 
as kind is therefore fitting. Such exemplars and examples offer, I believe, an excellent 
starting point for the descriptive aim of the present project: to discover the rich and 
complex nature of kindness. The second aspect of my approach in this dissertation is 
therefore to begin my inquiry into kindness by describing and analyzing the behaviors 
and characteristics of a fictional character who, in my view, embodies the same— 
namely, the Bishop Bienvenu from Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables. 
When we refer to an act or person as kind our speech act is both descriptive and 
normative, assuming of course that kindness has for us some kind of moral significance. 
That our claim is descriptive renders it a subject fit for scrutiny, as was mentioned above. 
There may be some disagreement regarding whether or not a particular action (say, 
16 
 
feigning gratitude when one is given a dull gift) is properly designated as “kind.” When 
we attribute kindness to an act or person, our gesture is also normative, and for two 
distinct reasons: first, because it reflects moral approbation (the claim that “x is kind” 
implies that “x is worthy of approval”), entailing that the action in question is properly 
subject to normative assessment, and second, because it contributes in some way to our 
evolving collective conception of kindness (the claim that “x is kind” also implies that “in 
my view x ought to be counted among things that are deemed kind”). When we refer to a 
person or act as kind, we are in essence revealing the types of acts and characteristics that 
we would like to see proliferate in the world. We must confess that the descriptive and 
normative aspects of our claims about kindness are difficult to disentangle. Where we 
quibble over whether or not a particular thing ought to be called kind, we are at heart 
debating what we believe kindness ought to mean.14 Whether we approach a claim about 
kindness descriptively or normatively, it is precisely when we disagree in our 
assessments that the richest questions about kindness emerge— the types of questions 
that can lead to a robust conceptualization of kindness by forcing the acknowledgment of 
underlying principles and beliefs. In my analysis of what I take to be instantiations of 
kindness, I will open up a number of questions about the fundamental ethical beliefs and 
commitments that underlie our moral assessments. To whatever extent I contribute to the 
normative construction of “kindness,” my contribution should be thought of as a starting 
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 I subscribe to the meta-ethical view termed quasi-realism by philosopher Simon Blackburn, which holds 
that ethical claims (such as “X is kind”) are not propositional (do not have a “truth-value”), but instead 
project important attitudes as though they were real properties. Quasi-realism is not reducible to emotivism 
(which holds that the claim “X is kind” is equivalent to the expression “Yay for X!”) because unlike 
emotivism quasi-realism entails that all ethical claims involve some realist component (we say that “X is 
kind” due in part to something actual about X). Quasi-realism allows us to account for the evolving nature 
of popular moral concepts such as kindness without collapsing into mere subjectivism. For a rich 
articulation of the quasi-realist perspective see Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).  
17 
 
place for further discussion. This project will succeed in no small way if it manages only 
to catalyze a sophisticated dialogue on the nature and significance of kindness.   
 
Looking to Aristotle and Kant 
 Although I draw from a number of resources in both canonical and contemporary 
philosophy in the following exploration of kindness vis-à-vis luck, the bulk of my 
analysis centers around Aristotelian and Kantian moral theory. I turn to Aristotle and 
Kant for three key reasons: first, because they are the two figures most clearly associated 
with the twofold problem of luck, second, because their moral systems appear to overlap 
in important ways with some basic assumptions about kindness, and third, because by 
placing kindness in dialogue with key concepts in Aristotelian and Kantian moral 
philosophy we may test, in a tentative way, the aforementioned belief that kindness is 
historically absent from philosophy and the resultant conviction that previous philosophy 
offers no precedent for serious reflection on kindness.  
The tension between impossibility and necessity here understood as the 
fundamental problem of ethics was construed above as a problem of luck in a twofold 
sense, one associated with the ancient conception of ethical life, the other born of the 
modern presumptions of rational autonomy and moral responsibility. We might express 
this tension via two related claims: first, our desire to flourish is at the mercy of a world 
that we did not create, and second, we are at best ambiguously responsible for many or 
most of the traits and actions for which we are morally assessed. To fully appreciate why 
and how these claims relate both to the human/ethical situation and to each other, we 
must appreciate the fundamental philosophical commitments out of which they emerge. 
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Where the history of moral theory is in essence a history that denies luck— that devotes 
much of its thought to the preservation of the ethical realm as a sacred site immune to the 
slings and arrows of fortune— two figures stand out as diametrically opposed: Aristotle 
exemplifies a willingness to acknowledge and explore the role of luck in the moral life, 
and Kant exemplifies the conventional desire to maintain moral agency as a site immune 
to luck. Aristotle, who famously admits that virtue may not be sufficient for flourishing, 
acknowledges the problem of luck in the first form expressed above.15 Kant, whose 
reversal of the naturalistic “can entails ought” conception of morality has yielded the 
contemporary problem of moral luck, is properly associated with the second claim. By 
attending to Aristotle’s conception of the ethical life we will be better able to understand 
why and how luck in the first form emerges as a philosophical problem. By attending to 
Kant’s account of moral agency we can better approach the contemporary philosophical 
problem of moral luck. I turn to Aristotle and Kant initially, then, as representatives of 
the twofold problem of luck. 
Key aspects of Aristotelian ethics appear to resonate with commonsense beliefs 
about kindness. In our effort to better articulate the nature of kindness it is therefore 
natural that we should turn to Aristotle’s ethical system. For example, although we often 
refer to discrete acts as kind, is it intuitively appealing to think of kindness as embodied 
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 Among the ancients, as Bernard Williams notes, there were several philosophical attempts to render the 
moral life immune to luck. Such attempts may be found in the doctrines of the Cynics, Epicurean, and most 
famously the Stoics. These attempts succeed in inasmuch as they render the sage immune to incidental 
luck, but as Williams rightly points out, “it was a matter of what one might call constitutive luck that one 
was a sage, or capable of becoming one: for the many and vulgar this was not (on the prevailing view) an 
available course (Williams 35). According to Martha Nussbaum, in most of his dialogues Plato also depicts 
the good life as immune to luck (Statman 3). Each of these attempts is challenged by the Aristotelian view 
of luck, which acknowledges that the preconditions for virtue are, to some extent, no up to the agent.   
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in a stable character, rather than in episodic (‘random’) acts.16 Just as one swallow does 
not make a spring, a conception of kindness divorced from some stable character feels 
rather anemic. It makes sense, then, to think with Aristotle about how kindnesss might be 
conceptualized as a hexis, or stable mode of comportment. Further, because kindness 
appears to involve a pronounced affective element (indeed, that kindness involves the 
sentiments may in part explain its dismissal by most modern philosophers, who decidedly 
prefer “principled” or rational virtues over the overtly sentimental), it is reasonable to 
place it in dialogue with Aristotelian moral virtues, or those excellences that have to do 
with “feeling and action” (NE 1106b 19).  
Kant is hardly the first thinker to come to mind when contemplating kindness, and 
the choice to turn to his theory in the present inquiry might naturally be met with greater 
resistance than would the choice to turn to Aristotle’s.  But we needn’t wax liberal in our 
interpretations of Kant to suggest that he has important insights to contribute to our 
analysis. A close examination of Kant’s account of friendship, for example, reveals that 
the attitudes and commitments that characterize moral friendship (moral friendship being, 
by Kant’s account, essential to personal development and a key component of the moral 
life) are, as we shall see, almost indistinguishable from those which characterize 
kindness. That he places a high premium on what is here termed kindness will become 
even clearer when we attend to his complex views about truth-telling and the sharing of 
moral judgments.   
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 This is not to say that indifferent or even cruel agents cannot do a kind thing now and then, nor to suggest 
that discrete acts have nothing to contribute to the present project. I will discuss the nature of episodic 
“kindness” when I engage Phillip Hallie’s discussion of the so-called kindness of Frederick Douglas’s slave 
master.  
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It was suggested above that one reason for the contemporary neglect of kindness 
might be the presumed lack of historical precedent. In reflecting on Aristotelian and 
Kantian philosophy, I model a way to test this assumption. An examination of canonical 
moral theory in the light of a more reflective conceptualization of kindness may reveal 
the presence of kindness where least expected, including, for example, in Kantian moral 
theory. Kindness may be encompassed in one or more analogous phenomenon, including, 
for example, generosity or benevolence— hidden, so to speak, in plain sight. Even if an 
independent phenomenon that we would term kindness is missing from the ethical 
vocabulary (as it appears to be, for example, with the Greeks),17 the fundamental moral 
commitments which underlie it may not be; in such cases, an argument may be made for 
the theoretical commensurability of kindness with the given vision of ethics (we might, 
for example, justify the characterization of kindness as a moral virtue in the Aristotelian 
sense). If, however, historical philosophy fails to allow for an adequate articulation of 
kindness, then in showing the profound moral significance of this phenomenon we at 
least discover a meaningful limit to the breadth of that philosophy. If, for example, 
Aristotle’s conception of virtue is found to preclude a robust conceptualization of 
kindness, then we discover in the Aristotelian account a potentially reproachable limit.  
Although in the present project kindness is placed in dialogue with Aristotelian 
and Kantian moral theory primarily in order to expand our understanding of the former, 
reflexively kindness may shed light on the content and limits of historical moral 
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 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle characterizes kindness (kharis) not as a virtue, but rather as an emotion, 
understood as “helpfulness towards someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of 
the helper himself, but for that of the person helped” (Book 2, Ch. 7; 1385a). Although this understanding 
of kindness has something in common with the characterization I offer, it remains much too narrow. I am 
reticent to claim that kindness cannot be conceptualized as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense, but I agree 
with David Konstan that Aristotle did not so conceptualize it; Aristotle simply does not offer an account of 
kindness qua active condition (hexis).  
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philosophy in the process. The historical/comparative element of the present project, 
which is by no means exhaustive, is intended in part to inspire further reflection on where 
and how kindness appears within or is excluded from extant moral theory, which may in 
turn both justify and enable the pursuit of more robust contemporary theorizations of 
kindness and richer criticisms of canonical moral theory.   
Chapter Summaries 
 Above I claimed that the problem of luck poses the greatest challenge both to 
individual human flourishing and to theoretical ethics. In Chapters II and III I clarify the 
twofold problem of luck in greater detail. I begin with brief characterizations of the 
Aristotelian conception of ethics and the Kantian account of morality. I then indicate 
where and how luck emerges to confront both systems, drawing from contemporary 
literature on moral luck. I briefly assess several popular solutions to moral luck, 
concluding that each ultimately fails. I tentatively offer kindness as a novel means of 
responding to the twofold problem of luck, but argue that a richer articulation of kindness 
is first required.       
 In Chapters IV through VI I work to construct a rich conceptualization of 
kindness. Because kindness is often conflated with related phenomena, in Chapter IV I 
bring kindness into relief via comparison with phenomena that have received more 
sustained philosophical treatment, including politeness, charity, benevolence, and 
compassion. To ground my analysis I turn to several read and fictional examples, with a 
special emphasis on the actions and character of Bishop Bienvenu, from Victor Hugo’s 
Les Miserables, who serves as the exemplar of kindness.  
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In Chapter IV I establish, in a preliminary way, the behaviors and commitments 
that kindness involves. I argue that although kindness encompasses key elements of 
generosity, compassion, politeness and charity, it cannot be reduced to any analogous 
phenomenon. I end by tentatively defining kindness as a stable mode of comportment that 
involves a willingness to attend to others on their own terms and a readiness to help and 
the cheer, even at the risk of offending.  
Having established that kindness is plausibly understood as a stable mode of 
comportment or hexis, in Chapter V I ask whether or not it can be conceived as a moral 
virtue in the Aristotelian sense.18 In order to pursue the question properly, I begin with an 
articulation of the Aristotelian vision of character, with an emphasis on the moral virtues 
and how they are acquired. I offer Aristotle’s account of courage as a useful model for 
understanding the nature of moral virtue in general. I then turn to Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
analysis of courage in order to highlight the way in which courage presupposes care and 
concern for the polis. I then explore the senses in which kindness appears to be analogous 
to courage, concluding that kindness does not foreclose the exercise of courage, but 
instead demands it.19 
In the latter half of Chapter V I ask whether or to what extent the Aristotelian 
virtues of generosity, friendliness and gentleness, and the emotions of pity and kharis can 
capture the significant features of kindness as I have described them. In relation to 
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 That is, as a hexis having to do with feeling or desire, which admits of a deficient and an excess 
condition. 
 
19
 Phillips and Taylor offer an insight relevant to the discussion of courage in relation to kindness. Phillips 
and Taylor approach kindness from the perspective of psychoanalysis, yet their conclusion that “one’s 
capacity or instinct for kindness can be actively and unconsciously sabotaged by that part of oneself that 
fears the intimacies it fosters,” speaks to the need for courage in the kind agent. Kindness involves a certain 
risk- a risk of offending, of creating awkwardness, or (to use Kantian language) of erring too far on the side 
of love- and it is perhaps for this reason that so few people are consistently kind. 
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generosity, I argue that there is a way of giving which is kind, but that kindness is not 
reducible to generosity in the Aristotelian sense. I here emphasize the excessive nature of 
kindness: the kind agent might appear excessive in certain respects from the Aristotelian 
perspective. In relation to friendliness, I argue that the kind person may or may not 
qualify as friendly in the Aristotelian sense. I contend, with Hamrick, that people who do 
not immediately strike us as kind may in fact be genuinely kind. In so doing, I mean to 
reiterate that kindness is not reducible to its typical caricature.  Gesturing toward Chapter 
VI, I suggest that the attitude of kindness is closer to respect than to friendliness.  In 
relation to gentleness, I argue that the kind agent is not necessarily one who is slow to 
anger, but rather one who angers readily at those things which are antithetical to 
kindness, including and especially cruelty.  I hold that a sense of justice is already at 
work in the kind agent, and that righteous anger is in essence the foil of kindness. In the 
process of engaging Aristotle’s ethical thought I gain several key insights which enrich 
the emerging conception of kindness: (1) kindness requires moral courage, (2) kindness 
involves care and concern for the polis, (3) kindness is often excessive, (4) kindness 
involves key judgments about agency and luck. 
In Chapter VI I complete my conceptualization of kindness by turning to Kant’s 
analyses of virtue, truthfulness and friendship. I begin by examining Kant’s prima facie 
attitude toward kindness, emphasizing the conventional reading of Kant which holds that 
his theory privileges principles over virtues, rationality over emotion, and respect over 
love. I then turn to the Kantian distinction between the “pretty” or feminine virtues, and 
the “noble” or masculine virtues, noting that he counts kindness among the former.20 
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 I speak only briefly to the role of gender in Kant’s account of virtue. In his Observations on the Feeling 
of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant associates sublime (noble) virtues with men, and beautiful (pretty) 
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Next I analyze Kant’s account of moral friendship, paying special attention to the theme 
of honesty between friends. I maintain that kindness is quite similar to Kantian moral 
friendship, but differs in two key respects: first, kindness is directed towards others 
generally, and second, whereas in moral friendship Kant wants us to err on the side of 
respect, I argue that in kindness it is better that we err on the side of love.21 I end by 
reassessing Kant’s analysis of kindness (counted by him among the “pretty” or non-
principled virtues) in the light of his descriptions of friendship and truthfulness, arguing 
that the tension between love and respect, principles and feelings, which characterizes 
moral friendship, also characterizes kindness. I conclude that kindness can be 
conceptualized as a Kantian noble virtue, or a virtue which is founded upon key ethical 
principles. I end Chapter VI by exploring the limitations of conceiving of kindness in this 
way. 
In Chapter VII I bring a now robust conceptualization of kindness into dialogue 
with the twofold problem of luck. Mindful of Aristotle’s attentiveness to the political as a 
ground for the ethical, I turn to Phillip Hallie’s contention that kindness cannot function 
at the level of institutions. Painting with a broad brush I imagine how the basic 
commitments that underlie kindness as a virtue might find expression in political 
institutions. Via an analysis of a handful of “kind” political institutions, I then argue that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
virtue with women. The virtues appropriate to women are essentially natural virtues, having more to do 
with sentiment than with principles. Because they rest on principles, masculine or noble virtues have for 
Kant a greater moral worth. Even so, as Kant suggests in The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue and in 
several of his lectures on ethics, sentimental virtues, too, have their place in the moral life.   
 
21
 With this claim in mind, I return briefly to my earlier suggestion that kindness entails vulnerability, and 
argue that the vulnerable state of the kind agent stems from a willingness to overstep the boundaries 
between self and other which Kant wishes us to maintain for the sake of our dignity.   
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kindness can and does appear in institutional/political praxes.22  Because kind institutions 
ameliorate those forces which, from the perspective of agency, yield bad luck, 
institutional kindness goes far in addressing the first facet of the problem of luck. With 
the insights of Chapter VI in mind, I return in the latter half of my concluding chapter to 
the problem of moral luck. I here emphasize the role of kindness in the formulation of 
moral judgments, characterizing kindness as an approach to moral judgment that, like 
friendship, involves a tension between love and respect and is aimed at mutual moral 
amelioration. I ultimately conclude that kindness allows agents to maintain moral 
seriousness while acknowledging that the world is largely beyond their control; it is in 
and through the kindness of others that the moral life is preserved, to whatever extent 
possible, as a site secure from the assaults of luck.    
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 Note to readers: I initially planned to ground this analysis in the phenomenon of public education, but am 
now considering other examples, including the Marshall Plan and a handful of recent US trade/foreign aid 
decisions. The appeal of the education example is that it relates in key ways to Aristotelian and Kantian 
claims about the value of moral education, but the appeal to globally relevant phenomena might open up 
some interesting avenues for future research. I am open to suggestions.  
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CHAPTER II  
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS AND THE CHALLENGE OF LUCK 
Introduction: Ancient Ethics and Modern Morality 
 “There is a venerable tradition,” write Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, 
“according to which ancient ethical thought and modern ethical thought are sharply 
opposed” (1). As G.E.M. Anscombe writes, “Anyone who has read Aristotle’s ethics and 
has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts 
between them” (1). A handful of especially influential contemporary reflections on the 
history of ethical philosophy, including those of Anscombe1 and Alasdair Macintyre,2 
have contributed to the now popular division between ancient and modern approaches to 
moral agency. According to those who accept this division, ancient ethics and modern 
morality are premised upon radically different beliefs about the human situation, and are 
thus largely if not wholly incompatible. Whether or not we accept this strong conclusion, 
it must be acknowledged that the problem of luck is expressed in substantially different 
ways within ancient and modern ethical theories. I will here briefly outline some key 
differences between ancient ethics and modern morality, as epitomized by the ethical 
systems of Aristotle and Kant, in order to better illustrate some differences between 
Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions of luck as they relate to moral agency.  
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 See especially Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124. Jan 1958, pp. 1-
19).   
 
2
 See especially MacIntyre’s After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).   
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Ancient Ethics: Telos and Eudaimonia 
 Ancient ethical systems are by and large teleological and eudaimonist in nature, 
and if we are to believe Anscobme and MacIntyre, it is precisely these characteristics that 
render them incompatible with modern morality.3 The ancient conception of ethics has 
much to do with the belief that every being has a function or end (telos), and that each 
being is distinguished most importantly from others by the characteristics which allow it 
to attain its end. The virtues or excellences of a particular type of being are just those 
capacities the exercise of which allow it to function well and so to best attain this end. 
For the ancients, beliefs about teleology are bound up in a key way with beliefs about the 
good (to agathon); the human good, for example, has everything to do with the human 
telos. As MacIntyre notes of Aristotle’s initial thoughts in the Nicomachean Ethics, the 
association of telos and good presupposes “that what G.E. Moore was to call the 
‘natuaralistic fallacy’ is not a fallacy at all and that statements about what is good— and 
what is just or courageous or excellent in other ways— are just kinds of factual 
statements” (MacIntyre 148).  
To say that ancient ethical systems are eudaimonist is to claim that they are 
grounded in important ways in a conception of the human good. The ethics of Aristotle 
certainly exemplifies this tendency. Aristotle begins his ethical enquiry with a 
consideration of the good, seeking not particular or contributory goods, but rather the 
ultimate good under which all others are subsumed. This ultimate good he terms 
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 John Cooper writes, “All the major systems of moral philosophy in antiquity, including that of the early 
Stoics, are eudaemonist in their structure.” Cooper argues that the Stoics “follow Aristotle” when they 
speak of a human telos, and when they further associate that telos with eudaimonia. (see Cooper, John M, 
“Eudaimonism, the Appeal to nature, and ‘Moral Duty’ in Stoicism,” in Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: 
Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Edited by Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).   
 
28 
 
eudaimonia, or living well.4 To discern what such a state would entail for the human 
being, Aristotle considers the appropriate function or being-at-work (ergon) of the human 
being, set apart as he is from other souled (empsychois) or living beings.  
By Aristotle’s account, the soul finds expression in three different ways, 
corresponding to the three types of souled beings. Plants, which grow but do not move (in 
the sense of locomotion) possess a purely nutritive soul, and are therefore called simply 
alive, or vegetative. Non-human animals possess, in addition to the nutritive capacity, an 
appetitive soul (or part of the soul), which governs desire. The animal (zöe) also 
possesses self-movement (kinesis) and the faculty of perception (aisthesis), which 
enables it to pursue its ends.  In the human being (zoon logon echon) there is additionally 
present a part of the soul in which logos “dwells,” the possession of which renders the 
human soul uniquely “conversant.” The logos-possessing or rational soul of the human 
being “speaks” to the appetitive soul, and thus helps to govern human choice and action 
in a way that is conducive to living well. 
When we speak of the soul as “having” reason, we refer to two different types of 
“having;” the part of the soul in which logos dwells has reason “in the governing sense,” 
while the appetitive soul “has” reason in that it can listen to and obey the dictates of 
reason: Aristotle writes, “In the same way too we call listening to one’s father or friends 
‘being rational,’ though not of course in the way mathematicians mean that” (NE 102b 
29-30). The appetitive soul, though not itself “rational,” possesses logos inasmuch as it 
can be persuaded by reason. Virtue, says Aristotle, is divided in a similar way: “for we 
speak of virtues as pertaining either to thinking or to character, and speak of wisdom, 
                                                           
4
 Eudaimonia, though often translated as “happiness,” and admittedly bound up in important ways with 
happiness in the ordinary sense, is not in Aristotle’s view reducible to a psychological state, as we will see.   
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astuteness, and practical judgment as intellectual virtues, and generosity and temperance 
as virtues of character” (NE 1103a 3-6). The intellectual virtues are by and large the 
product of education, while the virtues of character (or moral virtues) arise primarily via 
praxis.     
 Since the human soul alone possesses logos in the twofold sense described above, 
and since the proper being-at-work of the human being must be tied to that which sets 
him apart, then the proper function of man must be a being-at-work that involves this 
special kind of logos. And since “each thing is accomplished well as a result of the virtue 
appropriate to it,” then “the human good comes to be disclosed as a being-at-work of the 
soul in accordance with virtue, and if the virtues are more than one, in accordance with 
the best and most complete virtue,” over the whole of a lifetime (NE 1097b 16-19).5 
 As Engstrom and Whiting note, “in spite of their emphasis on the human end and 
its characteristic human virtues, the ancients were sensitive to the fact that this end must 
be sought and these virtues exercised in different ways in different circumstances” (1). 
Ethics is not and cannot be an exact science, and living well cannot be reduced to the 
adherence to some set of abstract universal principles. Instead, “the end determines what 
sort of action is appropriate given the agent’s particular circumstances,” such that right 
action within a given situation is a matter of “the virtuous agent’s perception of what the 
circumstances require” (1). Ancient ethics is therefore particularist, as well as 
teleological and eudemonist.  
                                                           
5
 In the progression of the Nicomachean Ethics this best or most complete kind of virtue is increasingly 
identified with the intellectual virtues, and with sophia (a combination of episteme and nous; see 1141a) in 
particular. Hence the conventional interpretation of the Ethics holds that the text ends with the paradoxical 
conclusion that ethical comportment or praxis (the exercise of the moral virtues and of phronesis) 
culminates in a non-praxical or theoretical life, namely the life of philosophical contemplation. This 
interpretation of Aristotle is not without its critics: see footnote 23, below.    
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 Ethical praxis emerges within, by way of, and at least to some extent for the sake 
of a community; for Aristotle, it would be senseless to envision the ethical life apart from 
the political community (polis): 
[T]he complete good seems to be self-sufficient. And by the self-sufficient 
we mean not what suffices for oneself alone, living one’s life as a hermit, 
but also with parents and children and a wife, and friends and fellow 
citizens generally, since a human being is by nature meant for a city.” (NE 
1197b 9-10)   
 
As Aristotle notes in the Politics, although the city comes into being “for the sake of 
mere life,” it also secures the conditions for the good life.6 As Joe Sachs writes, “since 
the city aims at the human good […] a necessary part of the political study is ethics, the 
inquiry about human character and happiness, while the rest of its study and practice have 
to do with means to that end” (209). For Aristotle, ethics and politics are therefore 
inextricably intertwined.7  
   
Modern Morality: Rationality and Universalism 
Anscombe and MacIntyre account for what they take to be the paradigmatic 
differences between modern morality and ancient ethics via a shared conception of the 
                                                           
6
 See Politics 1275b 18-21 and 1252b 29-30. 
 
7
 Paradoxically, Aristotle concludes that in order to become virtuous, one must already be good, inasmuch 
as one must be receptive to logoi about virtue. He writes: “it is necessary for the soul of the listener to have 
been worked on beforehand (1179b 33). As we will see, this receptivity of the soul is enabled via just social 
and political institutions, “Hence it is necessary to arrange for rearing and exercise by laws” (1179b 33). It 
is thus no coincidence that Nicomachean Ethics culminates in a discussion of the need for politics. As 
Sachs notes, the final paragraph of the ethics is a summary of the Politics, hence Aristotle’s ethical project 
might be said to end where his political project begins (200, f. 304).  
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history of ethical philosophy in general and of the emergence of Kantian morality in 
particular. The story might be summed up as follows. 
Christianity arose within the rabbinical tradition and inherited the “law 
conception” of ethics of the latter. The mandates of Christian morality, which comprise a 
“divine positive law,” are absolute and universal, grounded as they are in the divine will. 
Standing between ancient ethics and modern morality, Christian ethics is the mechanism 
via which the former has been rendered incompatible with the latter, and for two distinct 
reasons. First, via the centuries-long intellectual dominance of Christian ethics, key 
concepts in ancient thought were so radically transformed as to be unrecognizable.8 
Second, the particularism that characterized so much of ancient ethics was rejected in 
favor of Judeo-Christian absolutism. During the centuries preceding the rise of modern 
moral theory, this absolutism became increasingly entrenched.  
When constructing their ethical theories early modern moralists “took as their 
starting point the moral code they inherited from medieval Christianity, which consisted 
roughly in a system of rules or commands grounded in divine law” (Engstrom and 
Whiting 1). But with the rise of modern science and the proliferation of theological 
disputes originating during the Reformation, the divine origin of universal moral 
principles was increasingly called into question. Seeking a new way to ground morality, 
some thinkers looked to the sentiments, but “the legalistic character of the code 
encouraged most Enlightenment moralists to seek a foundation for our duties in universal 
laws of nature ascertainable by natural reason” (Engstrom and Whiting 1-2). The Kantian 
                                                           
8
 As Anscombe writes, for example, via Christianity “The Greek word ‘hamartanein’ […] acquired the 
sense ‘sin,’ from having meant mistake, ‘missing the mark,’ ‘going wrong.’ The Latin peccatum which 
roughly corresponded to hamartema was even apter for the sense ‘sin,’ because it was already associated 
with ‘culpa’- guilt- a juridical notion.” (5).  
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system which has come to emblemize Enlightenment moral theory therefore retains the 
principled absolutism of Christian ethics but grounds this absolutism in human rational 
understanding instead of in the divine will. 
The ultimate end of all ethical comportment, on the ancient view, is eudaimonia. 
For Kant, the end of morality is not and cannot be happiness. Kant reaches this 
conclusion as follows. The will of a moral agent may be determined in relation to desired 
consequences or by rationality alone via pure practical reason.9 The maxims or principles 
that determine the will may therefore be of two kinds: hypothetical (involving a desired 
outcome) and categorical (unrelated to outcome). Whereas practical principles (which 
are empirically derived and “presuppose an object”) arise out of desired consequences, 
laws are derived via rationality alone, and bind the will which immediately recognizes 
them as binding.10 “Laws,” says Kant, “must completely determine the will as will, even 
before I ask whether I am capable of achieving a desired effect” (CPR 18). Laws must 
therefore be categorical, and must “refer only to the will” (CPR 19). One might here 
object on the ground that some universal human desire such as the desire for happiness 
might serve equally well as the basis for moral law. Supposing such a desire could be 
shown to be universal, and the means of obtaining it could be equally established, Kant 
would yet reply: “Even then [we] could not set up the principle of self-love as a practical 
                                                           
9
 The two may be mixed in the heterogenous will: “Subordinate to reason as the higher faculty of desire is 
the pathologically determinable faculty of desire, the latter being really and in kind different from the 
former, so that even the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength and superiority of reason, 
just as taking anything empirical as the condition of a mathematical demonstration would degrade and 
destroy its force and value” (Grounding 24).   
 
10
 Due to their very nature: the rational agent recognizes that a law must be universal in order to be binding. 
Kant writes, “If a rational being can think of his maxims as practical universal law, he can do so only by 
considering them as principles which contain the determining grounds of the will because of their form and 
not because of their matter” (Grounding 26, emphasis mine).  
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law, for the unanimity itself would be merely contingent. The determining ground would 
still be only subjectively valid and empirical, and it would not have the necessity which is 
conceived in every law” (CPR 25).  
Although agents can immediately recognize that law is by its nature universally 
binding, and thus conceive of a categorical imperative, in Kant’s view the principle of 
self-love entails that moral laws may or may not motivate agents to abide by categorical 
imperatives. Here two types of failure are possible: first, agents may choose to abide by 
convenient hypothetical imperatives instead of adhering to the moral law, and second, 
they may choose to act in accordance with the moral law but do so only because they 
expect to benefit from such behavior. Kant therefore makes an important distinction 
between acting merely in accordance with duty and acting from duty, or “from respect for 
the law” (CPR 84). An agent’s action has moral worth, Kant argues, only when it is both 
in accordance with the moral law and motivated by respect for the same. Kant’s 
assumption— and this point is key— is that agency entails autonomy, both literally and 
figuratively. Every moral agent, by virtue of his rationality, is a legislator of the moral 
law, and every moral agent may and must choose whether to act from inclination or from 
duty.11 
Although Kant abandons the teleological ground of ethics which characterizes 
ancient and especially Aristotelian ethics, it is reasonable to speak of an ultimate end of 
                                                           
11
 To act from duty is, says Kant, to act according to one’s own will inasmuch as one is a legislator of the 
moral law. Kant therefore writes, “I want […] to call my principle the principle of the autonomy of the will, 
in contrast with every other principle, which I accordingly count under heteronomy” (Grounding 39). The 
importance of autonomy in Kantian moral philosophy cannot be overstated; as James Ellington writes, 
“Kant sums up his progress in the first two sections of the Grounding by saying that the principle of 
autonomy is the sole principle of morals and that this has been shown by merely analyzing the concepts of 
morality” (Grounding viii). The centrality of autonomy in Kantian moral theory is at the root of the 
problem of moral luck, as will been seen.   
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morality within the Kantian vision. Here it is useful to consider Kant’s kingdom of ends 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative.12 Kant writes,  
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as 
legislating universal law by all his will’s maxims, so that he may judge 
himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to another very 
fruitful concept, which depends on the aforementioned one, viz., that of a 
kingdom of ends. (Grounding 39) 
By “kingdom,” Kant intends “a systematic union of different rational beings through 
common laws,” in which each member is both sovereign (as legislator of the moral law) 
and subject. The telos of morality is for Kant just this kingdom: an ideal harmonious 
unity of the plurality of rational beings under common laws.13    
 
        Aristotle’s Ethics and the Challenge of Luck 
 The above sketches of Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality are not intended to 
reify the view that ancient and modern conceptions of moral agency are radically 
incommensurable. On my view the incompatibility of ancient and modern moral 
systems— and of Aristotelian and Kantian ethics in particular— is and ought to remain 
                                                           
12
 Of the three formulations Kant writes, “The aforementioned three ways of representing the principle of 
morality are at bottom only so many formulations of the very same law” (Grounding 41). Yet there is a 
“subjectively” practical difference between them which brings the idea of a Categorical Imperative “closer 
to intuition.” Kant explains: “There is a progression here through the categories of unity of the form of the 
will (its universality), the plurality of its matter (its objects, i.e., its ends), and the totality or completeness 
of its system of ends” (42).   
 
13
 One increasingly popular approach to resuscitating Kant’s moral theory involves emphasizing its social 
or communal aspects. See, for example Thomas E. Hill’s Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral 
Theory. (Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 1992), and Christine M. Korsgarrd’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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an open question. Instead, my hope is that by understanding some of Aristotle and Kant’s 
key philosophical commitments it will be easier to discern where and how luck emerges 
as a challenge within their respective descriptions of the moral life, and in turn how 
kindness might respond to these challenges. We may begin with Aristotle’s account.  
 The ancient Greek word which most closely resembles “luck,” tychē is quite 
ambiguous, meaning both “chance” and “fortune.”14 Aristotle draws a useful distinction 
between tychē and automaton (chance) in the Physics, Book II:  
They differ because chance is more extensive, for everything from fortune 
is from chance, but not everything from it is from fortune. For fortune and 
what comes from fortune are present to beings to whom being fortunate, 
or generally, action, might belong. (197a35-197b3)15 
 
To favor the language of “fortune” or “luck” over the language of “chance” is both to 
emphasize that in the realm of ethics tychē is bound up not just with what happens but 
with what happens to human beings, which is to say in relation to the human good and 
human aims, and to acknowledge that it is experienced subjectively in relation to 
particular desires, and so perceived by agents as more or less favorable to them given 
                                                           
14
 Tychē is also the name of the Greek goddess who came to be associated with the Roman Fortuna. In 
Greek art Tychē is usually depicted with symbols of prosperity, including, often, the infant Plontos 
(wealth). The shape of her crown suggests city walls, as the fortune of the polis was dependent upon her 
grace. She is occasionally shown blindfolded, indicating the capriciousness of chance (in Roman art, 
Fortuna is usually so depicted). 
 
15
 In Physics Book II Aristotle explores and partially rejects the ancient convention that tychē ought to be 
counted among the causes. To be more precise, Aristotle does not count tychē as “the cause simply” of 
anything that comes about, though “There are things that come about from tychē: they come about 
incidentally, and tychē is an incidental cause.” Both chance [automaton] and tychē are, says Aristotle, 
“among those things […] which could come about for the sake of something” (197a 10, 35). 
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their aims. 16  Thus for our purposes we may understand tychē not as simply that which 
happens by chance, but instead, as Martha Nussbaum does, as that which befalls an 
agent: “What happens to a person by luck will be just what does not happen through his 
or her own agency, what just happens to him, as opposed to what he does or makes” 
(Statman 76).  
 Eudaimonia: Living Well and Faring Well 
 To better understand the role of luck in Aristotle’s ethical account, it is useful to 
dwell a moment on the distinction between what one does and what simply befalls one, or 
more precisely, between living well and faring well. We might ask, with Aristotle, 
whether or to what extent eudaimonic life requires agents to live well or act virtuously, 
and whether or to what extent it requires that agents fare well or have good luck. We 
might further wonder about how living well and faring well intertwine: supposing that 
virtue is sufficient for eudaimonia as the Stoics insist, is it possible to live well without 
faring well, and thus to enjoy the eudaimonic life despite misfortune? Aristotle explores 
these questions at some length in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.    
The power of faring well to enable the eudaimonic life is, or at least appears to be, 
quite profound; many of the key components of a happy life may fail to materialize 
despite agents’ wishes and efforts. These components include friends, wealth, power, 
ancestry, children and attractiveness; Aristotle writes: 
                                                           
16
 A sign of this is the fact that agents are deemed more or less fortunate in relation to their chosen 
activities; Aristotle writes: “no inanimate thing nor any animal or small child can do anything as a result of 
fortune, because they do not have the power to choose in advance” (Physics II 197b 7-10). That which 
befalls a stone or a non-human animal happens by chance, that which befalls a human being happens “as a 
result of fortune” (i.b.i.d.).  
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For many things are done, as if by instruments, by means of friends and 
wealth and political power, and those who lack certain things, such as 
good ancestry, good children, and good looks, disfigure their blessedness; 
for someone who is completely ugly in appearance, or of bad descent, or 
solitary and childless is not very apt to be happy, and is still less so 
perhaps if he were to have utterly corrupt children and friends, or good 
ones who had died. (NE 1099b 1-5)  
So profound is the influence of luck on agents’ happiness that many simply 
equate the two, conceiving of eudaimonia as a gift from the gods. There is thus an 
impasse, says Aristotle, “about whether happiness comes by learning or habit or training 
of some other kind, or else comes to one’s side by some divine lot” (NE 1099b 9-10).17 
Here he leaves open the possibility that although happiness comes about by training and 
praxis, training and praxis themselves may involve external influences such that the 
moral life is subject to luck in more subtle ways; perhaps one must fare well in order to 
live well.  
Aristotle is decidedly unsettled, as we should be, by the extreme suggestion that 
eudaimonia comes about merely and purely by luck. He stands ready to reject this view if 
it can be shown that eudaimonia may also arise via “learning and taking pains:” 
And if it is better to be in this way, rather than for one to be happy by 
chance, it is reasonable that this is the way it stands, if indeed things in 
accordance with nature occur naturally in the most beautiful possible way 
                                                           
17
 Aristotle comments, “now if there is anything else that is a gift of the gods to human beings, it is 
reasonable that happiness too should be god-given (NE 1099b 11-12). 
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[…] for what is most beautiful to be left to chance would be too 
discordant. (NE 1099b 24-25)18 
 There is something comforting about the latter possibility, as it would seem to 
insulate (at least to some extent) the best kind of life from luck. Although Aristotle is 
more drawn to this view than to the commonplace suspicion that eudaimonia is merely 
the result of chance, he must qualify the former thesis in important ways, lest he maintain 
a paradox, since: “those who claim that someone who is being tortured, or someone who 
falls into great misfortunes, is happy if he is a good person are either intentionally or 
unintentionally talking nonsense. 
 The best kind of life, says Aristotle, is a life in which virtue and happiness grow 
together, since “the life [virtuous] people lead has no additional need of pleasure as a sort 
of appendage, but has its pleasure in itself” (NE 1099a 16-17).19 The happiness born of a 
lifetime of living well and doing well is quite stable, as befits the stability of the moral 
character from which it results. Such happiness may not render the virtuous agent 
immune to misfortune, but does serve as a kind of fortification against bad luck:  
So what is sought will belong to the happy person, who will be happy 
throughout life, for such a person will always, or most of all people, be 
acting and contemplating the things that go along with virtue, and will 
bear what fortune brings most beautifully. (NE 1100b 18-20) 
                                                           
18
 Here Aristotelian teleology comes to the fore; Aristotle’s suggestion that we prefer happiness which 
comes about through agents’ effort to that which arises by luck relies on a belief that nature brings 
“natural” things about in the most beautiful way.  
 
19
 Of those who “act rightly,” Aristotle says: “And the life they lead is pleasant in itself. For feeling 
pleasure is one of the things that belongs to the soul, and to each person, that to which he is said to be 
passionately devoted is pleasant… Acts of justice are pleasant to one who is passionately devoted to justice 
and generally things in accord with virtue to one who is devoted to virtue” (NE 1099a 7-12).  
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Even so, Aristotle’s holistic conception of the eudaimonic life entails that bad luck may 
prevent the agent who is otherwise virtuous from living a truly happy life, or, after the 
fact, from properly being described as so having lived, since “it is possible for the most 
thriving person to fall into great misfortunes in old age, just as the story is told of Priam 
in the epics about Troy; no one calls happy the one who suffers such misfortunes and dies 
in misery” (NE 1100a 9-10). Yet the virtuous agent is more capable than those who lack 
virtue of enduing both “the small bits” of bad fortune and great misfortunes, including 
those which prevent the active exercise of virtue.20  Enduring grievous misfortune with 
equanimity and without turning to vice is for Aristotle a sign of stable virtue, and a thing 
quite worthy of praise:  
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances something beautiful shines 
through when one bears many great misfortunes calmly, not through 
insensitivity, but through good breeding and greatness of soul. If, as we 
said, it is ways of being at work that govern life, no one who is among the 
blessed could become miserable, since such a one will never do base or 
hateful things; for we suppose one who is truly good and sensible will bear 
all fortunes gracefully and will always act in the most beautiful way the 
circumstance permit, just as a good general will make best use for war of 
the terrain that is at hand. (NE 1100b 30-1101a 3) 
                                                           
20
 The role of praxis is key in Aristotle’s conception of moral virtue. He distinguishes between mere 
possession of an excellence and possession which is fulfilled in use: “But presumably it makes no small 
difference whether one supposes the highest good to consist in possession or in use, that is, in an actively 
maintained condition or in a way of being at work […] Just as, with those at the Olympic games, it is not 
the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete” (NE 1098b 30-1099a 6). The 
one who possesses virtue but is unable to exercise it is virtuous only in some qualified sense. 
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The genuinely virtuous agent is then insusceptible to the worst kind of life, or that life 
which involves doing base and vicious things. But even this praiseworthy agent has need 
of additional goods if she is to be properly called happy. Thus Aristotle’s asks: 
What is to prevent us calling happy the person who is at work in 
accordance with complete virtue and supplied with sufficient stock of 
external goods, not for any chance amount of time but for a complete life 
[…] when he shall have both lived in that way and died in a proportionate 
way? (NE 1101a 14-15) 
 Aristotle’s views on the interplay between luck and eudaimonia are thus mixed; 
he rejects the extreme view that eudaimonic life comes about merely by chance while 
acknowledging the need for certain externals. In order to live the best kind of life, the 
agent must have a consistently sufficient stock of external goods and must exercise 
complete virtue over the whole of her lifetime. Our judgments regarding an agent’s 
happiness must remain tentative until after her passing, since radical reversals of fortune 
may impact the manner of her death, where for Aristotle one must die well in order to be 
judged to have lived a truly happy life. We may say, then, that for Aristotle one must fare 
well (to some extent and in specific respects) in order to live the best kind of life; to state 
it simply, Aristotle “denies that virtue is sufficient for flourishing” (Tessman 4).  
 
 Tychē and Virtue 
 Laying aside the question of what evidence substantiates the judgment, 
after the fact, that an agent was truly happy, we may now ask to what extent and 
in what specific ways the formation and sustenance of virtue itself (a key 
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component of the eudaimonic life) is subject to forces beyond agents’ control. In 
what ways, that is, must an agent fare well in order to become and remain 
virtuous?21 Let us consider Aristotle’s refined view of luck as it relates to the 
formation of character.  
 In the Nicomachean Ethics tychē emerges as a challenge to the acquisition 
and exercise of virtue in a number of ways; I will here describe three, each related 
to a key component of Aristotelian ethical theory. First, because virtues arise 
within a community and largely as the result of a proper education, complete 
virtue requires a social context that the agent cannot create for herself. Second, 
and in relation to the above point, where an agent lacks certain opportunities 
and/or resources, she may fail to acquire and/or sustain the moral virtues, which 
arise via praxis and often require the possession of certain external goods. Third, 
and here the problem posed by tyche is most easily conceptualized as an 
instantiation of moral luck, an agent may be cast into situations in which she must 
perform intrinsically regrettable or blameworthy actions.  
Social Context and the Acquisition of Virtue 
 Virtue, says Aristotle, is of two kinds, “one pertaining to thinking and the other to 
character” (1103a 10). Intellectual virtue, says Aristotle, “[is] both in its coming to be and 
in its growth, a result of teaching,” whereas virtue of character or moral virtue “comes 
                                                           
21
 For the modern reader who readily distinguishes between happiness and moral worth, placing a higher 
premium on the latter, this question is most pressing. We may grant that subjective happiness is not entirely 
within our control, yet wish to maintain (and this seems to some extent to be the basis of modern ethical 
theory) that what matters most in life— our goodness or character— is within our control. It is important to 
recall, however, that for Aristotle goodness and happiness are intrinsically connected, and both are crucial 
to the best kind of human life. Much is lost if we are so prejudiced by our modern views that we fault 
Aristotle for simply failing to distinguish between goodness and happiness.     
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into being by habit.” (NE 1103a 16-17).22 Setting aside for the moment the intertwining 
of moral and intellectual virtue, we may turn to the social context within which both 
kinds of virtue arise. It may already be observed that intellectual virtue, as it emerges via 
education, necessarily involves a social context which moral agents cannot create for 
themselves; whether or to what extent an agent is properly reared and educated is beyond 
her power to control. Although moral virtue owes more to the sustained efforts of the 
agent herself than to the teaching she receives, whether and to what extent she acquires 
the moral virtues has a great deal to with social and political forces beyond her control. 
Let us begin by examining the latter claim in greater detail.   
 The word character (êthos), as Aristotle notes, derives from the word habit 
(ethos), by no mere coincidence (NE 1103a 18). Indeed, the virtues of character develop 
largely as the result of habituation. “It is clear from this,” writes Aristotle, “that none of 
the virtues of character comes to be present in us by nature, since none of the things that 
are by nature can be habituated otherwise;” one cannot teach a stone to fall upward, 
“even if one were to train it by throwing it upward ten thousand times” (NE 1103a 19-1). 
The relationship between habituation and moral virtue is complex, though; as Joe Sachs 
writes, “Ethical virtue is by no means simply a set of socially approved habits” (Sachs 22 
n.25). Moral virtue requires, first and foremost, a natural capacity, such that “the virtues 
come to be present neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but in us who are of such a 
nature as to take them on” (1103a 22-23). This natural capacity for virtue, as Sachs notes, 
                                                           
22
 Aristotle writes: “excellence of character comes into being on account of habit, on account of which it 
gets its name by a small inflection from habit” (NE 1103a 18). As Joe Sachs notes, “The word character 
(êthos) derives from habit (ethos) by a mere lengthening of the initial vowel from epsilon to eta” (Sachs 22 
n. 25).  
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must be “completed properly in a certain way,” by means of habit (1103a 22-23). For this 
reason, Aristotle likens moral virtue to techne: 
But we do take on the virtues by first being at work in them, just as also in 
other things, namely the arts; the things that one who has learned them 
needs to do. We learn by doing, and people become, say, housebuilders by 
building houses […] So too, we become just by doing things that are just, 
temperate by doing things that are temperate, and courageous by doing 
things that are courageous. (NE 1103b 1-5)  
 
The development of moral virtue, like the perfection of a techne, requires practice. But 
since poor practice will only ingrain poor habits, the development of excellence both 
technical and moral requires that the right kinds of habits be modeled and encouraged 
from the start; says Aristotle: “It makes no small difference, then, to be habituated in this 
way or in that straight from childhood, but an enormous difference, or rather all the 
difference” (NE 1103b 24). Most would agree that parents or other primary caretakers are 
those chiefly responsible for ensuring that children are habituated in good ways from a 
very young age. Unfortunately, whether or not one has responsible, attentive parental 
figures who are capable of instilling good habits is decidedly a matter of luck. But there 
is more to say. One’s parents are but one social influence among many, and, as 
Aristotle’s rightly notes, an agent’s parents are, like herself, the product of a society 
which may be more or less corrupt, and which may increase or diminish parents’ ability 
to instill good habits in their children.  
 So far we have noted two necessary conditions for the emergence of moral 
virtue—capacity and habituation. Already it is clear that the latter is subject to forces 
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external to the agent. We should pause to note that the same is also true of the former in 
relation to intellectual virtue, and to further note that capacity and habituation are 
entangled in an important way. Let us see how this is so. In Book Ten of the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle turns his attention to the relationship between ethics and 
politics. He returns in the course of his discussion to the capacity for virtue, mentioned 
above as the first component required for the development of moral character. Yet here 
his concern is with intellectual virtue, and specifically with the virtue sophia.23 The 
capacity for virtue, though naturally present, is easily degenerated by corrupt public 
discourses and laws. Vice is naturalizable such that the citizens of a corrupt society 
effectively come to lack a capacity for intellectual virtue. Morally educating an adult 
reared in such a society would prove quite difficult, to say the least: “For it is not 
possible, or not easy, to change by words things that have been bound up in people’s 
characters since long ago” (NE 1179b 18). Moral education involves listening to 
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 Aristotle’s contention that the human good involves “the being-at-work of the soul in accordance with 
virtue, and if the virtues are more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue,” has 
given rise to centuries of controversy. Many have held that for Aristotle moral virtue is a mere stepping-
stone to intellectual virtue, and in particular to life of intellectual reflection. Sachs shares this interpretation, 
writing, “habits belong only to the preparation of the soil, and are neither the seed nor the crop. Habituation 
is a necessary but early education, that is superceded by argument and understanding” (Sachs 197 n. 301). 
The rather simplistic belief that moral virtue exists merely for the sake of overcoming itself in favor of 
intellectual virtue is not without its critics. Claudia Baracchi challenges this convention in Aristotle’s Ethics 
as First Philosophy, demonstrating “the indissoluble intertwinement of practical and theoretical wisdom.” 
She writes, “sophia, theoretical wisdom, far from being an autonomous and separate pursuit, should be 
acknowledged as integrally involved in becoming, sensibility, experience, and, hence, action,” and adds 
that “practical considerations decisively mark the beginning or condition of all contemplation as well as 
discursive investigation” (1). Anthony Kenny shares Sachs’ interpretation, but (mindful of the less extreme 
position of the Eudemian Ethics) points out that “the person whom many regard as the hero of the 
Nicomachean Ethics turns out […] to be a vicious and ignoble character,” who pursues philosophical 
reflection in a single-minded and even ruthless way (Kenny 1978 214). To my mind, the point is rather 
moot; even if the best life for the human being is merely or purely philosophical (assuming such a life is 
possible, which I doubt), this life is simply unavailable to most human beings. As Suzanne Stern-Gillet 
writes, “”Most of us will not succeed in ‘immortalizing’ ourselves in the way indicated” (35). Since virtue 
is always appropriate to a given context, for most human beings moral virtues will govern life, though they 
will coexist and ideally harmonize with intellectual virtues. Moral virtues, which have to do with feelings, 
govern “human” life, and can belong to a eudaimoniac life even if that life does not represent Aristotle’s 
summum bonnum of a life that favors what is divine over what is human (the life of philosophical reflection 
being “greater than what accords with a human being,” and thus “something divine” NE 1177b 25). As 
Aristotle writes, “The life in accord with the rest of virtue is happy in a secondary way” (NE 1178a 10).  
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beautiful speeches (logoi), but in order to learn one must be able to hear the logoi 
properly, such that one might be transformed by them. Here a paradox emerges: the agent 
must already be persuadable before any speech can persuade her; as Aristotle writes, “it 
is necessary for a character to be present in advance that is in some way appropriate for 
virtue, loving what is beautiful and scorning what is shameful” (NE 1179b 30). For this 
reason, Aristotle argues, moral discourses rarely suffice to persuade agents to act as they 
ought; although beautiful discourses “appear to have the power to encourage and 
stimulate open-natured young people,” and those who already love what is beautiful and 
good, they have little enough power over the masses, who “have no notion of what is 
beautiful and truly pleasant, having had no taste of it” (NE 1179b 10-19). 
 But how is the soul of an agent made ready to receive logoi? Where does the love 
of what is truly good and pleasant come from? Aristotle claims that agents must have 
learned to love what is truly good (the intellectual pleasures) “beforehand by means of 
habits, with a view to enjoying and hating in a beautiful way, like ground that is going to 
nourish the seed” (NE 1179b 26-27). One must possess moral virtue in order to be 
receptive to intellectual virtue. The habits which characterize the former, as we have said, 
are in part the product of an early moral education. Hence the acquisition of intellectual 
virtue, like the initial acquisition of moral virtue, requires a particular social context. This 
context— and this is no small point— involves a system of laws that facilitate 
appropriate child-rearing and civic education: “it is difficult to hit upon a right training 
toward virtue from youth if one has not been brought up under laws of that sort […] 
Hence it is necessary to arrange for rearing and exercise by laws” (NE 1179b 29-30). The 
Nicomachean Ethics culminates in a discussion of the political art, and with good 
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reason— a good and just society inculcates the proper values and moral virtues in its 
citizens, and so prepares them for lives of virtue, or at least dissuades them from living 
the worst kinds of lives.24 The character of an individual agent in turn owes much to the 
character of her society. Writes Aristotle: “for lawmakers make the citizens good by 
habituating them, and since this is the intention of every lawmaker, those that do not do it 
well are failures, and one regime differs from another in this respect as a good from a 
worthless one” (NE 1103b 2-4). 
 The acquisition of both moral and intellectual virtue involves, for Aristotle, social 
forces beyond the agent’s control: whether or not one is blessed with loving, responsible 
parents, and whether or not one is born into a just society are matters of luck. This is not 
to say that one’s upbringing dictates one’s moral destiny, nor that virtuous individuals 
cannot arise within corrupt societies, but certainly social forces facilitate and/or impede 
the emergence of virtue. Thus far, then, it is consistent with Aristotle’s account to 
acknowledge the considerable role of luck in the initial acquisition of virtue. Before we 
move beyond the social context in which virtue emerges, it would be wise to say a word 
on friendship, which holds a special place in Aristotle’s ethical vision, and which renders 
the moral life vulnerable to luck in numerous ways. 
Friendship and Virtue 
 As we have said, on Aristotle’s view human life is to be lived in communities. To 
speak of human flourishing outside of a society would be to talk nonsense; recall the 
passage cited above: 
                                                           
24
 The many, says Aristotle, are generally governed by feeling and not by the intellect. Because “in general 
feeling seems to yield not to reasoned speech but to force,” Aristotle notes that some lawmakers “must also 
impose punishments and penalties on those who are disobedient or lacking in natural capacity” (NE 1179b 
29-1180a11).  
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[T]he complete good seems to be self-sufficient. And by the self-sufficient 
we mean not what suffices for oneself alone, living one’s life as a hermit, 
but also with parents and children and a wife, and friends and fellow 
citizens generally, since a human being is by nature meant for a city. 
(1197b 9-10)  
Friendship (philia) is broadly construed by Aristotle as “any association of people who 
spend time and do things together, share in pains and pleasures, and wish for eachother’s 
good” (Sachs 205, see NE 1166a 1-10). Although for Aristotle its superlative form 
involves the deep and enduring attachment between people of fine character, as Suzanne 
Stern-Gillet writes, “in ancient Greek usage the concept of philia […] encompasses a 
wide and diverse field of personal and social relationships compared to which the 
extension of the modern concept of friendship is bound to appear very restricted” (7). 
Sachs notes, “The Greek word takes in all love felt and practiced toward family members, 
fellow countrymen, and generally those like oneself” (Sachs 205).25 In Book VIII of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle characterizes friendship as a microcosm and key 
component of the political community: “And friendship seems to hold cities together, and 
lawmakers seem to take it more seriously than justice” (NE 1155a 23).26 Friendship is 
natural, as it “seems to be present by nature in a parent for a child and a child for a 
parent” (NE 1155a 17). Friendship is necessary, “For no one would choose to live 
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 Aristotle writes: “But the complete sort of friendship is that between people who are good and who are 
alike in virtue, since they wish for good things for one another in the same way insofar as they are good, 
and they are good in themselves” (NE 1156b 8-9).  
  
26
 Surprisingly, in the realm of the political justice is trumped by friendship. Unlike justice, which Aristotle 
characterizes as an incomplete or “underdeveloped” virtue (Sachs 91 n. 122), friendship is “sufficient to 
ends which justice is not” (Sachs 144 n. 232). Aristotle writes: “And when people are friends there is no 
need of justice, but when they are just there is still need of friendship, and among things that are just, what 
inclines toward friendship seems most just of all” (1155a 38).  
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without friends, despite having all the rest of the good things” (NE 1155a 2).27 Friendship 
is beautiful, since we praise those who love their friends, and “an abundance of friends 
seems to be one of the beautiful things” (NE 1155a 30). Excellence in friendship is, if not 
a virtue, certainly the mark of virtue, such that “people believe that it is the same people 
who are good men and friends” (NE 1155a 31).28 Friendship is, in sum, a key component 
of ethical life, and indispensible to human flourishing.29  
 In addition to being intrinsically valuable, friendship plays an important 
instrumental role in the moral life. Both moral and intellectual virtue are, on Aristotle’s 
account, perfected in and through relations of philia. It is exclusively within the context 
of social relationships that many of the virtues of character find their expression.30 The 
generous person, who “values money not for itself but for the sake of giving it,” requires 
a recipient in order to practice generosity (NE 1120b 16). The just person “needs people 
toward and with whom he will act justly” (NE 1177a 32). The friendly person, who 
judges best when to agree with the crowd and when to dissent, requires interlocutors. 
Because the moral virtues are, for Aristotle, actualized via social praxis, in the absence of 
relationships of philia they cannot emerge. Unquestionably and unfortunately, 
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 Aristotle opens his discussion of friendship in Book VII by explicitly claiming,: “[It] is also most 
necessary for life” (NE 1155a 1).  
 
28
 Although “friendliness,” characterized by an appropriate willingness to agree with others in social 
settings, is counted among the minor moral virtues, it is not to be conflated with friendship, which is, by 
Aristotle’s account, a broader and more ethically significant phenomenon. 
 
29
 One sign of this, as Sachs notes, is that “The treatment of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics is longer 
than that of any other topic, and comes just before the conclusion of the whole inquiry” (Sachs 205).  
 
30
 It would be more accurate to say that all of the moral virtues require relations of philia, though some are 
more self-sufficient than others. Where generosity and friendliness clearly require philia, courage and 
temperance seem to require it in a less obvious way. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
names sophia as the most self-sufficient of the virtues, but counts justice, temperance and moderation 
among those virtues which require the presence of others. Unlike the moral virtues, the intellectual virtue 
sophia requires only a minimal stock of external goods, since “the wise person is able to contemplate even 
when he is by himself” (NE 1177a 30-35).  
49 
 
relationships are properly counted among those goods which may fail to materialize; an 
agent may, through no fault of her own, perpetually lack or suddenly lose the social 
connections that enable the exercise of moral virtue. Because their actualization is 
intrinsically related to relationships of philia which the agent cannot create for herself, 
the moral virtues are therefore (and once again) subject to luck. As Martha Nussbaum 
notes, “Against the defender of solitary self-sufficiency Aristotle argues that these 
vulnerable relationships and their associated activities have […] instrumental value as a 
necessary means to […] the best human life,” and it is for this reason that no one would 
choose to live without friends despite having all other goods: “For what benefit would 
there be from such abundance if one were deprived of the opportunity to do favors, which 
arises most of all and in the most praiseworthy way toward friends?” (Nussbaum 345; NE 
1155a 7-8).   
 It might be objected that such external goods as wealth and position would 
insulate the agent from the need for friendship, and thus from the special vulnerability 
born of that need; Aristotle writes, “For people say there is no need of friends for those 
who are blessed and self-sufficient, since good things belong to them already” (NE 1169b 
4-5). Common opinion holds that the fortunate person will have no need of friendships of 
utility, and since, as Aristotle suggests, many assume that friends are merely and purely 
for use, they conclude that the blessed do not need friends. This view, however, is 
misguided, and for several reasons. Power and wealth, rather than mitigating the need for 
friendship, instead and proportionately demand it: “for rich people and those who rule 
and have power, there seems to be the greatest need for friends […] how could it be 
watched over and kept safe without friends? For the greater it is, the shakier its 
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foundation is” (NE 1155a 9-11).31 Moreover, it is in and through friendship that external 
goods become a boon to virtue. Generosity, for example, is characterized not simply by 
giving, but by giving in the right measure, for the right reasons, and, especially, to the 
right people. So, too, do the other moral virtues require the presence of deserving 
recipients. The blessed person needs friends in order to exercise virtue, and even if he did 
not, “it is absurd to make the blessed person solitary, since no one would choose to have 
all good things by himself,” and “it is clear that it is better to spend one’s time with 
friends” (NE 1169b 18-21). “Therefore,” says Aristotle, “it is necessary for the happy 
person to have friends” (1169b 24).  
 Friendship facilitates moral virtue in a rather obvious way, but the intellectual 
virtues, too, are actualized in and through philia, or more precisely through a special kind 
of philia.32 Aristotle’s ideal form of friendship, variously termed “moral friendship,” 
“primary friendship,” and “character friendship,” has much in common with philia more 
generally: it involves shared activities, mutual pleasures and pains and a reciprocal desire 
between friends for the other’s good. Deep friendship, however, requires like-
mindedness, and like-mindedness is present most of all “among decent people,” while “it 
is impossible for people of low character to be like-minded except to a small extent” (NE 
1167b 6-8). Unlike those friendships of mere utility or pleasantness, the friendship of 
character involves a shared love of the good. Aristotle writes:   
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 In poverty, too, friendship is needful: “in both poverty and misfortunes people believe that friends are the 
only refuge” (NE 1155a 11). 
 
32
 This special type of philia is none other than that ideal form mentioned above, in contrast to which all 
other types of friendship are understood to be partial or imperfect. As Ellijah Milgram writes, “Aristotle 
takes virtue-friendship, i.e., the friendship of virtuous people who are friends for virtue, as 'friendship in the 
primary way.' Other 'friendships' -- for utility and for pleasure -- are only so-called by way of similarity to 
friendship proper, i.e., virtue-friendship (NE 1157a 30). 
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But the complete sort of friendship is that between people who are good 
and alike in virtue, since they wish for good things for one another in the 
same way insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves (NE 
1156b 8-9).   
This moral grounding renders the character friendship more constant than other forms of 
philia. As Nancy Sherman writes: 
Friendship based on what is good […] is the most stable kind of 
friendship, since good character tends to be a reliable condition and those 
interested in cultivating a union on its basis are committed in a stable way 
to the end of virtue. (200-201) 
Character friendship is “the most paradigmatic, too, with respect to the depth and level of 
mutual engagement” (Sherman 201). Aristotle wants to insist, as Sherman notes, on the 
mutual desire of friends to believe and feel and act together. Says Aristotle: “And just as 
in the case of virtues, people are called good either with respect to an active condition or 
with respect to being at work, so too it is with friendship” (1157b 8-9). Separation from 
friends will not therefore immediately dissolve friendships, but will in time, since the 
“the being-at-work of it,” characterized by shared activities, mutual pathoi and 
reciprocated expressions of goodwill is the very essence of friendship. As Sherman 
argues, “Aristotle’s claim is that we appreciate mutual activity in its fullest when it lasts- 
when it has a chance to create its own history- and when it brings to bear the full 
dimension of a friendship,” and the friendship of virtue is most able to do all of these 
(204).  
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 Character friendship, as it is grounded in a mutual love of the good and involves 
shared pleasures and activities, can clearly serve as a catalyst for moral virtue, since the 
moral virtues have to do with feeling and actions and generally require deserving 
company. But in what sense can the friendship of character foster intellectual virtue, as 
was previously claimed? To answer this question we must turn to one of the most cryptic 
themes in Aristotelian ethics, namely, that of the (ideal) friend as “another self.”  
 As Suzanne Stern-Gillet argues, grasping the true sense of friendship as other-
selfhood requires an acknowledgement of what precisely, for Aristotle, selfhood consists 
in. Stern-Gilet claims that selfhood, or what we might prefer to call self-actualization, is 
for Aristotle a matter of degrees (28). In sharp contrast to many modern notions of 
selfhood, the Aristotelian conception has everything to do with the structure of the 
uniquely human psyche.33 Recall the earlier argument that since the telos of a particular 
souled being is tied to what most sets it apart from other souled beings, and what most 
distinguishes the human being is the possession of a reasoning or conversant soul, the 
telos, and thus the virtues and good of a human being, must be tied to the logos-dwelling 
part or parts of the soul. Because the human soul possesses logos in a twofold sense— 
both “in the governing sense” in the conversant soul and in a receptive sense in the 
appetitive soul— the human good must have something to do with the conversant or 
intellectual and the appetitive soul. Indeed, as we have said, human virtue is twofold and 
corresponds to this division of the logos-possessing parts of the soul. Aristotelian 
selfhood, as Stern-Gillet contends, consists in the activity and harmonization of the parts 
of the soul, thus in the human being selfhood is actualized in and through the exercise of 
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 For a rich comparison of ancient and modern conceptions of selfhood, see Stern-Gillet, chapters 1 and 2.   
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moral and intellectual virtue, and, especially, through their concordant coexistence.34 
Although moral virtue is “the single most important aspect of the Aristotelian good life,” 
intellectual virtue takes precedence over moral virtue inasmuch as it ensures and 
regulates the former. Aristotle writes, “people are called self-restrained and unrestrained 
according to whether their intellect masters them or not, as though this were each 
person” (NE 1168b 35, emphasis mine). As Stern-Gillet argues, “Aristotle never wavers 
in his conviction that […] the essential human self is noetic” (35, emphasis mine). 
Because the intellect effectively regulates moral virtue, the agent whose intellectual 
virtues (including and especially phronesis) are lacking will suffer from “some form or 
other of psychic disintegration” (25). Conversely, the agent whose intellectual virtues 
regulate and coexist harmoniously with her appetites will possess integrity: she will be at 
one with herself, where the dissipated agent will be at odds with, or turned against, 
herself. Thus selfhood admits of degrees: we may say that the virtuous agent has obtained 
a higher degree of self-actualization than the dissipated or vicious one. The virtuous 
person is, for Aristotle, most fully a “self.”  
 In order to explain why complete selfhood, including the actualization of the 
noetic or governing part of the soul, requires friendship, Aristotle offers a notoriously 
difficult line of reasoning.35 He begins by claiming that “what is good by nature is good 
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 And, it must be noted, through the activity of the nutritive and kinetic/perceptive soul. Although the 
activity of the logos-dwelling parts of the soul is for Aristotle the very mark of humanity, mere life, 
perception and movement also belong to human beings, and self-actualization must involve these as well. 
This is consistent with Aristotle’s insistence that virtue entails praxis such that one who was sleeping 
through life could not be called virtuous in any proper sense, and with his identification of voluntariness 
with auto-kinesis.  
 
35
 A number of thinkers have attempted to articulate the argument by means of syllogisms. See, for 
example, J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1900), and David Ross, Ethica Nicomachea, 
in The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, vol. IX, 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925).   
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and pleasant itself to a serious person” (NE 1170a 16). Next he argues that since the life 
of any souled being is defined by its characteristic activity, and human life is 
characterized by both perception and thinking, human life is defined by the being-at-work 
of perception and thought (1170a 19). Living, Aristotle notes, is something intrinsically 
good and pleasant. Whenever we are aware of ourselves as perceiving or thinking, we are 
aware of ourselves as alive, and “being aware that we are alive is something pleasant in 
itself” (1170b 1-2). If being alive is something good and choiceworthy in general, it is all 
the more so, Aristotle contends, for the person who is virtuous, since “one’s being is 
choiceworthy on account of the awareness of oneself as being good” (1170b 11). A 
serious person, who is the same way toward his friend as he is toward himself, will desire 
that his friend should be, and that his friend should be aware of his being and of his 
goodness. The friend’s awareness of himself as being (and as being good) develops via 
the mutual recognition that defines friendship: “and this would come about through living 
together and sharing conversation and thinking” (1170b 11-12).  
 Aristotle’s contention is quite profound: in order to become fully self-actualized 
we need to be-at-work as friends, engaging in the activities that allow for the realization 
and expansion of the noetic or governing part of the soul which ensures the harmonious 
coexistence of intellectual and moral virtue.36 As Sachs writes, “Friendship thus provides 
a bridge between moral and intellectual virtue,” paving the way for a human life of 
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 The moral quality of a friendship is reflected in the activities that friends choose to engage in together. 
Base friends, who pass the time drinking or gambling, entrench their baseness: “the friendship of people of 
low character becomes corrupt,” since those who engage in base activities together “become corrupt in 
becoming like one another” (NE 1172a 9-10). Friends who love justice will work for the public good, those 
who love wisdom will pass their time in shared philosophical reflection, and so on. The activities that we 
believe ought to accompany friendship have everything to do with our beliefs about the best kind of life; if 
we imagine that the life of sophia is the ideal life for the human being, then the characteristic activity of  
ideal friendship would be shared philosophical reflection.   
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complete, harmonious virtue (205). In friendships of virtue agents’ goodness grows 
together over time: “[T]he friendship of decent people,” writes Aristotle, “is decent, and 
grows along with their association, and they seem to become even better people by 
putting the friendship to work” (NE 1172a 12). It is in and through friendship that we 
become good and, more surprisingly, in and through friendship that we become fully 
actualized human beings.    
 In Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle asks whether or not “one ought 
to love oneself most, or someone else” (1168a 29). Common opinion holds that one ought 
to love one’s friends most of all, but this view, Aristotle argues, is inconsistent with “the 
facts,” since: 
A best friend is someone who wishes for good things for the sake of that 
person for whom he wishes them […] but this belongs most of all to 
oneself in relation to oneself, and so too do all of the rest of the things by 
which a friend is defined. (NE 1168b 1-5)   
Aristotle’s claim that “one is a friend to oneself most of all, and so what he ought to love 
most of all is himself” must be understood in a qualified sense, since it holds true only of 
the virtuous agent, and more precisely of the agent who “gratifies what is most 
authoritative in himself, and obeys this in all things” (NE 1168b 31).37 The decent person 
loves the noetic part of his soul, and should: “That, then, this is each person, or is so most 
of all, is not unclear, nor that a decent person loves this most. Hence such a person would 
be a lover of self most of all” (NE 1168b 32-1169a 5). The virtuous agent or fully 
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 That which “is most authoritative” being the noetic soul or intellect, inasmuch as it governs virtue. Sachs 
writes, “Even though the thinking part is most properly oneself, it is only the love of the beautiful that 
properly satisfies that part. That in turn means that the irrational part of the soul must be brought into its 
best condition, so that the beautiful can be discerned (1113a 29-33), and the whole human being can be 
fulfilled” (Sachs 173 n. 268).    
56 
 
actualized self, governed by intellect, fostering moral virtue through praxis, actively 
seeking the good and the beautiful, “ought to be a lover of self,” since he loves what is 
good and “will both profit himself and benefit the others by performing beautiful actions” 
(1169a 11-12). But this self-love of self-friendship cannot replace friendships with others. 
Moral friendship alone allows for complete self-actualization, and this process 
necessarily involves mutuality: it is “a joint becoming, by the partners, of one another’s 
selves” (Stern-Gillet 172, emphasis mine).     
 
Virtue and the Illusion of Self-Sufficiency 
 The self-sufficiency that characterizes so much modern moral philosophy 
is radically at odds with Aristotle’s conception of the moral life. In Aristotle’s 
view, virtue grows within, on account of and for the sake of a community. The 
moral life in general and the actualization of moral and intellectual virtues 
absolutely demand the presence of others. But the communal context of virtue 
renders it deeply vulnerable to luck. As we have said, the acquisition of virtue has 
much to do with the quality of care and education one receives and with the 
integrity or corruptness of the laws under which one lives. As we will see, cultural 
beliefs about gender, race and class also impact agents’ ability to foster certain 
virtues. That complete self-actualization requires deep friendships between good 
people introduces three further vulnerabilities to the moral life: first, the 
vulnerability born of the need for friends who may fail to appear or may in time 
leave the community or pass away, second, the vulnerability that arises when we 
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share deeply in others’ fortunes and misfortunes, joys and sorrows,38 and third, 
the vulnerability born of trusting in friends who may prove false, or may in time 
become corrupt despite our efforts at mutual melioration.39 In sum, the 
indispensability of relations of philia for the perfection of virtue unquestionably 
buttresses our claim that ethical life is, for Aristotle, deeply vulnerable to luck.   
 
 Needful Things: Virtue and Means 
An Elitism of Exclusion: Some Feminist Remarks 
 Even the novice ethicist will be familiar with the charge that Aristotle’s ethics is 
elitist— that it excludes in principle many or most would-be moral agents from serious 
ethical consideration and from the enjoyment of the best kind of life. Indeed, Aristotelian 
ethics applies to those identified as citizens of the political community, and “not all 
members of a community are citizens. Slaves are notably excluded, and so too are 
women” (McInry 1).40 As Ralph McInry therefore rightly points out, “there seems to be 
an elitism of exclusion before the discussion even begins” (1). In addition to striking 
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 As Howard Curzer explains, “The quasi-virtue of friendship opens people up to much pain. An odd 
example is this: ‘To see [our friends] pained at our misfortunes is painful’ (1171b4–6) so when a person 
reveals his own misfortune (e.g., by announcing the funeral of a beloved relative) he ‘cannot stand the pain 
that ensues for his friends’ (1171b8)” (151).   
 
39
 A possibility which Aristotle considers at some length, asking whether or not we should dissolve 
relations with friends who become dissipated or vicious. As we ought to love only what is good, we cannot 
persist in our love of the friend who has become corrupt. Although we ought to seek his amelioration, 
“when it is impossible to rescue someone who has changed, one withdraws from his” (1165b 22). When 
friends diverge sufficiently in their thinking or in their interests, the friendship also must be dissolved, yet 
former friends should remain kind to one another for the sake of the friendship that has been, providing the 
dissolution did not result from excessive vice (1165b 33-36).  
  
40
 One’s membership within a political community is as fragile, Aristotle holds, as it is necessary for the 
good life. Martha Nussbaum notes, “Among the cherished human goods, membership and good activity in 
a political community are outstandingly vulnerable to chance reversal,” and this was especially so in 
ancient Greece during Aristotle’s time (346). Steeped in political turmoil, the elite of Athens were aware of 
this vulnerability, as was Aristotle (himself an “outsider”); Nussbaum continues: “The tragedies on which 
Aristotle and his audience were raised, and on which he wishes to raise young citizens, focus on the themes 
of defeat in war, enslavement, the loss of political exercise and political freedom” (346).  
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modern readers as offensive, Aristotle’s failure to inquire seriously into the potential for 
virtue of marginalized groups is surprisingly inconsistent with his own method. As 
Martha Nussbaum writes, “The Aristotelian method does not doggedly defend the status 
quo. It asks for imagination and responsiveness concerning all human alternatives” (371). 
That Aristotle, “this judicious fair-minded man,” failed to apply his own method to the 
consideration of women in particular “shows us the tremendous power of sexual 
convention and sexual prejudice in shaping a view of the world” (Nussbaum 371).  
 There are a number of ways to address this apparent defect in Aristotle’s ethics. 
We might, for example, mark Aristotle’s exclusion of certain groups as an all-but-
inevitable result of the particular historical context in which his philosophies arose, and 
might further suggest, with McInry, that “the undeniable restraints of Aristotle’s historic 
setting may be overcome by suggesting that there is no intrinsic reason in what he teaches 
for such restrictions” (1).41 There is in Aristotle’s ethical writing strong evidence to 
support the latter view.42 And although Aristotle did not extend his full ethical 
consideration to persons generally, holding for example that “women were incapable of 
the highest and best kind of friendship,” we might further content ourselves, as Stern-
Gillet does, “with the confidence that, had he lived today, Aristotle would most probably 
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 The social the status of women in ancient Greece was appalling by our own standards. That Aristotle’s 
comments regarding women are not more disparaging is surprising to me, given Greek beliefs about 
women’s inferiority which essentially reduced them to objects with greater or lesser use-value. 
 
42
 Consider, for example, the following passage: "And any random  person, or a slave, might enjoy bodily 
pleasures no less than the best person; but no one would grant a share of happiness  to a slave, if he does 
not even have a share in his life. For happiness [consists] in activities in accord with virtue” (NE 1177a 6-
10, empahsis mine). On my reading, Aristotle here implies that any person might share in virtue, were s/he 
allowed to engage in the activities that actualize it. In his discussion of the intertwining of virtue and 
happiness in Book 1, Aristotle writes: "It [the happiness resulting from virtue] admits of belonging to all 
those who are not incapacitated for virtue, by means of some sort of learning and taking pains" (NE 
1099b18-20). 
59 
 
have revised his views on the nature of women,” and by extension other excluded groups 
(9).  
 But even if we don’t wish to worry overmuch about Aristotle’s presumed elitism, 
for the purposes of the present investigation it would behoove us to address two related 
concerns. First it is consistent with Aristotle’s ethics to note that gender and other 
accidental personal properties will and do impact whether and how virtue is actualized in 
agents’ lives. Second, and here we reiterate a point touched upon above, the actualization 
of virtue requires states of affairs and material goods that will generally be more available 
to the socially and economically privileged. Both concerns speak to the interplay of virtue 
and luck.  
 Feminist ethicists have done much to highlight the ways in which discriminatory 
cultural practices and beliefs bar women and other oppressed groups from various kinds 
of ethical praxis, and/or render their virtuous acts invisible.43 In The Unnatural Lottery, 
Claudia Card rightly notes that although most philosophical discussions of the 
intertwining of luck and ethics center on the lives of the privileged, “the more usual 
cases” of ethical misfortune “are lives with beginnings that are relatively disadvantaged 
along significant dimensions, such as having a socially disvalued gender, race, ethnicity, 
or class, or a socially stigmatized disability, illness, deformity or disorder” (3). Members 
of such groups are “oppressed” in the sense expressed by Marilyn Frye: reduced, molded, 
immobilized (Card 3). The ethical life is for Aristotle a life of being-at-work, a life of 
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 We would do well to mark, for example, the omission of childbirth from Aristotle’s discussion of 
courage. Courage, which Aristotle broadly defines as the endurance of pain for the sake of the beautiful and 
the good, seems to me a virtue most appropriate for the experience of childbirth. For a rich discussion of 
this theme, see Kayley Varnallis’s excellent essay, “Of Courage Born: Reflections on Childbirth and Manly 
Courage,” in Coming to Life: Philosophies of Pregnancy, Childbirth and Mothering, ed. By Caroline R. 
Lundquist and Sarah LaChance Adams (Fordham University Press, 2013).    
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praxis, so where activity is stymied the ethical life is rendered anemic. In any society, 
such hierarchies as those associated with gender, race and class will inevitably impact the 
opportunities open to agents, and so impact whether or to what extent virtue is accessible 
to them, and/or the extent to which their virtues are recognized and appreciated as such. 
Let us see how these facts are consistent with Aristotle’s ethical account.  
 As we have said, parenting plays a significant role in the inculcation of virtue in 
young people. We ought now to note that much of early training in virtue has little to do 
with the young agent’s intellect— which is at the outset too immature to be of much 
service— and much more to do with the habits which parental figures insist upon. 
Parenting, we might say, is thus a highly coercive activity, but this must be so. The 
toddler is incapable of understanding most dangers and mores, and so must be forced to 
act in certain ways despite her affective drives; as Aristotle writes, “Education through 
habits must come earlier than education through reason” (Politics 1338b4–5). We should 
note that although praxis is key, logos also tends to accompany early parental guidance: 
children are told— in increasingly sophisticated ways as they mature— why some 
behaviors are permissible and others not. In time, as proper habits are ingrained, children 
learn to listen properly to logos and to make connections between behaviors and 
justifications— between the “whats” and the “whys” of virtue.   
 That this initial training for virtue is highly effective is a double-edged sword; 
children may, for example, become accustomed to a decidedly narrow range of activities 
depending upon the habits their caretakers deem appropriate for them.44 In ancient 
Greece, young girls, for whom the life of the soldier, politician and scholar were cut off 
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 Just as they may become accustomed to vicious or dissipated behavior, if their caretakers foster the 
accompanying habits in them.  
 
61 
 
as possibilities, might be barred in childhood from fostering the habits that could later 
blossom into the moral virtues deemed appropriate to those activities. Where courage, for 
example, involves the endurance of pain, girls might be barred from engaging in 
potentially painful activities, while their male counterparts might be actively encouraged 
or even forced to do so to.45 Similarly, a child born into slavery or into the working 
would not only be denied a civic education but would also in all likelihood be 
discouraged from the sort of reflection that fosters theoretical wisdom.46  
 Early guidance that is too restrictive may rob youths of the initial fecundity that 
genuine moral virtue requires such that it will be difficult if not impossible for them to 
actualize certain virtues as they mature. This is even more the case if the habituation in 
question continues when children mature enough to enjoy a degree of freedom. Aristotle 
makes it clear that once children have become accustomed to acting in appropriate ways, 
they must be “let loose,” so to speak, to discover virtue and vice for themselves. As 
Myles Burnyeat points out, it is not sufficient that one be shown how to act nor told that 
so acting is good, but one must also act independently  “so that by doing the things that 
you are told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been told is true” 
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 The Aristotelian virtue of courage seems a likely candidate for a feminist critique. Andreia literally 
means “manliness,” and was in the ancient world associated with characteristically male activities 
including and especially war. As Linda Hirshman writes, “tempting as it is to translate classical concepts of 
military virtue into things like courage in the face of disease or the loss of status, Aristotle quite clearly 
directs our attention to the concerns of the classical order” (Freeland 215). The paradigm of courage, 
Aristotle contends, is that exercised in defense of the polis (NE 1115a 30-35); the agent who is unafraid to 
die in war is so on account of the beautiful, namely, the desire to maintain the polis. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that Aristotle sometimes identifies citizenship with the ability to take up heavy arms (Freeland 
216).   
 
46
 Aristotle is aware that even in the best societies many may be barred from public education. As 
Nussbaum remarks, “because of economic necessity there will always be those who, living the life of 
manual laborers, will be debarred by the exigencies of their daily work from having the education requisite 
for human excellence” (347). Indeed, in the Politics Aristotle writes, “for no man can practice virtue who is 
living the life of a mechanic or laborer” (1278a 20).    
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(Burnyeat 73).47 Young people must be allowed the freedom to act of their own volition 
even or especially if such freedom entails ethical risk. Ethical “failure,” understood as 
“missing the mark,” is for Aristotle a key component of the development of moral virtue. 
Just as we must experience the feelings of hunger and of over fullness before we can 
identify and appreciate the feeling of satiety, so too must we experience the deficient and 
excessive conditions related to a moral virtue before we can appreciate how it feels to 
strike upon the mean. This is especially so inasmuch as the mean is no objective point but 
is always relative to the individual. Youths absolutely must be permitted the freedom to 
take risks, and to fail.48 In societies in which children’s degree of freedom correlates with 
their gender, race, social standing or economic position, disparities in the development of 
virtue will in all likelihood arise between various groups.49    
 Parents who bar their children from engaging in the activities which pave the way 
for various virtues, and/or deny them the freedom to act independently as they mature, 
effectively reduce their children’s capacity for virtue. This fact is relevant to our inquiry 
for two reasons: first, as a buttress to the previously-made claim that parenting has a 
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 This developmental stage is key since young people must learn to recognize and appreciate the good 
feelings that accompany virtue and the shameful feelings that accompany vice before they can learn to 
govern their actions properly (more precisely, before they can integrate the thinking and appetitive parts of 
the soul via phronesis, which is for Aristotle a key component of self-actualization). Those who are 
prevented from taking ethical risks are likely to suffer from dissipation later in life since they will “know” 
what is right (having acted in analogous ways and having heard parental declaration to that effect), but will 
not “know” in the governing sense, never having brought their appetites under the aegis of their intellect. 
(For a rich analysis of this claim see Cruzer, especially p. 147)   
 
48
 Aristotle’s position makes manifest the paradoxical nature of two fabled inscriptions carved into the 
temple at Delphi, which read “know thyself,” and “nothing in excess.” The self-knowledge that grows 
alongside moral virtue entails the identification of mean conditions which are almost necessarily made 
manifest through (repeated) transgression.       
 
49
 Oddly, one possible exception is the virtue of slaves, which Aristotle discusses in Book 1 of the Politics. 
Although he claims that the slave will require “only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his 
duty,” Aristotle also claims that masters should educate slaves in virtue, rather than merely issuing 
commands, as the virtue of the slave stems from and is a reflection of that of his master. Here he likens the 
practice of mastering slaves to the rearing of children (1260b 5-10).  
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profound impact of the emergence of moral virtue, and second, as evidence of how 
cultural norms are reified in and through the parental inculcation of virtue in children. Let 
us dwell for a moment on the latter. 
 Because parenting practices unfold within a society and often reflect dominant 
social values and mores, systemic misogynist or bigoted beliefs will tend to find 
expression in the way parents rear their children, including in the activities which 
children are permitted to engage in, and the degree of personal freedom they enjoy as 
they mature. Young girls may be encouraged to occupy themselves with self-
beautification, domestic tasks, and pleasant if banal conversation, while boys may be 
encouraged to play ay war, to engage in athletic activities, and to devote adequate time to 
their studies. The degree of freedom permitted to children as they mature will tend to 
reflect dominant beliefs about the fragility or strength, independence or dependence of 
various groups.50 In both ways, through parenting children will be gradually molded to fit 
the norms of their society. Unfortunately, such molding serves to reify dominant cultural 
beliefs, such as the conviction that women are fragile and intellectually inferior to men. 
Since virtues are for Aristotle related to the ends of particular types of beings, where 
sufficient differences are identified between various groups of people, there will emerge 
disparate ways of living well. Since differences tend to be organized in terms of valuative 
schemes, societies will often develop hierarchies of virtue in which, for example, 
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 That this is so in our own culture was made beautifully clear  in Iris Marion Young’s superlative essay, 
“Throwing Like a Girl” (On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). Young shows just how radically constraining social norms are on girls by 
highlighting their manifestation in girls’ movement. Card summarizes: “contemporary middle-class and 
even working-class ideals of femininity in the United States […] reduce female development and mold it as 
they constrain female motility” (5).  
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“feminine” virtues are less esteemed than “masculine” ones.51 In such societies, even if 
members of a disvalued class manage to succeed morally, their success will remain 
qualified, paling in comparison to that of their purported superiors.52  
 In our time as in Aristotle’s, gender and other accidental personal properties 
impact whether and how virtue is actualized in agents’ lives. So, too, do such properties 
(or more precisely the valuative schemes through which they are interpreted) impact 
whether or not virtue is recognized as such. Consider the woman who, in a society which 
devalues physical strength in women and associates courage with war and death, endures 
childbirth courageously. On the face of it, it is quite consistent with Aristotle’s account of 
andreia to recognize the endurance of pain for the sake of birthing a new citizen as an 
instantiation of courage, but myriad cultural beliefs may bar it from being recognized as 
such.53 The agent who possesses, whether by nature or as a result of praxis, qualities that 
are deemed inappropriate to her “kind,” may even suffer ignominy, and this as is true of 
virtue as it is of other types of qualities.54 Moral success requires a cultural setting that 
agents cannot possibly create for themselves; it is largely a matter of luck whether or not 
children will be given the opportunities to acquire various virtues, and a matter of chance 
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 This theme will be explored in some length in Chapter VI, when we turn to Kant’s gendered division of 
virtue.  
 
52
 An ethical “double-bind,” to use Frye’s term. No matter what women do in a society that disvalues the 
feminine, it will be less “good” than what a man may do. “This situation,” as Card notes, “systematically 
undermines the development of self-respect” (5).  
 
53
 In the case of childbirth this is especially so in cultures that equate women and women’s bodies with 
vice, evil or sin; as Kayley Varnallis writes, “Christianity, particularly Genesis 3:16, presents a significant 
impediment to recognizing pregnancy and childbirth as experiences that can occasion pps [manly] courage. 
Genesis 3:16 expresses God’s explicit command that women should “bear children in sorrow.” Saint 
Augustine argues that suffering in childbirth is a punishment for Eve’s sexual sin […] If suffering in 
childbirth is God’s punishment for sexual lust, then childbirth cannot be courageous: in general, one can't 
heroically triumph over conditions one truly deserves.” (51)   
 
54
 It is not difficult to cite examples in our own culture: women who are highly assertive are often deemed 
aggressive, men who are soft-spoken or highly compassionate are disparaged as weak, and so on.     
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whether or not those virtues that arise contra social norms will be recognized, much less 
appreciated.   
Time for Praxis: Virtue and Opportunity 
 Because moral virtue arises in and through praxis, agents must have adequate 
opportunities to engage in the activities associated with virtue before they can become 
virtuous. Because agents must also continue to act virtuously if they are to remain 
virtuous in a rich sense, such opportunities must persist over the course of a lifetime. We 
noted above that membership in certain groups may exclude one from various types of 
ethical praxis, and so from the acquisition of virtues deemed inappropriate to that group. 
There are, we may now add, a number of other cases in which one might be denied 
ethically significant praxical opportunities. As Martha Nussbaum notes, because in 
Aristotle’s view “an average life is hedged round by dangers of impediment,” 
unconstrained activity “begins to look like the rare or lucky item” (328).  As we will see, 
agents must enjoy a considerable degree of good fortune if they are to be supplied with 
sufficient opportunities to maintain virtue over a lifetime.  
 In extreme cases, ethically significant activity may be blocked completely. 
Because Aristotle maintains that virtue is a stable active condition (hexis), we might 
assume that virtuous agents would maintain their virtues despite the inability to act. 
However, as noted above, where virtue is concerned “the highest good” consists in use, 
not in possession (in actualization, not in potency). Goodness of character, like athletic 
conditioning, it “a kind of preparation for the activity; it finds it natural fulfillment and 
flourishing in activity” (Nussbaum 324). Just as “with those at the Olympic games, it is 
not the strongest or the most beautiful who are crowned, but those who compete,” so too 
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with those who are “beautiful and good,” only those who act rightly who are properly 
said to be accomplished in virtue (NE 1099a 5).55 As Nussbaum writes,  
[T]he endowment and condition are not sufficient for praise: the person 
has to do something […] our ethical assessments are based on actual effort 
and activity, as well as on the stable character that is the cause of the 
activity. Character alone is not sufficient. (324)     
To see why this claim is plausible, we might consider the extreme case of a virtuous adult 
who falls into a prolonged coma. It would sound odd, even to our modern ear, to say of 
such a person, “she is (being) so brave.” It would be more appropriate to refer to her 
known qualities of character in the past tense: “she was always so brave.” Those who 
would insulate the moral life from luck by locating its source in stable character, rather 
than activity, might say of such a person that she is still as morally good as she was, since 
her character has not been expunged.56 On Aristotle’s view, this view makes little sense; 
just as we would not call happy the person who sleeps through life (NE 1096a 1-2), “we 
are not going to be able to praise and congratulate this hopelessly inactive adult” 
(Nussbaum 323). 
 Impediments to ethical praxis may originate with the agent herself. Severe or 
prolonged illness, serious injury and psychological trauma may comprise insurmountable 
barriers to a broad range of activities. Those praxes which require kinesis, for example, 
are especially vulnerable to changes in agents’ health and motility. We might object to 
the claim that the maimed soldier, no longer capable of bearing arms, is barred from the 
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 The phrase “beautiful and good,” as Sachs notes, is often run together as one word, and is the term by 
which the aristocracy of Athens referred to itself (13, n. 18).  
 
56
 This view, which Nussbaum terms “good-condition theory,” is quite consistent with Kant’s ethics, as we 
will see.  
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praxis through which courage is actualized, but this view is quite consistent with 
Aristotle’s understanding of courage. We might be further offended by the suggestion 
that extreme ugliness could prevent an agent from actualizing her ethical potential, but in 
Aristotle’s view extremely unattractive people are unable to engage in moral friendship, 
and are thus barred from the complete acquisition of virtue (or actualization of self).57  
 The loss of loved ones presents a special kind of impediment to virtuous praxis. 
Grief is an extraordinarily disruptive force, throwing a wrench into the works of one’s 
daily life. Even if the emotional toll of grief were not sufficient to dampen agents’ ethical 
praxis (and we must admit that it often is), the loss of loved ones represents, says 
Aristotle, the loss of indispensible means for virtue. As we noted in the case of 
generosity, loved ones are the recipients or objects of virtuous activity; those who have 
become isolated through loss suffer a tragic privation of means for moral virtue. 
Friendship, which as we have noted is constituted in no small part by shared activity, 
loses much of its ethical force when the loss of a friend relegates it to the realm of mere 
memory.58 That relations of philia, which Aristotle so highly prizes, are by virtue of 
mortality deeply vulnerable to loss, is an especially tragic aspect of the moral life. 
 Paradoxically, many of the situations which provide opportunities for virtuous 
praxis are themselves intrinsically undesirable. Courage, for example, is actualized most 
fully in war, for its paradigmatic expression involves agents’ willingness to die for the 
sake of the polis. Although certain types of praxis may prepare a soldier to act 
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 See Nussbaum, p. 328. 
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 Necessary absences, says Aristotle “dissolve not the love [between friends] but its activity” (Nussbaum 
360, citing NE 1157b10-11). But as Nussbaum remarks, “This impediment to valued activity may already 
impede eudaimonia” (360). Where the friend’s absence is permanent, even the memory of that love may 
fade with time: “if the absence is of long duration,” Aristotle writes, “it appears to bring about forgetfulness 
of the love itself” (Nussbaum 360, citing NE 1157b10-11).    
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courageously in war, just as breathing exercises may prepare a woman to give birth, there 
is no substitute for the experience itself.59 The virtue of gentleness, which is characterized 
by reacting to wrongs with the appropriate measure of anger, and by properly directing 
and expressing that anger, arises in situations in which some measure of anger is called 
for. Righteous indignation, the mean condition between the extremes of “joy at the 
misfortunes of others” and “envy,” requires that others benefit undeservedly, since “the 
person inclined toward righteous indignation is pained at those who fare well without 
deserving it” (1108b 1-7).60 In each of these cases some intrinsically undesirable state of 
affairs opens up an opportunity for ethical praxis.61 It is commonly acknowledged that 
frustrating or extreme situations have a way of “revealing” moral character. From the 
Aristotelian perspective, it would be more accurate to say that such situations have a way 
of completing or perfecting moral character, since virtue is actualized in activity and such 
situations generally compel agents to act.62 The “luck” comprised by opportunities for 
ethical praxis may therefore be of a mixed kind. It is only with an appreciation for the 
paradoxical that we ought to call such luck “good.”  
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 In his classic essay, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good” (in A.O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 69-92), Myles Burnyeat maintains that analogous activities 
prepare agents for genuinely virtuous activity. Cruzer objects to this claim: “A defender of Burnyeat might 
maintain that […] previously performed courageous and temperate acts prepare us to resist warriors and 
seducers.  
Yet what is like war and seduction? Is Burnyeat ’s defender maintaining that habitually resisting pressure in 
committee meetings and declining hot fudge sundaes disposes us to want to stand fast when we find 
ourselves in our first battle and run fast from our first seduction? This seems implausible” (Cruzer 147).  
 
60Righteous indignation is the quasi-virtue which disposes one toward justice; the former has more to do 
with natural feelings than with an actively inculcated hexis.   
 
61
 To state it more strongly, we might say that the actualization of these virtues requires that agents find 
themselves in intrinsically undesirable situations.  
 
62
 Or at least to feel, and this, too, is morally significant. On Aristotle’s view, how we feel reveals what we 
value such that the righteously indignant person, in experiencing and expressing her indignation, is 
revealed to be someone who values justice.   
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  As we have said, an agent’s life is properly deemed eudaimonic only if her 
happiness persists over the course of her life, and if she dies well. So too is an agent 
virtuous only to the extent that she persists in virtuous activity throughout her life, for 
“one swallow does not make a Spring” (NE 1098a 19). Agents who are so blessed in 
youth and adulthood as to enjoy a multitude of opportunities for ethical praxis, who 
through proper training at the hands of virtuous teachers and their own active cultivation 
of character come to possess stable virtue as adults, remain ethically vulnerable to luck. It 
is a bitter truth that the very means and conditions which enable virtue also render 
character fragile. Friendship requires trust, and friends who appeared to be worthy of 
trust may prove false. Lovers may prove unfaithful, and those closest to us may die. 
Courage requires a beautiful and good end, and many an end that appeared just has a 
different aspect in hindsight. Acts we count among our most generous may turn out to 
benefit the undeserving. In all of these cases, ethical praxis paves the way for bitter 
regret, resentment of others, and a generally cynical attitude. In a decidedly unsettling 
passage in the Rhetoric, Aristotle remarks upon the toll of a lifetime of activity on the 
elderly: 
They have lived many years, they have often been taken in, and often 
made mistakes; and life on the whole is a bad business. The result is that 
they are sure about nothing and under-do everything. They ‘think,’ but 
they never ‘know;’ and because of their hesitation they always add a 
‘possibly’ or a ‘perhaps,’ putting everything in this way and nothing 
positively. They are cynical; that is, they tend to put the worst construction 
on everything. Further, their experience makes them distasteful and 
70 
 
therefore suspicious of evil. Consequently they neither love warmly nor 
hate bitterly, but following the hint of Bias they love as though they will 
some day hate and hate as though they will some day love. They are 
small-minded, because they have been humbled by life: their desires are 
set upon nothing more exalted or unusual than what will help to keep them 
alive. They are not generous, because money is one of the things they 
must have, and at the same time their experience has taught them how 
hard it is to get and how easy to lose. They are cowardly, and are always 
anticipating danger; unlike that of the young, who are warm-blooded, their 
temperament is chilly, old age has paved the way for cowardice; fear is, in 
fact, a form of chill. They love life; and all the more when their last day 
has come, because the object of all desire is something we have not got, 
and also because we desire most strongly that which we need most 
urgently. They are too fond of themselves; that is one form that small-
mindedness takes. Because of this, they guide their lives too much by 
considerations of what is useful and too little by what is noble— for the 
useful is what is good for oneself, and the noble what is good absolutely. 
They are not shy, but shameless rather; caring less for what is noble than 
for what is useful, they feel contempt for what people may think of them. 
They lack confidence in the future; partly through experience— for most 
things go wrong, or anyhow turn out worse than one expects (1389b 11-
1390a 5).  
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Aristotle’s account of the character of the elderly is quite disturbing, infecting as it 
appears to the moral life with a tragic taint. The very youthful activities through which 
virtue is actualized plant in agents the seeds of moral corruption: the young person, who 
due to her readiness to trust is easily duped, grows distrustful over time; the youth whose 
hopeful disposition buttresses her confidence takes grand risks, and when failure follows 
she loses hope and grows fearful; the young person whose friendships are for the sake of 
the noble is often disappointed when friends turn out to be morally inferior, and in old 
age is suspicious of others and relies on friendships of mere use alone.63 In sum, the 
activities which we would be inclined to count among virtuous praxes— trusting readily, 
giving generously, speaking confidently, loving fiercely, and acting boldly— may in 
retrospect be counted among so many ‘errors’ of youth.64 But such ethical “failures” in 
youth are not simply the result of ethical praxis; they have much to do with how our 
projects and relationships actually turn out. These outcomes, in turn, have much to do 
with luck. We can certainly imagine that two agents, having spent their adulthoods 
engaging in the same types of praxis but with radically more and less fortunate results, 
might grow over time into people with radically different characters. There is every 
reason to believe that the sustained virtue which Aristotle values most, and which he 
counts among the necessary components of a eudaimonic life, requires that agents be 
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 For Aristotle’s account of the character of the young, from which these claims are drawn, see Rhetoric, 
1389a 3-1389b 11.  
 
64
 There is, says Aristotle, something “excessive” about the mean condition; this is especially obvious in his 
discussion of generosity: “But it is most definitely characteristic of a generous person to go to excess in the 
giving” (NE 1120b 9).   
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blessed both with adequate opportunities for the exercise of virtue, and that their virtuous 
undertakings turn out somewhat well.65 
 
Needful “Things”: External Goods and Virtue 
 Aristotle is most reluctant to construe other people as mere means, or beings 
whose value lies in their usefulness. One sign of this is his portrayal of friendships of 
mere usefulness as quasi-friendships, or relationships which lack the characteristics that 
render moral friendship truly noble (see NE 1157a 15-1157b5). Nonetheless, Aristotle 
counts friendships among external goods.66 That such relationships are for Aristotle key 
means to ethical praxis should be clear from what has been said above. We should here 
note that friendship is necessary to the good life in two distinct but related ways: first, 
intrinsically, as a key component of a happy life, and second, as an instrumental means to 
the actualization of one’s moral and intellectual virtue, indeed of one’s very selfhood. 
These claims are related, inasmuch as virtue and eudaimonia are related; we need friends 
in order to be happy, and we need friends in order to become and remain good (and we 
need to become and remain good in order to be happy). The same relationship, Aristotle 
maintains, holds true for other external goods: our happiness requires a sufficient stock 
external goods generally, and our goodness requires a sufficient stock of external goods 
(and our happiness requires that we become and remain good).  
 Before concluding our examination of the means which enable the actualization 
of virtue, we ought to say a word about material means, and in particular, about the role 
of wealth as an instrumental means to virtue. Aristotle counts civic education, political 
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 Or at least that such undertakings do not consistently turn out so badly as to mar their ethical disposition 
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 Philoi are, says Aristotle, “the greatest of the external goods” (NE 1169b10). 
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activity and shared philosophical dialogue among the boons to a virtuous and happy 
life.67 As a rule, the wealthy and privileged enjoy greater access to all three; this was 
certainly so in ancient Athens, and seems to be the case our own time and place as well. 
To note these facts is to revisit the suspicion that Aristotle’s ethics appears to exclude all 
but the privileged from the best kind of life. To whatever extent we share Aristotle’s 
vision of the good life (and perhaps even if we do not), we must admit that externals such 
as personal wealth and social position have much to do with agents’ ability to flourish. 
Despite his presumed elitism, Aristotle is not unaware of the latter fact. Unlike the Stoic 
who maintains that ‘the sage is immune to misfortune,’ Aristotle would surely appreciate 
that it is largely as a result of luck that one is able to become and persist as a sage. For he 
holds, as we may recall, that the best kind of life stands in need of external goods. One 
must be fortunate indeed to receive an excellent education, attain a political office or 
commence a philosophical life, and even those types of life which are most self-
sufficient—that of the politician and, to a greater degree, that of the philosopher— 
require sustenance.  
 Certain of the moral virtues seem especially in need of external goods, and these 
include generosity, magnificence and greatness of soul. Aristotle discusses them in 
succession in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, and not by coincidence: each exceeds 
the former in some way.  Generosity is “the mean condition which concerns money,” and 
for the most part the giving of money (NE 1119b 20). It stands as a mean condition 
between the deficiency of stinginess and the excess of wastefulness. As with certain other 
virtues, the mean condition of generosity itself has the appearance of excessiveness, for: 
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 Nussbaum offers a useful analysis of why, on Aristotle’s view, virtuous life requires public or civic 
education, as opposed to proper parenting alone; see pp. 345-346.   
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“it is most definitely characteristic of a generous person to go to excess in the giving” 
(1120b 6-7). Generosity is oddly self-diminishing; since the generous agent is more 
concerned with sharing wealth than with procuring it, this virtue tends to be its own self-
undoing. This is true whether the agent has only moderate means or great wealth initially 
(NE 1120b 8-12). The agent who is most assured of continuing income is most able to 
practice generosity on an ongoing basis. We might be tempted to secure the virtue of 
generosity from the caprices of fortune by extending it to other kinds of behavior, and 
indeed we often speak of those who volunteer as generous with their time, or those who 
willingly share their admiration as generous with their praise, but for Aristotle the 
province of generosity is confined to agents’ behavior with money. 
 Magnificence is closely related to generosity, but surpasses the latter in 
magnitude. “[I]t does not extend,” writes Aristotle, “as generosity does, to all actions 
involving money but only concerns lavish expenditures,” such as those associated with 
public festivals, military campaigns or diplomatic endeavors (NE 1122a 18-19). Thus “a 
magnificent person is generous, but it does not follow that a generous person is 
magnificent” (NE 1122a 29-30). The deficiency of magnificence is chintziness, which 
entails spending as little money as is required and doing so with pain, and the excess is 
vulgarity, which involves spending more than the occasion requires or generally making 
“a big display that is out of tune” (NE 1123a 20-21).68 Magnificence involves public 
activity or work, and the excellence of such work lies “in its grandeur” (NE 1122b 18). 
Thus only sufficiently grand people are capable of magnificence. When the poor, or those 
who lack sufficient property or family connections, attempt magnificence, they merely 
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 For example, “by bringing food fit for a wedding to a pot-luck dinner, or, when fitting a chorus of comic 
actors, bringing them onstage in the opening scene in royal purple” (NE 1123a 22-23).  
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reveal their own foolishness (NE 1122b 27). Magnificence is an unequivocally elite 
virtue; Aristotle writes: “But magnificence is appropriate to those who have such means, 
either on their own or from their ancestors or those with whom they are connected, as 
well as those who are well born or well thought of or anything of that sort, since all these 
things include greatness and worth” (NE 1122b 30-35).  
 Greatness of soul (megalopsychia) is a special kind of virtue, being one of four 
states of character which require the co-presence of all of the moral virtues.69 “It is 
necessary,” Aristotle writes, “for one who is great-souled in the true sense to be good, 
and what is great in each virtue would seem to belong to someone who is great-souled” 
(NE 1123b 30-31). The great-souled person “is one who considers himself worthy of 
great things, and is worthy of them,” by virtue of being “the best human being” (NE 
1123b 3-4; 1123b 28). The external good which the great-souled person most seems to 
deserve is honor, and specifically that kind of honor bestowed upon those who perform 
“the most beautiful deeds;” thus “the great-souled person is concerned with honors and 
acts of dishonor in the way one ought to be” (NE 1123b 21-22).70 The great-souled 
person stands in need of external goods, but so stands with a degree of detachment: “he 
will surely hold himself moderately toward wealth and power and every sort of good 
                                                           
69
 The others being phronesis 1144b 30-1145a 2), justice (1129b 25-27) and moral friendship (1157a 18-19, 
29-31).  
 
70
 Honor (timê) involves both the high esteem of others and the bestowing of prizes, including awards and 
political offices. Sachs draws a useful distinction between honor and what we tend to call self-respect, 
noting that in Aristotle’s ethics “the sense of one’s own worth, when this is both accurate and considerable, 
is called greatness of soul” (207). One characteristic of the great-souled person is that he is not overly-
concerned with seeking honor, since others are generally of a lower moral caliber than himself, and their 
esteem is worth less than his own high opinion of himself.   
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fortune and bad fortune” (NE 1124a 16-17).71 But greatness of soul, like all virtue, stands 
in need of a considerable degree of good fortune; the life of the great-souled person, self-
sustaining though it may be once established, is aided by fortune, since: 
[T]he things that come from good fortune also seem to contribute toward 
greatness of soul, for those who are well-born consider themselves worthy 
of honor, as do those who are powerful or rich, since they are in a superior 
position, and everything that is superior in respect to something good is 
held in higher honor. (NE 1124a 22-25) 
High birth and wealth not only ease the way for the acquisition of moral virtue generally 
but also inspire in agents an initial sense of self-worth which is perfected through virtue. 
Greatness of soul and good fortune stand, then, in a reciprocal relation of need: good 
fortune needs virtue if it is to be carried of harmoniously (1124a 29-30), and virtue needs 
good fortune for its fulfillment and sustenance.72   
Constrained Choice: Human Activity and the Tragic 
  Thus far we have examined two ways in which tychē emerges as a challenge to 
the acquisition and sustenance of virtue in Aristotle’s ethics, the first related to social 
context and the second related to praxical opportunities and external goods. We may now 
turn to the problem posed by tychē which, as we will see in Chapter III, is most easily 
conceptualized as an instantiation of moral luck. This third challenge is born of the fact 
that many ethically significant choices are framed by considerable external constraints. 
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 As Aristotle suggests in the Posterior Analytics, greatness of soul may belong to people of low birth or 
little fortune who, like Socrates, “do not care about good or bad fortune” (97b 14-26; Sachs 205). 
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 Which is clear from Aristotle’s descriptions of the great-souled person’s activity, which involves the 
performance of great deeds and the liberal doing of favors, both of which require the aid of external goods 
(see NE 1099a 30). What is true of generosity, magnificence and greatness of soul is in essence true of 
virtue more generally: fortune and virtue stand in a relation of mutual need.    
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Even the most virtuous agent may, through no fault of her own, be thrust into situations 
in which she must perform intrinsically regrettable or blameworthy actions. Such actions 
may, despite their being easily construed as forgivable by those who witness them, 
irreparably harm the psyche of the agent who performs them.  
 In Book Three of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle examines the conditions of 
voluntariness at some length. He begins by remarking that “virtue is concerned with 
feelings and actions, and praise and blame come about for willing actions, but for 
unwilling actions there is forgiveness and sometimes even pity” (NE 1109b 34-35). Thus, 
he argues, “it is no doubt a necessary thing for those who inquire about virtue to 
distinguish what is a willing act and what is an unwilling act, and it is a useful thing for 
lawmakers as well, with a view to honors and punishments” (NE 1109b 33-35). As Susan 
Meyer notes, Aristotle appears to be here attempting to make explicit the connection 
between voluntariness and moral responsibility (40-41). He immediately identifies as 
willing those actions which have their origin (archē kinēsēos) in the agent and unwilling 
those acts which originate outside of the agent:  
Now it seems that unwilling acts are those that happen by force […] a 
forced act being one of which the source is external, and an act is of this 
sort in which the person acting, or being acted upon, contributes nothing, 
for instance if a wind carries one off somewhere, or people do who are in 
control (NE 1110a 1-4). 
But this basic claim rightly gives rise to a dispute, since many actions are of a mixed 
kind, having their (kinetic) origin in the agent, but coming about on account of external 
constraints. Such is the case, Aristotle notes, when one throws goods overboard during a 
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storm, for “no one simply throws them away willingly, but all those who have any sense 
do so for their own safety and that of the rest of the people aboard” (NE 1110a 9-11). 
External constraints may include coercion; Aristotle considers a scenario in which a 
tyrant is in control of one’s parents and children, and asks one to do something shameful, 
“and in the case of one’s doing it they would be saved but as a result of not doing it they 
would be killed” (NE 1110a 7-9). In both cases, says Aristotle, the actions are mixed, 
“but they are more like willing acts, since at the time when they are done they are 
preferred” (1110a 13).   
 The abandonment of goods during a storm for the sake of preserving human lives 
seems at worst a forgivable act. So, too, would an agent in all likelihood be forgiven for 
doing any number of shameful things for the sake of protecting her family. Indeed, 
Aristotle notes that “Sometimes people are even praised for actions of this sort,” though 
they are “willing” only in a qualified sense, being intrinsically unchoiceworthy (NE 
1110a 19-20). But it is exceedingly difficult, Aristotle confesses, to know which actions 
ought to be done and for the sake of what ends where choice is severely constrained. 
Some things done “for fear of greater evils,” or “for the sake of something beautiful” may 
be forgivable,73 some met with pity and some praised, but the appropriateness of these 
judgments has everything to do with the particulars of the situation.74 
 Moral assessments designating praise, blame, pity or forgiveness arise via 
analyses of how and why an agent acted in a given situation. Such assessments generally 
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 Forgiveness (sun-gnomê) is, as Sachs writes, “a judgment made by putting oneself in another’s place in 
imagination, that the other person’s action was wrong, but only for reasons no human being could be 
expected to overcome” (37). I return to the topic of forgiveness in Chapter VI.  
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 Aristotle writes, “But it is not easy to give an account of what sort of things one ought to choose in return 
for what sort of ends, since there are many differences among the particular ends” (NE 1110b 7-9).  
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come from outside the agent herself.75 But that a particular action is deemed forgivable 
by others does little to address the true problem of luck as it relates to constrained choice, 
since often the real damage from such actions is not to one’s reputation or status vis-à-vis 
the law, but instead to one’s psyche. This claim, though not explicitly acknowledged in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, is quite consistent with Aristotle’s conception of virtue. Virtue 
is concerned with both actions and with feelings, and one sign of an agent’s virtuous 
condition is the way she feels about her own actions, and more specifically, whether or 
not she feels remorse for her unwilling actions. In both the case of the seafarer and that of 
the victim of coercion, the agent would in all likelihood have somewhat mixed feelings 
about her action, and indeed, she should. Since those who act unwillingly “act with pain” 
and experience remorse, it stands to reason that mixed actions will and should produce 
mixed feelings in agents who reflect upon their actions after the fact; an agent who does 
something intrinsically wrong for the sake of some greater good would rightly be called 
callous, or worse, were she to feel no remorse whatsoever (NE 1110b 4).  
 Feeling remorse is an incredibly important ethical experience. It has a way of 
making agents mindful of what they should value— as it might for a youth who is just 
beginning to recognize the good— or of keeping them mindful of the same when they go 
astray. But where no such reminder is required, as in the case of one who does something 
intrinsically unchoiceworthy for the sake a greater good, remorse seems both natural and 
utterly useless. Indeed, we can imagine how remorse might be so damaging to an agent as 
                                                           
75
 One peculiarity of the extant literature on moral luck is that it tends to assume that some other agent is 
being assessed. The conflict which seems most to characterize moral luck is, in my opinion, a conflict 
between rational judgments about responsibility and feelings that arise via the existing values of the person 
passing judgment. This conflict is easier to appreciate when we reflect upon our moral assessments of our 
own actions: to feel remorse for actions that we were at best ambiguously responsible for is a rather 
common human experience.  Aristotle’s account of the tragic emotion of pity comes close to capturing why 
this is so; we pity tragic characters who suffer remorse despite having acted under extreme duress, but we 
understand why they feel remorse, and may even praise them for doing so.    
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to ethically incapacitate her, even to leave her suicidal.76 If it is true that remorse does 
and should sometimes follow unwilling or mixed actions, as we have said, then moral 
agency leaves us vulnerable to an unsettlingly tragic experience: we may suffer and 
suffer deeply for actions which we are at best ambiguously responsible for.77  
 Ethical Life and Human Vulnerability 
 Aristotle is as desirous as many modern philosophers to secure what is finest 
about human selfhood from the slings and arrows of fortune. Thus the Nicomachean 
Ethics carves a painstaking path to the life of philosophical reflection, a life which is as 
self-sufficient as any human life can be. But as we have seen, whether or how far an 
agent may proceed along that path is largely beyond her control, and even the life of the 
philosopher stands in need of external goods. Within the Aristotelian ethical account, 
which is decidedly persuasive, luck is an inescapable facet of human experience. If luck 
is, as we have said, that which befalls an agent as opposed to what she makes or does, 
then luck is entangled with the whole of human activity, which always arises within a 
particular social and material context. Human life is intrinsically tragic not only because 
bad luck may impede moral development or destroy the happiness of even the most 
virtuous agents, but also and especially because those things which are most worthy of 
choice— including and especially relations of philia— are also the most vulnerable to 
loss. What is striking about Aristotle’s vision is that it doesn’t entail the abandonment of 
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 I will return to the experience of remorse at some length in Chapter III, where I will maintain that we 
should feel remorse even for actions which we are not wholly responsible for, because it is generally 
consistent with our values to do so. But living in such a vulnerable state, I will suggest, is too great a 
psychological burden for any agent to endure alone, and gives rise to the need for human kindness and 
compassion.   
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 Not only does this conclusion appear to follow from an analysis of Aristotle’s conceptions of remorse 
and voluntariness, but it is also reflected in his analyses of the tragic in the Poetics, which we will examine 
in Chapter V.   
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deep personal attachments for the sake of preserving some adamantine moral core, as 
Stoicism appears to. Instead, Aristotle calls upon us to value those relations which render 
us vulnerable above all else, since it is in and through our relationships that we celebrate 
what is best about human life, and actualize what is most divine in ourselves.78 The moral 
life is one of risk and vulnerability, and as such requires profound courage and a 
willingness to trust in others. Success, construed as eudaimonia, is a rare thing indeed, 
yet its pursuit feels to us at least as necessary as its realization seems impossible.    
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 Unlike the Stoics, who spurn political attachments, Aristotle also calls us to attend to the political; though 
the life of the politician may be second to that of the philosopher, it is a life dedicated to the widespread 
proliferation of virtue, and is thus both noble and necessary. 
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CHAPTER III 
 THE PROBLEM OF MORAL LUCK 
“[W]hile there are various respects in which the natural objects of moral assessment 
 are out of our control or influenced by what is out of our control,  
we cannot reflect on these facts without losing our grip  
on the judgments.” 
-Thomas Nagel 
Introduction 
As we observed in Chapter II, in Aristotle’s view human flourishing is tethered to 
a vast array of circumstances beyond agents’ control. The way of life which is most self-
sufficient— that of the philosopher— arises within a context that agents cannot create, 
and stands in need of externals which include excellent friends and a sufficient stock of 
material goods. Virtue is not, for Aristotle, sufficient for eudaimonia, and even if it were, 
virtue itself is actualized only in the presence of certain praxical opportunities and with 
the help of external goods. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle says so little about 
the relationship between human excellence and personal responsibility. Were he to hold 
agents strictly accountable for their moral characters, or to emphasize the ethical 
significance of particular acts over that of stable character, Aristotle’s ethical philosophy 
would incubate the problem of moral luck in much the same way that Kantian moral 
philosophy does.1 Yet Aristotle’s engagement with the phenomenon of luck is complex 
and multifaceted. Perhaps the problem of moral luck which confronts Kantian philosophy 
may also challenge particular aspects of Aristotle’s ethical vision in subtle ways. We will 
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 Aristotle discusses the conditions of voluntariness at some length in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
but does so primarily in relation to particular acts. There is only one moment in the Ethics in which he 
attaches responsibility to character, and this attachment is later problematized via his account of how 
character arises. Even in relation to particular acts, Aristotle is very much aware of what we might call 
ambiguous responsibility. I will address these claims more fully below.   
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explore this possibility below, once we have a clearer grasp of how the problem of moral 
luck arises, and what challenges it poses to moral philosophy and to ethical life. 
Williams, Nagel and the Origin of the Problem of Moral Luck 
Any student of both Aristotelian and Kantian moral philosophy might be tempted 
to diagnose the latter as suffering from a pathological denial of the problem of luck. But 
this view is too simplistic. Indeed, a profound awareness of the power of luck to 
influence human life seems to be the driving force behind historical attempts at 
preserving morality. Kant’s practical philosophy might best be placed within the ethical 
tradition which sprung from Stoicism and makes its chief project the insulation of the 
moral life from the caprices of fortune. This project, we must confess, has been decidedly 
successful; that morality is insulated from the assaults of luck is now a rather 
commonplace belief, both within and beyond academia. It cannot suffice, as Bernard 
Williams therefore argues, that we depict Kant as a moral extremist. The Kantian attempt 
to escape ethical luck is “no arbitrary enterprise,” writes Williams, but indeed “so 
intimate to our notion of morality, in fact, that its failure may rather make us consider 
whether we should not give up that notion altogether” (ML 22). It is therefore with irony 
that Williams thought to announce the “problem” of moral luck. Williams writes, “when I 
introduced the expression moral luck, I expected it to suggest an oxymoron” (Statman 
251). His reasoning, which captures to a great extent the Kantian position, was roughly as 
follows. 
In the realm of character, Williams writes, “it is motive that counts, not style, or 
powers, or endowment” (ML 21). Thus what is morally significant about character is 
“unconditioned,” or unaffected by contingency. So, too, with action: “in action it is not 
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changes actually effected in the world, but intention” that is morally significant (ML 21). 
“Both the disposition to correct moral judgment, and the objects of such judgment, are on 
this view free from external contingency,” since both are the products of the 
unconditioned will (ML 20). The capacity for good will, which is synonymous with the 
capacity for rational agency, is presumably “present to any agent whatsoever, to anyone 
for whom the question can even present itself” (ML 21). Moral success thus results from 
the exercise of a “talent which all rational beings necessarily possess in the same degree” 
(ML 21).2 This egalitarian conception of morality is only sustainable, however, if we 
grant that moral value “possesses some special, indeed supreme, kind of dignity or 
importance” (ML 21).3 If moral success is prized above all else, and if all rational agents 
are equally capable of such success, then human life enjoys at least a “partial immunity” 
to luck. “Any conception of ‘moral luck,’ on this view” Williams writes, “is radically 
incoherent” (ML 21). This quintessentially Kantian position is as intuitively pleasing as it 
is popular, such that even the phrase “moral luck” sounds oxymoronic. “This,” Williams 
explains, “is because the Kantian conception embodies, in a very pure form, something 
which is basic to our ideal of morality” (ML 21).  
As appealing as the aim of making morality immune to misfortune may be, any 
such philosophical project “is bound to be disappointed,” for reasons hinted at by 
Williams and explicated most fully in Thomas Nagel’s now famous essay on moral luck 
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 Williams rightly notes that “Such a conception has an ultimate form of justice as its heart, and that is its 
allure. Kanitanism is only superficially repulsive— despite appearances; it offers an inducement, solace to 
a sense of the world’s unfairness” (ML 21).  
 
3
 Williams explains, “The thought that there is a kind of value which is, unlike others, accessible to all 
rational agents, offers little encouragement if that kind of value is merely a last resort, the doss-house of the 
spirit” (ML 21).  
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(ML 21).4 In what follows we will trace Nagel’s argument, noting in the process what he 
identifies as the four types of moral luck. We may then assess several popular “solutions” 
to the problem of moral luck.  
 
Nagel’s Explication of the Problem of Moral Luck 
 “Kant believed,” Nagel notes, “that good or bad luck should influence neither our 
moral judgment of a person and his actions, nor his moral assessment of himself” (Nagel 
ML 24). This belief arises from Kant’s conviction that the only thing which can be 
conceived of as good without qualification is the good will (Groundwork 393). The good 
will is intrinsically good; as Kant famously writes in the Groundwork: 
A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor 
because of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only through 
its willing, i.e. good in itself. When it is considered in itself, then it is to be 
esteemed very much higher than anything which it might ever bring about 
merely in order to favor some inclination, or even the sum total of all 
inclinations. Even if, by some especially unfortunate fate or by the 
niggardly provisions of stepmotherly nature, this will should be wholly 
lacking in the power to accomplish its purpose; if with the greatest effort it 
should yet achieve nothing […] yet would it, like a jewel, still shine by its 
own light as something which has its full value in itself. (394) 
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 Nagel’s essay on moral luck was originally published as a reply to Williams’ essay of the same name. See 
“Moral Luck,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. L (1976). Williams’ chief aim is 
not to identify the forms of moral luck, but instead to describe the influence of luck on the agent’s 
reflective moral self-assessments. This aim will be taken up below, when we consider what it might mean 
to show kindness to ourselves in our moral self-assessments.   
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Kant would presumably have held the same view regarding the bad will, believing, as 
Nagel suggests, that “whether it accomplishes its evil purposes is morally irrelevant” 
(Nagel ML 24). For Kant, an ill-intentioned act cannot be morally redeemed if it happens 
by chance to result in some desirable consequence, any more than a well-intentioned act 
can be morally marred by a negative outcome. This quintessentially Kantian view, as 
Nagel argues, “seems to be wrong,” since in our ordinary moral assessments we tend to 
consider both intentions and results, reserving our highest praise for well-intentioned acts 
that effect positive change, and our most serious censure for ill-intentioned acts that cause 
great harm (24). Even so, the Kantian position arises quite naturally, Nagel argues, “in 
response to a fundamental problem about moral responsibility to which we possess no 
satisfactory solution” (Nagel ML 25). This problem is none other than the problem of 
moral luck. 
 Moral luck develops, Nagel suggests, out of the ordinary conditions of moral 
judgment (Nagel ML 25). “Prior to reflection,” Nagel posits, “it is intuitively plausible 
that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for what is due to 
factors beyond their control” (Nagel ML 25). This belief is at the very heart of ordinary 
notions of moral responsibility. We may make judgments about the desirability or 
undesirability of some outcome or state of affairs, but such judgments are in addition to, 
and not to be conflated with, our moral assessments of agents. As Nagel writes, “when 
we blame someone for his actions we are not merely saying that it is bad that they 
happened, or bad that he exists, we are judging him, saying he is bad” (Nagel ML 25). 
Our assumption, which we may be more or less consciously aware of, is that he is 
responsible for his actions and character. Thus our desire to morally assess an agent 
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diminishes if we learn that “the act or attribute, no matter how good or bad,” is not under 
his control (Nagel ML 25). Other evaluations, including judgments about the desirability 
of the consequences or state of affairs, may persist, but our belief that the agent ought to 
be morally assessed “seems to lose its footing” when there is a clear absence of control 
(Nagel ML 25).  
 If the presence or absence of control were easily determined, the problem of 
moral luck need never emerge. Where control was clearly lacking, we would simply 
excuse an agent from moral assessment. But control is usually, and perhaps always, a 
matter of degree. Oddly, however, and as Nagel notes, our tendency to exempt agents 
from moral assessment does not extend to actions and traits which involve some 
indeterminate degree of control: “external influences in this broader range are not usually 
thought to excuse what is done from moral judgment” (Nagel ML 25). The consequence 
is that we often persist with moral assessment in cases where the agent is not clearly 
responsible for the trait or action in question, praising, for example, the highly privileged 
student for her academic successes, and withholding praise or even blaming the 
underprivileged student for her mediocre academic performance. Whether or not we are 
aware of it, the dictum that regulates our moral assessments seems to be, ‘When in doubt, 
judge.’ The possible reasons for this tendency are too numerous to explore here. Perhaps 
our desire to reward the good and punish the wicked is more deep-seated than our 
willingness to suspend judgment. Perhaps we simply fear to admit how little control we 
have over who we are and what we do. Regardless of its source, this tendency to favor 
judgment over the withholding of judgment gives rise to the problem of moral luck. 
Moral luck emerges when we judge agents for actions or character traits for which they 
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are at best ambiguously responsible for: “Where a significant aspect of what someone 
does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as 
an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck” (Nagel ML 26).  
 Moral luck, like many other philosophical problems, involves a kind of paradox. 
But unlike most philosophical problems, which have little bearing on most agents’ daily 
lives and therefore remain the province of academics alone, moral luck entails a real and 
pressing problem for all who practice moral assessment. It is perhaps for this reason that 
Nagel urges his readers to appreciate the considerable diversity and great extent of the 
problem of moral luck. To that end he offers a number of now-famous examples. 
“However jewel-like the good will may be in its own rights,” Nagel begins, “there is a 
morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and 
dropping him from a twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him” (Nagel ML 25). 
There is a similar distinction to be made between reckless driving and manslaughter, even 
though “whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the 
pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passed a red light” (Nagel ML 25). What we 
do, Nagel further notes, depends in many ways upon the opportunities available to us, 
such that “someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet 
and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany,” and vice versa 
(Nagel ML 26). We can appreciate just how far-reaching the problem of moral luck is if 
we note, with Nagel, that “Whether or not we succeed or fail in what we try to do nearly 
always depends to some extent on factors beyond our control” (Nagel ML 25). This is 
true not only of action in general but also of most if not all morally significant acts: 
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“What has been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by external 
factors” (Nagel ML 25).  
 The problem posed by moral luck which, as Nagel suggests “lead Kant to deny its 
possibility,” is that a wide array of influences “seems on close examination to undermine 
moral assessment as surely as does the narrower range of familiar excusing conditions” 
(Nagel ML 26). The acts and traits for which people are morally judged are determined, 
as Nagel notes, “in more ways than we at first realize by what is beyond their control” 
(Nagel ML26). Thus, when the intuitively plausible Control Principle— which holds that 
agents ought only to be morally assessed for those actions or traits for which they are 
responsible— is applied in the light of this fact, “it leaves few pre-reflective moral 
judgments intact.” (Nagel ML 26). Although we are inclined to deny it, “Ultimately, 
nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control” 
(Nagel ML 26). Luck, both good and bad, therefore appears to erode the very foundation 
of moral assessment, and with it, a key aspect of the practice of moral judgment which is 
at the very heart of most moral systems. Whether or not any system of morality can 
survive in the absence of moral assessment is an open question, but it is certainly difficult 
to imagine a rule-based theory such as Kant’s in the absence of such judgment.5  
 If we are consistent in our application of the control principle, Nagel maintains, 
most or all of our moral assessments cease to be legitimate. So why not, we might ask, 
simply abandon the Control Principle? Perhaps the condition of control is false, in which 
case, as Nagel writes, we could “look instead for a more refined condition which picked 
out the kinds of lack of control that really undermine certain moral judgments” (Nagel 
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 This would be especially clear if it could be shown that the good will itself— construed by Kant as the 
alignment of the will with the dictates of the moral law— is subject to luck. As we will see below, Nagel 
suggests that it is. 
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ML 26). A more nuanced control condition could acknowledge the role of luck without 
yielding the unacceptable conclusion— that “most or all ordinary moral judgments are 
illegitimate”— derived from the unrefined control condition described above (Nagel ML 
26). Nagel rejects such a possibility on the grounds that the erosion of moral assessment 
emerges “not as the absurd conclusion of an over-simple theory, but as a natural 
consequence of the ordinary idea of moral assessment, when it is applied in view of a 
more complete and precise account of the facts” (Nagel ML 27). The broad condition of 
control “does not suggest itself merely as a generalization from certain clear cases,” but 
instead seems correct in all other cases to which it is extended” (Nagel ML 26). Thus the 
view that “moral luck is paradoxical,” as Nagel explains, “is not a mistake, ethical or 
logical, but a perception of one of the ways in which the intuitively acceptable conditions 
of moral judgment threaten to undermine it all” (Nagel ML 27).  
 In defense of his view that moral luck will remain a problem regardless of the 
number of cases to which it is applied, Nagel proceeds to describe several instances in 
which moral assessment is undermined by luck. These instances exemplify what he 
identifies as four fundamental types of moral luck: resultant luck, circumstantial luck, 
constitutive luck and causal luck. A number of popular “solutions” to the problem of 
moral luck appear to address only one type of luck, and/or to have limited applications to 
the other types or to the broader problem introduced by Williams and Nagel. It will 
therefore be useful to briefly examine each type of moral luck before assessing critical 
responses.  
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 Resultant Luck 
 Nagel uses the term “resultant luck” to designate luck in the way that one’s 
projects turn out. As with moral luck in general, resultant luck may be good or bad. To 
distinguish mere bad resultant luck from bad resultant moral luck, Nagel introduces a 
handful of examples. Consider, for instance, the case of a truck driver who accidentally 
runs over a child. Assuming that the driver’s behavior leading up to the event was 
irreproachable— that he was sober, attentive to his surroundings, obeying traffic laws and 
so on— then even though he would certainly feel bad about having run over the child, it 
would be incorrect to morally assess him for having done so. In such a case, the driver 
would most likely experience what Williams terms “agent regret,” but what cannot yet be 
called bad moral luck (Nagel ML 29). If, however, the driver was in any way negligent— 
having failed, for example, to have his brakes checked regularly—, and if his negligence 
contributed to the accident, then, as Nagel writes, “he will not merely feel terrible,” but 
he will also blame himself for the child’s death (ML 29). What makes the negligent 
driver’s case a case of bad resultant moral luck, as Nagel explains, “is that he would have 
to blame himself only slightly for the negligence itself if no situation arose which 
required him to brake suddenly and violently to avoid hitting a child” (ML 29). Yet the 
negligence itself, as Nagel points out, is the same whether or not the driver actually hits a 
child, and “the driver has no control over whether a child will run into his path” (ML 29). 
 Resultant luck may also occur in cases of extreme negligence. Perhaps the most 
famous example of such negligence involves drunk driving. The drunk driver who 
accidentally drives onto a sidewalk may, as Nagel suggests, count himself morally lucky 
if there happen to be no pedestrians in his path (ML 29). Had there been pedestrians in 
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his path, he would be both morally responsible and legally culpable for their deaths. 
“But,” Nagel writes, “if he hurts no one, although his recklessness is exactly the same he 
is guilty of a far less serious legal offense and will certainly reproach himself and be 
reproached by others much less severely” (ML 29). In both our moral assessments and in 
our juridical practice, Nagel notes, we regularly distinguish degrees of wrongdoing by 
both intentions and actual outcome. Such is the case, for example, with attempted 
murder: “the penalty for attempted murder is less than that for successful murder— 
however similar the intentions and motives of the assailant may be in the two cases 
(Nagel ML 29). The assailant’s degree of culpability can depend, as Nagel notes, “on 
whether the victim happened to be wearing a bullet-proof vest,” or on any number of 
other matters beyond his own control (ML 29). 
 Resultant luck is often at play when agents make decisions under uncertain 
circumstances, as when “Anna Karenina goes off with Vronsky, Gaugin leaves his 
family, Chamberlain signs the Munich agreement, the Decemberists persuade the troops 
under their control to revolt against the czar, the American colonies declare their 
independence from Britain,” and so on (Nagel ML 29). It is tempting, as Nagel notes, “in 
all such cases to feel that some decision must be possible, in the light of what is known at 
the time, which will make reproach unsuitable no matter how things turn out” (ML 29). 
But, Nagel argues, this is not the case. When an agent acts in such a case, he “takes his 
life, or his moral position, into his hands, “because the ultimate outcome of his action 
largely determines its moral status (ML 29). We might, Nagel cedes, also assess the 
action taking into account only what the agent knew at the time, but our moral assessment 
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does not and cannot end there. The outcomes of such actions are morally significant, thus 
our moral assessments will and must take them into account; for example:  
If the Decembrists had succeeded in overthrowing Nicolas I in 1825 and 
establishing a constitutional regime, they would be heroes. As it is, not 
only did they fail and pay for it, but they bore some responsibility for the 
terrible punishments meted out to the troops who had been persuaded to 
follow them. (Nagel ML 30) 
 Decisions are quite difficult when agents cannot clearly foresee the possible outcomes. 
Yet often, action is required despite such restraints. Although we may morally assess how 
agents make decisions under such circumstances, Nagel’s point is that the latter is but one 
type of moral assessment that we do and must engage in. We must also, he argues, take 
into account the actual results of agents’ actions: “Actual results influence culpability or 
esteem in a large class of unquestionably ethical cases ranging from negligence through 
political choice” (Nagel ML 30). If our judgments in such cases were merely 
“expressions of temporary attitudes” rather than genuine moral judgments, then resultant 
luck would be less problematic. But as Nagel points out, such is not the case: “this is 
evident,” he writes, “from the fact that one can say in advance how the moral verdict will 
depend upon the results” (ML 30).6 Resultant luck, it would seem, is not easily dispensed 
with.   
 
 
                                                           
6
 Nagel illustrates: “If one negligently leaves the bath water running with the baby in it, one will realize, as 
one bounds up the stairs toward the bathroom, that if the baby has drowned one has done something awful, 
whereas if it has not one has merely been careless” (ML 31).  
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 Circumstantial Luck 
 That one can be more or less fortunate in one’s circumstances is hardly worth 
disputing, and was illustrated at some length in Chapter II. As Nagel points out, luck in 
one’s circumstances may contribute to a second type of moral luck. We like to believe 
that we would exhibit good character if put to the test, and we easily persist in such a 
belief if we are fortunate enough never to have it tested. Similarly, it is easy enough for 
us to judge harshly those whose cowardice, selfishness or complacency is revealed in the 
face of some adversity, even or especially if we ourselves have never been subjected to a 
similar trial. In general, our moral assessments of ourselves and others fail to appreciate 
the fact that we do not create our own morally significant circumstances. Yet, as Nagel 
writes, “The things we are called upon to do, the moral tests we face, are importantly 
determined by factors beyond our control” (ML 33).  
 A familiar example of circumstantial luck is that of civilian complacency in Nazi 
Germany: “Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically 
by opposing the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and most of them 
are culpable for having failed this test” (Nagel ML 34). But his is a test, as Nagel points 
out, that the citizens of other countries did not have to face. It is entirely possible, if not 
highly probable, that the citizens of other countries would have behaved just as badly had 
they been similarly put to the test. That German citizens are to be blamed is largely the 
result of their having been unfortunate enough to have lived in a particular place at a 
particular time, yet we do and must blame them since, “We judge people for what they 
actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstances had 
been different” (Nagel ML 34).  
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 Here again, Nagel points out, our ordinary approach to moral assessment gives 
rise to a philosophical problem. In cases of circumstantial luck, “one is morally at the 
mercy of fate, and it may seem irrational upon reflection, but our ordinary moral attitudes 
would be unrecognizable without it” (ML 34). As with resultant luck, the paradoxical 
nature of moral assessment is evident, but with circumstantial luck “we can begin to see 
how deep in the concept of responsibility the paradox is embedded” (Nagel ML 34). 
Although we may believe that an agent is only morally responsible for what he does, 
what he does results from “a great deal” that he does not do. As Nagel therefore 
concludes, “he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not morally responsible 
for” (ML 34). This is not, Nagel maintains, a contradiction, but is instead a paradoxical 
and fundamental truth which arises out of our ordinary beliefs about moral assessment.  
 If the practice of moral assessment is undermined, as it appears to be, by resultant 
and circumstantial luck, then perhaps the locus of moral assessment ought to shift from 
actions and their outcomes to agents’ moral characters and intentions. If character and/or 
the good will can be affirmed as sites of human agency immune to luck, then the practice 
of moral assessment can be preserved, at least to some extent. The tendency to pare down 
the scope of moral assessment to the “morally essential core” of each act is, as Nagel 
notes, quite pervasive. Adam Smith famously advocates such a position in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, but, as Nagel notes, Smith is aware that it “runs contrary to our actual 
judgments” (ML 31-32).7 As we will see below, a number of contemporary theorists 
favor a similar approach. In Nagel’s view, neither human character nor the will itself 
evade the problem of moral luck. The latter is subject to constitutive luck, and the former 
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 See Smith, Part II, section 3, paragraph 5. 
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is subject both to constitutive and to causal luck. Let us see why, in Nagel’s view, this is 
the case. 
 Constitutive Luck 
 Those who wish to preserve the practice of moral assessment despite rather 
obvious instances of moral luck often favor isolating human character from the vast array 
of phenomena which are more clearly beyond agents’ power to control. Yet those who 
advocate such an approach must cede, as Kant does, that many qualities of personality or 
temperament which we commonly associate with moral character are not— at least in an 
obvious way— under agents’ control.8 To morally assess agents based upon the 
possession or privation of such qualities would be as unjust as morally assessing them 
based upon their physiological qualities. That we must reserve our praise and blame for 
those qualities which are within agents’ power to control is especially true within Kant’s 
system, since it explicitly identifies moral agency with control. Indeed, as Nagel writes, 
“Kant was particularly insistent on the moral irrelevance of qualities of temperament or 
personality that are not under the control of the will” (Nagel ML 32). As Nagel writes, in 
Kant’s view: 
Such qualities as sympathy or coldness might provide the background 
against which obedience to moral requirements is more or less difficult, 
                                                           
8
 This is one of Waller’s chief claims in Against Moral Responsibility. Waller cites numerous behavioral 
studies which suggest that personality and much of what falls under the umbrella of “character” is 
essentially the result of genetics, upbringing and circumstances that agents do not control. Whether or to 
what extent we are responsible for our personalities is to me an open question, and best left to those who 
employ the scientific method. I concur with Aristotle and Kant, however, that whether or not one possesses 
“natural virtue” is morally irrelevant. Virtue is always relative to the agent, thus (assuming agents possesses 
the requisite mental capacities) any agent can become virtuous with proper training and praxis, regardless 
of innate personality. Both Waller and Nagel fail to adequately distinguish between virtue properly 
speaking (“in the governing sense,” as Aristotle says) and personality traits or “natural virtues.” This is one 
reason why constitutive moral luck ought not to be conflated with the broader problem of tychē vis-à-vis 
character as described by Aristotle.  
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but they could not be objects of moral assessment themselves, and might 
well interfere with confident assessment of its proper object— the 
determination of the will by the motive of duty (ML 32). 
This stipulation, says Nagel, rules out the moral assessment of all virtues and vices that 
influence choice, but do not strictly determine the will. The range of character traits that 
ought to be subjected to moral assessment is therefore narrow indeed, and excludes most 
familiar virtues and vices.9  
 Kant’s belief that we ought not to assess most character traits has a commonsense 
appeal. Most agents do seem able to work against their inclinations, including those 
inclinations which we associate with traits of character. A courageous person, for 
example, may be more inclined to act with courage, but even a cowardly person can act 
with courage where duty requires him to do so. Indeed, many vicious inclinations may be 
overcome via what Nagel conceives of as a monumental effort of will: “A person may be 
greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or conceited,” yet 
successfully will their behavior not to reflect such morally repugnant traits (ML 32). Even 
so, it would be inappropriate to say that such a person does not possess the 
aforementioned vices, if, as Nagel believes, to possess them “is to be unable to help 
having certain feelings under certain circumstances, and to have strong spontaneous 
impulses to act badly” (ML 32-33). In Nagel’s view, even if “one controls the impulses” 
which arise from a given vice, “one still has the vice” (ML 33).10 We might here object 
                                                           
9
 Assuming it does not exclude the assessment of virtue entirely. One possible candidate for moral 
assessment might be self-control, assuming that such a quality/practice can be construed as a virtue. But 
Nagel is skeptical regarding the extent to which we control our own willing.   
 
10
 I suspect Nagel either failed to read Aristotle’s account of virtue carefully, or has in mind some other 
conception of virtue when he makes the latter claims. Aristotle is careful to distinguish akrasia 
(dissipation)— which is akin to but not yet vice— from vice properly speaking. The agent who suffers 
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that virtues and vices must be actualized in order to merit censure, but Nagel rejects this 
possibility. Many vices, Nagel argues, need not be exposed in order to merit censure. An 
envious person may be condemned for his hatred of others’ success, even if he does not 
openly share such feelings. Likewise, Nagel argues, conceit needn’t be displayed, yet is 
“fully present in someone who cannot help dwelling with secret satisfaction on the 
superiority of his own achievements, talents, beauty, intelligence or virtue” (ML 33). 
 Vices may, says Nagel, to some extent be attributable to agents’ previous choices. 
He even cedes that certain vices may be amenable to change based upon agents’ present 
actions. By and large, though, “it is largely a matter of constitutive bad fortune” that 
agents possess particular traits of character (ML 33). Yet people are routinely praised and 
blamed for possessing or displaying such qualities; they are, as Nagel writes, “assessed 
for what they are like” (ML 33). When agents are morally assessed for some trait for 
which they are not clearly responsible, they are the victims of constitutive moral luck. As 
with the other forms of moral luck, constitutive moral luck may be either good or bad.  
 From the Kantian perspective, Nagel argues, constitutive moral luck seems 
incoherent. Virtue is “enjoined on every one and must in principle be possible for 
everyone” (ML 33). Though it may come easier to some than to others, it must be 
conceivable that any agent might become virtuous “by making the right choices” (ML 
33). But traits such as generosity of spirit do not seem to be within agents’ power to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
from akrasia recognizes that her actions are wrong, but does not possess the will to act otherwise, often 
because she has had little practice doing so. Her feelings of regret after the fact, however, reveal that she is 
not vicious, as the vicious agent would take pleasure in vice. Where an agent who is inclined to cowardice 
(either by nature or through lack of practice at being courageous), yet acts with courage because she 
recognizes that virtue requires such action, she is, in Aristotle’s view, on the way to becoming courageous. 
As was noted in Chapter II, in Aristotle’s view virtue is actualized in activity such that “courage is as 
courage does.” If there is an Aristotelian metaphysics of character, it is a metaphysics of becoming, and not 
of being, as Nagel seems to assume. Thus Aristotle would almost certainly reject Nagel’s position.  
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control, and therefore ought not, in Nagel’s view, to be praised or blamed.11 That we do 
condemn ourselves and others for failing to possess such virtues is paradoxical. But here 
again, says Nagel, the paradox is unavoidable. Kant’s conclusion— that we cannot 
subject certain traits of character to moral assessment— is unacceptable in the light of our 
commonsense moral convictions. As Nagel explains: “We may be persuaded that these 
judgments are irrational, but they reappear involuntarily as soon as the argument is over” 
(ML 33).12 We do and will, Nagel maintains, judge others based upon their character and 
personality traits, even if upon reflection we recognize the unfairness of such judgments.    
 The problems of resultant, circumstantial and constitutive luck are closely and 
rather obviously tied, as Nagel notes, to the more general problem of free will. Although 
he does not presume to address the latter at great length, Nagel takes up free will by way 
of analyzing a fourth type of moral luck— causal luck— to which we may now turn our 
attention.       
 Causal Luck 
 As noted above, one way to circumvent the problems of resultant and 
circumstantial luck is to confine our moral assessments to agents’ morally significant 
attributes, including traits of character and intentions. Since many or most of the former 
                                                           
11
 It is clear enough that Kant does not believe such virtues can be willed. It is in part for this reason that he 
places a higher premium on the good will, as he defines it, than on virtues like “generosity of spirit,” 
“sympathy” and so on. See, for example, Grounding 1:11.  
 
12
 This is one of the clearer illustrations of moral luck as a tension between our justifiable beliefs about the 
practice of moral assessment and our emotional expressions of deeply held values. It is perfectly rational to 
agree that people ought not to be blamed for possessing repugnant personality traits and yet to feel repulsed 
by such traits. If a person is by nature cold and indifferent to others through no fault of his own, we may 
condemn the trait (our repugnance reminds us that we value care and concern for others) without 
condemning him for possessing it. This amounts to making the judgment that “callousness is a bad 
character trait, and it is unfortunate that this person possesses it.” Nagel rejects this solution, however, 
claiming that “Condemnation implies that you should not be like that, not that it is unfortunate that you are” 
(ML 33).     
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appear upon reflection to be influenced by forces beyond agents’ control, the good will 
emerges as a last bastion of moral assessment. If it can be shown that the problem of 
moral luck does not extend to the will itself, then we may yet be justified in practicing 
one type of moral assessment. Following Kant’s lead, we might deny the moral 
significance of circumstances, results and even character, and instead locate the moral 
significance of every act in what Nagel describes as “its morally essential core, an inner 
act of pure will assessed by motive and intention” (ML 31). In Nagel’s view, however, 
even this solution ultimately fails. 
 If, Nagel argues, we cannot reasonably hold agents responsible for the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, or for the consequences of their actions 
which result from factors beyond their control, or for the antecedents of their acts that are 
“properties of temperament” not subject to their will, then it makes little sense to hold 
agents accountable for acts of the will. Such acts are attributed with little difficulty to 
factors beyond agents’ control, including external circumstances, antecedent character 
traits, and so on. When we subject the will itself to analysis the result is quite unsettling; 
as Nagel writes, “The area of genuine agency, and therefore of legitimate moral 
judgment, seems to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless point” (ML35). The 
very core of selfhood seems to dissolve when we subtract everything that belongs to the 
realm of externals, such that “it becomes gradually clear that actions are events and 
people things” (Nagel ML 35). But this view is wildly incompatible with our basic beliefs 
about agency, and with the practice of moral assessment which assumes such agency.  
 The problem of moral luck admits of no easy solution, as Nagel argues and as we 
shall see below. We are not likely to abandon the practice of moral judgment any more 
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than we are likely to jettison our commonsense beliefs about the nature of agency— such 
as the belief that persons are not merely things and actions are not merely events. But we 
must recognize that the objects of moral judgment—persons and acts— are so radically 
subject to external circumstances that they indeed seem to belong to the classes of mere 
objects and events. So long as we cling tenaciously to our convictions about moral 
agency and acknowledge the plain fact that who we are and what we do is largely not up 
to us, the problem of moral luck will persist. We cannot even determine “the degree to 
which the problem has a solution,” Nagel argues, unless we can determine the degree to 
which our ordinary beliefs about agency are incompatible with our apparent lack of 
control (ML 37, emphasis mine). It is difficult to debate Nagel’s ultimate conclusion that 
“in a sense the problem has no solution,” since: 
[I]t is not enough to say merely that our basic moral attitudes toward 
ourselves and others are determined by what is actual; for they are also 
threatened by the sources of that actuality, and by the external view that 
forces itself on us when we see how everything we do belongs to a world 
that we have not created (ML 38).  
  
Responses to the Problem of Moral Luck 
 The problem of moral luck has received considerable attention since Williams and 
Nagel first introduced it. Responses have varied widely, ranging from denial of the 
problem on various grounds to a call for the complete abandonment of all notions of 
moral responsibility. Perhaps the most promising solution, favored by a handful of moral 
theorists, involves restricting moral judgments to character, purportedly rejecting Kantian 
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“morality” in favor of Aristotelian “ethics.” Although this approach has certain merits, as 
we will see, it conflates the problem of luck which confronts Aristotelian ethics with the 
problem of moral luck as defined by Williams and Nagel, and thus requires greater 
elaboration than it has yet received.  
The Practice of Moral Judgment: A Few Observations 
 Before surveying scholarly responses to the problem of moral luck, it is useful to 
make a handful of basic observations regarding the nature and purpose of moral judgment 
which are often overlooked in the moral luck debate. Moral luck arises alongside the 
practice of moral assessment. Oddly, however, the value or usefulness of moral 
assessment itself is rarely questioned in the context of the moral luck debate. There are a 
number of ways to justify the practices of assessing responsibility and of assigning praise 
and blame, and some of these reasons are more compelling than others. In my view, it is 
incumbent upon those who favor the practice of moral assessment to justify both the 
practice of determining agents’ degree of moral responsibility, and to justify the awarding 
of praise and blame. That the former ought to be the province of moral agents generally 
and not simply of those who adjudicate legal responsibility is hardly given, and requires 
some kind of rationalization.13  
 Perhaps moral assessment is— or begins as— an involuntary rational and 
emotional response to a given state of affairs, rather than some conscious, reflective 
practice. Even so, it is one thing to pre-reflectively disapprove of an action or character 
                                                           
13
 Clarifying the differences between legal and moral responsibility may go far in addressing the problem of 
moral luck. As Dana Nelkin notes, some theorists have suggested moral luck is incorrectly inferred from 
cases of legal luck. She writes, “While there might be good reasons for the law to treat people differently 
even if what they do depends on factors beyond their control, we (understandably) make the mistaken 
inference that the law directly reflects our moral assessment in such cases” (4.1.1). For a helpful analysis of 
this approach to dissolving moral luck, see Brian Rosebury’s essay, “Moral Responsibility and Moral 
Luck” (Philosophical Review, 104: 499-524).   
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trait, and quite another to make public one’s judgment. Even if we cannot and need not 
justify the mere existence of our initial pre-reflective moral judgments, we certainly can 
and should justify whether or how we share them, and with whom. The problem of moral 
luck, on Nagel’s view, stems from a peculiarity of Kant’s moral system. It is worth 
mentioning, then, that Kant is well-aware of the need to justify the disclosure of our 
moral assessments. As we will observe in Chapter VI, Kant generally encourages 
restraint when it comes to both the practice of moral assessment of others and to the 
sharing of our moral judgments with those we judge. The mere fact that we have moral 
opinions is insufficient justification for the disclosure of judgments that may prove 
devastating to those with whom we share them. When and if we divulge our judgments of 
others’ actions and characters, we must have strong reasons for doing so. 
 Not all moral assessments have to do with the acts and characters of other agents. 
Indeed many or most of our moral assessments are of our own choices, actions, 
motivations and characters. Because we presumably enjoy a privileged access to our own 
motivations and greater awareness of the context within which we act than we do of 
others’ motivations etc., the way we go about assessing our own actions and character 
may differ substantially from the way we go about judging others.14 We ought to reflect 
upon these differences, and to be open to the insights which may arise as the result of 
such reflection. If in assessing ourselves, for example, we are quick to appreciate how 
antecedents inform our actions and character, then we ought to learn to extend that 
awareness to our assessments of others.   
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 Kant challenges this assumption, arguing that our true motives may be hidden even from ourselves. We 
ought to be reticent, he therefore concludes, to praise and blame anything other than actions themselves. I 
explain this stance in some detail in Chapter VI. 
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Response 1: Dissolving the Problem of Moral Luck 
 Given the centrality of morality to most people’s lives, it should not be surprising 
that the most popular philosophical reaction to the problem of moral luck is to deny 
and/or seek to disprove its existence. Theorists including Henning Jensen, Nicholas 
Rescher, Norvin Richards, Michael J. Zimmerman and Judith Jarvis Thompson take this 
approach, seeking to preserve morality by showing how or to what extent the problem of 
moral luck is merely apparent. Their analysis, as we will see, generally involves 
disentangling various types of assessment in order to preserve explicitly moral 
assessment as a viable practice. 
 An analytic approach to the phenomenon of moral luck seems quite fitting, since, 
as Daniel Statman writes, “The fact that luck threatens our moral concepts does not imply 
that it threatens all of them equally” (2). Statman holds that axiological moral 
judgments— judgments of a person or thing’s “goodness” and “badness,” for example— 
“are not threatened in the same way as are the concepts of responsibility and 
justification” (2).15 Thompson concurs, suggesting that even if an agent’s cowardice, 
selfishness, and so on have developed as a result of luck, it would still be correct to call 
him a bad person. Whether or not such an agent is to blame, Statman argues, is quite 
another matter. “Thus,” as Statman observes, “the debate around moral luck turns mainly 
around the question of whether or to what extent our moral notions of responsibility, 
justification, blame and so forth, are subject to luck” (2).  
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 Statman may, it should be noted, be assuming that the proper object of moral assessment is moral 
character. This is a common belief among moral luck theorists, as we will observe below, but introduces as 
many philosophical problems as it resolves. 
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 In their efforts to explain away the problem of moral luck, theorists often employ 
some form of what Andrew Latus terms the “epistemic argument.”16 The epistemic 
argument, which most clearly applies to cases of resultant luck, attempts to show that 
apparent cases of moral luck involve epistemic, rather than moral, differences. According 
to this line of reasoning, instead of changing the moral status of a particular agent, luck 
merely places us— as observers— in a better or worse position to judge the intentions or 
character of the agent in question. As Dana Nelkin notes, we rarely know “exactly what a 
person’s intentions are or the strength of her commitment to a course of action” (4.1.1). 
One indicator of such intentions and commitments is whether or not she succeeds in what 
she attempts to do. “If someone succeeds,” Nelkin writes, “that is some evidence that the 
person was seriously committed to carrying out a fully formed plan. The same evidence 
is not usually available when the plan is not carried out” (4.1.1).  
 Those who accept the epistemic argument hold that our differential treatment of 
successful and unsuccessful criminals need not reflect any commitment to the existence 
of resultant luck. Consider the case of two would-be murderers, one of whom— by some 
stroke of luck— succeeds. On Nagel’s view, such a case is a clear illustration of resultant 
luck, since we are inclined to deem the “successful” murderer more blameworthy than the 
unsuccessful one. The epistemic argument instead holds that it is a matter of luck that one 
agent was revealed to be a murder while the other was not, though had we enjoyed a 
different epistemic relation to the unsuccessful murderer, our judgments would have been 
the same: “If we were in the unrealistic situation of knowing that both agents had exactly 
the same intentions, the same strength of commitment to their plans, and so on,” then our 
moral assessments of them would be the same (Nelkin 4.1.1). 
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 See Latus, Andrew. “Moral and Epistemic Luck,”,Journal of Philosophical Research, 2000, 25: 149-172.  
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 One potential objection to the epistemic argument is that it fails to capture our 
disparate emotive responses to, for example, cases of negligence in which one agent 
causes serious harm and another does not. To illustrate we might return to the example of 
the negligent driver who accidentally runs over a child. In Norvin Richards’s view, “the 
driver who kills is unfortunate because by killing he made it clear to us that he is a 
negligent driver and that he deserves to be treated accordingly” (Statman 17). This 
conclusion is consistent with the epistemic argument, as it suggests that “luck does not 
affect one’s deserts but only our knowledge of them” (17). But this assessment of the 
situation, though technically correct, is far from satisfying. The epistemic approach fails 
to appreciate the total situation which extends beyond the negligent driver to include the 
fact that a child is now dead. We may believe that all negligent drivers ought as a rule to 
be reprimanded with equal harshness while allowing that such negligence may never be 
clearly manifested, and yet feel that we should reprimand the negligent driver who did in 
fact kill a child much more harshly than we would the driver whose negligence was 
revealed when he hit, say, a mailbox. It is difficult to see how the epistemic argument can 
explain away moral luck in such a case.17  
 Jonathon Adler criticizes Richards’ view that moral bad luck “is not luck in one’s 
moral status being hurt,” but merely bad luck “in one’s character becoming transparent” 
(Statman 17). Adler questions the extent to which Richards’ contention, and the epistemic 
approach to dissolving moral luck more generally, can capture our actual intuitions about 
                                                           
17
 Those who accept the epistemic argument often assume that traits of character, rather than actions, are 
the proper objects of moral assessment. In the case of the negligent driver who kills, we may unknowingly 
be assessing both a trait of character (negligence) and an act (running over a child), while attempting to 
determine a degree of responsibility for one or both. If so, it stands to reason that our moral assessment 
might produce considerable confusion. The epistemic argument may therefore help to resolve the problem 
of moral luck, but more analysis is needed if we are to resolve the problem completely.    
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the appropriateness of praise and blame. As Adler explains, “legally, emotionally and 
socially, the blame we attribute to the driver who runs over the child is far worse than that 
which we attribute to the driver who doesn’t have an accident but whose record indicates 
equal, if not greater, recklessness (248). Adler holds that our tendency to blame the driver 
who kills more than the one who does not has nothing to do with epistemic privilege but 
instead simply reflects our belief that actual results are morally significant. Although, as 
Statman points out, Thompson, Richards and Rescher find this view to be mistaken, it is 
difficult to deny its intuitive appeal. It matters to us, as Adler would contend, if a child 
has in fact died as the result of a driver’s carelessness in one case but not in another; the 
loss of a child’s life is more significant to us than the destruction of a mailbox.      
 Perhaps the problem of resultant luck can be dissolved if we distinguish between 
“moral discredit” and blame (Statman 17). Assuming, in keeping with the epistemic 
argument, that two negligent drivers are equally morally disgraceful despite the fact that 
one driver’s negligence has been revealed and the other’s has not, we might yet ask 
whether or not the two drivers are equally to blame. Judith Jarvis Thompson attempts to 
answer this question by distinguishing between two types of blame, which we may refer 
to as blame1 and blame2. Blame1 occurs when “a person P is to blame for an unwelcome 
event, where P caused it by some wrongful act or omission for which P had no adequate 
excuse” (Statman 17). Blame2 occurs when a person P is more or less blameworthy “for 
doing something, which is unwelcome, where P’s doing it is a stronger or weaker reason 
to think P is a bad person” (17). This distinction allows Thompson to conclude that 
although the killer-driver is subject to blame1 while the other driver is not, the killer-
driver is no more subject to blame2 than is the other driver. In other words, although we 
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are correct to hold the killer-driver responsible for the child’s death, we need not 
conclude that he is any more of a bad person than is the other driver. 
 Thompson’s approach is somewhat helpful. Not only does it acknowledge the 
complex nature of “blame” which our ordinary and equivocal use of the term may 
obscure, but it also upsets Nagel’s suggestion that agents’ moral worth in cases of 
resultant luck has to do with circumstances beyond their control. It is less clear, however, 
that Thompson’s conclusions can address the concerned raised above, namely, that our 
strong emotive responses to various actions and results may (and should) reassert 
themselves despite our having analyzed away the philosophical problem of resultant luck. 
Even if we accept Thompson’s conclusion that it would be incorrect to judge the killer-
driver to be a worse person than the other driver, we may yet feel that he ought to 
experience the kind of remorse an agent would feel were he, in fact, revealed to be a 
worse person. We tend to find it deeply unsettling when agents engage in 
“rationalization” following some act of wrongdoing, reasoning away their feelings of 
remorse rather than experiencing them deeply.  
 But perhaps this kind of regret is commensurable with Thompson’s conclusions. 
Even if, as Thompson maintains, the fact that one driver killed a child and one did not 
“says nothing morally interesting about them,” this does not imply that neither driver will 
feel guilty (Thompson 204). As Daniel Statman writes, “because the death of a human 
being is a bad and saddening thing, it is quite reasonable that one should feel terrible if 
one contributes to such a result, even if it is not one’s fault” (16). The feeling of 
diminished moral worth in the case of the driver-killer is not irrational, as it does not 
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conflict with the determination that he is not to be blamed (in the second sense described 
by Thompson).   
 Thompson is not alone in making such a claim. Those who would defend morality 
from the threat posed by resultant luck often call for a distinction between moral 
assessment and feelings. “Those who adopt this strategy,” as Nelkin notes, “argue that it 
is understandable or even appropriate to feel differently about the driver who kills a child 
than about the one who does not” (4.1.1). What is not acceptable, they contend, is to 
support differing moral assessments of the two. Thompson and Richards hold that it is 
reasonable for agents to feel what Williams terms “agent-regret” in the wake of an 
unlucky consequence. Agent regret is a feeling of regret accompanied by a first-person 
acknowledgment that “it would have been much better” if the agent had acted otherwise . 
The notion of agent-regret properly reflects the fact that the agent involved, though not 
morally at fault, is more connected to the event than, for example, someone who merely 
witnessed it. As Williams rightly points out, the fact that we feel sorry for the driver 
reflects our awareness that his involvement in the situation is of a special kind. Susan 
Wolf goes further than Thompson and Richards, arguing that regret is not only reasonable 
but also praiseworthy in cases of apparent resultant bad luck. We should, in Wolf’s view, 
disapprove of the agent who fails to take responsibility for the child’s death, even if, 
strictly speaking, doing so is more than justice requires.18   
 Most attempts to dissolve the problem of moral luck apply most clearly to cases 
of resultant luck. It is possible, however, to extend some of the methods employed to 
                                                           
18
 Wolf’s response to moral luck is more mixed than most. Unlike Thompson, Richards, Zimmerman, 
Jensen and Resher, Wolf is somewhat committed to the existence of moral luck. As we will see below, her 
solution is not to resolve the problem itself, but instead to prescribe some way for agents to flourish within 
the constraints imposed by luck.  
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other forms of moral luck. The epistemic argument, for example, may be applied to 
circumstantial luck. Circumstantial luck, as we may recall, “has to do with the kind of 
problems and situations one faces,” and is epitomized by the case of the Nazi 
concentration camp officer mentioned above (Statman 18). The Nazi officer presumably 
chose to collaborate, even if only in some qualified sense (we can imagine without 
contradiction another person in his position choosing not to collaborate). Even so, there is 
something unfair about our holding him accountable for his choice, since it is a choice 
that countless other agents did not have to make. It is a matter of bad luck that the officer 
found himself living during a particular historical moment and in a particular 
geographical location. Yet because the agent in question chose to collaborate, we 
reasonably find him worthy of blame. The epistemic argument holds that it is a matter of 
bad luck that the Nazi sympathizer’s true character was revealed. We might therefore ask, 
as Statman does, whether or not potential Nazis are also blameworthy, and/or as 
blameworthy as our actual Nazi. 
 In their efforts to dissolve the problem of circumstantial luck, both Zimmerman 
and Richards answer in the affirmative. Richards asks us to imagine an émigré who 
shares the relevant traits of character (including, for example, a strong desire to please 
authority figures, a lack of compassion, and so on) with the Nazi officer such that “only 
the émigré’s geographical good luck prevented his playing the same role” (174). 
Richards, who holds that an agent’s character alone determines his deserts, argues that 
the émigré may well deserve the same treatment as the actual officer. This is especially 
clear, he argues, if there is substantial evidence of the émigré’s flawed character. 
Supposing, however, that the émigré’s immoral tendencies are never enacted, is he still 
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deserving of our moral approbation and/or punishment? Richards shirks the question, 
suggesting that character does and will find expression, even if in subtle ways. However, 
it is difficult for us to justify punishment or other reform measures where character is so 
subtly expressed. Our moral assessments of the officer and the émigré ought therefore to 
be the same, Richards holds, even if our actual treatment of the two must differ in relation 
to the degree to which their character has been made apparent. We do and should, 
Richards maintains, blame people for what they would have done, and not merely for 
what they have done. If his assessment is correct, then the problem of circumstantial luck 
appears to be resolved. 
 Zimmerman takes a subtly different approach to circumstantial luck by proposing 
a distinction between the scope and degree of moral responsibility. The scope of 
responsibility is that activity for which the agent is being held responsible, while the 
degree reflects the type of agent he is. In the case of the Nazi office and the émigré, the 
latter has done nothing to indicate his reprehensible character. The scope of his 
responsibility, then, is 0. The degree of his responsibility, however, is the same as that of 
the Nazi officer. In a sense, then, on Zimmerman’s view the émigré is responsible, even 
though he is not responsible for anything. But this claim, as Statman rightly points out, 
“does not seem very promising” (19). Put another way, however, it becomes more 
palatable; we might say that the émigré “is to blame for being such that he would have 
made the decision to collaborate,” had his circumstances been otherwise (Zimmerman 
228). Zimmerman correctly points out, however, that this solution to the problem of 
circumstantial luck is incomplete, since it may well be a matter of constitutive luck that 
the émigré became the sort of person he is.  
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 The approaches of Jensen, Resher, Richards, Zimmerman and Thompson have 
their merits. Whether or not the problem of moral luck can ultimately be “solved,” it 
behooves moral theorists to help us distinguish between different types of judgments, and 
to understand the morally relevant features that inform such judgments. But the success 
of those who would defend morality from the problem of luck is at best partial. While 
their analysis helps to explain away certain cases of resultant luck, it is only if we accept 
several potentially problematic premises that their case against circumstantial luck is 
persuasive. In accepting one such premise— that we ought to judge agents’ character 
alone— we merely lend the problem of constitutive luck a greater weight, effectively 
trading one philosophical problem for another. Where we properly acknowledge the great 
extent to which agent’s character is not up to them— as we did in the previous chapter— 
the problem of constitutive luck becomes imposing indeed. The problem of moral luck 
looms larger still when we acknowledge, as Nagel does, the intrinsic connection between 
causal luck and the other types, and between causal luck and constitutive luck in 
particular.  When subjected to careful reflection, the initially robust notion of stable 
moral character loses its integrity, and character itself appears as the mere effect of so 
many antecedent causes. When we take the problem of moral luck seriously, then, it is 
difficult to avoid pessimism vis-à-vis moral responsibility. When we begin to critically 
reflect upon our ordinary moral assessments, it seems that we step onto a slippery slope 
that ends in the total destruction of viable conceptions of moral agency. 
 Response 2: Accepting Luck and Abandoning Moral Responsibility  
 In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller advocates the extreme and 
ostensibly unpopular view that we ought to abandon all notions of moral responsibility. 
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His contention is that our ordinary beliefs about responsibility, desert, praise and blame 
are wholly unjustifiable in the light of a reflective, naturalistic analysis of the human 
situation. Waller is unequivocal in his stance: “We should never,” he writes, “hold 
anyone morally responsible” (2, emphasis in original). It is reasonable and proper, Waller 
acknowledges, to recognize acts of wrongdoing, and to strategize regarding useful reform 
measures, but it is unreasonable to hold agents responsible for such acts and/or for the 
traits of personality or character with which we associate them. Although Waller 
ultimately rejects all notions of moral responsibility, the bulk of his argument is aimed at 
upending the commonsense version which, as Galen Strawson notes, is employed to 
justify the allocation of praise and blame: “responsibility and desert of such a kind that it 
can exist if and only if punishment and reward can be fair or just without having any 
pragmatic justification, or indeed any justification that appeals to the notion of 
distributive justice” (Strawson 452).   
 Although Waller does not explicitly frame his argument as a response to the 
problem of moral luck, his central claims echo Nagel’s, and his conclusions have clear 
implications for the moral luck debate.19 The Control Principle from which Nagel 
generates the problem of moral luck corresponds to the notion of moral responsibility 
described by Strawson, and the bulk of the empirical evidence Waller calls upon to 
buttress his position involves what Nagel would identify as evidence of resultant, 
circumstantial and constitutive luck. Like Nagel, Waller links luck to the problem of 
                                                           
19
 The free will/determinism debate and the moral luck debate are connected in obvious ways, and the 
literature on the two reflects this connection (Susan Wolf’s response to the problem of moral luck, for 
example, belongs also if not primarily to the literature on free will). Waller contextualizes his stance via the 
free will/determinism debate, favoring literature on metaphysics and the philosophy of action, while most 
of the literature on moral luck is rooted explicitly in moral theory. Even so, given the obvious parallels 
between Waller’s argument and Nagel’s, I find it exceedingly odd that Waller makes only one reference to 
Nagel (see Waller, p. 22). Waller invokes Nagel’s claim that “under close scrutiny— luck swallows up the 
ultimate control required for moral responsibility,” in support of his basic position (Waller 22).    
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human agency, appearing to adopt (though never explicitly claiming) a pessimistic view 
of freedom. Waller’s response to the phenomenon of moral luck is diametrically opposed 
to those described above; rather than seeking to defend moral responsibility against the 
threat of luck, he readily confesses that luck effectively dissolves human agency, 
undermining any viable conception of moral responsibility. Waller is not only prepared 
but indeed eager to jettison our commonsense notions of moral responsibility.    
 Waller is aware of the hold moral responsibility has on most moral agents and on 
moral theorists in particular, but argues that this hold has an emotional, rather than a 
logical, basis. Most contemporary discussions of moral responsibility assume its 
existence, and merely quibble over the details. When foundational justifications are 
analyzed, however, systems of moral responsibility crumble.20 “Commitment to moral 
responsibility,” he writes, “is based in visceral emotional reactions and locked in place by 
a far-reaching theoretical system. But the moral responsibility system is fighting a 
running retreat against scientific research that renders this system less and less plausible” 
(1). The strong desires which compel us to maintain our basic beliefs about moral 
responsibility are varied, but include, as Daniel Dennet suggests, the desire to see 
wrongdoers blamed and punished:  
We ought to admit, up front, that one of our strongest unspoken 
motivations for upholding something close to the traditional concept of 
free will is our desire to see villains “get what they deserve” […] A world 
without punishment is not a world any of us would want to live in. 
(Dennett 258)   
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 Waller refers to several theorists whose work is aimed at assessing the concept moral responsibility itself. 
These include C.A. Campbell, Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Alfred Mele, Derek Pureborn and Susan 
Wolf.  
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Waller understands the power of emotions to commit us to beliefs, but notes that “we are 
sadly familiar with many deep emotional commitments— to racism, sexism, jingoism, 
xenophobia— that examination reveals to be harmful and irrational” (8). 
 Waller’s supporting arguments are at times quite persuasive, but he errs— as do 
Nagel, Jensen, Resher, Richards, Zimmerman and Thompson— in assuming that moral 
responsibility (and indeed morality itself) requires pure agency. Waller betrays this belief 
by framing his analysis around what he takes to be “the best account of moral 
responsibility,” an account offered by the 15th-century nobleman Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola. Invoking a quasi-biblical creation story, Mirandola describes human beings as 
having been created with “the special power to make themselves whatever they chose to 
be” (Waller 19). In Pico della Mirandola’s account, God addresses humanity, saying: 
We have made thee […] as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou 
mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt 
have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are 
brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be 
reborn into the higher forms, which are divine. (Pico della Mirandola 224-
225)21 
That Waller takes the above to be the best account of moral responsibility is quite 
revealing. Pico della Mirandola’s myth of radical self-creation is obviously at odds with 
the human situation, as Waller goes on to argue at great length.  It is therefore difficult to 
avoid the thought that Waller’s argument revolves around a straw-man conception of 
                                                           
21
 As absurd as the idea of radical self-creation sounds when stated explicitly, it resonates alarmingly with 
the quintessentially American myth of the self-made person. I have argued in previous work that the 
American ethos is characterized by the denial of luck. If that characterization is fair, then the moral luck 
debate— and more specifically the erroneous commitment to pure moral agency— may have important 
implications for our deep-seated cultural beliefs.  
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agency; even the minimally self-reflective agent readily recognizes that her identity and 
activity are informed by external factors. What is surprising, however, is that the bulk of 
the literature on moral luck involves the same fundamental mistake.  
 Perhaps a new approach is needed. It may be possible to justify the continued 
practice of moral assessment if we can strike upon a mean between the extremes of 
defending morality on the basis of an idealized moral agency and rejecting it on the 
grounds that moral agency is an illusion. A more sophisticated conception of human 
agency, coupled with a more nuanced and rationally justified approach to the practice of 
moral assessment, offers us the best hope for overcoming the problem of moral luck.  
 
 Response 3: Replacing Morality with Ethics  
 In his 1993 Postcript, Bernard Williams confesses that “there are some 
misunderstandings that I now think my formulations in Moral Luck may have 
encouraged” (Statman 251). The essay may have led readers to conclude, for example, 
that a threat to one normative system must also threaten all normative systems. Invoking 
the distinction between “morality” and “ethics” mentioned in Chapter II, Williams 
instead suggests that although the problem of moral luck poses a very serious threat to the 
Kantian system of morality, it need not threaten a virtue-based system. This is the case 
since, as Nelkin puts it, “the essence of the Control Principle is ‘built into’” the former 
(and into systems of “morality” generally), but not into the latter (4.1.1). Morality, 
Williams argues, “does try to resist luck, in ways that my and Nagel’s articles point out,” 
while, as Judith Andre notes, Aristotle’s ethical system does not, thereby circumventing 
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the problem of moral luck (Statman 252).22 Although Williams does not explicitly 
suggest, as some have claimed, that we ought to abandon morality in favor of ethics, he 
does encourage continued reflection upon the weaknesses of the former: “The oxymoron 
in ‘moral luck,’” Williams concludes, “shows up as a fault line to which, I still think, is 
worth applying the chisel” (Statman 258). 
 Like Williams, Margaret Urban Walker accepts that moral luck is a real and 
pressing problem for a Kantian system of morality. But whereas Williams’ sentiments are 
quite mixed, in Walker’s view the dethroning of the Control Principle is a thing to be 
celebrated. She arrives at this conclusion via a comparison of two incommensurable 
conceptions of agency: pure agency and impure agency. The proponents of moral luck, 
Walker argues, embrace an impure notion of agency, whereas their detractors assume the 
contrary.  
 In their attempts to show that moral luck is merely apparent, Walker notes, 
philosophers like Jensen and Richards acknowledge “that we do seem often enough to 
allow matters of luck to figure in our moral assessments, but aim to show that through 
closer scrutiny and additional distinctions that the control condition is not in fact 
violated” (Walker 237). Unfortunately, Walker argues, their accounts involve beliefs that 
are “at least as counterintuitive as they take moral luck to be” (237). As mentioned above, 
Richards assumes that character alone, as opposed to acts or results, is to be subjected to 
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 Williams is correct to point out that Aristotelian ethics avoids the problem of moral luck as described by 
him Nagel, but his explanation of why it does so is incomplete. Although it is true that Aristotle 
acknowledges the existence of luck, he does maintain a robust conception of human agency and a rich 
conception of accountability (if not responsibility, strictly speaking). His position is ambiguous inasmuch 
as he maintains that our character both is and is not up to us; we play a role, but so too do the political 
institutions and other external forces which inform our character. It is not primarily through his acceptance 
of luck, however, that Aristotle avoids the problem of moral luck, but instead through his belief that moral 
responsibility extends (at most) to acts, but not to human character, which is much more ambiguous. I 
expand on this point in the analyses below. 
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moral assessment, while Jensen maintains that the agent whose risky behavior actually 
causes harm is no more to blame than the agent whose risky behavior does not. What is 
especially odd, in Walker’s view, is that in these accounts, and in so many like them, “the 
control condition stands curiously undefended” (Walker 238). Yet the Control Principle, 
Walker argues, which “expresses a substantive view about the conditions under which we 
should see ourselves and others as responsible,” is hardly self-evident (238). 
 With little enough reflection upon concrete human activity, it becomes clear that 
we are all hopelessly “impure” agents. We are, says Walker, “agents of, rather than 
outside, the world of space, time, and causality; agents whose histories and actions 
belong to it” (239). As such, the elegant regimentation of responsibility dictated by the 
Control Principle represents a drastic “alteration of our common life,” such that “To 
accept it […] would rid us of far more than an alleged kink in our philosophical thinking” 
(239). That this is the case is evident when we consider how differences of intentions, 
actions and outcomes complicate our everyday moral assessment of agents and acts. The 
minutiae which defenders of the Control Principle are quick to gloss over, Walker argues, 
matter to us: 
It will matter whether a woman with hungry children keeps a lost, money-
filled wallet that contains identification, whether a child is caught up in a 
Nazi youth group or an adult informs on his Jewish neighbor for political 
advantage, whether someone lied out of humiliation or greed. (Walker 
239)         
Moral luck, Walker argues, is simply a fact of human existence, and “part of the normal 
and required self-understanding of human agents is a grasp of that fact” (241).  
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 In Walker’s view, moral agency and moral luck are coextensive. Moral luck is not 
at odds with responsibility, but instead serves as one of its important sources. “The truth 
of moral luck that the rational, responsive agent is expected to grasp,” writes Walker, “is 
that responsibilities outrun control, although not in one single or simple way” (241, 
emphasis in original). She reminds us that the virtuous agent is characterized by 
responsiveness to the world. The fact of moral luck, she holds, therefore brings to light a 
special array of virtues that she terms the “virtues of impure agency,” and these include 
integrity, grace and lucidity (241). Though there may be a place for virtues like courage, 
benevolence and justice, Walker argues that “Bad moral luck taxes agents in distinctive 
ways to which the qualities mentioned distinctively respond” (241).  
 In Walker’s view moral luck is a thing to be celebrated, bringing to light as it does 
an impure agency that entails extensive responsibility. In a world of impure agents, 
Walker argues, “legitimate moral claims can overreach deliberate commitments,” and 
others’ “need or suffering can even sometimes impose responsibilities it would be 
indecent to ignore” (245). Pure agency, Walker holds, entails no such responsibilities. In 
a world of pure agency, for example, a mother needn’t care for her sickly child, since she 
did not cause the child’s sickness (245). Likewise, a pure agent needn’t comfort her 
grieving friend, since she did not cause the grief. Pure agents, says Walker, “are freer on 
the whole from responsibility; are freer to define for themselves what and how much 
responsibility they will bear” (246). Pure agency is a model of independence, Walker 
argues, and most of us would not want to live in a world of such independent agents. 
 It is difficult to deny the appeal of Walker’s conclusions, but they may require 
more substantial justification than she provides. Like so many moral luck theorists, 
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Walker misses a fundamental distinction between the type of luck which confronts an 
Aristotelian conception of ethics and that which confronts a Kantian system. One 
indicator is Walker’s equivocal use of the term “responsibility.” The problem of moral 
luck arises when we morally assess agents— when we hold them responsible for what 
they have done. But Walker uses the term “responsibility” primarily to describe 
obligations imposed from without by the needs of other agents.23 The latter use is more 
appropriate to an Aristotelian conception of agency, since, as we have noted, virtue has 
much to do with responsiveness. But this sort of responsiveness is not what Williams and 
Nagel had in mind when they identified the problem of moral luck. In order to address 
the problem of moral luck properly speaking, Walker would have to say something more 
about moral assessment of past actions. Walker is not effectively accepting, as she claims 
to be, the existence of moral luck (as defined by Williams and Nagel), but instead 
acknowledging and accepting a more fundamental human vulnerability which echoes that 
described by Aristotle. In asking readers to choose between a pure and an impure 
conception of human agency she is effectively asking us to choose between an 
Aristotelian and a Kantian conception of agency.  
 Walker might evade the problem of moral luck were she to explicitly reject the 
Kantian conception of responsibility and the type of moral assessment with which 
Williams and Nagel associate it. She does largely reject the former but, oddly, accepts 
that agency entails praise and blame from others. The impure agent who willingly takes 
responsibility for the care of others makes herself vulnerable to “criticism, rebuke, and 
                                                           
23
 Claudia Card offers a helpful analysis of two differing conceptions of responsibility. Her work, like 
Walker’s parts ways with most of the literature on moral luck by taking what Card terms a  “forward-
looking” approach to responsibility, or an approach that focuses on “acceptance, commitment, care and 
concern” (25). Both Card and Walker focus on our present and future responsibilities, and not on past 
actions which merit praise or blame, reward or punishment.  
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punishment; to valid demands of reparation, restoration, or compensation; to proper 
expectations of regret, remorse, self-reproof, and self-correction” (246). Certainly, the 
virtues which Walker associates with impure agency are, on her view, quite worthy of 
praise. It would seems to follow, then, that Walker would have us assess agents based 
upon how they ethically respond to the world of impure agency; upon the extent to which 
they practice such virtues as integrity, grace and lucidity. If this interpretation is correct, 
it is difficult to see how Walker’s ethical vision escapes the problem of constitutive luck, 
since we are not wholly nor clearly responsible for possessing such traits.  
 One way to buttress Walker’s approach to the problem of moral luck would be to 
introduce the notion of “taking responsibility.” Were Walker to maintain that although 
we do not, as impure agents, create ourselves in a moral vacuum, we do and should take 
responsibility for our moral character, and by extension for the actions which our 
character compels us to take. Such a view is offered by Harry Frankfurt in his defense of 
moral assessment against the threat of constitutive luck. Frankfurt holds that “the 
responsibility of a person for his or her character has to do, not with the question of 
whether its existence is within the person’s control,” but instead with whether or not he 
has “taken responsibility for” his character (Statman 12). An agent takes responsibility 
for his character, Frankfurt argues, when he identifies with his traits of character and 
“thus by his own will incorporates [them] into himself as constitutive of what he is” 
(Frankfurt 171-172).  
 Frankfurt’s defense of character against constitutive luck appeals to a sentiment 
that is as commonplace as it is problematic. Whereas we often disapprove of agents who 
make excuses for their character and actions, we generally admire those who take 
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responsibility for who they are and what they do. Wolf attributes these practices to our 
belief in a “nameless virtue,” characterized by a willingness to hold ourselves 
accountable for our actions and even for their unintended consequences (13). This virtue, 
Wolf argues, “involves a willingness to give more […] that justice requires,” and is in 
this sense akin to generosity (14). Frankfurt and Wolf are right to note our appreciation of 
those who go to excess in taking responsibility, but ought also to mark the potentially 
unjust consequences of this admiration. We might admire, for example, an agent who 
takes responsibility for a heavily determined character trait while unknowingly reifying 
oppressive social norms— as might a docile slave or a deferential housewife.24 It is unfair 
and unreasonable to ask agents to take responsibility for such character traits, and 
arguably for character traits more generally, since doing so entails fostering a willful 
ignorance of the power of external forces to shape character. We might reasonably worry 
that a society in which agents are expected to “take responsibility” for their character 
traits would lack the collective indignation that so often leads to social change.25  
 Perhaps moral luck theorists who favor the rejection of Kantian morality offer the 
best hope for resolving of the problem of moral luck. Whereas those who accept both the 
Control Principle and a pure conception of agency must rely on deeply problematic 
assumptions, those who instead shift the focus of moral assessment from acts and 
outcomes to character avoid such basic pitfalls. The latter approach also seems more in 
line with commonsense views about morality; we are ready enough to excuse an agent 
                                                           
24
 I have in mind two of Thomas Hill, Jr.’s exemplars of internalized oppression: the Uncle Tom and the 
Deferential Wife. See “Servility and Self-Respect,” The Monist 57, 1973, (1):87-104. 
 
25
 I have in mind the case of Pre-Apartheid black South Africans, which I will discuss in Chapter IV. 
Before figures like Stephen Biko introduced a critical perspective on the mythic “character” of black South 
Africans, the latter were encouraged to “take responsibility” for their inferior intelligence, laziness and 
generally poor character. It was only when critics encouraged black people to question assumptions about 
their “nature” that a kind of collective self-respect became possible.    
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from moral assessment if the outcome of her well-intentioned action was not within her 
control, but less ready to excuse her from such assessment where her character is at issue. 
Perhaps we unknowingly accept Richard’s view that “Identity must precede luck,” or 
perhaps stable character and intentions simply mean more to us than do discrete actions 
or outcomes (Richards 155).  
 Whether or not they accept the existence of moral luck, theorists who would 
confine the practice of moral assessment to character must contend with the intrinsic 
ambiguities of the latter— we are and are not responsible for our character traits. It is for 
this reason that we must acknowledge a key difference between the problem of moral 
luck as described by Williams and Nagel and the challenge of luck as described by 
Aristotle, a difference that moral luck theorists of every stripe have consistently failed to 
appreciate. It is only when we recognize that the challenge of luck as construed by 
Aristotle is not reducible to the contemporary problem of moral luck that we can begin to 
properly address both.   
The Challenge of Tychē and The Problem of Moral Luck 
 If we were to draw a false equivalence between the contemporary problem of 
moral luck and the Aristotelian problem of luck, then it would be simple enough to 
resolve the former. We might proceed, as many theorists do, by suggesting that character 
alone is the proper domain of moral assessment. If, like Richards, Zimmerman and 
Thompson, we accept the Control Principle, we would hold that agents are responsible 
for their characters. If, like Frankfurt and Wolf, we adopt an impure notion of agency but 
maintain the importance of moral assessment, we would call upon agents to take 
responsibility for their character, and assess them as if they were. The advantage of such 
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an approach, it seems, is that it allows us to acknowledge the problem of luck to a great 
extent while maintaining our belief in moral responsibility. The disadvantage is that such 
an approach cannot be supported, as is so often assumed, by Aristotle’s ethical theory. In 
Aristotle’s view, attributing responsibility for particular acts is a tricky business indeed, 
and attributing responsibility for character is as needless as it is unjustifiable. Ethics is for 
Aristotle a branch of the political art, since the latter has everything to do with whether or 
not particular agents realize their potential for virtue. Virtue is by and large the result of 
customs, laws and other institutions which agents cannot create. Praise and blame play 
important regulatory roles in moral education and in civic life, but have at least as much 
to do with the encouragement of good character as they do with the attribution of 
responsibility for past actions.  
 There is reason to doubt, as Susan Meyer notes, whether Aristotelian ethical 
theory even includes a conception of moral responsibility, as opposed to a mere account 
of the conditions of voluntariness. Aristotle insists, for example, that “voluntariness is 
shared by children and animals,” and that “non-human animals are not morally 
responsible for their actions, and children are responsible only to a diminished degree, if 
at all” (Meyer 2). Aristotle’s discussions of the conditions of voluntariness in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia are all relatively brief 
and read like surveys of common opinion, perhaps suggesting that “his goal is simply to 
enumerate the ordinary criteria for imputability in his day, without attempting to give a 
philosophical account of moral responsibility” (2). It is also worth noting, as Meyer does, 
that Aristotle does not directly confront the rather obvious conflict between causal 
determinism and moral responsibility: “This is the question of whether causal 
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determinism precludes our actions being up to us (eph’ hēmin) in the way that moral 
responsibility requires” (2).26  
 Despite these doubts, Meyer contends, “Aristotle’s concerns and aims in his 
various discussions of praise and blame are precisely those of a theorist of moral 
responsibility” (3). Although Aristotle’s discussions of the conditions of voluntariness 
revolve around common opinion (doxa), “he examines them dialectically, and revises 
them in the light of independent criteria for moral responsibility” (4). His account of 
responsibility, moreover, entails a compatibilism that explains why he need not address 
the problem of causal determinism; Aristotle’s beliefs about agency are perfectly 
compatible with both moral responsibility and with a naturalistic or causally determined 
conception of events. Aristotle’s ultimate conclusions about responsibility are quite 
sophisticated, and largely at odds with some of our most common contemporary views. It 
is perhaps for these reasons that his account of moral responsibility is so often overlooked 
or misconstrued.  
 What is most distinctive about Aristotle’s theory of responsibility— and he 
arrives at this conclusion via a protracted dialectical argument— is that although it 
clearly entails responsibility for certain acts, it does not clearly entail responsibility for 
the moral character that produces or contributes to them. An agent is responsible for a 
particular act, on Aristotle’s view, only if (1) she is the origin (archē kinēsēos) of the act, 
(2) it was within her power to act otherwise, and (3) she knows the particular 
circumstances in which the action takes place (NE 1111a 17-25). Meyer adds a fourth 
requirement, which she infers from Aristotle’s analysis of voluntariness: “we are morally 
                                                           
26
 Meyer notes that in recent scholarship on determinism some cite Aristotle in support of the view that 
“Morality […] is an institution of dubious merit,” since he appears to be “a thinker who is free of its 
presuppositions” (3).   
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responsible for all and only those actions of which our character is the cause” (4, 
emphasis mine).27 Not all agents possess moral character— children do only to an extent, 
— and only those who do are potentially responsible for their actions. It might seem odd, 
then, that although agents who possess moral character are responsible for the voluntary 
acts that their character produces, they are not responsible for the moral character that 
produces them. But this contention is, as we will see, consistent with the attribution of 
responsibility for certain acts and the claim that such acts are produced by stable 
character. Aristotle’s sophisticated account of the conditions of moral responsibility vis-
à-vis acts, coupled with his contention that we are not wholly responsible for our 
character, allow him to avoid the problem of moral luck. 
As was noted in Chapter II, Aristotle is aware that many or even most actions are 
of a mixed type—voluntary in only some qualified sense. Some such acts merit praise, 
some merit blame, and others are to be excused from moral assessment. It is only when 
we properly appreciate the context within which the action took place and observe how 
the agent feels about the act in retrospect that we are in a position to pass moral 
judgment. In many cases, we reserve both praise and blame, opting for forgiveness or 
even pity (NE 1110a 25). Aristotle’s contention that many acts are of a mixed kind entails 
a sophistication that, though often lacking in the contemporary moral luck debate, is 
perfectly consistent with both the Control Principle and with our ordinary practices of 
moral assessment. When we feel compelled to judge and to forgive an agent for the same 
                                                           
27
 Meyer rightly notes that Aristotle’s account of voluntariness occurs in the context of his account of 
character. The discussion of voluntariness is intended, Meyer holds, to identify the circumstances in which 
an agent is responsible for some particular act. “On Aristotle’s view,” she writes, “the property that makes 
the agent a proper subject of moral demands and evaluations must cause any action for which she is 
morally responsible” (4). This property, Meyer contends, is moral character. Thus, she concludes, we are 
responsible for those acts of which our moral character is the cause.  
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act— and such ambivalent feelings are common where moral assessment is at issue— we 
often do so because we recognize the mixed nature of her action. Moral responsibility is 
often ambiguous, and Aristotle is aware that this is true both of acts and— to an even 
greater extent— of moral character.  
As Myer writes,  
According to most modern views, all moral praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness is ultimately praise or blame for agents having the good 
and bad states of character that they do, and hence presupposes that the 
agents are responsible for their virtues and vices of character. (42)  
As we have seen, the problem of constitutive moral luck involves the moral assessment 
of virtues or vices as if they were up to agents, when in reality they are not. To whatever 
extent Aristotle holds agents responsible for their characters, it would seem, he must 
contend with the problem of constitutive luck. In his discussion of voluntariness in the 
Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle adopts something like the Control Principle in contending 
that voluntariness is a condition for praiseworthiness where character is concerned: 
Now since virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, and praise 
and blame come about for willing actions, but for unwilling actions 
there is forgiveness and sometimes even pity, it is no doubt a 
necessary thing for those who inquire into virtue to distinguish 
what is a willing act from what is an unwilling act. (1109b 30-34)  
It is largely true, as Meyer notes, that the conditions that for Aristotle ground 
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness “are in fact conditions of moral responsibility” 
(42). On closer inspection, however, “the alleged affinity between Aristotle and modern 
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theorists of moral responsibility evaporates” (42). Although we do and should praise 
agents for their virtues and blame them for their vices, this practice does not, by 
Aristotle’s account, entail that agents are responsible for such character traits (42). Virtue 
is praiseworthy “because of the actions and feelings which it produces, not because of the 
actions or feelings that produce it” (46). In other words, virtue and vice are praiseworthy 
and blameworthy respectively on account of their “causal powers,” rather than their 
“causal antecedents” (46). The moral assessment of character, then, is different in kind 
from the moral assessment of particular acts.28 The latter must be voluntary, but the 
former need not. This distinction makes a great deal of sense when considered in the 
context of Aristotle’s account of virtue, since although virtuous and vicious actions are 
chosen, virtue and vice are not, or at least not in the same sense.     
 In Chapter II we observed that virtue and vice are, in Aristotle’s view, radically 
dependent upon circumstances beyond agents’ control. In the light of the evidence there 
presented, it might be tempting to accept Meyer’s strong conclusion that Aristotle does 
not hold agents responsible for their moral character. There is, however, one passage in 
the Nicomachean Ethics that calls us to question such a view. Before closing his 
discussion of voluntariness in Book III, Aristotle points out what he takes to be an 
obvious link between activity and character. He writes, “in order to be unaware that it is 
from one’s being at work involved in each way of acting that one’s active conditions 
come about, one would have to be completely unconscious” (NE 1114a 10-11). This 
relation between activity and character has import implications for the relation between 
character and responsibility. The force of character is such that one’s stable character is 
                                                           
28
 Though they are related in an important way, since both are assigned to “part of a single complex of 
conditions identified in Aristotle’s canonical account of praiseworthiness: an agent, in virtue of her state, 
producing a good product” (Meyer 49).  
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not voluntary, strictly speaking, but it often arises via one’s voluntary or partly voluntary 
actions. Aristotle explains this view by analogizing between states of health and states of 
virtue:  
It may so happen that one got sick willingly, by living without self-
restraint and disobeying one’s doctors; in that case it was in one’s power 
at one time not to get sick, but that is no longer possible for one who has 
given up one’s health, just as it is not possible for someone who has 
thrown a rock to take it back again. Nevertheless, to have thrown and 
launched it was up to oneself since the source was in oneself. In that way 
too it was in the power of an unjust or dissipated person at the beginning 
not to have come to be that way, which is why they are that way willingly, 
but once they have become so it is no longer possible not to be so. (NE 
1114a14-24)  
 Meyer is correct to note that Aristotle does not hold agents wholly responsible for their 
states of character, but this need not entail, as she claims, that he does not hold them 
somewhat responsible. Because character (êthos) is the culmination of habit (ethos) over 
a lifetime, and habit is repeatedly chosen action, we do and must share some 
responsibility for our moral characters. Not only is this view consistent with the 
Aristotelian account of action and character, but it is also a position he explicitly states: 
“the virtues are willing things […] since we ourselves are in a certain way jointly 
responsible for our active conditions” (NE 1114b 21-22).29  
                                                           
29
 The phrase “in a certain way” (pôs) in Aristotle’s writing generally signals a nuanced conclusion that 
arises once more extreme stances have been eliminated in the progression of the text. In the case of 
responsibility, it entails that we are and are not responsible for our moral character. Aristotle will elaborate 
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 What distinguishes Aristotle’s conception of character from those of so many 
modern theorists is that he is comfortable admitting that character is heavily conditioned 
by externals, and further comfortable with assigning praise and blame despite the 
impossibility of attributing complete responsibility for character to moral agents. From 
the Aristotelian perspective, character may be molded from within— by the agent 
through thoughtful reflection and deliberative action— and from without— through 
proper rearing and laws. Both types of reform are useful, and both ought to be 
encouraged. Praise and blame, and reward and punishment, are useful ameliorative tools. 
Encouragement and discouragement in the form of praise and blame— whether from 
peers, teachers or those who enforce the law— have less to do with attaching 
responsibility to action, and more to do with helping agents learn what they ought and 
ought not to take pleasure in, and what types of people they ought and ought not to 
become. Moral luck theorists would do well to mark Aristotle’s sophisticated conception 
of responsibility, and to admit, with Aristotle, that the attribution of responsibility for 
particular acts must often be qualified, and the attribution of responsibility for character is 
inherently problematic.   
 
Kindness and Luck 
 Whether we conceive of the moral life as the human attempt to reach a state of 
eudaimonia, as an effort to abide by rationally derived principles, or as some combination 
of the two, we must contend with the problem of luck. Rule-based moral systems that 
emphasize personal responsibility must confront the tensions that arise when, in concrete 
                                                                                                                                                                             
upon this stance throughout the progression of the Nicomachean Ethics, highlighting the roles of education 
and political institutions in the process.  
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human experience, responsibility is ambiguous. Those who would resolve such tensions 
by taking responsibility for their actions and character render themselves morally 
vulnerable, since they do so in world that they did not create and cannot control. If 
morality asks that agents assume complete responsibility for who they are and what they 
do, then it asks a great deal indeed. If we instead accept— as Aristotle does— that 
responsibility is ambiguous, and work to dissociate it to some extent praise and blame, 
then we go far in resolving the problem of moral luck. But where we accept the 
ambiguity of responsibility, we must also accept the tremendous fragility of both human 
happiness and moral character, as their shared source is a world in which we control very 
little indeed. If we would make a better world, which is to say a world of happier, more 
virtuous moral agents, then we must be prepared to contend not just with our own moral 
flaws, but also and especially with the social and political institutions that contribute to 
the formation of character.   
 Though few of us conceive of ourselves as strict Aristotelians or as by-the-book 
Kantians, chances are we accept some of the fundamental aims of both moral visions. 
Most of us want to flourish, most of us attempt to live according to certain principles, 
most of us realize that we do not create our character in a vacuum, and most of us want to 
continue to morally assess ourselves and each other. Even absent the philosophical 
frameworks that ground them, these beliefs and desires mean that we must contend with 
the problem of luck, or risk living in ignorance of what is most obvious about the moral 
life: the world is not up to us, but we tend to moralize as if it were. What is most 
attractive about Nagel’s explication of the problem of moral luck is that it does justice to 
our deep-rooted beliefs and common practices. Philosophical attempts to dissolve or 
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evade the problem of luck, as we have seen, too often lose sight of both, while conflating 
the challenge posed by tychē and the contemporary problem of moral luck. We must find 
a way to attend to the twofold problem of luck without abandoning our intuitively 
plausible moral convictions, and without trespassing against the obvious facts of our 
existence.  
 The challenge of tychē entails that all human life is deeply vulnerable, and this is 
a truth that even the minimally self-reflective agent must recognize. The desire to flourish 
grates against an uncontrollable world such that even a humble sort of moral success is 
often difficult, and the sustained eudaimonic life envisioned by Aristotle seems absurdly 
idealistic. The problem of moral luck forces us to acknowledge a truth that we so often 
seem to suppress: that our most fundamental beliefs about responsibility are at odds with 
our everyday moral assessments. If we take these challenges seriously, they may appear 
to us insurmountable. In the light of the challenge of tychē, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that ethical striving simply isn’t worth the effort. In the light of the problem of 
moral luck, it is tempting to echo Waller’s call for the abandonment of moral 
responsibility.  
 As imposing as the twofold problem of luck is, it may prove to be a great source 
of ethical fecundity. Reflection upon the challenge of tychē prompts us to appreciate the 
tremendous power of parenting, education and friendship to foster virtue, and reminds us 
of the intertwining of the personal and the political. We may choose, with Aristotle, to 
take the challenge of tychē not as the death knell of ethics but instead as a provocation to 
make ourselves, to whatever extent possible, the sorts of agents who can flourish despite 
bad luck, and the sorts of agents who will work to ensure that others’ may do the same. 
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Reflection on the problem of moral luck forces us to recognize the ambivalent feelings 
that arise when our desire to express moral approbation and condemnation clashes with 
our desire to exercise compassion. It is only by recognizing this tension that we can fully 
appreciate just how deep our values run, just how aware we are, if only pre-reflectively, 
of the existence of luck, and just how willing we are to revise our initially harsh moral 
judgments in favor of more compassionate ones.  
 Though we ought not to conflate the challenge of tychē with the problem of moral 
luck, we would do well to acknowledge that both reveal ethical life to be one of profound 
vulnerability and interdependence.  Aristotle reminds us that our flourishing depends to a 
great extent upon the moral guidance, material help, and expressions of friendship that 
we receive from others. Williams and Nagel remind us that we are the objects of others’ 
moral assessment and as such vulnerable to praise and blame that may profoundly 
influence our moral identities. Hence the twofold problem of luck calls on us to admit not 
only that the world is not up to us, but also that we are— to a troubling extent— not up to 
ourselves. It is in the light of this most distressing insight that kindness emerges as the 
most promising mode of ethical comportment. It takes courage to acknowledge the plain 
fact that we are all subject to circumstances beyond our control and thus often in need of 
each other’s help and compassion. It takes greater courage still to hold ourselves 
primarily responsible for our moral character and for the consequences of our actions, 
since as we have seen such responsibility so often exceeds control. Hence when we 
acknowledge the great extent to which our moral flourishing is dependent upon externals, 
kindness emerges not only as the most natural, but also as the most courageous ethical 
posture.  
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 The tremendous promise of kindness as a response to the problem of luck lies in 
its ameliorative potential. Whether as a way of helping others or as an approach to moral 
assessment, kindness not only indicates sensitivity to the twofold problem of luck but 
also has some power to diminish it. Aware that kindness in the form of material help can 
to some extent mitigate the toll of bad luck on agents, the kind agent stands ready to help 
those in need. The kind agent values moral assessment less as a reification of personal 
responsibility, and more as an ameliorative tool. Kind moral assessments are sensitive to 
the ambiguity of moral responsibility, and aim both to foster agents’ deeply held values 
and to comfort agents who, even if through no fault of their own, rightly feel remorse 
when they have caused harm. The kind agent is inclined to feel deep remorse for her own 
wrongdoing, since such remorse reflects her deeply held values. She hopes that others 
will foster the same moral seriousness, while appreciating how the vulnerability born of 
such a moral attitude increases the need for kindness from others. In the absence of such 
kindness, bad luck too easily disrupts the progression of virtue, and the attitude of moral 
seriousness too easily leads to despair. It is therefore in and through kindness that we may 
preserve, to whatever extent possible, the moral life as a site of resistance to the assaults 
of luck. In a world that is not up to us, our best hope for morally flourishing lies in being 
kind and in being graciously open to the kindness of others. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
 ON KINDNESS 
Before you learn the tender gravity of kindness,  
you must travel where the Indian in a white poncho  
lies dead by the side of the road.  
You must see how this could be you,  
how he too was someone  
who journeyed through the night with plans… 
-Naomi Shihab 
Introduction 
 That kindness is widely recognized and appreciated in our society is clear. It is 
less clear, however, that we know precisely what we mean when we refer to a particular 
act or person as kind. Kindness often functions as an umbrella term, covering such 
phenomena as generosity, helpfulness, compassion, niceness and friendliness. Vagueness 
in our collective understanding of kindness may obscure differing beliefs such that if 
called upon to cooperatively define kindness, we might well quibble over the details. 
Although we might agree that kindness generally involves helpfulness, for example, we 
might disagree regarding the intentions, words and actions that constitute kindness in 
particular cases. In the present attempt to elucidate kindness, caution is therefore 
appropriate. An overly broad definition may gloss over covert expressions of dominance 
or even cruelty, as Phillip Hallie and William Hamrick rightly point out, while an overly 
restrictive definition may exclude subtle yet morally significant expressions of kindness. 
 In Chapter III I suggested that kindness is the most suitable and praiseworthy 
response to the inescapable phenomenon of luck. But this claim cannot be properly 
evaluated until we have a clearer conception of what it means to be kind. My task in this 
chapter, and in the two that follow, is therefore to elucidate the phenomenon of kindness. 
I begin the present chapter by observing in some detail a handful of apparent instances of 
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kindness. Before analyzing these, I reflect briefly upon several of the phenomena— 
including acknowledgement, helping and giving—that have received considerable 
philosophical attention and that are often conflated with or reduced to kindness. I end by 
drawing out a tentative definition of kindness, which I will further develop in Chapters V 
and VI via an engagement with Kantian and Aristotelian moral theory.    
 
Kindness Exemplified 
 In Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables, the Bishop Charles-Françoise Myriel of Digne, 
known affectionately by his flock as the Bishop Bienvenu, refuses to have locks installed 
on the doors of his humble residence. This troubles his domestic servant, Madame 
Magloire, to no end. Bienvenu’s sister, Mademoiselle Baptistine Myriel, with whom he 
resides, tends to dismiss Madame Magloire’s concerns out of reverence for her brother. 
One evening, however, having heard tales of a “dubious-looking prowler” in the village, 
Bienvenu’s sister timidly takes up Madame Magloire’s cause. Encouraged by her 
mistress’s support, Magloire’s makes her case: “we must have locks, if only for tonight; 
you see, I say that a door that opens from the outside with just a latch that anyone can 
open, well, nothing could be more dreadful. Add to that the fact that Monseigneur is in 
the habit of always telling people to come in— even in the middle of the night. Heaven 
help us! They don’t even need to ask permission—” (63). Magloire’s protests are cut 
short by a knock at the door. “Come in,” the bishop says. 
 The door flies open, as though someone has “given it a vigorous and determined 
shove” (63). Valjean steps in, with a “ragged, reckless and sinister look in his eyes.” By 
the light of the fire he is a “sinister apparition,” shocking the two women into silence. 
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Bienvenu fixes Valjean with a tranquil gaze, and listens as the traveler recounts the day’s 
events with abrasive honesty. “Madame Magloire,” the bishop says by way of reply, “set 
one more place” (64). Valjean approaches Bienvenu roughly, saying, “Listen […] it’s not 
like that. Didn’t you hear me? I’m a galley slave. A convict” (64). Valjean draws out his 
yellow passport, and reads: “‘This man is extremely dangerous.’ There! Everybody’s 
kicked me out. Would you put me up? Is this an inn? Would you give me something to 
eat and a place to sleep? Do you have a stable?” (64). “Madame Magloire,” Bienvenue 
responds, “put clean sheets on the bed in the alcove” (64). Turning to Valjean, he says, 
“Monsieur […] sit down and get warm. We’ll have supper shortly and your bed will be 
made while you’re eating” (64). As it dawns on Valjean that he truly is to be made 
welcome, his hard expression turns to a look of disbelief, then at last to one of joy. 
“True?” he stammers, “You mean it! You mean you’ll keep me? You’re not chasing me 
away? A convict, and you call me monsieur!” (64).1   
 The Bishop seats Valjean as close to the fire as he may, then calls to have his 
silver candlesticks brought from the cabinet and lit. Valjean is deeply touched: “You light 
your candles for me. Even though I didn’t hide from you where I’ve been or the fact that 
I am a poor cursed man” (66). Touching Valjean’s hand, the bishop replies, “You didn’t 
have to tell me who you were […] you are hungry and thirsty; you are welcome” (66). 
The bishop asks Valjean whether he has suffered greatly, to which Valjean replies: “the 
ball-and-chain at your feet, a plank to sleep on, the heat, the cold, hard labor, the galleys, 
the stick! Double shackles for nothing. The dungeon for a word. Even sick in bed, the 
chain. Dogs, dogs are better off! (66)” “If you come out of such a painful place full of 
                                                           
1
 Hugo writes, “Every time he said that word monsieur in his gently grave yet so very companionable 
voice, the man’s face lit up.”  “Monsieur,” he interjects, “ to a convict is a glass of water to a man 
shipwrecked on the Medusa. Ignominy thirsts for respect” (66).  
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hate and rage against men” says the bishop, “you are worthy of pity; if you come out full 
of goodwill, gentleness, and peace, you are worth more than any of us” (66). Dinner is 
served, and Valjean eats like a man starved. Only after he is sated does Valjean seem to 
fully appreciate the austerity of his surroundings. “Monsieur le curé,” he remarks, “all 
this is still far too good for me, but I must tell you the cart drivers who didn’t want me to 
eat with them live better than you do” (66). The bishop dismisses his poverty, saying: 
“They are a lot tidier than I am,” then changes the subject (67).    
 The meal presented, as Hugo notes, “a perfect occasion to get in a bit of a 
sermon” (69): 
Anyone else, if he had had this poor unfortunate in his hands, might have 
seen it as an opportunity to feed the man’s soul at the same time as his 
body and to deliver a reprimand seasoned with morality and advice, or 
else a touch of commiseration with the exhortation to behave himself 
better in the future. (69)  
Bienvenue not only refrains from sermonizing, but also takes great care not to do or say 
anything that might remind Valjean of where he has come from, since, as Mlle. 
Baptistine observes, “in his history lies his crime” (69). Recognizing that Valjean is all 
too aware of his miserable past and of the hopelessness of his present situation, the kindly 
Bishop seeks to distract Valjean, and “to make him believe, if only for a moment,” that 
he is a man like any other (69).2 
                                                           
2
 Mlle. Baptistine later reflects on the dinner in a letter to a friend, writing: “Isn’t that what charity is, 
properly called? Isn’t there, my good Madame, something truly evangelical in the sort of delicacy that 
abstains from sermons, moral lessons, allusions, and isn’t the highest form of pity, when a man has a sore 
spot, not to touch it at all?” (69).  
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 When the meal is concluded, Bienvenu takes Valjean to the bed that has been 
prepared for him. Overwhelmed by the bishop’s trust, for a moment Valjean’s baser 
instincts take hold, and he turns on the bishop, growling: “Hah! I don’t believe it! You’re 
putting me up at your place, right next to you, just like that!” He laughs, adding, “Have 
you really thought about this? Who’s to say I’m not a murderer?” (69). Bienvenu 
dismisses Valjean’s outburst— which seems as much a warning as it does a threat— and, 
offering Valjean a blessing, takes his leave. Valjean collapses onto the bed, blows out his 
candle, and falls instantly asleep. 
 As the cathedral clock strikes two, Valjean awakens. Unaccustomed to a proper 
bed, the sensation is simply “too novel not to disturb his sleep” (83). His thoughts swirl, 
old memories mingling with new, old fears and resentments reasserting themselves. Time 
and again his thoughts return to the bishop’s silverware: “These six silver sets of cutlery 
obsessed him. They were just sitting there. A few feet away” (83). For more than an hour 
Valjean sits in turmoil, until at last he rises, and, gathering his things,  moves to the chest 
where, only hours before, the cutlery had been placed as was customary. The chest is in 
the bishop’s own room, and Valjean pauses upon reaching Bienvenu’s bed to see how 
deeply the good man sleeps: “He had never seen anything like it. Such trust horrified 
him” (87). Valjean stares for some time, both deeply moved and deeply distressed. In 
time he moves to the cupboard, thinking to break the lock but finding the key already in 
place. He grabs the silver, throws it in to his knapsack, and climbs out the window. In an 
instant he is over the garden wall and gone. 
 Dawn finds the Bishop in his garden. Madame Magloire rushes to his side, 
franticly reporting that “the man’s gone! The silver’s been stolen!” (88). The bishop 
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thinks a while before asking, “was the silver really ours?” He pauses, then continues: “I 
was wrong to hang on to that silver— and for so long. It belonged to the poor. What was 
that man? He was poor, evidently” (88). Bienvenu returns to his home to take breakfast 
with his sister. Before the meal is concluded, there is a knock at the door. Madame 
Magloire opens the door to reveal three rough-looking gendarmes, one of whom clutches 
Valjean by the scruff of the neck. Before the gendarmes have time to state their business, 
the bishop moves to Valjean, exclaiming, “Ah, there you are! […] I gave you the 
candlesticks too, you know; they are made of silver like the rest and you can get two 
hundred francs for them, easily” (89). Shocked into silence, Valjean listens as Bienvenu 
explains to the gendarmes that the silver had been freely given. He collects the two 
candlesticks from the mantle and hands them over to Valjean. Dismissing the gendarmes, 
the bishop moves to Valjean’s side and says in little more than a whisper, “Don’t forget, 
don’t ever forget, that you promised me to use this silver to make an honest man of 
yourself” (90). Dumbfounded, Valjean listens as the bishop continues, emphasizing each 
word carefully, “Jean Valjean, my brother, you no longer belong to evil but to good. It is 
your soul I am buying for you” (90). And with that, Valjean is sent on his way.   
 Valjean’s shock is believable, and we might find ourselves as perplexed as he 
does by the bishop’s actions if not for Hugo’s elegant depiction of the latter’s character, 
which opens the novel and contextualizes Valjean’s encounter with him. Hugo’s 
description of Bienvenu is among the richest character sketches in literature, and cannot 
be fully captured here, but it would be wise to say a word on the bishop’s tendencies.  
 
 
141 
 
 The Bishop’s Character 
 When Charles-Françoise Myriel arrives in Digne to begin his service as bishop, 
he discovers that the episcopal palace is a vast and handsome town house; “truly,” as the 
bishop muses, “a mansion fit for a lord” (5). Adjacent to the palace stands the local 
hospital, a “low, narrow, single-story house with a small garden” (6). One visit to the 
ramshackle building, crammed with its 26 patients, and Bienvenu announces his decision 
to reside there, leaving the episcopal palace to serve as the town hospital. Upon  moving 
into his new home, the bishop immediately allocates the majority of his salary of 15,000 
francs to various charities, reserving 6000 francs to give directly to the poor, and a mere 
1000 francs for his own expenses. He refers to this distribution not as charity, but as 
“taking care of his household expenses” (7).3  
 In addition to the majority of his own income, large sums— most of them 
offerings to the church— have a way of passing through the bishop’s hands and into the 
hands of the needy. Despite becoming the manager of countless charities and a “cashier 
to all those in distress,” nothing can make the bishop change his humble way of life. 
Money is to him water on endlessly thirsty soil, such that everything is “given away, so to 
speak, before it was received” (9). The bishop’s generosity to those in need knows no 
bounds. In his efforts to aid the poor, he gladly robs himself, and has no qualms about 
redistributing the wealth of the church. As Hugo writes, the bishop takes from the rich 
“all the more greedily for giving it all to the poor” (9).      
                                                           
3
 After three months in Digne, the bishop’s sister and Mmle. Magloire comment upon the household’s tight 
budget. The Bishop responds by petitioning the town councilors for “carriage funds.” Though the 
bourgeoisie of Digne — who oppose the church’s tendency to squander its wealth on luxuries—raise 
objections, Bienvenu is awarded the funds. He allocates the entire 3000 francs to charity, preferring to 
move about his parishes on foot or astride a donkey.     
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 The Bishop of Digne is a gardener. He works the humble patch of earth behind his 
home diligently, joyfully and with little care for convention. Though his days are “full to 
the brim with good thoughts, good words and good deeds,” he never fancies a day 
complete save when it ends with an hour or two spent in his garden (47). Though a poor 
student of horticulture, he seems always to know what his bit of earth requires, and acts 
accordingly. His time in the garden stirs in him a compassionate affection for all living 
beings, tethered as they are to an apparently chaotic and often unforgiving Nature. He 
appreciates the beauty of nature but is not blind to its ugliness. External deformities and 
deformities of instinct evoke his deepest sympathy, often moving him nearly to tears, as 
when he says of a particularly hideous spider, “Poor creature! It’s not her fault!” (46). 
Surrounded by unfortunate beings, he seems, says Hugo, “at times to be asking God to 
hand down lighter sentences.” (46). 
 No one knows so well as the gardener how to do each day what the season 
requires.4 It is in this sense that Bienvenu is a gardener not merely of his little patch of 
earth but also of his bishopric. Sensitive to the needs of his fellows, he responds to the 
exigencies of even the most delicate situations. He knows, says Hugo, “exactly how to sit 
and keep quiet for hours at a stretch by the side of a man who had lost the woman he 
loved, the mother who had lost her child” (16). He has the courage to consort with the 
condemned, even when all others turn their backs. On one occasion he visited a man 
awaiting execution in his final hours, when the prison chaplain and the local curé could 
not be bothered to hear the man’s last confession. The bishop rushed to the man’s cell, 
“called him by his name, took his hand and talked to him,” and spent the night consoling 
                                                           
4
 Paraphrasing Goethe, who writes: “A tranquil eye, an unruffled consistency in doing, each season of the 
year, each hour of the day, precisely what needs to be done, are perhaps required of nobody more than they 
are of the gardener” (224).  
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him. The next morning, the two rode in a cart together to the guillotine, where Bienvenu 
stood beside the prisoner even as he was executed. Although the man went to his death at 
peace, this act took its toll on the Bishop, who took considerable time to recover. 
 Bienvenu believes that vice is not simply chosen, but instead arises as if by nature 
under particular pressures. He is therefore slow to judge, and taking into account the 
surrounding circumstances, is known to say, “Let’s see how this sin came to pass” (13). 
He is generally forgiving of wrongdoing, which to him belongs to mortal beings as much 
as gravity does to the earth, and is especially forgiving of the vices of the powerless, 
since “the weight of human society” falls on them (12). “The sins of women and 
children,” he holds, “domestic servants and the weak, the poor and the ignorant, are the 
sins of the husbands and fathers, the masters, the strong and the rich and the educated” 
(13). He understands that ameliorative efforts must contend with inadequate institutions, 
saying: “Those who are ignorant should be taught all you can teach them; society is to 
blame for not providing free public education; and society will answer for the obscurity it 
produces. If the soul is left in darkness, sin will be committed. The guilty party is not he 
who has sinned but he who created the darkness in the first place” (12). 
   Though well aware of the injustices of the world, the bishop has great faith in 
humanity, and believes that no person is beyond redemption. He believes in the moral 
potential of all people, and actively fosters that potential whenever possible. He never 
represents a virtue as if it is “beyond an ordinary person’s reach,” and is the first to point 
out the goodness of others. Instead of appealing to far-fetched examples or needlessly 
complex arguments, he holds up the citizens of one parish as an example to the 
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inhabitants of another. Where no example may be found, he offers a parable that goes 
“straight to the point— with few pretty phrases and lots of images” (11).  
 When making his rounds Bienvenu seldom preaches, preferring as he does to 
“chat.” He speaks to others in their own tongue whenever possible, going so far as to 
perfect numerous dialects and adopt the idioms of his diverse parishes. All people are 
equal in his eyes, so he treats every person— “the high and mighty and the humble 
alike”— the same. He makes himself at home everywhere, whether in a humble cottage 
or a fine mansion. His home is in turn open to all.  
 Bienvenu is not afraid to look foolish in the eyes of the rich and powerful. He 
knows full well that his way of life renders him comical to his fellow clergymen and to 
certain of his wealthy parishioners. He navigates awkward encounters with such persons 
with dignity and humor. On one occasion he arrived at the episcopal palace of a parish on 
the back of a mule, having surrendered his “carriage finds” as described above. The 
mayor stood before the palace, scandalized, as “A few good burghers stood around 
snickering” (9). “Monsieur le maire,” Bienvenu said, dismounting, “I see I’ve shocked 
you. You think it’s terribly arrogant of a poor priest to ride the same beast that Jesus 
Christ rode. I only did so out of necessity, let me assure you, and not out of vanity” (10). 
 Bienvenu knows he must guard against the appearance of insincerity lest those 
who observe him grow cynical about goodness. Himself an “ex-sinner” and fully aware 
of his own flaws, he does not believe himself to be morally superior to others. His 
humility and compassion are genuine. Even so, he realizes that some might misread the 
minutiae of his goodness. Genuine virtue, as Aristotle tells us, is a kind of extreme, and 
the bishop’s virtues are such that he might appear pretentious to those who do not know 
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him well. Lest he be accused of “laying it on thick,” the bishop not only avoids singing 
his own praises but also becomes, in time, somewhat secretive about his goodness, and 
especially about the poverty born of his extraordinary generosity. He wears his coats until 
they are threadbare, but conceals them beneath a cloak. He does what he may to entertain 
his houseguests, scrambling to procure the best food and wine he can afford. When 
preparing to entertain, he pulls every chair in his home into the main room. If there are 
too few chairs for all present, he perambulates, looking thoughtful, to obscure the 
deficiency. His choice to hold onto his silver until the fateful meeting with Valjean is due 
in part to his principled rejection of a potentially pretentious-looking asceticism.5     
 So sincere is his goodness that most find the bishop an inspiration. Less fond of 
him, however, are the self-serving novice priests who would use his office to further their 
own careers. In an institution rife with sycophants and flatterers, Bienvenu, “humble, 
poor, peculiar,” does not count among the great miters of the clergy, as evinced “by the 
complete lack of young priests flocking around him” (44). “The impossibility of getting 
anywhere under Monseigneur Bienvenu,” writes Hugo, is “so palpable that, scarcely out 
of the seminary, the young men ordained by him promptly got themselves 
recommendations to the archbishops of Aix or Auch and swiftly disappeared” (44). The 
bishop is as uninterested in elevating the careers of self-serving priests as he is dedicated 
to helping those who are sincerely in need, whether of comfort, of compassion or of some 
material necessity. 
                                                           
5
 He has no moral qualms about keeping the silver since he thinks his having something fine would not 
deprive the poor in any substantial way, and revels in a childlike enjoyment of having something pretty to 
contrast with his generally impoverished surroundings. As he says to Madame Magloire, who playfully 
chides him about keeping a “useless” flower garden: “you are mistaken. The beautiful is just as useful as 
the useful […] Perhaps more so” (21).  
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 It is far more difficult to paint a portrait of any person— real or imagined— than 
it is to take a snapshot. Our image of Bienvenu is by now, I hope, close to the former, yet 
there remains a detail that must be added if we are to fully appreciate his character. 
Bienvenu is not naïve. He understands that his open-hearted nature leaves him deeply 
vulnerable. And indeed, his kindness and generosity are at times rejected or even 
mocked. His compassion is so great that others’ suffering becomes his own. His faith in 
others is sometimes met with disappointment, and this disappointment wounds him 
deeply. His generosity is occasionally misconstrued as self-righteousness. His 
extraordinary hospitality, extending as it does even to known criminals, puts his home, 
his possessions and even his life at risk. The bishop is aware of these risks, and is glad to 
abide them, caring far less for his own good than he does for the amelioration of others’ 
suffering. He understands as well as one may that the great injustices in the world— and 
the great deformities of the human heart that they so often yield— must be painfully 
acknowledged before they can be properly addressed.  
 The bishop has a great deal to teach us about the nature of kindness. His 
openness, attentiveness and sensitivity to the needs of others are, if not themselves 
manifestations of kindness, at least kindness-enabling behaviors. His sincere wish to see 
others flourish is no mere wish but is instead and unfailingly actualized through his acts 
of generosity and helpfulness. He treats all people equally, with alike dignity and respect, 
and makes every effort to engage them on their own terms. He believes that all people 
have the potential for good, but also that all are vulnerable to misfortune, and as such can 
only flourish with some degree of help and care. He is slow to pass judgment, 
emphasizing the situated nature of every act of wrongdoing over some purportedly 
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flawed moral character. He believes, despite the opposing view that pervades his age, in 
the ameliorative potential of all people.  
 In the light of these descriptions, we may tentatively say that kindness involves an 
openness to others, a desire to see them flourish, a tendency to treat them with dignity 
and respect regardless of status or station, and a tendency to act on their behalf. We may 
add that kindness is facilitated by, if not premised upon, an awareness of human 
contingency or fragility.    
      
Kindness Is Manifold 
 It is difficult to imagine a finer exemplar of kindness than Hugo’s bishop 
Bienvenu. But our analysis ought not to be restricted to his character alone, nor to his 
treatment of Jean Valjean, lest we give the false impression that kindness is monolithic. 
As we have said, kindness may find expression in some discrete act, in an attitude of 
helpfulness, in an approach to judging others, or as a stable mode of comportment that 
involves all of these. To better appreciate the multifarious nature of the phenomenon at 
hand, we may now observe several markedly different instances of kindness, both real 
and fictional.      
 
 The Sky is Gray 
 James, an eight-year-old black Louisiana boy, is the narrator of Ernest Gaines’s 
short story The Sky is Gray. With his father away fighting in World War II, James is 
forced by his mother Octavia to take on many of the responsibilities of a grown man. 
Poverty has made life a continuous struggle for the family, and fear and doubt are 
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James’s constant companions. Despite the bleakness of their situation— or rather as a 
result of it— his mother won’t permit him to betray his emotions; James must show his 
little brother how to be brave. When a rotten tooth grows so painful that James can no 
longer sleep at night, his mother determines to take him to town to have it pulled. The 
procedure will cost most of Octavia’s meager savings, leaving just enough, she hopes, for 
a few ounces of salt meat and a bus ride home. 
 Bayonne, Louisiana, with its driving sleet and interminable cold, is a cruel place 
that day, crueler still to a black mother and her son who are denied entry to most of the 
shops and restaurants, and ignored, sneered at or openly threatened by so many of its 
citizens. Octavia and James wait for what seems ages in the dentist’s office before being 
turned away— they must return in several hours if they hope to be seen. Back on the 
streets, exhausted, famished, and cold, James stares hungrily at the people eating in 
white-only cafés, longingly at the mannequins sporting clothes he wishes he could buy 
for his mother, and hatefully at the man who whistles at her. They make their way to the 
poor part of town and enter a café. Octavia takes her money from a kerchief, and spends a 
quarter on milk and cakes for James, despite his obviously false declarations that he’s not 
hungry. The café is warm, the jukebox is playing, and James is happy to be there. The 
mood turns when a man begins harassing Octavia to dance. Threatened, she grabs him by 
the collar and throws him to the floor. He jumps up to attack, but Octavia pulls a knife. 
When at last the man relents Octavia pulls James out the door and back into the driving 
sleet. 
  They move at what seems to James a snail’s pace back toward the dentist’s 
office. It’s colder now, and the streets are all but empty. Rounding a corner, they nearly 
149 
 
run into a little old white woman dressed all in black. “Stop,” she says, and Octavia stops, 
uncertain. “Y’all done ate?” she asks. “Just finish,” Octavia replies. “Y’all must be cold 
then?” Octavia explains that they are on their way back to the dentist. “Come on in,” she 
replies, “I’ll telephone him and tell him y’all are coming.” She leads them into her tiny 
shop. From the back room, the woman’s husband calls, “Did you see them?” “They’re 
here,” she replies, “Standing beside me.” “Good,” he says, “Now you can stay inside” 
(113).  
 Octavia and James wait for the old woman to speak, unsure what she wants with 
them. “I saw y’all each time you went by,” she says, “I came out to catch you, but you 
were gone” (113). She again asks if they have eaten, and Octavia again answers in the 
affirmative. The old lady scrutinizes her for some time, as James observes, “like she’s 
thinking maybe Mama might just be saying that” (113). The woman tells Octavia there’s 
warm food in the kitchen. Octavia moves toward the door. “Just a minute,” the woman 
says, “The boy’ll have to work for it. It isn’t free” (113). “We don’t take no handout,” 
Octavia says, stern (113). “I’m not handing out anything,” she replies, “I need my 
garbage moved to the front. Ernest has a bad cold and can’t go out there” (113). Octavia 
agrees to let James help. The old woman insists that Octavia must also eat: “I’m old, but I 
have my pride, too” (113). With that, she leads James out back to the trash cans. James 
picks up the first can, which is so light that he sets it back down to see if it’s empty. 
“Leave that can alone” she tells him. “Pick it up and carry it to the front” (114). James 
does as he’s told, then comes back for the second can. It’s as light as the first. He carries 
it to the front, aware that the old woman is watching him. On the way back inside, he 
notices how small the kitchen is— just as meager and congested as the yard out back.  
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 Back inside the tiny shop, Octavia and James sit down to eat. The table is laden 
with more food than they have seen in ages — rice, meat, gravy, salad, milk and even 
cakes. The old woman withdraws while James and his mother eat. James can hear voices 
in the back room. When she returns the woman tells Octavia that the dentist will be ready 
for James as soon as he arrives. Octavia and James rise to go, and from the back room 
Ernest calls out, “Good-bye both mother and son […] And may God be with you” (116).   
 No sooner has the door closed behind her than Octavia returns to the small shop 
to ask, “You sell salt meat?” (116). The woman replies that she does, and Octavia asks 
for two bits worth. “That’s not very much salt meat,” the woman comments (116). 
“That’s all I have,” comes the reply (116). The woman goes behind the counter and cuts a 
large portion of meat. She wraps it up, puts it in a bag and brings it to Octavia. “That 
looks like awful lot of meat for a quarter,” Octavia protests (114). “I’ve been selling salt 
meat behind this counter for twenty-five years. I think I know what I’m doing” (116). 
Octavia asks her to weigh it. “What?” the woman says, indignant, “Are you telling me 
how to run my business?” (117). Octavia thanks her again for the meal and turns to leave. 
“Just a minute,” the woman says. James and Octavia keep moving. “Just one minute,” she 
says, this time more forcefully (117). Octavia pauses. The old woman unpacks the meat, 
cuts it in half, rewraps one half and hands it to Octavia. Laying a quarter on the counter, 
Octavia says, “You kindness will never be forgotten” (117). As they walk away from the 
shop, James looks back. There, in the window, the old woman is watching them go.   
 The old woman in Gaines’s story notices Octavia and James. So, too, do dozens 
of other people that day, but in her case something is different. This mother and child are 
for her more than two black people— exchangeable with any other unwanted “blacks” in 
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a white neighborhood— as we might imagine they are for the people in the cafés and 
shops and on the streets of Bayonne. The shopkeeper’s wife sees that they have been 
walking for hours in the cold, and she takes the time to wonder about who they are and 
where they are going. We’re so often content to feel a bit of compassion for someone in 
need, to imagine ourselves helping them, and then to move on. But the old woman in 
Gaines’s story won’t content herself with mere affect. By the time she at last catches 
Octavia and James, she has determined to help them in any way she can. There is 
something firm, even forceful about her presence, yet she approaches them tentatively, 
with an attitude of curiosity and openness. She will help them, if she can, on their own 
terms. In the delicate tango of wills between the old woman and Octavia, the former 
pushes the bounds of the latter’s willingness to accept help, persistently charitable and 
even willing to deceive rather than relent. When Octavia insists on being treated fairly 
rather than generously, the shopkeeper’s wife graciously cedes. Octavia, who is at least as 
hungry and cold as James, doubtless appreciates the fine meal. When she thanks the old 
woman for her kindness, though, we understand that she appreciates being treated with 
respect and dignity in front of her son infinitely more. 
 As Gaines’ story reveals, kindness involves a robust acknowledgement of others, 
a willingness to accommodate their desires, and an approach to helping that preserves 
recipients’ dignity and self-respect.  
  
 To Kill a Mockingbird 
 Arthur “Boo” Radley is one of the ‘mockingbirds’ in Harper Lee’s Classic novel 
To Kill a Mockingbird — a once-benign creature whom others have destroyed through 
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their carelessness and cruelty. Silent and reclusive, he is, for young Scout Finch and her 
brother Jem, the stuff of monstrous childhood imaginings: 
Jem gave a reasonable description of Boo: Boo was about six-and-a-half 
feet tall, judging from his track; he dined on raw squirrels and any cats he 
could catch, and that’s why his hands were bloodstained— if you ate an 
animal raw, you could never wash the blood off. There was a long jagged 
scar that ran across his face; what teeth he had were yellow and rotten; his 
eyes popped, and he drooled most of the time. (13)  
Over the course of the novel Scout’s curiosity about Boo, coupled with the conviction 
(inculcated by her father Atticus) that most people are good, overrides her fear. In time, 
and despite the fact that they have never actually met, the two form a peculiar kind of 
friendship, with Boo leaving little gifts for Scout to find. Scout never passes the Radley 
house without looking to see if Boo is there. 
 Near the end of the novel Scout and Jem are attacked on their way home from a 
school Halloween pageant. Jem yells for Scout to run, but she loses her balance in her 
awkward wire costume. Someone is on her, trying to hurt her. Jem struggles to help her 
up, and for a moment the two break free. The assailant grabs Jem. Scout hears a dull 
crunching sound, and Jem screams. When she turns back to help him the assailant grabs 
hold of her, slowly crushing her. Suddenly he is flung backward, nearly taking Scout with 
him. She hears a struggle behind her, then silence. Panicked and confused in the 
darkness, Scout feels around on the ground for Jem. Insead she finds the body of the 
attacker, prone, limp, and smelling of stale whiskey. She rises and walks toward the road 
home. Under the light of a street lamp, she sees a man “walking with the staccato steps of 
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someone carrying a load too heavy for him” (263). The man walks up to Scout’s house 
and through the door.    
 The doctor arrives and, having seen Jem, assures Scout that he’ll recover. Scout is 
at last allowed into Jem’s room. Her aunt is there, rocking in a chair by the fire. Someone 
else is there, too— the person who carried Jem home. He’s standing against the wall, in 
the shadows. The sheriff, Heck Tate, arrives, and he and Atticus sit near Jem as Scout 
recounts the details of the attack. When she explains that someone pulled the assailant off 
her, Tate asks, “Who was it?” (270). “Why, there he is, Mr. Tate, he can tell you his 
name” (270). Scout looks at the man standing in the shadows, and seems to really see him 
for the first time. His hands are thin and sickly white, like they’ve never been exposed to 
daylight. He presses them nervously against the wall. A strange spasm shakes him, “as if 
he heard fingernail scrape slate” (270). But as she gazes at him, “in wonder,” the man 
relaxes. His lips part, “into a timid smile” (270). With tears of recognition in her eyes, 
Scout says, “Hey, Boo” (270). 
 As composed as ever, Atticus politely introduces them: “Mr. Arthur, honey,” says 
Atticus, gently correcting her. “Jean Louise, this is Mr. Arthur Radley. I believe he 
already knows you” (271). Atticus suggests that they all leave Jem’s room and reconvene 
on the front porch, where there will be chairs enough for everyone (and where, as Scout 
surmises, the lights aren’t as bright as they are in the living room).6 “Come along, Mr. 
Arthur,” Scout hears herself say, “you don’t know the house real well, I’ll just take you to 
the porch, sir” (272). Scout leads Arthur to the darkest spot on the porch, well away from 
                                                           
6
  Scout learns by example how to engage people on their own terms. When entering Jem’s room she 
notices that no one has brought a chair for the man in the corner, but assumes that Atticus knows he’ll be 
more comfortable standing, since “Atticus knew the ways of country people far better than I” (266). She 
recalls how “Some of his rural clients would park their long-eared steeds under the chinaberry trees in the 
back yard, and Atticus would often keep appointments on the back steps” (266).   
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Atticus and Tate. The two sit in silence, perfectly content to simply be in one another’s 
presence. Arthur and Scout listen as Tate and Atticus argue about how to deal with the 
aftermath of the attack. It slowly dawns on Atticus that Arthur killed the assailant. Tate 
can’t bear to bring Arthur into the limelight, and so insists on maintaining that the 
attacker fell on his knife. With a troubled conscience, Atticus relents. When Tate leaves, 
Scout assures Atticus that he made the right decision, since making Arthur a local hero 
would be “sort of like shootin’ a mockingbird” (276).   
 Before leaving, Arthur motions toward the house. Scout understands that he wants 
to say goodnight to Jem. She leads him back in, where with her encouragement he lays a 
gentle hand on Jem’s forehead. In a broken whisper, he asks Scout, “Will you take me 
home?” (278). Scout shows him how to lead her by the arm, like a gentleman, and 
together the two walk out the door, across the street and up to the Radley home. Arthur 
opens the door, and disappears inside. They never see each other again. Back on her own 
porch, Atticus reads to Scout from The Gray Ghost— Jem’s horror novel that spurred 
most of their fantasies about Arthur. Before falling asleep that night, Scout tells Atticus, 
“they didn’t know what he looked like, an’ Atticus, when they finally saw him, why he 
hadn’t done any of those things … Atticus, he was real nice” (281). “Most people are, 
Scout,” Atticus replies, “when you finally see them” (281).  
 We may safely assume that Arthur Radley is a complex human being, but even 
after he kills the attacker and carries Jem to safety, it is perhaps difficult for us to think of 
him as such. He becomes fully actualized in that moment of profound recognition, when 
Scout truly sees him for the first time. He becomes ever more human when she leads him 
to the front porch, sits with him, takes him to Jem’s room, and walks him home. Radley’s 
155 
 
literal invisibility throughout the story is perhaps different in kind than the sort of 
invisibility he might have experienced as a mentally impaired man in a relentlessly 
judgmental society, but the effect is similar: to others, and perhaps to himself, he’s not 
quite human until he is recognized as such. Atticus, Tate and Scout treat Arthur with a 
kind of gentle dignity that importantly includes a willingness to accommodate his 
idiosyncrasies. When at last Scout walks him home, he must stoop to accommodate her 
slight stature. Although she knows that they might look a comical pair to anyone 
happening to watch, in her eyes he is a gentleman. It is, we may imagine, the first and last 
time in his life when he is treated as— and so momentarily becomes— as dignified a 
person as any other. 
 Atticus teaches Scout to look past appearances, and to overcome her fears of what 
is strange. It is only when she abandons her prejudices that she is able to see Arthur 
Radley as a full human being, and so to want to be kind to him. Kindness involves the 
willingness to tolerate what is strange to us, and to look past facile caricatures of others to 
the humanity and potential for goodness that such imaginings so often obscure. Scout is 
learning to be kind, and from her we learn that kindness can be inculcated.    
 
 The Woodsman 
 When first we meet Walter in Steven Fechter’s play The Woodsman, we know 
very little about him. What little we know, however, may suffice to make us despise 
him— Walter is a pedophile who has just been released from prison, having served a 
twelve year sentence. What he is leaves most of the people he meets with no curiosity 
regarding who he is. Those who don’t know the details of his past assume the worst and 
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steer clear of him, and those who do, including the secretary at the mill where he is 
grudgingly hired, make his life a constant torment. When a child is abducted from 
Walter’s neighborhood, his parole officer Sergeant Lucas bursts into Walter’s apartment. 
Walter must, Lucas is certain, be to blame. Lucas opens a desk (a woodworking 
masterpiece that Walter crafted years ago), pulls out Walter’s journal (which he has been 
diligently using to try to cope with his unwelcome, “perverse” desires), and tears it to 
pieces. Giving voice to the audience’s sentiments about pedophiles— and perhaps about 
Walter specifically— Lucas says: 
In my eyes, you are a piece of shit. Think anyone would miss you if I 
threw you out the window right now? …I could say you jumped when I 
came in. Who are they going to believe? Not you, because you'd be a dead 
piece of shit. (52) 
 The cruelty of the people around him drives Walter further into himself. He has 
grown almost pathologically apprehensive by the time a co-worker, Vicki, begins trying 
to approach him. Vicki has seen how Walter has been treated, and even though she seems 
to suspect why he is so despised, she comes to him with an attitude of openness and 
curiosity. She catches him being good— working diligently and skillfully, helping 
others— when no one else seems to notice.  It takes a great deal of persuading, but one 
day he finally lets her drive him home. The two strike up a kind of friendship, which 
begins to turn romantic when Walter insists on telling Vicki “the truth” about himself. He 
has molested children; he is a monster. Vicki doesn’t immediately leave, as Walter 
expects her to. She insists that she sees good in him. Irate, he insults her, sure that 
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something must be wrong with her if she doesn’t immediately find him disgusting. Vicki 
gives him time, but won’t let their friendship end.  
 As the two grow closer Walter learns that Vicki was molested by all three of her 
brothers, and she learns that Walter has had perverse desires since he was four years old. 
It is almost certain that he was molested, too, and that his “queer” desires long ago 
became his way of coping with the trauma. Whatever their source, those desires are so 
much a part of him that he fears he will never be able to live a normal life. 
 Walter knows that the odds are against him, as most pedophiles become repeat 
offenders. He is terrified of himself, and rightly so. Forced to reside across the street from 
an elementary school (his landlord being the only one who would rent to a convict), he is 
tempted almost constantly. When Vicki realizes how tortured Walter’ daily life is, she 
asks him to move in with her despite her very real awareness of the risk involved. She 
wants to do everything she can to help him, and recognizes that without some practical 
intervention there is little hope for him. Walter thinks of himself as damaged goods, as 
possibly irredeemable, and is reluctant to accept Vicki’s help. He needs time to think it 
over.  
 Despite Vicki’s compassion and friendship, things continue to go poorly for 
Walter. The secretary at the mill publicizes Walter’s past in hopes of getting him fired, 
and the mill workers go into a frenzy. Walter’s only relative— his sister— refuses to see 
him. Walter’s closest friend (his sister’s husband), misinterprets a comment and their 
friendship abruptly ends. Walter has lost all hope, and prepares to use the only coping 
mechanism he knows. He leaves his apartment and walks to a nearby park, where he has 
often seen a girl in a red coat bird-watching. In one of the most poignant scenes in 
158 
 
contemporary drama, Walter invites the girl to come sit with him. They talk about bird-
watching. Walter is so gentle and sincere that the girl, whose name he learns is Robin, 
feels at ease. Eventually, he asks if she would like to sit on his lap. Frightened and 
embarrassed, she says that she would prefer not to. Walter is embarrassed, too. In little 
more than a whisper Robin tells Walter about how her father makes her sit on his lap. 
Walter asks questions about her father, which Robin timidly answers. Looking at the 
fragile creature beside him, for the first time Walter realizes the true consequences of his 
own actions. He is moved so deeply that his driving desire to molest Robin transforms 
into a fierce desire to protect her from anyone who would do the same, including and 
especially himself. Walter tells Robin that she must tell her teacher about the abuse, and 
promises that her father won’t stop loving her. “I don’t want to hurt my daddy,” Robin 
says (63). Walter responds, struggling to find the right words: 
At first he’ll be upset… very upset… because he’ll realize he’s been a bad 
daddy. Then he’ll try… He’ll try very hard to be a good daddy… People 
will say stupid things about your daddy. That will be hard for you… But 
one thing I know for sure, he’ll always love you… always. (63) 
 There is a long silence. The girl sees the tears in Walter’s eyes, and trying to comfort 
him, says that she will sit on his lap if he still wants her to— that she wants to. Walter 
gently tells her to go home. “Can’t I stay a little longer?” she asks. “No,” he replies. 
“Will I see you tomorrow?” Robin asks. “Will I ever see you?” “I can’t… see you,” 
Walter says, “I’m going away. But I’ll always remember you, Robin” (64). Before she 
leaves, Robin stands, moves to Walter’s side and gives him a hug, silently thanking him.  
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 The play ends in a mood of tentative hope. Walter is fragile indeed, but he is able 
to recognize that his horrifying sexual impulses are mitigated by a more pressing desire to 
do no harm, even to help. The ugliness of his past is altogether real to him, but it needn’t 
bar his having some kind of a future. He will never be, as he had once so desperately 
hoped, “normal,” but he may yet find his own way of flourishing.  
 Early in the play Walter contemplates suicide, and it is easy to imagine his having 
acted out this fantasy had Vicki not been there. There is no other person in his life who 
sees him as redeemable. To the rest of the world he is a monstrous being, and his passing 
would hardly be a thing to mourn. But with Vicki in his life he becomes a dynamic 
human being. Through her compassionate eyes we come to see him as a victim-turned 
perpetrator. If we can feel compassion for the victims of sexual abuse, we learn, we can 
feel the same for the perpetrators of abuse that they so often and tragically become. 
Through Vicki’s generous eyes Walter even becomes for us a kind of moral exemplar— a 
person struggling with every fiber of his being not to violate moral imperatives despite 
overwhelmingly opposing desires. Perhaps more remarkably, with Vicki’s help and 
encouragement Walter becomes capable of more than mere self-restraint; he becomes 
capable of genuine kindness. 
 Vicki’s treatment of Walter reveals that kindness involves an awareness of others’ 
flaws as contingent, coupled with the active search for others’ redeeming characteristics. 
It further reveals that kindness is potentially fecund, awakening its recipients to their own 
capacity for kindness.      
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 The Help 
 Eugenia ‘Skeeter” Phelan, like many of the white characters in Kathryn Stockett’s 
novel The Help, grows up having a closer relationship with her family’s black maid than 
she does with her own mother. Constantine is loving and supportive of Skeeter, and 
always takes the time to comfort her when she needs it most. At the age of thirteen, 
having been called ugly for the first time, Skeeter goes to kitchen to talk to Constantine. 
“Why you crying, girl?” Constantine asks (62). With tears streaming down her face, 
Skeeter tells Constantine that a boy just called her ugly. “Well,” Constantine replies, “Is 
you?” (62). Skeeter blinks, stops crying and asks, “Is I what?” (62). “Now look here, 
Eugenia,” the older woman says, “Ugly live up on the inside. Ugly be a hurtful, mean 
person. Is you one a them peoples?” (62). “I don’t know,” Skeeter sobs, “I don’t think so” 
(62). As Constantine sits down next to her at the kitchen table, Skeeter can hear the 
cracking of her swollen joints. Constantine presses her thumb hard in the palm of 
Skeeter’s hand in a gesture that means listen to me, and says, “Ever morning, until you 
dead in the ground, you gone have to make this decision,” Constantine says, leaning in 
close, “You gone have to ask yourself, Am I gone believe what them fools say about me 
today?” (63). Years later, Skeeter recalls how at that moment she realized, for the first 
time, that she actually had some choice in what she could believe (63).  
    Mae Mobly Leefolt is neglected by her mother almost from the day of her birth. 
Ms. Elizabeth Leefolt always takes the time to dress carefully, style her hair and apply 
her elaborate makeup, but can’t quite find the time to meet her daughter’s basic needs. 
More concerned with socializing than with caring for Mae, Elizabeth strolls around the 
town looking so tidy that no one would ever suspect her of being the kind of person who 
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would leave her infant at home, screaming in a crib. Mae is little more than an annoyance 
to her mother, so the housemaid Aibileen’s principal task is to keep Mae out of her 
mother’s way. Most mornings when Aibileen arrives at work, she finds the toddler 
screaming in her crib, miserable in a soiled diaper. Mae is so accustomed to sitting in a 
filthy diaper that she struggles when it’s time to potty train, and this irritates her mother 
to no end. Elizabeth is openly disgusted with Mae, and regularly expresses her wish that 
she could have good child, as her friends do.  
 Aibileen loves Mae as if she was her own child, but knows she can only do so 
much to help her. She takes excellent care of Mae, and gives her plenty of attention and 
affection, rightly suspecting that she’ll receive little enough from her parents. Aibileen 
teaches Mae, who at the age of two is already sure she is a dirty, bad and ugly child, that 
the things her mother says about her simply aren’t true. Every time Elizabeth is cruel to 
Mae Aibileen tells her: “You a smart girl. You a kind girl, Mae Mobley. You hear me?...” 
(92). She always makes Mae repeat the words.  
 When Mae is only three years old Aibileen is suddenly fired. Brokenhearted, 
Aibileen goes to the Leefolt home to say goodbye. “Baby girl,” Aibileen says, “I need 
you to remember everything I told you. Do you remember what I told you… About what 
you are [?]” “you is kind,” the little girl says, “You is smart. You is important” (443). 
Aibileen hugs Mae like she’s “just given her a gift” (443).  She leaves hoping that Mae 
will remember to see herself through her eyes— as a good, loving, worthwhile person— 
and not through the cold, often cruel eyes of the people around her. 
 The care Aibileen takes of Mae is kind because it does more than meet her basic 
physical needs. Aibileen actively inculcates in Mae a conviction of her own value as a 
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person. Constantine’s treatment of Skeeter similarly fosters the latter’s feelings of self-
worth, but in a way that is more appropriate to a young adult. As these stories reveal, 
kindness fosters feelings of self-worth in its recipients.  
  
 Phyllis Diller 
 Phyllis Diller is widely regarded as one of the most successful stand-up comics in 
history. Most famous for her flamboyant stage persona— resplendent in ludicrous wigs 
and Technicolor dresses— and for her outrageous laugh, those who conflated Diller with 
her on-stage character might be surprised to learn that what she valued most in life was 
kindness. Diller herself recognized the farcicality of a woman whose stage presence was 
synonymous with cynicism claiming to appreciate kindness. In a press conference late in 
her life, Diller was asked what she most hoped to be remembered for. When she 
answered, with all sincerity, “kindness,” she had to laugh at herself.7 The press member 
who had posed the question responded, with equal sincerity, “well you are,” to which the 
room erupted in applause.  
 Though perhaps too self-deprecating to acknowledge it, during her decades as a 
comic Diller was widely known as one of the kindest people in show business. Having 
been mentored by the greatest comedians of her time, including, famously, Bob Hope, 
Diller knew how important it was for young comedians to find support. Once her own 
career was established, she made a habit of going to see young comics perform. She 
always laughed loudest when hearing fledgling performers. She knew they would be able 
                                                           
7
 More precisely, Diller said “I always said I would like to become a gracious lady, and be known for 
kindness.” Interviewed for a 2011 profile in Out magazine, Diller was again asked how she would like to 
be remembered. This time she replied: “For being funny. Well, I should say being kind. I am a kind person. 
I'm kind to everybody. I treat everybody the same, and I'm proud of that. In fact, that's my religion.” (See 
Ari Karpel, “Ladies We Love: Phyllis Diller,” Out, March 18th, 2011). 
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to hear her unmistakable, infectious cackle through the noise of the crowd, and would 
benefit from having a famous comic in stitches in the audience. When prompted, she 
would offer advice to young comics, with the confidence of an expert and the compassion 
of someone who knew what it was like to “work without a safety net.” Her example and 
encouragement helped to foster the careers of some of today’s most well-regarded 
comedians, including her lifelong friends Joan Rivers and Roseanne Barr. 
 Diller was often publicly recognized for her considerable charitable work, but 
most of her kind gestures took place out of the limelight. One anecdote comes from film 
critic Leonard Maltin. Many years before Diller’s death, on a sudden whim Maltin agreed 
to appear on a series of gameshows. When he taped a week’s worth of episodes of a show 
called Password Plus, he had the opportunity to spend some time with Diller, the other 
celebrity guest. As Maltin recalls, 
Naturally, we changed wardrobe for each day’s show, and by the second 
or third episode she noticed that I had a different lapel pin on each jacket I 
wore. She asked me about it and I explained that I collected them. For the 
next ten to fifteen years, every month or so I would receive an envelope in 
the mail with a pin from a city she had visited or an event in which she’d 
participated. She would always attach a card wishing me love.   
When Diller died in the summer of 2012, Maltin reflected on her act of kindness, writing, 
“I still can’t get over this extraordinary gesture of thoughtfulness for someone she barely 
knew.” Maltin’s anecdote is one of many; Diller routinely went to the trouble of getting 
to know the people around her, and actively sought out ways to be kind to them. A 
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staunch atheist, Diller often said that she wanted to make kindness her religion. If one’s 
faith is defined by practice, then she certainly succeeded in doing so.  
 Diller’s life illustrates an important truth about kindness, namely, that kindness is 
fundamentally excessive. Certainly none could fault Diller had she merely treated her 
colleagues and fans cordially. We may properly praise her as kind because she was more 
than merely cordial or polite, routinely going out of her way to help and cheer the people 
around her, expecting nothing in return. Kindness involves more than abiding by 
conventional moral injunctions; it involves the tendency to do more than decency 
requires. From Diller we learn that there is something morally excessive about kindness.8 
 
 Stephen Biko 
 When Stephen Biko helped found the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in 
the 1960’s, the few white South Africans who were not overtly racist preferred to ignore 
racial difference altogether. As Barney Pityana, another BCM founder put it:  
It is true that the question of race is one which we often find embarrassing. 
It should rather not be discussed, like the problem of sex during the 
Victorian era. “Oh, you see, I love you as a person and it never occurs to 
me that you are black!”— this is the sort of gesture we receive from our 
sympathetic friends. Many would prefer to be color-blind. (Woods 36-37) 
But the willful denial of racial difference was powerless to address the widespread 
oppression that entrenched, systemic racism was in fact helping to foster. Denying the 
fact of racial difference and the problem of racial prejudice in South Africa involved a 
radical cognitive dissonance, which is clear from what white South African children 
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 A claim I develop in Chapters VI and VII. 
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simply knew growing up. “My contact with other white children,” writes Biko’s friend 
and biographer Donald Woods, “reinforced the generally accepted white version of the 
black stereotype,” which held that:  
[B]lacks could never be the same as us; that they did not want to be the 
same as us; that they were created black because the Almighty clearly 
intended that they should be set apart and should stay different, with a 
different color, different smell, different language, different attitudes (all 
naturally inferior to ours). (42)  
So systemic and deeply rooted was South African prejudice that black children— whose 
inferiority was so thoroughly inculcated as to be naturalized— matured into men and 
women who were willing to remain complacent despite being politically disenfranchised, 
economically impoverished and socially irrelevant.  
 Biko understood that a new paradigm was needed, and that such a paradigm must 
originate in a fundamental shift in black people’s self-consciousness. It was not sufficient 
to become aware of one’s blackness, since blackness was so fully equated with poverty, 
and with intellectual and moral inferiority. Black people must, Biko held, become 
conscious of themselves as black at the same time that they became conscious of 
blackness as something good, or at least not intrinsically inferior to whiteness.9 His new 
paradigm, Black Consciousness, entailed that every black person was a full person, “a 
being, entire in himself,” and as such worthy of dignity, respect and a political voice (59). 
Biko and his supporters began to propagate a new story of blackness, to reveal that 
                                                           
9
 In a 1977 interview that appeared in The Boston Globe Biko said, “Even today, we are still accused of 
racism. This is a mistake. We know that all interracial groups in South Africa are relationships in which 
whites are superior, blacks inferior. So as a prelude whites must be made to realize that they are only 
human, not superior. Same with blacks. They must be made to realize that they are also human, not 
inferior" (25 October 1977). 
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blackness had a rich history before it was appropriated as a means of control by white 
colonists. They began to broadcast the creed that, as Biko put it, “the most potent weapon 
in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed,” and the related belief that 
black people, in refusing to assert their basic humanity, had long been complicit in their 
own oppression (Woods 59).  
 Biko’s contention that black people were intrinsically worthy of respect was, to 
many black South Africans, a shocking revelation. To the black man who had always 
doffed his cap to a white man in an accepted gesture of politeness, the realization that in 
so doing he reified his own inferiority must have been both deeply upsetting and 
profoundly liberating. It is easy to grasp why the critical perspective that the BCM 
represented, once publicized, could not be contained; Biko and his supporters had broken 
the spell that had long allowed Apartheid to flourish.    
 We tend, perhaps, to think of kindness as a phenomenon that occurs at the level of 
individuals— an act of helpfulness, for example, performed by one person for the benefit 
of another. But Biko’s work on the BCM suggests that kindness may, at least in some 
cases, be actualized on a larger scale; an individual or organization, guided by proper 
principles, can offer comfort and aid to a great population in need.  Biko’s belief in the 
fundamental worth of all people, his righteous indignation in response to oppression, his 
willingness to work to help those in need, his moral courage in the face of threatened 
violence, and his tireless efforts to persuade black South Africans to take up their own 
cause, are both a reflection of his kind character and a powerful illustration of how 
kindness can find expression—and indeed effect great change— at the societal level.   
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 Les Chambonnais 
 Beginning in the winter of 1940-1, the commune of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon in 
France became a safe-haven for refugees, most of whom were Jewish, escaping Nazi 
persecution. The local minister, André Trocmé, with the assistance of his wife Magda and 
local pastor Eduard Theis, led efforts that ultimately saved thousands of lives. These 
efforts were not, like those of the French guerrilla organizations, motivated by political 
allegiance or a desire to preserve a community; as Phillip Hallie writes, “On the contrary 
[…] they put their village in grave danger of massacre, especially in the last two years of 
the Occupation” (Hallie Lest Innocent Blood be Shed 10). Although today the story of Le 
Chambon is often put forth as a singular example of heroism, what is perhaps most 
remarkable about the events that took place there is that those involved did not see their 
efforts as remarkable— they were simply doing what they felt others in their situation 
ought and might reasonably be expected to do.  
 As Hallie remarks, “The word good sometimes carries with it connotations of 
vapidity” (Hallie Lest Innocent Blood be Shed 68). Certainly, the same can be said of the 
word “kindness.” We may think of kind people as being foolish or naïve, or at least of 
suppressing complex selves with a kind of smothering decency. The kindness of people 
like André and Magda Trocmé subverts any such characterization. André Trocmé’s 
aggressive attitude of nonviolence did not represent a theologically sanctioned position, 
but instead emerged, through careful reflection, over the course of a difficult life. He had 
seen enough death to appreciate the pricelessness of life (48). Though nonviolent, 
Trocmé was known for his fiery temper. Magda called her husband “a turbulent stream,” 
and Hallie recounts how, during a lecture he was giving on nonviolence, André bellowed 
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at an audience member who had been whispering (words of praise for Trocmé’s work, as 
it turns out), and called for an usher to remove the miscreant (47). Trocmé’s presence was 
at times overwhelming, especially to his more reserved friends. He insisted on embracing 
and kissing those he made welcome, and did so with a ferocity that bordered on the erotic 
(48). A complex, at times inscrutable man, Trocmé was most of all enthusiastically 
helpful to those in need. He was, for so many refugees, “the soul of Le Chambon,” and 
the “driving force” that carved out an unparalleled sanctuary in a time of unparalleled 
need (72).    
 The day Hallie went to meet Magda Trocmé, he listened, rapt, as she told stories 
of the children— most of them orphaned— whom she and her community had saved 
from the Nazis. Hallie was so deeply moved by her courage and by her obvious love for 
the children she helped that he couldn’t help proclaiming, “But you are good people, 
good” (Hallie Eye of the Hurricance 31). Magda, indignant, told Hallie he had missed her 
point entirely: “We have been talking about saving the children. We did not do what we 
did for goodness’ sake. We did it for the children. Don’t use words like ‘good’ with me. 
They are foolish words” (31). In time Hallie came to appreciate Magda’s point, and so 
must we. Ethical comportment involves particular human beings, and for Magda, Andre 
and the people of Le Chambon, it was one thing to abstractly espouse a principle and 
quite another “to face a shivering, terrified Jew on your doorstep” (Hallie Lest Innocent 
Blood be Shed 128). Magda was no do-gooder. She did not actively seek out people 
whom she could help, but she did feel compelled to help those who were clearly in need. 
Her “principle,” as Hallie writes, “did not involve any abstract theories, but only a feeling 
of responsibility to particular people […] Hers was a caring involving help, not romantic 
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yearning” (153). The words she spoke to her first refugee, “Naturally, come in, and come 
in,” were no grand gesture, but simply a practical acknowledgment by one person of 
another’s need. 
 The Trocmé’s show us that kindness isn’t reducible to its popular caricature: a 
vapid, unreflective quasi-goodness that ought properly to be called niceness or mere 
pleasantness. Agents who do not immediately strike us as kind— including those we 
would not classify as “do-gooders”— are capable of striking acts of kindness. The 
Trocmé’s also reveal that, although kindness involves reflective personal commitments, 
kind agents need not be motivated by grandiose moral ideals, nor by an inflated sense of 
their own moral importance. The values of the kind agent are suited to an imperfect 
world in which agents need each other’s help and support, and are actualized in acts that 
positively affect particular human beings. 
 
 Frederick Douglass  
  Frederick Augustus Washington Baily was born into slavery during the second 
decade of the nineteenth century. The son of a white man and a black slave, Douglass 
was separated from his mother early in life. He lived with his grandmother for a time 
before being sent first to a plantation, then, when his overseer died, to live in a great 
household, where he served a woman named Lucretia Auld. Douglas was yet too young 
to work the fields, and had few responsibilities. He happily performed small errands for 
Lucretia, for whom he felt a special regard. One day Douglas found himself injured 
following a scuffle with another young slave. When the sadistic kitchen slave Aunt Katy 
found Douglas, she took no notice of his tears and injuries, but instead reproached him 
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harshly for getting into a fight. Lucretia then appeared and called him into the parlor 
(itself, as Douglas writes, “an extra privilege”), where, without using toward him any 
“hard-hearted and reproachful epithets,” she quietly “acted the good Samaritan” (207). 
“With her own soft hand,” he writes, “she washed the blood from my face, fetched her 
own balsam bottle, and with the balsam wetted a nice piece of white linen, and bound up 
my head” (207). The ointment was less healing to his injuries, Douglas recollects, “than 
her kindness was healing to the wounds of my spirit, made by the unfeeling words of 
Aunt Katy” (207). 
 That day the bond between Lucretia and Douglas deepened. The simple act of 
binding up his injury, Douglas believed, awakened in Lucretia’s mind an interest in 
Douglas’s welfare (207). From then on, he believed, they were friends. She would bestow 
upon Douglas “such words and looks as taught me that she pitied me, if she did not love 
me” (206). She would set aside extra food for him, shirking the household’s meticulous 
rationing, and would reward him for singing little songs to her from beneath her window. 
She would treat him with compassion when he was cruelly treated by Aunt Katy. She was 
his friend, Douglas reasoned, because she gave him acknowledgement, bread, and 
sympathy. Although he confesses that these gestures were slight, and that he, being 
accustomed to a dearth of kindness, doubtless overvalued them, Douglass yet recalls 
them fondly: 
Bitter as are my recollections of slavery, I love to recall any instances of 
kindness, any sunbeams of humane treatment, which found way to my 
soul through the iron grating of my house of bondage. Such beams seem 
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all the brighter from the general darkness into which they penetrate, and 
the impression they make is vividly distinct and beautiful. (208-209) 
 Douglas’s experience reveals an important and perhaps surprising truth about 
kindness, namely, that genuine kindness may occur despite imbalanced power relations.10 
 
 Spurious Kindness 
 Mr. Meagles, a retired banker in Charles Dickens’ novel Little Dorritt, is a 
“practical man.” When his wife, overcome by compassion, bursts into tears at a home for 
orphaned children, he deems it a most practical response (18). With like practicality, he 
determines to take in one of the poor unfortunates to serve as maid to his benign but 
spoiled daughter, known affectionately as Pet. Mr. Meagles understands that he cannot 
expect the poor soul to have all of the good qualities of a full person, having been 
deprived of “all of the influences and experiences that have formed us” (18). And so the 
Meagleses adopt a young girl named Harriet Beedle. They immediately decide that 
Harriet, “an arbitrary name, of course,” is an unfitting moniker for their daughter’s maid, 
and so take to calling the girl Hattey (18). Soon after, Mrs. Meagles determines that the 
child ought to have a nickname, and so takes to calling her Tatty instead. The child’s last 
name, Beedle, also offends the Meagleses, who change it to Coram, after the founder of 
the institution from which she came. Sometimes she is called Tatty, and sometimes 
                                                           
10
 There is a great deal to say about kindness vis-à-vis power differentials. There may, for example, be 
something especially praiseworthy in the kindness shown by a superior to an inferior. Even so, we might 
worry about praising any kindness that plays out within cruel institutions, and even worry that kindness 
might somehow enable the sustenance of systemic indifference. The latter is, roughly, one of Nietzsche’s 
objections to slave morality; slave morality is a morality of psychological, and not practical, resistance. I 
return to this concern in Chapter VII, where I consider an argument regarding the ineffectiveness of 
kindness under institutionalized slavery put forth by Harriet Beecher Stowe.     
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Coram, until at last the Meagleses settle into calling her Tattycoram. In time they can 
scarcely recall her given name, though, unbeknownst to them, she most certainly can.      
 Mr. and Mrs. Meagles are quite pleased with what they take to be their 
compassionate generosity toward Tattycoram. She is in their eyes a privileged soul 
indeed to have found a home, and in service to such a fine mistress. They work to keep 
her mindful of her most fortunate position, even as they compound her servility with 
increasingly demeaning tasks. The Meagleses are utterly oblivious to Tattycoram’s need 
for acknowledgement and affection, and so attribute her rage— which, as they naturally 
fail to note, coincides with excessive displays of kindness and affection toward their 
daughter and especially unfeeling treatment of her— to a defect of character inherited 
from her (almost certainly) defective mother. One for practical solutions, instead of 
listening to Tattycoram’s explanations, Mr. Meagles invariably answers her anger with a 
prescription: “count five-and-twenty, Tattycoram” (322).  
 In time, mysterious woman named Miss Wade meets and takes an interest in 
Tattycoram. Miss Wade treats the latter as an equal, calling her by her preferred name— 
Harriet— and inquiring into her hopes and plans for the future. The friendship restores 
the young maid’s feelings of self-worth, which makes her life with the Meagleses 
insufferable. Even those accustomed to careless disregard may have their breaking points, 
and Tattycoram eventually reaches hers. Having been callously disregarded one time too 
many, she rushes down the stairs “in a flying rage” and announces to the family: “I hate 
you all three,” and “I am bursting with hate of the whole house” (322). The very model of 
equanimity, Mr. Meagles simply replies, “count five-and-twenty, Tattycoram,” which 
triggers the young woman’s trained response. By the count of eight, though, she has 
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broken down completely, and pours her heart out to the Meagleses. As Mr. Meagles 
recalls: 
She detested us, she was miserable with us, she couldn’t bear it, she 
wouldn’t bear it, she was determined to go away. She was younger than 
her young mistress, and would she remain to see her always held up as the 
only creature who was young and interesting? No. She wouldn’t, she 
wouldn’t! What did we think she, Tattycoram, might have been if she 
would have been caressed and cared for in her childhood, like her young 
mistress? As good as her? Ah! Perhaps fifty times as good … we exulted 
over her and shamed her… and who were we that we should have a right 
to name her like a dog or cat? 
At that the young woman proclaimed she would take no more “benefits” from the family. 
By the next morning she had gone. She could endure no more of the Meagleses’ 
“kindness.”11   
 The story of the Meagleses reveals, first, the importance of moral intentions in 
rendering particular acts kind, and second, the potential of misuse of the term “kind” to 
describe certain acts of helpfulness or giving that are, if not cruel, certainly far from kind. 
Tentatively, we may say that a genuine act of kindness is motivated by a desire for 
another’s good. 
 
                                                           
11
 I regret to confess that “Tattycoram” does not go on to live a rich, independent life with Miss Wade (who 
turns out to be ruthless and self-serving), to whom she repairs after leaving the Meagleses. Instead, and in 
true Victorian fashion, she repents her rage and begs the Meagleses to take her back: “I hope I shall never 
be quite so bad again,” she weeps, “I’ll try very hard. I won’t stop at five-and-twenty, sir. I’ll count five-
and-twenty hundred, five-and-twenty thousand!” (812). Mr. Meagleses accepts her apology by way of a 
solemn a lecture on duty.   
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Taking Stock 
 The above examples, though not exhaustive, are sufficiently diverse to reveal the 
basic contours of kindness. But because the phenomenon of kindness shares much in 
common with, for example, helpfulness, generosity, and hospitality, it will be easier to 
appreciate kindness if our analysis can bring it into relief against the backdrop of these 
phenomena. If our account is to be successful, it must ultimately distinguish not only 
between kindness and radically opposed modes of comportment, but also between 
kindness and closely related phenomena. In the analysis that follows I therefore consider 
whether or to what extent kindness exceeds analogous phenomena by evaluating the 
above examples in the light of both. 
 
 Kindness and Acknowledgment 
 Dozens of villagers saw Jean Valjean, and several spoke to him, but few 
acknowledged him in a way that would have enabled kindness. When Bienvenu admitted 
Valjean into his home, listened patiently to his story, and invited him to stay, Valjean was 
acknowledged not as a mere criminal, but as a fellow man, and as a person in need. 
Absent this acknowledgment Bienvenu might have helped Valjean materially, but he 
would not have shown him genuine kindness. Octavia and James, too, were seen by many 
but weren’t truly acknowledged until the shopkeeper’s wife turned her attention to them, 
noticed their discomfort, and approached them with an attitude of curiosity and a 
willingness to help. The old woman saw Octavia’s immediate need, and so paved the way 
for kindness, but her acknowledgement had to go further. Her offer of food was 
charitable, but it was only when she acknowledged Octavia as an equal, and showed a 
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willingness to take a proud woman her own terms that her act of giving became 
genuinely kind— and could be perceived by Octavia as such. Arthur Radley, who was 
initially for Scout merely “some country person” standing in the shadows of Jem’s 
bedroom, came to life when she took the time to see him. When she looked in his eyes, 
called him by name, and made him welcome in her home, he became something else. Her 
encouragement enabled him to lay a gentle hand on Jem’s face in a gesture of friendship 
and concern, to walk like a gentleman, to momentarily become for himself, perhaps, a 
person like any other. Vicki watched Walter, curious and sympathetic, and refused to turn 
away from him when she learned of his past. She would not be persuaded to deny the 
goodness she had seen in him, and refused to suppress her own compassion for someone 
who had once, and in a sense still was, a victim of sexual violence. She saw him as a 
dynamic, fragile human being. Walter in turn learned to truly acknowledge Robin, to see 
her not as an object to be manipulated to satisfy his desires, but instead as a vulnerable 
human being in need of help and protection. Phyllis Diller took the time to notice the 
people around her, was sensitive to their needs and preferences, and so came to know 
what type of advice and which gestures of helpfulness or generosity they would 
appreciate. Her willingness to act on this knowledge was part of what made her kind, but 
that kindness presupposed a tendency to truly acknowledge others. Steve Biko taught 
black South Africans that their liberation had to begin with an acknowledgment of 
themselves as intrinsically valuable and fully human, as irreducible to the tools of white 
colonialism. His acknowledgment of them as such made possible their own, breaking the 
spell colonization had cast upon their own feelings of self-worth. Magda Trocmé greeted 
refugees not as strangers nor as Jews, but as human beings in desperate need of help and 
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care. The people of Le Chambon did not just open their homes to the refugees, but also 
opened their hearts to them, as fellow human beings worthy of dignity and respect.  
 It is possible to see another human being without acknowledging her in a way that 
makes kindness possible. It is possible to perceive another person only vaguely, through a 
fog of one’s own worries and needs, and so to be blind to hers. It is possible to see and 
immediately judge another person as being unworthy of one’s help or compassion, or as 
being worthy of one’s derision. It is possible to reduce another human being to the mere 
object of one’s own self-interest. To acknowledge others in a way that enables kindness 
we must be able to see past the ends of our own noses, think past our perceived self-
interest, and suspend or immediately question the sorts of judgments that would render 
other people anything less than full human beings. It is only when we learn to 
acknowledge others in this way that we make possible our own kindness. Kindness 
begins, then, in a special kind of acknowledgement.  
 For Emmanuel Levinas, the force of the “ought”— our compelling, embodied and 
affective sense of moral responsibility— “can be directly experienced only because the 
Other is not an object but a free, independent subject” (Hamrick 53). The Other, Levinas 
contends, escapes all efforts of categorization. When we attempt to reduce the Other to a 
perceptual object, or bring her totality under a concept such as “black,” “criminal,” or 
“pedophile,” we do her great violence. But merely acknowledging the Other as such may 
not suffice to enable kindness. Kindness involves an active and responsive ethical 
posture, a readiness to cheer, to help and to give. There is something special, then, as 
William Hamrick observes, about the “face” (outward expression) of the kind person: “In 
both look and word, the face of the kind other expresses warm generosity in terms of 
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welcome, peace and hospitality” (52). When confronted by the Other the genuinely kind 
person does not merely become cognizant of a set of negative injunctions (do not kill, do 
not injure, etc.), but rather experiences a desire to “remedy needs,” “enhance the Other’s 
flourishing,” and express kinship and responsibility “through welcome and peace” (53). 
There is something meritorious, even excessive, about the ethical posture of kindness and 
the form of acknowledgement that it involves. Kind comportment entails a partial 
disintegration of the boundaries between self and other that lovingly eschews, playfully 
mocks, the ideal of rational autonomy. 
 
 Kindness and Helpfulness 
 As Kant observes, many people consider themselves kindhearted because they 
hope or wish for the happiness of others (Kant LOE 200). But mere wishing, says Kant, 
fails to evince a kind heart. Wishing for others’ happiness takes little effort and entails no 
risk. Acting for the sake of others is decidedly more challenging, and often less 
rewarding, but we must so act if we are to be genuinely kind; “we are kindhearted,” Kant 
rightly asserts, “only in so far as we actually contribute to the happiness of others” (200). 
This practical kindheartedness is perhaps most evident in gestures of helpfulness, acts 
that may involve sacrifices of time, energy, material resources, safety and security, and 
that may be emotionally or psychologically draining. 
 The Bishop Bienvenu is especially attentive to the people around him, and so is 
especially aware of their needs. He wishes for others to be happy, and, because he is truly 
kind, he will not content himself with mere wishing. No one sacrifices more than he does 
to help those in need. The Bishop, as we have observed, is well aware of the risks he 
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takes in aiding others. He knows that his refusal to have locks installed and his 
willingness to board criminals put him at considerable physical and material risk. He 
knows that circumstances can strain human nature too far, and that some of the people he 
helps and makes welcome in his home may be so strained as to rob, hurt, or even kill 
him. He takes these risks willingly, and considers them less substantial than the spiritual 
risks he takes in comforting those who need his comfort most.  
 Sometimes the help that is needed most desperately is also the hardest to give. 
When the condemned man sat despairing in his cell, Bienvenu alone was willing to act on 
his behalf. He traveled far to offer comfort and compassion— immaterial help but help 
nonetheless— to a person in desperate need, and this help came at a great personal cost. 
When he climbed the scaffold and stood beside the man as the blade of the guillotine fell, 
he helped in a profound way, but his help required him to witness the brutal death of a 
pitiable man. The experience shook Bienvenu to his core, and made him question— to 
the extent he was capable— his faith in humanity. The ensuing and radical emotional 
upheaval was just another burden Bienvenue was willing to bear for the sake of others.   
 There are gestures of helpfulness that heal their recipients and gestures of 
helpfulness that harm them, and this is a truth that Hallie begs us to appreciate. The help 
that manifested at Le Chambon was truly good, Hallie contends, because the refugees 
were in desperate need, were treated with dignity and respect, and nothing was expected 
from them in return. Sadly, in certain situations help can come at a great moral cost to the 
recipient, and what appears to a casual observer like a gesture of helpfulness may feel to 
a recipient like an act of disrespect or even cruelty. The Meagleses presumably believed 
they were doing everything in their power to help Tattycoram, but their “help” was to her 
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anything but kind. An intended gesture of helpfulness also felt offensive to Octavia, who 
perceived it as a “handout.” Sherriff Tate understood that the public’s well-intended 
gestures of helpfulness (baskets of goodies taken to his home, social invitations, etc.), 
should his heroism be publicized, would be simply devastating to Arthur Radley.  
 Helpfulness is not necessarily kind, but there are ways of helping that are kind. 
Kind helpfulness begins, as does all kindness, with an attentiveness to and 
acknowledgement of others. It involves, moreover, a readiness to intervene on others’ 
behalf, an attitude captured nicely in the French phrase prêt-à-servir (ready to serve). But 
this readiness to act must be motivated by a desire for the other’s good, and not by the 
desire to benefit personally, say, by gratifying one’s desire for control or longing for 
approbation.12 The Aristotelian emotion of kindness (kharis), defined as a feeling of 
“helpfulness towards someone in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage 
of the helper himself, but for that of the person helped,” then, belongs properly to the 
attitude of the kind agent (Rhetoric 2, Ch. 7; 1385a). The Meagleses’ act of helpfulness 
failed to actualize kindness in part because it came with strings attached. Had they 
intended only, or even primarily, to help Tattycoram— to provide her a home, an 
education, and the parental love and guidance that she so desperately craved— then their 
taking her in could have been genuinely kind. But they, being “practical people,” 
expected to benefit materially and psychologically from their act of purported goodness; 
adopting the young girl solved their practical problem of not having a maid for their 
daughter, and buttressed their already considerable feelings of moral superiority. Indeed, 
the Meagleses asked a great deal more of Tattycoram than they offered by forcing her 
                                                           
12
 After all, a busybody might be as prêt-à-servir as anyone, but not necessarily in a way that makes 
kindness possible.     
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into a mold that went against her nature, requiring her to be complacent and cheerful 
when she was by nature spirited, and pressed by their indifference into a state of 
perpetual rage. Far from being kind, their helpfulness has every appearance of cruelty. 
 Readiness to serve must be tempered with a sensitivity to others’ desires for help 
or lack thereof. In some cases the deliberate choice to withhold help may be closer to 
kindness than the act of intervening. Hamrick recalls an occasion on which he shoveled 
snow from the steps of an octogenarian neighbor. Hamrick, assuming the man would not 
want to risk broken bones or heart failure, set to work on what he took to be an act of 
kindness. While Hamrick was busy shoveling the neighbor emerged and let loose “a 
torrent of abuses” that took him by surprise, to say the least (65). “His invectives,” 
Hamrick writes, “clearly (and colorfully) displayed his belief that I falsely thought him 
incapable of shoveling snow himself” (65). From the neighbor’s perspective, Hamrick’s 
gesture was not only not kind, but was also disrespectful and naïve.13  
 Hamrick’s belief that his neighbor would appreciate help was based on an act of 
“self-transposal,” a term coined by Herbert Spiegelberg to describe the imaginative 
taking of another’s place (64). Hamrick concluded that if he were an elderly, solitary 
man, he would need and value a neighbor’s help. Self-transposal often solidifies our 
determination to intervene on another’s behalf (entailing, perhaps, an intuitive preference 
for the Golden Rule, since, were we in the other’s situation, we would want help). But 
this well-meaning act of the moral imagination has its limits. When, for example, an able-
bodied person sees a disabled person struggling with a task and engages in self-
                                                           
13
 Hamrick is right to argue that even in cases in which we think carefully about what would be most 
helpful to another person, we may be met with “ambiguities and surprises” (65). But in this case the 
Hamrick’s insensitivity to his neighbor’s preferences might be partially to blame for the negative outcome 
of his gesture; rather than assuming that his act of helpfulness would be welcome, he might simply have 
asked.  
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transposal, she might be tempted to intervene. But for many people with disabilities, 
unbidden help may feel denigrating; constant gestures of helpfulness by well-meaning 
strangers can have a cumulative effect, contributing to intense feelings of frustration and 
resentment. Ambiguous situations— situations where someone may or may not be in 
need of help, or may or may not be willing to accept help— therefore call for more than 
self-transposal. They require a special sensitivity on the part of the kind agent, who must 
listen and watch for subtle cues. When in doubt, she must have the courage to ask the 
other if she needs or desires help. 
We might wonder why Hamrick didn’t simply ask his neighbor whether or not he 
desired help, and more broadly why we often feel more inclined to help others than we do 
to ask them whether or not they want our help. If we believe it is easier to act on the 
behalf of another person than it is to investigate their preferences regarding intervention, 
this should give us pause. In Hamrick’s case we should note that although a purported 
gesture of helpfulness may have been physically taxing, it didn’t entail an emotional risk, 
and was most likely emotionally rewarding. Had Hamrick instead approached his 
neighbor with an offer of help, he would have made himself vulnerable to rejection. 
Hamrick was stunned when his neighbor angrily disrupted his act of helpfulness, but he 
could have (and may have in fact) imagined the same sort of reaction in response to an 
offer of help. In offering to shovel the elderly man’s drive, Hamrick would in essence 
have been asking the man to admit to or deny his own vulnerability and need for help. A 
denial might have contained the same colorful phrases that the man used when Hamrick 
actually intervened, but even if it hadn’t, it would have been experienced by Hamrick as a 
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rejection all the same, as even the most polite rejection of help can be upsetting to the 
person who offers.  
 That we fear our offers of help might be rejected is one ground for our 
unwillingness to ask others before intervening on their behalf, but there is another that 
ought also to be considered. Supposing that Hamrick’s neighbor had accepted his offer of 
help, in so doing he would have implicitly acknowledged his own vulnerability and need. 
That acknowledgement would in turn have brought Hamrick and his neighbor into a new 
kind of relation, a relation that neither might be wholly at ease with. In accepting an offer 
of help we foster an intimacy that disrupts our comfortable sense of autonomy and self-
reliance. Accepting help forces the acknowledgement of a fundamental human 
vulnerability that Phillips and Taylor suggest most of us prefer to deny, and that 
acknowledgement in turn makes us vulnerable in-relation to others.  
Acts of kindness, and the kind reception of the same, demonstrate, “in the clearest way 
possible, that we are vulnerable and dependent animals who have no better resource than 
each other” (113). Because it takes courage to ask whether or not our intervention is 
wanted, it is easy to imagine why, as Phillips and Taylor argue, “one’s capacity or 
instinct for kindness can be actively and unconsciously sabotaged by that part of oneself 
that fears the intimacies it fosters” (113).14  
 
 Kindness and Hospitality 
 In Perpetual Peace, Kant defines hospitality as “the right of an alien not to be 
treated as an enemy upon his arrival in another’s country” (358). The right to visit, he 
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 This capacity of instinct for kindness may, we should note, include a willingness to accept help when it is 
kindly offered. Whether we are offering to help another or accepting an offer of help, we are confronted 
with a fundamental human vulnerability that we might reasonably prefer to deny.   
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argues, belongs intrinsically to all people by virtue of their common ownership of one 
planet. Through hospitality, he contends, “distant parts of the world can establish with 
one another peaceful relations” such that “the human race can gradually be brought closer 
and closer to a cosmopolitan constitution” (118). At the heart of Kantian hospitality is a 
conception of welcome that is most congenial to kindness: hospitality is founded upon 
common humanity, and entails the suspension or dissolution of enmity. But when 
conceptualized as a right, hospitality yields too anemic a prescription, taking as it does 
the form of a mere negative injunction: “do not treat an alien as an enemy when s/he is in 
your nation.” To bracket enmity is not yet to manifest kindness.  
 Suspicious of what he takes to be an anodyne conception of hospitality, Jacques 
Derrida distinguishes between conditional or traditional hospitality and perfect or 
absolute hospitality. He contends that the history of hospitality in the West is a history of 
conditionality, of hospitality framed always by laws, or “those rights that are always 
conditioned and conditional” (Derrida Hospitality 77).15 Conditional hospitality requires 
a nation to make welcome the foreigner (one who has been identified as such), where 
welcome entails a deferral of enmity and some kind of reciprocity. Absolute hospitality 
instead requires, as Derrida writes, a standing welcome to “the absolute unknown, 
anonymous other,” and requires that “I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let 
them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either 
reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names” (25). Absolute hospitality, 
commanding as it does a break with conditional hospitality, is “strangely heterogeneous 
to the law to which it is yet so close, from which in truth it is indissociable” (25). While 
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 Under Kant’s definition, for example, hospitality is conditional in that it requires that the guest and host 
embody the enmity of their respective nations.  
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absolute hospitality transcends laws, it is itself “universal law as ethic,” and as such 
forms an antimony with conditional hospitality; the ethic of absolute hospitality requires 
the concrete law of conditional hospitality as a thing to be surpassed. Derrida insists that 
hospitality is always in some sense conditioned, but equally insists on absolute hospitality 
as an ideal for ethical comportment.16 
 The vulnerabilities involved in offers and gestures of help are also present, and 
perhaps more obviously so, in the related phenomenon of hospitality. The prêt-à-servir 
attitude that underlies helpfulness is epitomized by the ethical posture of hospitality; to be 
hospitable is to stand ready to take others in, to meet their needs and to accommodate 
their preferences. Implicit in the notion of hospitality is the otherness of the guest, thus it 
is by no coincidence that the Greek word for hospitality (xenia) derives from the same 
root as the word for stranger or outsider (xenos). To be hospitable is to welcome others 
in a way that enables them to feel at home, and one implication of this is a tolerance for 
and readiness to accommodate difference. Hospitality, like kind acknowledgement and 
kind helpfulness, involves a willingness to let the stranger persist in her strangeness; the 
hospitable host, like the kind agent, resists the temptation to reduce the Other to herself. 
 Genuine hospitality involves risk. To open ourselves to others entails, as Derrida 
suggests, “an interruption of the self” (Derrida Adieu 51). In its absolute form hospitality 
entails pure self-transposal such that “the one who invites, the inviting host,”  becomes 
the hostage, while the “guest (hôte) becomes the host (hôte) of the host (hôte)” (Derrida 
Hospitality 125). Absolute hospitality entails a total abandonment of self-interest, and a 
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 Mindful of the Maussian conception of the gift as paradoxical, Derrida finds a similar paradox in the very 
idea of hospitality. Hospitality is a kind of openness, yet this openness is premised upon the existence of 
borders and boundaries; the host makes the guest welcome by permitting entrance, but such permissiveness 
entails that the host is in a dominant position. Hospitality is an asymmetrical relation, therefore, though as 
ideal it ought to involve equality.    
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complete attentiveness to the interest of the guest. Such hospitality is an ideal and as such 
by definition impossible; like all ethical ideals it is useful as measure of our actual 
comportment: we are hospitable to the extent that we abandon ourselves and our own 
interests in favor of acknowledging and securing the guest’s. 
 The Bishop Bienvenu is the very soul of hospitality, as his affectionate epithet 
attests. His welcome is perpetual; his door is always open. He is cognizant of the dangers 
to his goods and person that his hospitality engenders, but they cause him not a moment’s 
unrest. So deep is his feeling for his fellow men that he experiences his own good as 
inextricable bound up with theirs. Valjean is his “bother,” as are all men— humanity is 
his kin. He therefore keeps us mindful of one etymological connotation of “kindness,” 
namely, the treatment of strangers as “kin.” The Bishop’s hospitality is so complete that it 
all but actualizes Derrida’s ideal of absolute hospitality; the Bishop cannot feel himself to 
be a hostage because his hospitality transcends the logic of liminality. His very character 
is a sanctuary that excludes no one who is in need.      
 As is the case with hospitality, the essential core of kindness is lost if we reduce it 
to a set of moral rules or obligations. The virtue of kindness lies in its excessive nature; 
kindness is fundamentally meritorious. Like absolute hospitality, absolute kindness might 
be conceived of as a moral ideal. Just as the host must retain a degree of control over his 
home, or persist in his role as host, in order to allow the guest in, the kind agent must 
retain a degree of autonomy in order to properly attend to the needs of others, and in 
order to judge when and how it is appropriate to actualize kindness. Kindness assumes a 
high degree of permeability and interdependence, but we ought to suspect that a total 
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collapse of the boundaries between self and other would render kindness 
incomprehensible.17  
 
 Kindness and Giving 
 There are many ways of giving, and certain of them are admittedly far from kind. 
Some gestures of giving serve primarily to reify morally contemptible power dynamics, 
and ought to be conceived of as acts of cruelty in disguise. This is certainly the case with 
the Meagleses’ “gifts” to Tattycoram. In his analysis of Frederick Douglas’s 
enslavement, Philip Hallie dismisses the moral value of kindness for precisely this 
reason. Far from opposing cruelty, Hallie contends, kindness within an oppressive social 
dynamic is “ultimately destructive” (Hallie Cruelty 159). As Douglas writes: 
The kindness of the salve-master only gilded the chain. It detracted 
nothing from its weight or strength. The thought that men are for other and 
better uses than slavery throve best under the gentle treatment of a kind 
master. (Hallie Cruelty 159) 
 For Hallie, the “little kindnesses” of the slave-master serve both to ease the conscience 
of the slave-master and to reify his status as superior to the slave. Douglas’s experience 
buttresses these suspicions. On the rare occasions when one master paid him a few cents 
of the profit his labor had produced, Douglas reflects that “I always felt uncomfortable 
after receiving anything in this way, lest his giving me a few cents might possibly ease 
his conscience, and make him feel himself to be a pretty honorable robber after all” 
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 A similar dynamic underlies Kantian friendship. Ideal friendship entails an absolute unveiling of oneself 
and a maximum reciprocity of love, but in reality too high a degree of honesty and reciprocity undermines 
friends’ respect for one another. Once the boundaries that characterize autonomy break down, the spell is 
broken, and the friendship compromised. I examine this dynamic in greater detail in Chapter VI.  
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(Hallie Cruelty 160). Hallie calls us to reflect on how apparent acts of kindness might be 
experienced by their recipients, lest we overlook cases in which, “What is well-
intentioned kindness to the victimizer” is “torture to the victim” (160).  
 Hallie is wise to emphasize the recipient’s perspective, and right to raise 
suspicions regarding some purportedly kind acts of giving. Gifts can most certainly be 
used to manipulate others, and may serve to ease consciences that are rightfully uneasy. 
He is also justified in suspecting that kindness has the potential to be destructive under 
systems of institutionalized cruelty.18 But Douglas himself emphasizes the profound 
transformative power of many “little kindnesses” that he experienced as a slave. These 
were decidedly different in kind than those described by Hallie. Pennies from his master 
frustrated Douglas, robbing him as they did of a degree of dignity. But other acts of 
giving— as when Lucretia gave him extra bread— were felt by him to be truly kind, and 
served to restore his feelings of self-worth. It is precisely these feelings of self-worth that 
Douglas credits for his resistance to slavery and, ultimately, for his liberation.19      
 As the story of Octavia reveals, there are ways of giving that are kind. We might 
equally say that kindness, in whatever form, is best understood as a way of giving. But if 
the act of kindness is conceived of as gift, then it will arouse the same suspicions that 
have long plagued philosophical discourse on giving. By and large, the contemporary 
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 Hallie contends that power differentials pervert kindness and are themselves essentially indistinguishable 
from cruelty. The opposite of cruelty, he therefore contends, is not kindness but instead liberation from the 
cruel dynamic: “The opposite of cruelty,” he writes, “is freedom.”  (Cruelty 159). By Hallie’s logic, we 
would not expect to see cruelty among those who are social equals, or equally free, and we would not 
expect genuine kindness (as opposed to the spurious kindness that Hallie describes) where power 
differentials are present. But Douglas’s autobiographies reveal how the greatest cruelties are often 
perpetuated among the victims of institutionalized oppression, whose social status is equal. Both Douglas 
and Viktor Frankl reflect on the profound value of kindness that occurs under institutionalized oppression, 
and the profound ugliness of unkindness of one victim of oppression to another.  I return to this theme at 
length in Chapter VII. 
 
19
 See especially Douglas, p. 286. 
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literature on giving is tainted by the suspicion that the gift is by nature impossible. In The 
Gift (1967), Marcel Maus amously characterizes giving not as a mere exchange of 
commodities, but instead as a fundamental means of establishing community relations 
through mutual indebtedness. In Maus’s view, social economies are established via a 
logic of giving that involves, as Rosalyn Diprose notes, “reciprocal relations of 
obligation” (5). The recipient is honored by a gift, but also indebted to the giver; the gift 
must be repaid in no other way than through the maintenance of the social bond (Maus 
6).20  
 Understood within the Maussian logic of contract and exchange, as Diprose 
explains, “the gift is recognized as a gift (it functions as a commodity) and, once 
recognized, the gift bestows a debt on the recipient and is annulled through obligation, 
gratitude or some other form of return” (Diprose 6). It would be comforting to believe 
that acts of kindness transcend contractual logic and therefore resist annulment via debt, 
since kindness would be an anemic virtue indeed if it demanded absolute reciprocity. 
Happily, there is some reason to situate kindness outside of the logic of exchange, as part 
of what distinguishes the act of kindness is that it is offered willingly with the knowledge 
that it might not be graciously received. We have all proffered a sincere compliment only 
to be insulted in return, and yet, if we are kind, we will continue to offer compliments.  
 If in conceptualizing the act of kindness as gift we cannot escape the logic of 
exchange (agent A gives gift B to agent C; agent C is indebted to agent A and obliged to 
reciprocate with gift D), there is yet hope that in kindness we find a type of exchange that 
it itself worthy of praise, and one which dissolves to some extent the paradox of giving. It 
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 Maus is often credited for raising the suspicion that the gift is, by nature, paradoxical or impossible, but 
both Diprose and Alan Schrift attribute the contemporary interest in giving less to Maus and more to 
Derrida’s analysis Maus (Diprose 5; Schrift 1).         
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is clear that kind agents do not demand that others “repay them in kind” (returning a 
material gift with a material gift, for example). But perhaps the kind agent does anticipate 
some form of acknowledgment, namely, an expression of gratitude. For Derrida, the 
expectation of gratitude effectively annuls the gift. In the case of kindness, however, a 
special kind of expectation is at work, and it is one that preserves the excessive character 
of the gift. We cannot deny that a heartfelt “thank you” is itself gift, and we might even 
say that a sincere expression of gratitude is as much a gift of kindness as is the sincere act 
of kindness which prefaces it.  Where gratitude, too, is understood as a gift of kindness 
freely given, we can see how in some cases the “recipient” of some false act of kindness 
might be kinder in her reception than the giver was in her giving. But even so, we needn’t 
characterize freely expressed gratitude merely as the repayment of a debt by means of 
which balance is restored between giver and recipient.  Instead, we can say that the initial 
gesture of kindness creates the conditions for a second, independent act of kindness, one 
which entails the same vulnerability and excess which characterizes all acts of kindness. 
In graciously accepting a gift, an agent effectively places her trust in the giver.21 Gracious 
acceptance expresses confidence in the giver’s good will; one who accepts a gift in this 
way makes herself vulnerable, since some gifts are intended to manipulate or lower the 
dignity of their recipient. The kind agent does not require thanks in order to restore 
equilibrium between herself and her recipient, but rather hopes in that second moment to 
see kindness perpetuated. If the recipient greets the kind gesture with disdain or 
indifference, she has not failed to restore an economic balance, but has instead 
                                                           
21
 I am here reminded of Gabriel Marcels’ notion of “creative fidelity,” which holds that we ought to act as 
if the world deserves credit. The kind agent similarly assumes the credit-worthiness of other people. To 
accept a gift graciously is to trust in the goodness of the giver. It takes courage to extend moral credit in 
this way, as we know that people will not always prove to be worthy of it.  
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disappointed the latter’s hope to see kindness proliferate. The moral courage of the kind 
agent, then, is characterized more by the ability to endure disappointment at the lack of 
kindness in others than by an ability to endure privation at the hands of others. Kindness 
will not necessarily be reciprocated, and the kind agent is she who can sustain kindness in 
the face of this reality. Consistent kindness therefore demands fortitude, and is as such all 
the more worthy of praise.       
 
Kindness: A Sketch in Outline 
 Kindness has, at first glance, a striking resemblance to several other phenomena, 
and these include generosity, benevolence, friendliness, altruism, agapic love, 
compassion, and care, to name a few. One might therefore reasonably object that the 
above reflections on kindness vis-à-vis kindness-related phenomena are incomplete. To 
remedy these omissions, reference will be made to several kindness-related phenomena in 
the chapters that come, as I work to refine the tentative conception of kindness that I offer 
here. 
 In the light of the examples above, and of the analyses of acknowledgement, 
helping, hospitality and giving, we may make several remarks about the nature of 
kindness. Kindness presupposes or begins with a special kind of acknowledgment. The 
kind agent takes the time to notice the people around her, and is open to and curious 
about them. She has a strong desire to see others flourish, and is not content merely to 
wish for others’ good, but instead actively works to secure it. She is especially sensitive 
to others’ needs, and carefully judges where and when intervention on another’s behalf is 
appropriate. She will intervene where help is needed, and when in doubt she has the 
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courage to ask others whether or not they are desirous of her help. When she helps 
another person, or gives something to them, she does so with genuine goodwill and a 
special care for the dignity of the recipient. She expects nothing in return, but is pleased 
to see her kindness reciprocated. Her kindness raises recipients’ awareness of their own 
worth, and at times inspires in them the desire to be kind.   
 Kindness unquestionably involves important judgments, and we may tentatively 
say that it involves a particular approach to moral judgment. The kind agent views acts of 
wrongdoing and flaws of character as contingent, and appreciates the many constraints 
luck places on human activity and the development of character. She is slow to judge, 
and is more concerned with helping and cheering others than with morally assessing 
them. When her pre-reflective judgments of others are harsh, she takes the time to 
evaluate them; she suspends or questions the kinds of judgments that would validate her 
in choosing to neglect or harm others. She is willing to accommodate others’ 
idiosyncrasies, even to find them endearing. She is careful not to touch others’ “sore 
spots,” nor to point to their moral defects. When sharing her judgments, she emphasizes 
others’ intrinsic worth, goodness, or potential for goodness. She actively searches for 
others’ positive character traits and praiseworthy acts. She is inclined to treat all people 
well, regardless of status or station.      
 The kind agent tends to do more than decency requires. She will not only refrain 
from insulting and harming others, but will also go out of her way to contribute to their 
flourishing. She is aware of the intimacies that kindness fosters, and she has the courage 
to foster them. She is comfortable with some collapse of the boundaries between herself 
and others, as she sees her good as intertwined with the good of the people around her. 
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She is aware of her own contingency and fragility, just as she is aware of human fragility 
more generally. As such, she will graciously welcome others’ acts of kindness.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 The above observations will suffice to allow a further investigation into kindness 
vis-à-vis Aristotelian and Kantian moral theory in the two chapters that follow. Such 
investigation is necessary in part because there is yet a great deal to discover about the 
nature of kindness. In Chapter VI will attempt to conceive of kindness as a virtue in the 
Aristotelian sense, inquiring, for example, into the affective elements of kindness and 
into the potential of kindness to be inculcated through training and praxis. In Chapter VII 
work to discover the rational component of kindness, including and especially the 
intellectual commitments that kindness presupposes and the moral imperatives that it 
might be said to yield.   
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CHAPTER V 
 THE VIRTUE OF KINDESS 
“And we also feel friendly towards those  
who praise such good qualities as we possess,  
and especially if they praise the good qualities  
that we are not too sure that we do possess.”  
-Aristotle, Rhetoric 1131a 36-37 
 
Introduction  
 Most of us are deeply committed, if only prereflectively, to the existence of 
human character. This is evinced, for example, by our feelings of surprise and confusion 
when someone does something that is at odds with our perception of what she is “like.” 
We seem to believe, as does an ethicist of virtue, that beliefs and feelings are intrinsically 
tied to action, that actions are linked importantly to habits, and that an agent’s moral 
character is the gestalt of her rational, affective and praxical tendencies.1 So strong is our 
commitment to character that, as David Hume rightly contends, when we praise or blame 
a particular action we are in truth praising or blaming the trait of character from which we 
believe it stemmed, since outside the context of character, action has little or no moral 
significance.2 In the light of our observations about kindness in the preceding chapter, the 
association of kind acts with kind character is intuitively appealing; kind agency involves 
stable rational convictions, predictable affective responses, and praxical habits. Although 
                                                           
1
 I use the (admittedly esoteric) term praxical in this chapter to emphasize the special nature of virtuous 
activity. For Aristotle, praxis represents the culmination of theoretical knowledge, as does poiesis 
(production). But unlike poiesis, through which some external thing is produced, praxis embodies its own 
end. The being-at-work of the soul that actualizes theoretical knowledge of the good is ethical praxis, and is 
its own end. (See also footnote 9, below)      
 
2
 Writes Hume, “If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only a sign of some quality of character. It 
must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into 
personal character. Actions themselves, not preceding from any constant principle, have no influence on 
love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently, are never consider’d in morality” (367).  
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it is certainly possible to imagine a person who does not possess a kind character 
occasionally doing something that appears kind, or treating only certain people with 
kindness, when we speak of kindness we tend to have in mind people whose stable 
character is such that they are kind in a more general way. For these reasons, it is only 
natural that we should turn, in our effort to give an account of the nature and value of 
kindness, to an ethic of virtue. 
 Aristotle’s ethical theory is widely and properly regarded as the virtue ethic par 
excellence. That his virtue ethic is superlative is reason enough to justify our turning to it 
in an effort to elucidate the nature of kindness, but there is an additional justification for 
such a turn, and it is one worth mentioning here. As was suggested in Chapter II, 
Aristotle is uniquely sensitive to the role of luck in human existence, and uniquely aware 
of the contingent nature of virtue. If we wish to test the hypothesis that kindness is the 
virtue most appropriate for a world in which luck constrains both human activity and the 
development of moral character, then it is only natural that we should turn to an ethic that 
properly recognizes luck as a threat to human flourishing. 
 In this chapter I develop and refine the characterization of kindness offered in 
Chapter IV by exploring the possibility that kindness can be construed as a virtue in the 
rich sense of an Aristotelian virtue of character. I begin by abstracting what I take to be 
the three dimensions of Aristotelian moral virtue— the rational, the affective and the 
praxical— and by explaining how they harmonize. Next I consider how the rational 
component of moral virtue (phronêsis) might be at work in kind agency. I then compare 
kindness with the Aristotelian emotions of kindness (kharis) and pity (eleos), with a mind 
to identifying the affective dimensions of kindness. To identify the praxical dimensions 
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of a virtue of kindness I consider some of the praxical components of Aristotelian moral 
virtues that in some way resemble kindness, including generosity, friendliness and 
courage. I conclude by offering a tentative depiction of a moral virtue of kindness before 
reflecting on the value and limits of conceiving of kindness as an Aristotelian virtue of 
character.   
 
The Rational Component of Moral Virtue 
 The distinction between Aristotelian and Kantian ethics has often been 
generalized as a distinction between an ethics that privileges feelings and one that 
privileges rationality, and this distinction is not without ground.3 Unquestionably, the 
emotions play a fundamental role in Aristotle’s account of virtue, such that, for example, 
the mark of virtue is that the agent enjoys being virtuous. But a reductive reading of 
Aristotle runs the risk of disregarding the central role of rationality in his theory of virtue. 
Even a somewhat sophisticated reading of Aristotle’s ethics may gloss over the 
importance of rationality, if, for example, it fails to acknowledge the intertwining of 
thought and feeling that make moral virtue possible. For although virtue is twofold— 
with one part being intellectual and one part moral— these forms of virtue are 
complimentary, and the moral virtues only arise alongside and on account of the 
                                                           
3
 Aristotle’s attentiveness to the emotions is one reason why recent feminists have suggested that his ethics 
might serve as an important counter to the rationalism that characterizes some much 
contemporary/masculinist ethics. In The Virtue of Care, for example, Ruth Groenhout suggests that 
Aristotle’s moral theory dovetails nicely with— and may potentially correct certain flaws within— the 
ethics of care (see Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. by Cynthia A. Freedland. University Park: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).  
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intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (phronêsis).4 The role of rationality and the 
intertwining of the rational and affective components of moral character are fundamental 
components of Aristotle’s account of the virtues of character.   
 In Book Two of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle investigates the processes 
through which the moral virtues, or virtues of character, arise. In Chapter One he 
establishes that moral virtue, like excellence in technical matters, arises in and through 
praxis, such that “we become just by doing things that are just, temperate by doing things 
that are temperate, and courageous by doing things that are courageous (1103b 1-3). We 
might here recall that character (êthos) is understood as the sedimentation of habit (ethos) 
into a stable mode of comportment. We may also recall that the praxes that give rise to 
character are generally established through proper upbringing and education, and that in 
Aristotle’s view “It makes no small difference […] to be habituated in this way or that 
straight from childhood, but an enormous difference, or rather all the difference” (1103 b 
25-27). For one who wishes to inculcate virtue, then, it is imperative to establish which 
actions or kinds of activity will give rise to good character.5         
  Inquiring into the kinds of actions that agents ought to perform and the manner in 
which they ought to perform them, Aristotle appeals to right reason (orthos logos): “Now 
the phrase ‘acting in accordance with right reason’ is commonly accepted, and let it be set 
                                                           
4
 For a superlative account of the intertwining of the rational and the emotional, the theoretical and the 
practical, and the intellectual and the moral in Aristotle’s ethical thought, see Claudia Baracchi’s Aristotle’s 
Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
 
5
 This is largely the concern of lawmakers, educators and parents, but it is also relevant to anyone who 
wishes to inculcate virtue in herself, and this is evident from Aristotle’s remark that “we are investigating 
not in order that we may know what virtue is, but in order that we might become good, since otherwise 
there would be no benefit in it” (1103b 20-30). This comment prefaces Aristotle’s inquiry into right 
reasoning (orthos logos), or the kind of reasoning that will reveal right actions.    
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down” (1103b 33-34).6 He immediately qualifies his approach, however, by asking us to 
acknowledge that “every discourse (logos) that concerns actions (praxes) is obliged to 
speak in outline and not precisely” (1104a 1-2). Every discourse must be appropriate to 
its material, and the material of action is particular, such that the discourse concerning 
action must “lack precision,” and cannot fall under any particular art (têchne) “nor under 
any skill that has been handed down” (1104a 7-8). The reasoning involved in action, 
then, will not involve precise rules, but will instead entail a sensitivity and responsiveness 
to “the circumstances surrounding” the agent (1104a 8-9). 
 Virtuous action necessarily involves a kind a right reasoning, but this reasoning is 
not technical. Aristotle must then establish the kind of reasoning that can guide action 
(particulars), without the aid of the precise rules that characterize the arts (têchnai), and 
he does so in Book Six. He begins by assessing three potential sources of practical right 
reason: sense perception, intellect, and desire. The first is immediately dismissed on the 
grounds that non-human animals “have sense-perception but do not share in action 
(praxis)” (1139a 17). The two that remain are determined to be complimentary, since 
“what affirming and denying are in thinking, pursuing and avoiding are in desiring” 
(1139a 20-21). Not only are they complimentary, but they are also coextensive in praxis 
such that deliberate action is inconceivable without both. Thinking that is not bound up 
with desire is impotent, since “Thinking itself moves nothing” (1138a 39), and the kind 
of desire that yields choice is inconceivable without “a rational understanding which is 
                                                           
6
 That is, set down as an hypothesis. Aristotle’s method is characterized by the laying down and testing of 
hypotheses (generally derived from common opinion or doxa). It is telling that his hypothesis that right 
reason leads to knowledge of virtuous action is immediately qualified.  
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for the sake of something” (1139a 35).7 Virtuous praxis therefore requires the 
harmonious coexistence of the intellect and desire, as Aristotle explains: 
 [S]ince virtue of character is an active condition of the soul that 
determines choice, while choice is deliberative desire […] the rational 
understanding must be true and the desire right  if the choice is to be of 
serious moral worth, and what one affirms, the other pursues. (1139a 22-
25)  
 Having established that the right reasoning proper to action requires both thinking 
and desire, Aristotle conceives of choice as “either intellect fused with desire or desire 
fused with thinking” (1139b 6-7). The right reasoning that enables virtuous praxis will 
then be an excellence governing choice that is at once intellectual and appetitive. It is 
useful to recall here Aristotle’s bifurcation of the rational or logos-dwelling part of the 
soul into that part which possesses logos “in the governing sense” (rational soul) and that 
part which is governed by logos (appetitive soul). This division corresponds to the 
division between intellectual and moral virtue. The virtue governing choice is somewhat 
ambiguous, functioning as a kind of interface between the rational and desiring parts of 
the soul, having the characteristics of an intellectual virtue, but governing the moral 
virtues. This virtue is none other than phronêsis, or practical wisdom.8  
                                                           
7
 Action requires desire, and virtuous action requires right desire. Knowledge that is at odds with desire 
leads to unrestraint (akrasia), or the intellectual knowledge of what is good combined with a tendency to 
act in ways that oppose the good.    
 
8
 “Practical wisdom” is a popular translation of phronêsis in contemporary virtue ethics literature. Joe 
Sachs prefers “practical judgment,” as it does not imply a stark division between phronêsis and sophia 
(wisdom). I prefer “practical wisdom” for precisely that reason; the distinction between sophia (as 
concerned with theoretical knowledge and universals) and phronêsis (as concerned with practical 
knowledge and particulars) is one of Aristotle’s key contributions to ethical thought. 
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         To grasp the nature of phronêsis, Aristotle suggests, we would do well to 
reflect on those who are said to possess it. “And it seems then to belong,” he observes, 
“to someone with practical judgment to be able to deliberate beautifully about things that 
are good and advantageous to himself, not in part […] but the sort of things that are 
conducive to living well as a whole” (1139b 25-27). It is rightly said that those who 
manage households or govern cities well possess phronêsis, since these, too, have to do 
with knowledge of what is good for human beings (1140b 7-8). But unlike economics 
(literally, the management of the home) and  statecraft, phronêsis is no art; every art 
entails some end external to itself, and in the case of phronêsis “acting well is itself the 
end” (1140b 6).9  
 Phronêsis involves a kind of knowledge, and since “wisdom (sophia) would be 
the most precise kind of knowledge,” Aristotle turns to sophia as a possible source of the 
knowledge that phronetic agents possess. But sophia governs knowledge of things 
generally, and especially those that “are most honorable in their nature,” whereas 
phronêsis has only to do with knowledge regarding the good of the beings that possess it 
(1141a 27-28).10 This knowledge is akin to sophia, inasmuch as it involves an 
understanding something universal (namely, an understanding of what is good for human 
beings in general), but unlike sophia, because it is related to choice and action and thus 
necessarily involves knowledge of particulars.11 That phronêsis must have this dual 
                                                           
9
 Here we might note the distinction between ergon (a thing produced, as in a “work of art”) and energeia 
(being-at-work). Arts produce works, whereas virtue is a way of being at work.  
 
10
 Which includes non-human animals. Aristotle notes that many animals “manifestly have a capacity for 
foresight about their own lives;” and he describes this foresight as phronêsis (1141a 27).  
 
11 Aristotle writes: “Practical judgment is concerned with action, so that it needs to have both 
universals and particulars, or more so the latter” (1141a 21-22).  
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nature— involving knowledge of both universals and particulars— is clear from the 
regulative role it plays in moral virtue, since the latter involves both universals and 
particulars.   
 Correct knowledge of both universals and particulars is required if phronêsis is to 
properly facilitate the virtues of character.12 To appreciate why this is so, we need only 
consider Aristotle’s discussion of the subjective mean which constitutes each of these 
virtues. Every moral virtue represents a mean condition between the extremes of 
deficiency and excess. This mean, however, is not mathematical but subjective; Aristotle 
writes, “the mean in relation to us is what neither goes too far nor falls short, and this is 
not one thing nor the same thing for everyone” (1106a 33). Just as the bodybuilder must 
eat quantities of food that would be excessive for someone who does not exert as much 
energy, so too must individuals feel and act in ways that are appropriate to their 
respective natures and situations. The mean condition is in some sense quantitative, such 
that, for example, a soldier ought to feel less fear when confronting an armed enemy than 
a civilian would, but it is also and especially qualitative. That is, a particular action that 
would be courageous for a soldier might well be foolhardy for a civilian. The mean is 
complex, involving feelings and actions that arise (and ought only to be assessed within) 
a dynamic situation, and is therefore very difficult to achieve. Anyone, for example, can 
act out in anger, but to feel angry “when one ought, and in the cases in which, and toward 
the people whom, and for the reasons for the sake of which, and in the manner one 
ought,” is exceedingly difficult, since there are many ways to miss the mark (1106b 21-
22).  
                                                           
12
 Which is, perhaps, why Aristotle’s account of moral deliberation is so often understood as the mere 
working through of a “practical syllogism” (a reduction that I firmly reject).  
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 The virtuous agent is she who feels what she ought when she ought, and who and 
is apt at choosing the mean (1106a 39). The affective states that mark virtue are largely a 
matter of habituation, but knowing how to act virtuously is the result of phronêsis. The 
phronetic agent possesses a correct knowledge of the (theoretical) nature of virtue, and—
desirous of the good— knows how to actualize it. She is adept, then, at discerning “the 
right means to the right ends in particular circumstances” (Sachs 209). Grasping the 
universal component of virtue is less difficult than mastering the particular, since 
knowledge of the latter can only arise through experience. Knowledge of particulars 
includes, importantly, a particular kind of self-knowledge. Recall here that in Aristotle’s 
view young people must be allowed to transgress so as to learn to associate pain and 
remorse with experiences of excess and deficiency (where excess and deficiency are 
relative to the agent in question). The phronetic agent knows which means (to ends) are 
appropriate not only in relation to external circumstances, but also and especially in 
relation to herself. Since both self-knowledge and knowledge of particulars more 
generally can only arise through experience, phronêsis tends to grow with age. It is not 
surprising, then, as Aristotle suggests, that although young people often possess sophia, 
they do not possess phronêsis. 
  Aristotle suggests that one might raise an impasse (aporia) regarding the 
usefulness of phronêsis. For, unlike the medical arts, phronêsis does not produce 
anything. He cedes that this is the case, but notes that the end of phronêsis, unlike the 
ends of an art, is intrinsic to its activity, such that it produces something “not in the way 
that the medical art produces health, but in the way that health produces health” (1144a 
4-5, emphasis mine). Phronêsis works in concert with moral virtue to bring about a state 
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of flourishing, since “virtue makes the end on which one sets one’s sights right and 
practical judgment makes the things related to it right” (1144a 8-9). All deliberative 
activity has a starting point, and in the case of phronêsis that starting point is the end laid 
down by virtue; for this reason, Aristotle concludes that “it is clear that it is impossible to 
be possessed of practical judgment without being good” (1144a 39).13 That is, the agent 
who possesses phronêsis will necessarily possess moral virtue. But phronêsis does not 
and cannot exist prior to moral virtue; moral goodness requires virtuous activity, and 
virtuous activity requires virtuous deliberation, so, as Joe Sachs notes “good character 
and good judgment are mutually dependent […] and must develop together (117).   
  Phronêsis is, for Aristotle, the rational component of moral virtue.14 But that it is 
the only such component is difficult for many readers of Aristotle to accept. As Jessica 
Moss rightly remarks, although Aristotle clearly and repeatedly states that virtue (as 
opposed to intellect) determines the ends of human action, “a formidable array of 
interpreters refuse to take him at his word” (1). These interpreters generally fall into two 
camps, with some believing that such an interpretation misconstrues Aristotle’s genuine 
view, and others contending that Aristotle simply got it wrong.15 Although I cannot 
engage the dispute here, I will note that if phronêsis is the only intellectual component of 
Aristotle’s theory of moral virtue, it is at least a substantial one. Few would dispute that a 
person who possesses excellent judgment tends to live well, and most would agree that 
excellent judgment coupled with good intentions (the kind that, for Aristotle, typify moral 
                                                           
13
 Without moral virtue to lay down virtuous ends, phronêsis would be mere cleverness. See 1144a 25-30.  
 
14
 A point that he makes abundantly clear. See, for example, NE 1144a 7-9, 1145a 5-7.   
 
15
 Among the former are Neil Cooper, W.F.R. Hardie and Sarah Broadie, and among the latter L.G.H. 
Greenwood, Harold Joachim and, perhaps most famously, T.H. Irwin.  
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virtue) tends to yield virtuous behavior. Perhaps, then, interpreters of Aristotle have 
simply failed to appreciate the magnitude of phronêsis. Alternatively, they may have 
failed to properly appreciate how the affective and praxical dimensions of moral virtue 
supplement and enhance phronêsis in ways that make moral goodness possible. Bearing 
the latter possibility in mind, I will now turn to the next dimension of moral virtue, 
namely, the affective. 
 
The Affective Component of Moral Virtue 
 The virtues of character dwell, says Aristotle, in the appetitive or desiring part of 
the soul. Whereas intellectual virtues govern thought, moral virtues govern activity, and 
more specifically, the sorts of activities that are accompanied by pleasures and pains. 
How we feel about our actions reveals something important about our character, and this 
is a truth that Aristotle appreciates. The mark of moral virtue is not that an agent acts in a 
certain way, but rather that she feels what she ought in relation to her actions. Thus 
Aristotle writes, “As a sign of the active states of one’s soul, one must consider the 
pleasure and pain that accompanies one’s deeds” (1104b 4-5). The virtuous agent is she 
who takes proper pleasure in virtuous activity. 
 Every active state of the soul is defined, Aristotle argues, by the kind of being-at-
work (energeia) that brings it about or improves it (1104b 19-20). That the moral virtues 
are fundamentally concerned with pleasure and pain is clear from the fact that “it is by 
means of pleasures and pains that people become base, through pursuing and avoiding 
them, either the ones they ought not, or when one ought not, or in a way one ought not” 
(1104b 22-23). Although moral virtues and vices are actualized in and through action 
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(praxis), such action is pursued on account of pleasures and pains; writes Aristotle, “it is 
on account of pleasure that we perform base actions, and on account of pain that we 
refrain from beautiful actions” (1104b 10-11). Aristotle appreciates the tremendous 
power of desire and aversion to guide human conduct. He concludes, with Plato, that the 
inculcation of moral virtue requires that we learn through training and experience to feel 
properly pleased by what is good and properly pained by what is bad, so we will 
enthusiastically pursue the former and willingly avoid the latter. 
 The central importance of the affective aspect of moral virtue is perhaps most 
apparent in Aristotle’s discussion of unrestraint (akrasia). Unlike Plato, for whom willful 
pursuit of the bad is by definition possible, Aristotle acknowledges that people often have 
knowledge of the good but consciously fail to act on that knowledge.16 When they do, 
they manifest akrasia, which though not a vice, is most certainly opposed to virtue. 
Akrasia is a state of disharmony between the rational and affective parts of the soul in 
which the agent possesses correct knowledge of the good, but also possesses wrong 
desires, and/or lacks adequately strong right desires, and in which the agent is governed 
by the latter. Akrasia is incredibly common in our own time, as it was in Aristotle’s: a 
chain smoker may continue to smoke even if she is fully acquainted with the risks that 
her behavior involves, a student may fail to complete her assignments even though she 
knows that she ought to complete them, and a person who firmly believes that donating to 
public television is good may yet fail to do so despite having ample means. Whereas 
                                                           
16
 By “willful” I do not mean that the agent actively seeks out the bad, but instead that she acts against her 
correct knowledge of what she ought to do. Her behavior is both willing and unwilling, as is evinced, 
Aristotle suggests, by her feelings of regret after the fact. Aristotle also believes that agents can deliberately 
choose the bad as part of an active state of character. Dissipation (akolasia) is that vice “by which one 
deliberately chooses to be, or acquiesces to being, someone who indulges in the pleasures of eating, 
drinking, and sex whenever they are available” (Sachs 203, see NE 1146b 22-23). Whereas dissipation is a 
vice (hexis), akrasia is a pathos (something suffered or undergone). It is not a vice, but works against or 
prevents virtue.    
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Plato would attribute these failures to a lack of knowledge (suggesting, for example, that 
the smoker doesn’t really know how dangerous smoking is), for Aristotle the affective 
component of the failure is primary. A sign of this, he argues, is the feeling of regret that 
akratic agents experience after they have failed to act virtuously.  
 When agents fail to do what they believe is good, Aristotle contends, they are 
failing to be governed by phronêsis, which not only reveals the appropriate means to 
virtuous ends, but also issues responsibilities to act accordingly. Aristotle writes: 
“practical judgment imposes obligations, since the end that belongs to it is what one 
ought or ought not to do” (1143a 9-10, emphasis mine). In the akratic agent these 
obligations are rationally understood, whereas in the virtuous agent they are also felt in 
the form of right desires. In cases of akrasia, the failure to be governed by phronêsis has 
less to do with a lack of knowledge regarding how one ought to act, and more to do with 
an absence of the stable affective states without which phronêsis cannot function.17 The 
akratic agent understands her moral obligations rationally, inasmuch as she understands 
what someone in her situation ought to do, but she lacks the strong feeling of obligation 
that moves the virtuous agent to act, and this is because she is not affectively conditioned 
to take the proper pleasure in virtuous activity.      
   Aristotle believes there is some hope for agents who suffer from akrasia, since the 
rational component of virtue is already at work (though not in a complete way) in them. 
                                                           
17
 A point that interpreters of Aristotle often miss, instead conflating Aristotle’s view with Plato’s. As 
Devin Henry writes, “those that believe he [Aristotle] reduces all akrasia to some form of culpable 
ignorance” ultimately hold “a weaker version of the Socratic thesis by allowing agents to act contrary to 
their knowledge of what virtue requires in general while still denying, along with Socrates, the possibility 
of acting contrary to what deliberation has shown to be the best course of action” (256). That the failing in 
cases of akrasia is not rational only but also and especially affective is evident, for example, in Aristotle’s 
analogizing between the akratic agent and the sick patient who hears and understands the physician’s 
advice, but does not follow it despite realizing it would be in her best interest to do so.     
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Aristotle likens the akratic person to the drunk who recites verses from Empedocles, and 
to the child who strings words together without grasping their true meaning. He writes 
that “one must grow into knowing; and so one ought to assume that people who behave 
without restraint speak in the same way as actors playing a part” (1147a 21-22).The child 
who strings words together is on the way to grasping their meaning, and the akratic 
person, by possessing a theoretical grasp of the good, has the potential to possess genuine 
knowledge of the same, which is to say knowledge that will govern her behavior. But 
again, this knowledge “in the governing sense” is impossible absent the affective states 
that foster it.  
 Aristotle’s account of akrasia is conventionally interpreted as an imbalance 
between reason and desire in which either the former is absent, or the latter overcomes 
the former.18 This reading brings to mind the Kantian division between rationality and 
inclination, and the quintessentially Kantian fear that moral agents will jettison moral 
principles in favor of sensual gratification. But Aristotle is not a Kantian, and his account 
of akrasia is more complex than the conventional view suggests. Although I cannot 
engage it at length, I will briefly explain why I believe that view is mistaken.19 
 In the case of the chain smoker, it would be incorrect to say that she lacks 
knowledge regarding the harmfulness of cigarettes. Indeed, she may not only have such 
knowledge, but also personally experience the deleterious consequences of her habit. We 
                                                           
18
 Even Joe Sachs, one of Aristotle’s most nuanced interpreters, espouses a similar view: “unrestrained 
behavior is a failure of choice […] in which the human fusion of desire and thinking […] has been 
imbalanced with desire taking the lead” (124).  
 
19
 My understanding of akrasia parallels Devin Henry’s account of what he terms “the worst kind of 
akrasia.” Henry accepts the conventional conception of akrasia in most instances, which he terms “drunk-
akrasia.” For an excellent illustration of what Henry takes to be the worst kind of akrasia (and what I take 
to be akrasia simply), see Melissa Burchard’s “What’s an Adoptive Mother to Do? When Your Child’s 
Desires are a Problem,” in Coming to Life: Philosophies of Pregnancy, Childbirth and Mothering, edited 
by Sarah LaChance Adams and Caroline R. Lundquist (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013).  
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might, then, say that she knows that smoking is unhealthy in a rich embodied sense. Still 
her rational understanding does not prevent her harmful behavior. If we espouse the 
conventional interpretation of akrasia we would simply attribute her smoking to her 
strong desire for cigarettes, and assume that her desire overwhelms her better judgment. 
What makes this explanation mistaken is that it fails to acknowledge a lack, namely, a 
lack of another desire that might properly compete with her desire to smoke. That such a 
conflict of desires is possible in cases of addiction is obvious; most smokers “want to 
quit.” But their desire to quit is often overwhelmed by the stronger desire to smoke to 
such an extent that there hardly appears to be a conflict of desires at work. In cases of 
akrasia, what is missing is a right desire strong enough to compete with a wrong desire, 
and this lack of competition involves the agent’s inability to take adequate pleasure in the 
good. The chain smoker either takes great pleasure in smoking, or is greatly pained by 
not smoking, or both. Only by inculcating the ability to be pleased (and/or not to be too 
deeply pained) by not smoking will her desire not to smoke introduce the kind of 
competition that might allow her rational understanding of the dangers of smoking to 
properly manifest in her behavior. What makes her addiction so difficult to overcome is 
that she must habituate herself to take pleasure in (and/or not be too deeply pained by) 
refraining from smoking through praxis, and it is notoriously difficult to establish new 
habits that are contrary to deeply embedded ones. Still, the nature of habit is such that 
there is hope for those who suffer from akrasia. To better appreciate why this is so, we 
may now turn to the praxical dimension of moral virtue.       
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The Praxical Component of Moral Virtue 
 “It is clear,” writes Aristotle, “[…] that none of the virtues of character comes to 
be present in us by nature, since none of the things that are by nature can be habituated to 
be otherwise” (1103a 19-21). Although the virtues are not naturally present in us, they 
come to be in accordance with nature, since we possess by nature the capacity for virtue. 
This capacity is none other than the capacity to be habituated to feel and act in certain 
ways. One may not teach a stone to fall up, but one may teach a child to eat moderately, 
and one does so by encouraging the appropriate habits. 
 As is the case with the arts, we acquire the virtues “by first being at work in them” 
(1103a 31). This being-at-work must be of a certain kind; just as “people become both 
good harpists and bad harpists from harp playing,” people become both virtuous and 
vicious through engaging in the activities that have to do with pleasure and pain. We 
learn to be virtuous, says Aristotle, by acting virtuously (or, we might say, by enacting 
virtue). Such activity requires guidance, especially when we are young, since the same 
situations may foster both virtues and vices depending on how we behave in those 
situations. Aristotle writes, “by acting in frightening situations and getting habituated to 
be afraid or confident, some of us become courageous and others become cowards […] 
the ones from turning themselves this way in these situations, the others from turning 
themselves that way” (1103b 16-21). Just as a fledgling artisan needs careful and specific 
guidance if she is to perfect her craft, so, too, does a young person need careful and 
specific guidance if she is to become virtuous. A seasoned craftsman, on the other hand, 
having learned through training and experience to perfect her craft, requires no such 
guidance. Analogously, a virtuous agent, having been trained and habituated in the right 
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ways, will have no difficulty acting virtuously, and so her behavior will require no 
external correction. 
 As we have noted,  the moral virtues govern activities that involve pleasure and 
pain. Since we naturally pursue some activities and avoid others on account of the 
pleasures and pains that we derive from them, it is to be expected that we will have more 
trouble inculcating those virtues (and avoiding those vices) that require us to forego 
intrinsically pleasurable activities or engage in intrinsically painful ones.20 It is generally 
more difficult to abstain from a pleasurable activity than to indulge in it, and more 
difficult still to engage in a painful activity than it is to avoid it.21 It is also therefore 
unsurprising that the mean which characterizes a virtue is often felt by the agent to be— 
and might even objectively be characterized as— further from one extreme than from the 
other.  
 Consider, for example, the virtue of temperance (sôphrosunê). Temperance is the 
active condition that causes agents to choose bodily pleasures so as to enhance their 
overall well-being. The deficient condition in relation to temperance is so rare that, as 
Aristotle notes, it does not even have a name; he elects to call it insensibility (1107b 7-8). 
The excessive condition, dissipation, is a common vice indeed. That one extreme in 
relation to temperance is essentially nonexistent and the other ubiquitous simply reflects 
                                                           
20
 My use of the word “intrinsically” here is admittedly equivocal, since, for Aristotle, we may habituate 
ourselves to be pleased and pained in accordance with virtue. But Aristotle does acknowledge, as is only 
reasonable, that people will by and large pursue similar pleasures and avoid similar pains, and this is 
especially evident in the behavior of children, who have not yet been habituated to enjoy what they ought 
to. I elaborate on this claim below.  
   
21
 A point that Aristotle appreciates, as should we. Whereas we might, for example, readily forgive 
someone for succumbing to torture, we would not readily forgive them to succumbing to temptation. 
People who betray state secrets when tortured retain their dignity in the eyes of the public, but those who 
sell state secrets for a bribe most certainly do not. This fact suggests, as Aristotle believes, that although 
pleasure and pain are both pathoi, they are fundamentally different in kind.   
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the fact that it is easier to habituate oneself to overindulge in bodily pleasures than it is to 
habituate oneself to avoid them wholly. The agent who tends to err on the side of 
dissipation (as many of us do) will undoubtedly feel as if insensibility is further from the 
mean than dissipation, as it seems to her more out of reach, and would require of her 
more extreme changes in her affective and practical habits. We might even contend that 
the mean is further from one extreme than from the other in an objective sense, given the 
rareness of the one and the pervasiveness of the other. That is just to say, some vices are 
more naturally appealing than others, and so require more training and practice to avoid. 
 What is true of moderation is true of courage, but in relation to pain rather than 
pleasure. Courage involves enduring pain for the sake of the beautiful and the good. The 
deficient vice related to courage is cowardice, and the excessive one is foolhardiness. 
Since agents are generally more inclined to avoid pains than to seek them out, we might 
say that foolhardiness is further from the mean than cowardice, and indeed, cowardice 
seems a more common vice than foolhardiness. Aristotle concludes that the vices are 
often disproportionately removed from the mean, where “it is in some cases the 
deficiency that is more opposite, but in other cases the excess,” and this is “for two 
reasons” (1109a 1-2). First, as is the case with moderation and courage, one extreme 
seems objectively to stand at a greater remove from the mean. Second, “those things 
toward which we ourselves tend more by nature in any way appear more contrary to the 
mean” (1109a 14-15).    
 Since we are by nature inclined to seek out pleasures an avoid pains, we might 
worry that the inculcation of virtue is dauntingly difficult, even impossible. But any 
parent who has habituated a child to eat her vegetables of brush her teeth without being 
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asked knows that the power of habit may work in support of virtue just as it may work 
support of vice. Activities, when engaged in regularly, become habits, and habits, once 
entrenched, are very difficult to dislodge. This is perhaps due in part to the fact that our 
affective conditions tend to align with our entrenched habits such that we come to enjoy 
(in at least some moderate sense; one might say “take comfort in”) those things that we 
do habitually. Once we have learned to something virtuous habitually, and once we feel 
properly pleased by our virtuous activity, the vices associated with that virtue feel 
increasingly remote and unappealing to us such that it becomes more difficult to err than 
to act as we ought.22 Virtue perpetuates virtue. Aristotle writes:  
[F]or by refraining from pleasures we become temperate, and once having 
become temperate we are most capable of refraining from them; and it is 
similar in the case of courage, for by habituating ourselves to disdain 
frightening things, and by enduring them, we become courageous, and 
having become courageous we shall be most capable of enduring 
frightening things. (1104a 36-1104b 3)       
 
Virtue as Hexis 
 Every moral virtue is a hexis, or stable active condition of character. As Sachs 
notes, the word hexis has often been mistranslated simply as habit (201). This is an 
understandable mistake, inasmuch as habits play a part in hexes, including both virtues 
                                                           
22
 Recall here Aristotle’s remarkable claim that phronêsis, which enables virtue, produces health not in the 
way that the medical art produces health but instead in the way that health produces health. Health has a 
tendency to perpetuate itself, and agents with healthy habits are generally inclined to engage in healthy 
habits, and reluctant to engage in unhealthy ones. In the same way, virtuous agents are inclined to be 
virtuous, and reluctant to be vicious. 
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and vices. But a hexis is a comprehensive way of being that involves rational 
commitments and stable affective responses in addition to a tendency to act in certain 
ways. The stable affective responses involved in a hexis are not mere predispositions, or 
tendencies to have certain feelings (such as jealousy, anger etc.), but are rather ways of 
bearing oneself in response to such feelings (1105b 21-22). Every hexis is therefore 
necessarily bound up with choice in a way that neither habits nor affective tendencies 
need be; as Sachs writes, a hexis is “Any way in which one deliberately holds oneself in 
relation to feelings and desires […] once it becomes a constant part of oneself” (201, 
emphasis mine).  
 As a hexis, a moral virtue is no mere passive way of being, but is instead a moral 
accomplishment.23 With the aid of phronêsis, the virtuous agent deliberately comports 
herself as she should in relation to activities that involve pleasures and pains, pursuing 
the right actions for the sake of the beautiful and the good, and finding pleasure in (or at 
least not being pained by) virtuous activity. If we wish to conceptualize kindness as a 
moral virtue in Aristotle’s sense, it will not suffice merely to identify certain rational, 
affective and praxical components within kindness, since these do not necessarily 
comprise a hexis, much less a virtue. Akrasia, for example, is a way of holding oneself in 
relation to pleasure and pain, but it is an active condition only in some limited sense, and 
is not yet a vice.24 We must show, rather, that kindness is both a hexis and a virtuous 
hexis, or one that is consciously adopted for the sake of the beautiful and the good. 
                                                           
23
 The translation “active condition” is apt in part because it distinguishes a mere natural tendency or 
passive disposition from a genuine virtue, which is to say a mere habit or “natural” virtue from a virtue in 
the governing sense.  
 
24
 As noted previously, Aristotle effectively characterizes akrasia as a mere pathos, and notes that it is not 
yet a vice, since it does not involve a deliberate desire for the bad, and is in some sense unwilling. See, for 
example, 1146b 22.   
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Similarly, and because every virtue is a harmonious state of the soul actualized in and 
through activity, if we are to characterize kindness as a virtue, we must show how the 
rational, affective and praxical components harmonize in the being-at-work of the kind 
agent.25    
 
The Components of Kindness 
 In the previous chapter we identified several characteristics that appear to belong 
to kind agency. To guide the analysis that follows we may here divide them according to 
the above distinction between rational, affective and praxical components. Dividing the 
characteristics of kindness in this way will be useful for the sake of analysis, but will 
inevitably involve abstraction from the actual being-at-work of kindness, which, if it is a 
hexis, will comprise a unity, and if a virtue, will comprise a harmonious unity.         
 The kind agent is remarkably sensitive to the needs of others, and carefully judges 
where and when intervention on another’s behalf is appropriate. She seems to know, or 
rather is apt at determining, how best to actualize kindness in particular situations and in 
relation to particular people. This is so to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine 
kindness absent the virtue of phronêsis. But if the rational component of kindness is 
phronetic, then our account of the latter will require further elaboration and qualification. 
We must explain, first, how it is possible that children often seem to be kind, when for 
Aristotle young people cannot possess phronêsis. Second, and in relation to this point, we 
must show how it is possible that the virtue of kindness grows over time and through 
experience. Third, given the dual nature of phronêsis, which involves both universals and 
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 It is worth noting that both akrasia and vice are disharmonious states or the soul, whereas moral virtues 
are always and necessarily harmonious states. These states are harmonious not by mere coincidence (as 
might be the case with natural virtue) but through the deliberate being-at-work of the virtuous agent.   
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particulars, we must explain how the understanding of the kind agent encompasses both 
theoretical and practical knowledge. And fourth, since the phronetic agent necessarily 
possesses the moral virtues, we must explain how the kind agent is also virtuous more 
generally. 
 The judgment of the kind agent entails not only excellence at determining when 
and where to actualize kindness, but also excellence in morally assessing others. 
Kindness is characterized in part by a particular approach to moral judgment. The kind 
agent views acts of wrongdoing and flaws of character as contingent, and appreciates the 
many constraints luck places on human activity and the development of character. She is 
slow to judge, and is more concerned with helping and cheering others than with morally 
assessing them. If it is to be complete, our elucidation of the rational component of 
kindness must involve an explanation of how the kind agent approaches praise and blame 
in relation to the people around her and, perhaps, in relation to herself.26     
 The affective dimension of kindness is more obviously present than the rational, 
and this is in part why kindness has traditionally been devalued by philosophers. It is by 
no coincidence that kindness has been denigrated by those theorists— and most notably 
by Kant— who favor rationality over sentiment as a ground for moral comportment. That 
feelings figure prominently in kind agency makes kindness immediately suspect to the 
moral rationalist, but not so to the ethicist of virtue, for whom the same feature enhances 
the possibility that kindness can be conceived of as virtue. The kind agent cares about the 
people around her, and therefore wants to help and to cheer them. She possesses genuine 
                                                           
26
 As I suggested in Chapter Two, for Aristotle virtue entails a certain self-relation. This is manifested both 
in his account of magnanimity, and in his characterization of the friend as the other self. It is therefore 
reasonable to suspect that an Aristotelian approach to moral assessment would encompass an approach to 
judging oneself.   
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goodwill, and does not expect that others will reward her for being kind. She is pleased, 
however, to see her kindness reciprocated, and is graciously open to the kindness of 
others. We might reasonably assume that the kind agent takes pleasure in being kind, but 
this need not imply that being kind is always or simply pleasurable. We have said that 
kindness requires courage, since the kind agent cannot know in advance the extent to 
which others will welcome her kindness, and since kindness entails a poignant if not 
painful awareness of human finitude and fragility. For these reasons, kindness will in all 
likelihood involve both pleasures and pains. If we are to conceptualize it as a moral 
virtue, we must explain how the kind agent stands in relation to both the pleasures and 
the pains that kindness involves.    
 The kind agent is not content merely to wish for others’ good, but instead actively 
works to secure it. The paraxial dimension of kindness must not therefore be 
undervalued; kindness is actualized in activity. The kind agent intervenes on behalf of 
others in diverse ways. She helps and gives where she perceives a material need, and 
comforts and cheers where she perceives an emotional one. She does more for others and 
gives more to others than decency requires. She is kind not only to those who are dear to 
her, but also to mere acquaintances and even to strangers. If we are to conceive of 
kindness as a moral virtue, we must acknowledge both the diversity of activities— 
including helping, giving and sharing of opinions— that kind agency involves, and the 
diversity of people— including family members, friends and strangers— for whose sake 
it is enacted.      
  We now have a rough sense of how the three dimensions of moral virtue are 
manifested in kindness. With these preliminary comments in mind, we may consider the 
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rational components of kindness in the light of Aristotle’s accounts of phronêsis and 
moral assessment.  
 
Kindness and Judgment 
 Children are very often kind, and sometimes in ways that adults fail to be. In The 
Kindness of Children Vivian Paley reflects on the many acts of kindness she witnessed in 
her years as a pre-school and kindergarten teacher.27 Most remarkable to her were the 
instances in which her students welcomed new children who were manifestly different 
from the rest of the group, including those with special physical or emotional needs. Her 
students would not hesitate to accommodate the needs of physically or mentally disabled 
peers, changing their ways of working and playing to make them more inclusive. They 
were incredibly sensitive to the needs of their peers, understanding that one boy needed 
to be alone when upset, and another wanted to do things himself, even it if took extra 
time. Paley concludes her assessment of the kindness of children by noting how young 
children “are more often kind to each other than unkind” (129). Children seem, at the 
very least, quite capable of kindness. If phronêsis is the rational component of kindness, 
then we must account for the fact that children so often seem to be kind despite the fact 
that they cannot, on Aristotle’s view, possess phronêsis. 
 Paley focuses on how children behave “at their best,” in an effort to discover 
ways to foster their better instincts, including and especially what she takes to be an 
instinct for kindness. While it is true that children are often kind, it is also true that the 
same children are sometimes cruel or indifferent. Parents and teachers know that that 
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 Paley is a retired educator and early childhood education researcher. She researched and taught at the 
University of Chicago Laboratory Schools for several decades.  
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child who is exceeding pleasant when in a good mood can be extraordinarily mean when 
in a bad one, if, for example, she is overly tired or hungry. Phronêsis works in concert 
with proper affective conditions to ensure a uniformity of behavior in the virtuous agent. 
Virtue is an active, intentional and stable state of being such that the genuinely kind agent 
would not behave kindly one moment and cruelly the next, as children so often do.  
 Some children are quite uniformly kind, though, thus we might wonder if it is 
possible to be born kind. If so, we might construe kindness an instinct or personality trait 
instead of or in addition to a moral virtue. To do so would be perfectly commensurate 
with Aristotelian moral psychology, and perfectly in keeping with the classical Greek 
conception of arête. The word arête is so broad in meaning as to encompass any attribute 
that either makes something an excellent example of its kind or makes it well-suited to its 
ends, and as such does not have necessary moral implications (see Sachs 5, n. 5). If we 
assume that kindness makes a person well-suited to her existence (a reasonable 
assumption, since it seems conducive to living well in societies, and human beings are, 
for Aristotle, primarily social beings), then it would be an arête whether or not it had any 
moral import, and regardless of whether it arose by nature or through experience and 
training. But this fact is perfectly commensurable with the claim that children do not 
possess phronêsis, and as such cannot possess the moral virtue of kindness. Here we may 
recall Aristotle’s distinction between natural virtues and virtues proper. He writes, 
[V]irtue too is in much the same situation that practical judgment is in as 
compared to cleverness— not the same as it, but similar to it— and that is 
the way natural virtue is related to virtue in the governing sense. For it 
seems to everyone that each of the types of character is present in some 
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way by nature, since we are  straight from birth; however, we still look for 
something different that is good in the governing sense. (1144b2-8) 
Children and even animals possess natural virtue, Aristotle claims, but theirs is a virtue 
unregulated by intelligence. Without intelligent guidance virtue is unpredictable and even 
potentially dangerous. In the same way that mere cleverness can be used for evil purposes 
where genuine phronêsis cannot, mere natural virtue can be deleterious where virtue in 
the governing sense promotes flourishing (1144b 9-10).28 The intelligence that 
distinguishes natural from genuine virtue is manifested in phronêsis, such that “virtue in 
the governing sense […] does not come about without practical judgment” (1144b 14-
15).             
 The fact that children often behave in kind ways reveals a capacity for genuine 
kindness, and one that caretakers ought to foster. Phronêsis grows over time and in 
concert with virtue. Virtue grows with experience, and, importantly, through failure. It is 
easy to imagine how this process might unfold in relation to kindness. A child who has 
been taught that it is good to help others in need might intervene on behalf of someone 
who does not welcome her help, or does not welcome the precise kind of help that she 
offers. As we are learning to be kind, we go wrong in numerous ways, whether by doing 
or saying the wrong things, or intervening for the wrong reasons, or at the wrong 
moments, or on behalf of the wrong people. These failures give us the knowledge of 
particulars that phronêsis, and by extension moral virtue, requires.     
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 That cleverness may be used for immoral purposes is quite obvious, but it may sound strange to suggest, 
as Aristotle does, that moral virtue without the guidance of intelligence is potentially harmful. This is 
especially true in the case of natural kindness, which seems a most mild virtue. But there is truth in 
Aristotle’s claim, as I suggest below. One must be kind to the right people, and in the right ways, and for 
the right reasons, lest one do harm either to the recipients of kindness or to oneself.     
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              If the rational component of kindness if phronêsis, then kindness will necessarily 
involve knowledge of both universals and particulars. The universal component of 
phronetic knowledge, as stated above, encompasses what, in general, is good for human 
beings, and acknowledges that every virtuous state represents a mean condition relative 
to the agent.29 The knowledge of particulars allows the agent to determine how, in 
particular situations, the mean is to be achieved. If kindness involves phronêsis, the kind 
agent must recognize that kindness is in some way conducive to living well, must 
conceptualize it as a mean between two extremes, and must be apt at determining how to 
actualize kindness in particular situations and in a way that is appropriate to her. 
 That kindness promotes human flourishing is quite apparent. The activities that 
kindness encompasses are also the activities associated with other virtues, including 
generosity, friendliness and gentleness, and these are activities that Aristotle associates 
with human flourishing. So it should not be controversial to suggest that kindness 
involves theoretical knowledge of what, in general, is good for human beings. But in 
order to construe kindness as a moral virtue we must also explain the other theoretical 
component of kindness, namely, how it represents a mean condition between two 
extremes. 
   The activities through which kindness is actualized are diverse indeed, and 
include helping, giving, and cheering.30 What they have in common is some kind of 
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 This is a notoriously difficult point. Determining the mean that marks a virtuous state involves both 
theoretical knowledge (as would determining some mathematical mean) and knowledge of particulars, 
including self-knowledge, since the mean is relative to the agent. Where the object of knowledge is the 
ethical mean as relative to individuals, the mode of knowledge is both theoretical reason and practical 
reason (phronêsis), working in conjunction with sense perception (aisthesis).   
 
30
 This diversity does not entail that kindness must be considered as a collection of more specific virtues 
such as helpfulness and generosity, since for Aristotle the moral virtues may encompass a variety of 
activities, and moral virtues may overlap. The moral virtue of generosity, for example, governs both giving 
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action on behalf of another agent. If kindness is the virtue that has to do with acting on 
behalf of others, then the extremes relative to which it is the mean would also involve 
activity (or the absence of activity) on behalf of others. Cruelty is often opposed to 
kindness, and so comes to mind as a candidate for the deficient condition of kindness. 
But cruelty has the character of wrongness that belongs to the activities Aristotle 
considers wrong simply (haplos), and which include murder, lying and adultery. He 
writes, “for some of them [actions and feelings] as soon as they are named are understood 
as having baseness involved in them, such as joy in others’ misfortunes” (1107a 9-11). 
There is no mean condition relative to such kinds of activity and feeling, and there seems 
to be no mean condition relative to the intentional harming of others nor to enjoyment of 
the same, which is a characteristic of cruelty. We might note that vices, though 
blameworthy, are also understandable and in some sense forgivable. We understand, for 
example, that it is easier to be cowardly than to be courageous, and though we do not 
praise cowards we do not despise them in the way we do and should despise people who 
are cruel. Cruelty, then, is not the deficient condition in relation to kindness.  
 When people fail to be kind we can blame them for their apathy, or for failing to 
care about others. Since every moral virtue has to do with feelings, we might suggest that 
apathy is the deficient condition of kindness. There is something appealing about this 
view, since care for and about others is an important motive for kindness and an 
important attribute of the kind agent.31 But kindness involves more than simply caring 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and taking. Certain of the virtues, including greatness of soul, require the co-presence of all of the other 
moral virtues. Kindness may turn out to be a virtue that encompasses or requires the presence of many 
other virtues.      
 
31
 So much so that one might be tempted to reduce kindness to a mere attitude, as Tibor Machan appears to: 
“The terms [kindness and generosity] are often used interchangeably, although kindness is more of an 
attitude, and an attitude need not issue action” (1).  
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about others; it also involves active intervention on their behalf. Since kindness has at 
least as much to do with action as it does with feeling, apathy, too, must be dismissed as 
its deficient condition. Unkindness is another potential deficient condition, but this term 
is too broad, and might include everything from the mere failure to be kind to deliberate 
enjoyment of others’ suffering. Since kind activity is for the sake of others, we might 
consider selfishness or egotism as the deficient condition of kindness, but this, too, is 
somewhat vague, and seems to have more to do with thoughts than with actions. The 
deficient condition of kindness should ideally capture the elements of apathy, unkindness 
and selfishness that are relevant to the failure to be kind, but also must exceed the 
definitions all three.  
        Not all virtues and vices have names, and Aristotle tentatively names many 
hexes that are easily recognizable but that lack common designations. Since the deficient 
vice related to kindness does not appear to have a name, we may follow Aristotle’s lead 
and suggest one. The deficient condition of kindness involves a failure to take an 
adequate interest in others’ flourishing and/or a failure to adequately involve oneself in 
the same. For these reasons I will call the deficiency of kindness disinterest-
disinvolvement. Disinterest suggests a failure to adequately care about others, and we 
may assume that the failure to care about others is often attributable to an excessive care 
about oneself, or selfishness. Disinterest then captures the features of apathy and 
selfishness that allow them to work against kindness. The term disinvolvement captures 
the praxical dimension of kindness and of the failure to be kind. The virtue of kindness 
involves more than mere (passive) care about others’ flourishing, such that those who are 
interested in others may yet fail to intervene on their behalf as they should. The 
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compound term disinterest-disinvolvement rightly implies that the affective and praxical 
dimensions of kindness (and the failure to be kind) are intertwined; those who are 
disinterested in others’ flourishing will not be likely to intervene on their behalf.  
 Where disinterst-disinvolvement is the deficient condition of kindness, 
hyperinterest-hyperinvolvement is the excessive. This extreme is probably further from 
the mean than the deficient condition, since selfishness and selfish activity are more 
common than altruism and altruistic activity. But certainly there are people who care too 
much about others, to the point that they disregard the self-care that ensures their own 
flourishing. And certainly there are people who become far too involved in the activities 
of others, where, for example, such involvement is unwelcome. Kindness entails caring 
as one ought about others, and acting as one ought for their sake. As is the case for all 
virtues, as a mean kind praxis must be correct both quantitatively— one must care 
enough, for example, about others’ flourishing— and qualitatively— one must do the 
right things at the right times to benefit the right people and for the right reasons. As 
such, with kindness as with all virtue, there are many ways to go wrong.  
 As the above reflections suggest, the characterization of kindness as a moral 
virtue seems quite commensurable with Aristotle’s claim that moral virtue is governed by 
phronêsis, which involves both universal knowledge and knowledge of particulars. The 
kind agent may be said to know that kindness promotes human flourishing, and could 
easily conceive of kindness as a mean condition between two extremes. And because it is 
universal, it would be possible for an agent to possess this knowledge without actually 
being kind, if, for example, she suffered from akrasia, or did not yet possess the 
knowledge of particulars that enables phronêsis. Kindness also seems to manifest the 
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particular knowledge that in part characterizes phronêsis; as we have said, the kind agent 
is apt at actualizing kindness in diverse situations and in relation to diverse people. The 
kind agent is also compelled to act; she feels the obligations imposed by phronêsis and 
acts accordingly. We may say, then, that phronêsis seems to be at least one component of 
kind agency, and specifically, that component which causes kind agents to properly 
determine how they ought to act, and which compels them to act as they ought. But if we 
are to maintain the stronger claim that the rational component of kindness is phronêsis, as 
we must if we wish to construe kindness as a moral virtue, then we must explain how 
phronêsis enables the other rational activity that kindness importantly involves, namely, 
proper moral assessment. 
     Kindness entails a particular approach to moral assessment, as noted in Chapter 
Four, and it is one that emphasizes human vulnerability. The kind agent is apt to forgive 
people for their moral failures and faults, since she understands the burdens bad luck so 
often places on them, and understands that human character is largely contingent. When 
she does immediately or perfectively judge another person harshly, she takes the time to 
reflect on and correct her initial judgment. She is less concerned with morally judging 
others and more concerned with helping and cheering them, such that where she shares 
her judgments she does so primarily in order to serve these purposes. The kind agent is 
therefore more inclined to share favorable opinions of others than unfavorable ones, and 
actively searches for personal qualities and particular actions worth praising. What 
characterizes the kind agent’s approach to judgment then is first, an approach to making 
judgments, and second, an approach to publicizing them. The former is attributable to a 
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rational excellence that Aristotle’s recognizes as belonging to phronetic agency and the 
second is attributable to moral virtue.  
 In Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes, “What is called 
thoughtfulness (gnômê), in accordance with which we speak of people as compassionate 
(sun-gnômê) and as being thoughtful, is a right discrimination of what is decent. A sign 
of this is that we say that a decent person is especially apt to be compassionate” (1143a 
19-21). These remarks arise within the context of Aristotle’s discussion of deliberation 
and phronêsis, and by no coincidence. There is a striking resonance between Aristotle’s 
claims about thoughtfulness and forgiveness and the judgment at work in kind agency, 
and it can only be appreciated if we understand the nature and significance of decency 
(epieikeia).  
 Although it has not received as much scholarly attention as the virtues of justice 
and phronêsis, decency is for Aristotle at least as praiseworthy a virtue as either, because 
it manifests both and at times transcends the former.32 In Book Five he describes the 
relation of decency and justice as follows: “while what is decent is just, it is not so 
according to the law, but is a setting straight of what is legally just” (1137b 12-13). 
Because the law “takes what applies to the greater number of cases,” it cannot make 
reference to every possible contingency at work in particular cases. An excellent judge 
must therefore account for what the law leaves out when speaking simply (1137b 26-27). 
This means, in some cases, making exceptions to the law for the sake of what is truly 
good or just. The agent who judges well how to make such exceptions is decent. For 
some things, Aristotle notes, there can be no law, and when it comes to these decency 
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 The significance of decency in Aristotle’s ethics must not be neglected since, as Joe Sachs writes, 
“Decency is one of Aristotle’s most frequent ways of naming human goodness” (203).  
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must substitute for legal justice. Although it sometimes means working against the law 
(which is just in theory), decency entails the fulfillment of justice, which, on Aristotle’s 
view, cannot be fully captured in universals: “Hence what is decent is just, and is better 
than a certain kind of justice [since it is] better than the error that results from speaking 
simply” (1137b 24-26).33   
 The relation between phronêsis and decency is already implied in the distinction 
between legal justice (as reflected in laws) and decency; legal justice has to do with 
universals, whereas decency, like phronêsis, involves particulars. Before we can fully 
grasp their relation, we must appreciate what thoughtfulness (gnômê) and compassion 
(sun-gnômê) have to do with both. Aristotle writes, “compassion (sun-gnômê) is a kind of 
thoughtfulness (gnômê) that governs a right discrimination of what is decent, ‘right’ 
meaning that it is of what is truly decent” (1142a 24-26). So the excellence of thought 
behind decency is thoughtfulness (gnômê), and this same thoughtfulness gives rise to 
compassion and forgiveness (sun-gnômê).34 The thoughtful agent judges well when an 
action ought to be forgiven. Such judgment invariably involves knowledge of particulars. 
Where in general we rightly blame someone for killing another person, for example, we 
blame them less if their action was accidental, or if they acted in self-defense. The ability 
to judge well in relation to both universals (rules or laws) and particulars (circumstances) 
is precisely the excellence of phronêsis. It is therefore fitting that at the end of his 
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 What is most remarkable about this claim is that it allows us to appreciate the need for universal laws 
without abandoning the kind of judgment that might make exceptions to laws for the sake of the same good 
that those laws are meant to serve. In Aristotle’s view, both justice and decency aim at the beautiful and the 
good, and so harmonize in a certain way.  
 
34
 Forgiveness is another common translation of sun-gnômê, and the term generally preferred in translations 
of Book Three, Chapter One, where sun-gnômê is granted in cases where an ordinarily blameworthy action 
is attributed in part to circumstances beyond the agent’s control.  
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analysis of thoughtfulness, compassion and decency, Aristotle suggests that all three are 
bound up with and implied by phronêsis:  
And it is reasonable that all these active conditions of the soul converge on 
the same meaning […] For all these capacities are directed at things that 
are ultimate and particular, and someone is […] considerate or 
compassionate in being able to discern those things a person of practical 
judgment is concerned with, since what is decent belongs in common to 
all good people in the way they act toward another person. (1143a 25-35) 
 The kind agent judges well, and is more apt to be forgiving. This is due in part to the fact 
that genuine deliberation— the kind Aristotle associates with phronêsis, thoughtfulness 
and decency— takes time.35 Aristotle’s contention is that the kind of judgment involved 
in compassion and forgiveness involves complex deliberation, as well as an accurate 
knowledge of certain universals (including and especially the human good) and adequate 
attentiveness to and knowledge of correct of particulars. If this is so, and if kindness 
indeed involves a tendency to judge compassionately, then kindness involves the rare and 
most praiseworthy intelligence that Aristotle associates with moral arête. This suggestion 
is quite at odds with the popular conception of kindness, hinted at in Chapter Four, that 
vaguely associates kindness with vapidity.  
 Kindness involves a certain approach not only to the moral assessment of others, 
but also to the publicizing of the opinions that such assessment yields. An agent who 
deliberates well regarding how to judge another’s character but then proceeds to publicize 
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 Aristotle writes of deliberation, “it is not skill in guessing […] since this is without a reasoned account 
and is something quick, while people deliberate for a long time, and say that one ought to be quick to do 
what has been deliberated, but to deliberate slowly” (1142b 3-6).  
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her least flattering conclusions to the exclusion of all else would hardly strike us as kind. 
Since the sharing of opinions belongs to praxis, I will address the second component of 
kind judgment in the discussion of kind praxis, below. At present I turn to the second key 
component of kind agency, namely, the affective.   
 
The Pleasures and Pains of Kindness 
 Although kindness has an important rational component, as we have seen, it is 
difficult to deny that its affective component is more apparent. As suggested above, this 
is in part why moral philosophers, who have conventionally preferred rationality to 
sentiment as a stable ground for ethics, have conventionally dismissed or disdained 
kindness.36 Kind agency involves strong feelings for others. Such feelings are observed in 
Aristotle’s accounts of several of the moral virtues, which is unsurprising given that 
moral virtues have to do with feelings and actions within a social context. What is 
surprising is that Aristotle also assesses what we might term social feelings outside the 
context of his discussion of moral virtue. Even more surprising is his characterization of 
kindness (kharis) not as a virtue of character, but instead as a feeling (pathos). To explore 
the potential resonance between kindness and Aristotle’s ethical thought, we must 
momentarily move beyond his explicitly ethical works to consider the ethically relevant 
emotions of kharis and pity (eleos), which he characterizes in the Rhetoric and Poetics.    
 
Aristotle on Kharis 
  Although emotions are, as we have seen, central to Aristotle’s ethical theory, as 
Christof Rapp rightly notes, Aristotle “nowhere offers such an illuminating account of 
                                                           
36
 A point I expand on in Chapter Six via analysis of Kantian ethics. 
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single emotions as in the Rhetoric” (1). That this is so is perfectly consistent with a 
central aim of the Rhetoric, which is to discern the sources of persuasiveness in speech. 
Speech persuades, Aristotle contends, by means of the character of the speaker, the 
emotional state of the listener, and/or the quality of the argument (logos) it embodies. The 
second means of persuasion is elaborated in Book Two, chapters 2-11, and it is in this 
segment of the text that Aristotle offers his account of kharis.  
 In English translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the word kharis is often rendered 
as kindness.37 We might note that in the biblical scholarly tradition the same word is 
generally translated as grace.38 This is by no coincidence; where grace often denotes a 
certain gratuitousness in the spirit in which something is given, kharis has to do, says 
Aristotle, with doing for and giving to others with no expectation of return: 
Kindness (kharis)— under the influence of which a man is said to ‘be 
kind’ (kharin ekhein)— may be defined as helpfulness towards someone 
in need, not in return for anything, nor for the advantage of the helper 
himself, but for that of the person helped. (1385a 17-19) 
The magnitude of kindness, says Aristotle, is proportional to the needs of the recipient, 
such that “Kindness (Kharis) is great if shown to one who is in great need, or who needs 
what is important and hard to get, or who needs it at an important and difficult crisis” 
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 Including the W. Rhys Roberts translation, from which the passages that appear below are taken. Other 
translations substitute the word benevolence. See, for example, Edward Cope’s 1877 translation and John 
Freese’s 1926 translation. As David Konstan notes, the tradition of equating kharis with either kindness or 
benevolence dates at least to the Renaissance. The text on which he bases this claim— Ermolao Barbaro’s 
1545 translation of the Rhetoric— uses the Latin word gratia (grace). Gratia, like kharis, is notoriously 
difficult to translate. See, for example, the diverse meanings of grace in W.E.Vine’s Expository Dictionary 
of New Testament Words (1940) 
 
38
 As Vine notes, in the New Testament the word kharis/gratia/grace is often indicative a certain generous 
or liberal disposition “on the part of the bestower,” and especially on the part of God as giver (he refers, for 
example, to, Acts 7:10, and Acts 14:26).   
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(1385 19022). From this Aristotle infers that unkindness (akharista) is present where 
someone fails to help another who is in need, or merely appears to help (giving, for 
example something “worthless”), or helps for the wrong reasons. He places a special 
emphasis on the intentions of the helper, noting that we rightly refrain from calling 
someone kind if “they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own 
interest,” or if their helpfulness is in some way coerced, or merely accidental (1385b 3). 
Kharis is only at work where an act of helpfulness is chosen for the sake of the other’s 
good. There is something fundamentally gratuitous about the help given in an act 
motivated by kharis, and this is evinced by the fact that Aristotle excludes the “returning” 
of favors from the category of acts that indicate kharis.39  
 Aristotle’s description of kharis resonates with the characterization of kindness 
thus far developed in several ways. First, by Aristotle’s account kharis denotes a certain 
positive feeling toward others that corresponds to the kind agent’s good will or desire to 
see others flourish. Second, this positive feeling influences agents to act in kind ways; as 
with kindness, kharis is not merely passively undergone but instead entails a 
corresponding tendency to act on others’ behalf. Third, kharis tends to involve helping 
others, and as we have noted kindness is often manifested in gestures of helpfulness. 
Fourth, kharis is characterized by an unselfishness, which we have noted is conducive to 
kindness. Given these observations, we might reasonably try to incorporate Aristotle’s 
description of kharis into our characterization of kindness.   
                                                           
39
 Aristotle’s characterization of kharis (as understood in conventional translations) appears, as Konstan 
notes, to work against Greek conventions regarding giving. The word “Kharis is often paired with timê (or 
payment),” he notes, because for the Greeks gifts and favors entailed some kind of reciprocity. Aristotle’s 
characterization either works against conventional conceptions of giving and or doing favors, or he is in 
fact using the word to signify multiple phenomena, including gratitude, as Konstan contends.     
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 Unfortunately, the prima facie resonance between kindness and kharis may have 
more to do with an often-repeated error in translation than with the actual resemblance of 
kindness to the feeling that Aristotle aims to capture in his description. Despite the 
scholarly convention that equates kharis with kindness, it is likely, as David Konstan 
argues, that Aristotle was referring in the Rhetoric not to kindness, but instead to the 
emotion of gratitude. The magnitude of Konstan’s objection is such that it must be 
addressed before we can determine whether or to what extent Aristotle’s account of 
kharis is relevant to the conceptualization of kindness as a moral virtue.   
 Kharis is, as Konstan notes, “one of the richer terms in the classical Greek 
lexicon” (167). In various contexts it signifies the charming or pleasant, a favor done or 
received, the reciprocity of a past favor, the feeling that inspires action on another’s 
behalf, or the feeling of gratitude. Although there is an ancient Greek word for 
ingratitude (akharista), there is no single word for gratitude, apart from the kharis itself 
(167). As Konstan writes, “When kharis refers to gratitude,” it is invariably expressed in 
either the phrase kharin ekhein (to have kharis) or in the phrase kharin eidenai (to know 
kharis) (167).40 The phrase kharin ekhein and the word kharis often appear in close 
proximity, as they do in the passage from the Rhetoric cited above, and reasonably so; 
kharis often means favor, and a feeling of gratitude often accompanies a favor done. 
Konstan contends that translators have erred in translating the phrase kharin echein as “to 
have kindness,” “to have benevolence,” or “to be kind,” instead of “to feel gratitude” 
(160).  
 Although Konstan apparently overlooked it when writing his critique of extant 
translations, Theodore’s Buckley’s translation resonates with Konstan’s claim; Buckley’s 
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 This is consistent with Woodhouse’s Dictionary of Classical Greek.  
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version of the passage is headed “Those towards whom people feel gratitude; on what 
occasions; and, as regards themselves, with what dispositions,” and begins as follows: 
“The persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and the occasions on which, and with 
what dispositions on their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous 
benevolence” (133). Buckley shares Konstan’s view that Aristotle was primarily 
concerned with the feeling of gratitude that comes about when one receives a favor of 
some kind. But in Buckley’s translation both the disposition of the one who receives 
(gratitude) and the disposition of the giver (gratuitous benevolence) are at issue. This, 
however, is perfectly consistent with the structure of Aristotle’s analysis of the other 
emotions in the Rhetoric. In relation to each, he sets out to describe the nature of the 
emotion itself, towards whom it is felt, and for what reasons it is felt towards them 
(1136a 22-25). In the case of gratitude, we tend to feel it more deeply if we judge that the 
person acted for our sake, and with no expectation of return; in other words, if their 
action appears to have been motivated by gratuitous benevolence, or, we might say, by 
kindness.  
 Konstan’s critique of conventional translations raises a difficult hermeneutical 
issue that I cannot resolve here. But whether Aristotle was concerned with the benevolent 
feelings that motivate generous acts, or with the degrees of gratitude that recipients feel 
in relation favors done (and/or the spirit in which they are done), or both, his description 
of kharis and Konstan’s analysis of the same shed some light on the relation between 
Aristotle’s ethical thought and the possibility that kindness can be properly characterized 
as a moral virtue. There are three points worth noting here. First, as Aristotle implies, the 
spirit in which something is done or given rightly impacts how we feel about the act and 
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the agent who acted. Aristotle rightly recognizes that a helpful, generous or kind thing 
that is done for the sake of the recipient is more worthy of our appreciation than the same 
act if done for some other purpose. Were we to characterize kindness as a moral virtue, it 
would be consistent with Aristotle’s analysis of kharis to say that it involves acting for 
the sake of others, and that its praiseworthiness derives at least in part from this 
characteristic. Second, and as Konstan rightly notes, although kindness entails certain 
emotive states, it is unreasonable to characterize kindness as an emotion (pathos). For 
Aristotle, the pathê are passively undergone, and a given pathos is a “response or reaction 
to some kind of stimulus or event” (158).41 All of the pathê analyzed in the Rhetoric are 
considered in the light of the stimuli or events that cause them. As such, and taken alone, 
the pathê do not motivate action in the way that hexes do. This is consistent with the 
characterization of kindness thus far developed; kindness is not merely a feeling-state, 
and it would be incommensurate with Aristotle’s account of virtue to suggest that it could 
be. Third, and as Konstan’s analysis suggests, there is something important about the way 
recipients affectively respond to (an act of) kharis. Kharis and gratitude exist in an 
important relation, entailing a kind of reciprocity between beneficiary and benefactor that 
exceeds, as Konstan suggests, conventional conceptions of the Greek dynamics of 
exchange. Kharin echein does not mean “to owe a debt,” as Konstan correctly notes. No 
debt is occasioned by the kinds of helping and giving that Aristotle addresses in the 
Rhetoric; the gratuitousness of the kharis produces not debt but gratitude, which cements 
an important bond between the giver and the recipient. It is no wonder, then, that 
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 An emotion is, on Aristotle’s view, an experience of some kind of a pleasure or pain combined with at 
least one belief or judgment, as I explain below.  
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Aristotle discusses kharis at one other point in the Rhetiric, namely, in his analysis of 
friendship (philia): 
Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them unasked; 
and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows that they 
were done for our sake and not for some other reason. (1381b 35-37) 
 Acts of kharis, on account of which recipients feel gratitude (kharin echein), build the 
bonds upon which the most morally significant relationships (those of philia) depend.42 
To characterize kindness as a virtue that in some ways involves kharis would be, then, 
quite consistent with Aristotle’s valuing of friendship, but perhaps the significant 
components of kindness are already at work in the phenomenon of friendship such that 
Aristotle need not identify some virtue external to friendship itself. That is, perhaps 
kindness is, for Aristotle, latent in philia, or at least in the state of character that makes 
agents worthy of the best kind of philia.43  
 
Aristotle on Eleos 
 The English word pity has decidedly negative connotations. Most of us equate 
pity with some compromise of the recipient’s dignity, perhaps assuming that when we 
pity someone we believe that person to be pitiful (which is to say weak, ineffective, 
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 These are arguably the same bonds by virtue of which the whole the political community (polis) is 
cemented.   
   
43
 A possibility I explore below in relation to the praxical dimension of kindness. Since the best kind of 
friendship requires that both agents be virtuous, and since kharis causes friendships to grow, perhaps the 
important features of kindness are dispersed among the moral and intellectual virtues that Aristotle 
identifies, and/or among the behaviors that he identifies with both virtue and the activities of the best kind 
of friendship.  
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etc).44 It seems that we prefer terms like compassion and sympathy (both meaning 
literally to feel/suffer together)  to pity in part because they do not suggest weakness or 
vulnerability on the part of the recipient, or at least not to the same extent that pity does. 
Moreover, the former terms do not entail that the agent who elicits the response is in 
some way less dignified than the person in whom that response is elicited.45 But our 
preference for terms like compassion and empathy appears to entail a problematic 
assumption, namely, that when others are in a state that merits pity, their dignity is in 
some way compromised; we assume, it seems, that a state of profound vulnerability is in 
some sense undignified. If we are convinced that this is so, then kindness— which 
involves emotions akin to pity, and is often actualized in situations where the recipient is 
profoundly vulnerable—entails the lowering of its recipients’ dignity.46 If we wish to 
maintain that kindness in no way diminishes— and perhaps even bolsters— the dignity of 
its recipients, then we must to learn to think vulnerability and dignity as at least 
potentially coextensive, and Aristotle’s analysis of the emotion of eleos gives us a way to 
do just that.  
 Aristotle’s treatment of eleos in the Rhetoric directly follows his treatment of 
kharis, and perhaps not by coincidence. Both are important social emotions; kharis 
because it has to do with help given and/or gratitude elicited, and pity because it has to do 
with those situations in which we are unable to help others, but wish that we could. We 
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 Which already suggests— as is consistent with Aristotle’s moral psychology— that emotions are 
intrinsically related to judgments in some way.  
 
45
 Pity also tends to entail a certain distance between the one who feels it and the one who elicits it, where 
compassion and empathy imply something closer to intimacy. This is echoed in the literal meanings of both 
words.   
 
46
 This analysis brings to mind Kant’s trenchant fear that acts of kindness do violence to the recipients’ 
dignity. I take up this claim in Chapter Six.  
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admire those who show kharis to a person who is suffering or in need, and we feel eleos 
when we see a person who is suffering or in need. Aristotle writes:  
Pity (eleos) may be defined as a feeling of pain caused by the sight of 
some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve 
it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours. 
(1385 13-15) 
Eleos requires that the evil witnessed is of a certain magnitude, which is to say non-
trivial. Aristotle identifies two categories of events that elicit eleos: painful events that 
“tend to annihilate,” and evils that are “due to chance” (1385 5-10). The former include 
“death in its various forms, bodily injuries and afflictions, old age, diseases, and lack of 
food,” and the latter “friendlessness, scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn 
away from friends and companions), deformity, weakness, mutilation; evil coming from a 
source from which good ought to have come; and the frequent repetition of such 
misfortunes” (1385 6-13). Interestingly, Aristotle points out that the former category is 
absorbed into the latter, since “all such evils are due to chance, if they are serious” (1385 
5-6). Eleos is, then, importantly bound up with luck and human vulnerability.  
 As Martha Nussbaum notes, eleos involves two key judgments on the part of the 
person who experiences it: first, the judgment that “the person did not deserve the 
suffering,” and second, the judgment that we ourselves are vulnerable, and in similar 
ways (384). The first judgment, which Aristotle echoes in his analysis of pity in the 
Poetics, marks pity as “distinct from moral censure or blame” (Nussbaum 384; Poetics 
1453a 3-5). Aristotle’s claim, as Nussbaum notes, is that “where we judge that the 
suffering is brought on by the agent’s own bad choices, we (logically) do not pity” 
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(384).47 The second judgment is even richer, as it entails both an awareness of the 
existence of luck in general, and an understanding that we ourselves and our loved ones 
are vulnerable to bad luck. Aristotle says little regarding the first facet of this judgment; 
perhaps he cannot imagine anyone living in denial of the existence of luck. But he dwells 
at length on the second, writing: 
In order to feel pity, we must obviously be capable of supposing that some 
evil may happen to us or some friends of ours […] It is therefore not felt 
by those completely ruined, who suppose that no further evil can befall 
them […] nor by those who imagine themselves immensely fortunate— 
their feeling is rather presumptuous insolence. (1385b 16-23)  
Those who are wholly cowardly and those who are wholly insolent are unlikely to feel 
pity, the former on account of their tendency to feel panic instead (which is an entirely 
self-centered emotion), and the latter on account of their foolish belief that no harm can 
befall them. Those who are most likely to feel pity include, says Aristotle, people who 
have suffered bad fortune and recovered, elderly men, “owing to their good sense and 
their experience,” people who have wives and children, and, perhaps most interestingly, 
educated people, on account of their ability to “take long views” (1385b 20-28). Aristotle 
further notes that in order to feel pity, we must believe that at least some people are good, 
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 It is interesting to place this claim in dialogue with Aristotle’s discussion of forgiveness (sun-gnômê) in 
the Nicomachean Ethics (see especially 1110a 20-35). Sun-gnômê is more akin to judgment than to 
emotion, as is suggested by the analysis of sun-gnômê vis-à-vis phronêsis above. But it is easy to imagine 
how in “mixed” situations, that is, situations in which an agent’s choices are radically limited, we might 
both forgive the agent for performing what is, by Aristotle’s definition, a willing act, and also feel pity for 
her on account of her suffering from bad luck. The ambiguity of moral responsibility is evident, I think in a 
certain resistance we feel to Nussbaum’s claim that we do not pity those whose suffering comes about as a 
result of their own choices; this claim is both true and untrue, as we often pity those whose actions we 
attribute to a poor character if we believe such character resulted from improper upbringing or other tragic 
circumstances.       
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since if we believe that all people are evil, we will wish evil things to befall them (1385b 
34-1386b 1). 
 We do not feel pity for family members and close friends, Aristotle argues, as 
their good is so bound up with our own that when they suffer it is as if we suffer 
ourselves (1386a 17-19). Instead, we feel pity for acquaintances, and especially for 
“those who are like us in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth,” since we 
are vulnerable in the same ways that they are (1386a 24-26). Our feelings of pity are 
importantly related to our fears, in that “what we fear for ourselves excites our pity when 
it happens to others” (1386a 26-29). In the light of these observations, we might object 
that pity seems not only a selfish emotion— as we feel it on account of our own desire to 
avoid pain and suffering—  but also one that entails a separation between ourselves and 
the people for whom we feel it. There is some truth in both claims, but the distance 
between self and other that allows us to experience of pity also allows us to critically 
reflect on human vulnerability in general and by extension on our own vulnerability, 
where such reflection is akin to, if not exactly, the kind of thoughtfulness that underlies 
compassion and forgiveness.48 Pity, if a “selfish” emotion, is also one that potentially 
fosters pro-social feelings, judgments and actions.49    
 Pity is one of the two emotions that, says Aristotle, comprise “tragic pleasure,” so 
it should not be surprising that he addresses it at some length in the Poetics (1453b 12). 
There are two key points about Aristotle’s discussion of pity in the latter text that we 
ought to note. First, in his analysis of tragic drama, he emphasizes that whereas comic 
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 This would not be possible if we simply felt the same emotion that the person we pitied was feeling, as 
we might if a loved one was suffering. (add references here?) 
 
49
 A claim I expand on below.  
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protagonists are by and large worse than we (witnesses) are, tragic protagonists are better 
(1449a 31-37, 1454b 8-10). One plot to be avoided, Aristotle contends, is that in which 
an evil person goes from a state of happiness to a state of misery, since we cannot feel 
pity for such a person (1453a 1-7). A satisfying tragic plot must have a protagonist who is 
good, and the tragic poet ought even to make him appear better than he might really be: 
“we in our way should follow the example of the portrait-painters, who reproduce the 
distinctive features of a man, and at the same time […] make him handsomer than he is” 
(1454b 9-12). Second, Aristotle argues that in a tragic plot the protagonist must suffer a 
reversal of fortune from good to bad. But such a reversal cannot simply happen, that is, 
cannot have some source that is purely external to the agent. In such a case, audiences 
would feel not pity but mere aversion. Nor can the reversal stem from the protagonist’s 
viciousness or ill will, as again, we would not pity one whose bad character brought 
about his own suffering. Instead of these, the reversal of fortune must arise on account of 
“some error of judgment” on the part of the protagonist (1453a 9-10).50  
 Tragedy is, says Aristotle, a representation (mimesis) of what could be, and is 
therefore truer— in the sense of being more universal— than history (1451b 4-5). Tragic 
drama reveals certain truths about human nature and the human situation, and makes 
apparent certain possibilities of human experience. Tragedy also importantly involves 
katharsis, which Nussbaum characterizes as a coming to clarity through emotional 
experience (389-90).51 In both senses, tragedy is fundamentally related to education or 
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 The word for error here is hamartia, which is derived from hamartanein (literally “missing the mark”). 
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 She writes, “the primary, ongoing, central meaning [of katharsis] is roughly one of ‘clearing up’ or 
‘clarification’” (389). Nussbaum emphasizes the relationship between education and katharsis, and 
between katharsis and correct knowledge (388-9).    
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coming-to-know. As Barbara Koziak writes, “Unlike Plato, Aristotle believes the dēmos 
[public] can undergo a paideia [education] supplied by tragedy” (267). But what is it we 
come to know through tragic stories? We come to know, first, that we are vulnerable, and 
in numerous ways. Whether or not we flourish, and whether or not our loved ones do, is 
largely beyond our power to control. We also come to understand that even people of 
good character— people who are, as Aristotle suggests, better than we are— are liable to 
make life-altering mistakes.52 These insights reveal, in turn, our moral vulnerability, and 
our shared need for compassionate forgiveness. It is therefore unsurprising that for 
Aristotle tragic drama was no mere entertainment; it was a powerful social institution and 
an important component of a complete moral education.  By evoking eleos, tragic stories 
(mythoi) create openings for friendship and community (263).  Tragic drama teaches its 
witnesses (arguably in a way that nothing else can) their great need for each other’s help 
and care, both through personal relations of philia and through the sustenance of just 
political institutions.  
 I have claimed that Aristotle’s account of eleos gives us a way to think 
vulnerability and dignity as at least potentially coextensive, which would entail that we 
might characterize pity and similar emotions— those emotions that characterize kind 
agency— as involving no disparity in the worth or value of the kind agent in comparison 
to the recipient of her kindness. In the light of Aristotle’s account of the tragic emotion of 
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 The greatest obstacle to incorporating eleos into the present characterization of kindness may stem from 
Aristotle’s rejection, in the Poetics, of those plots in which the most virtuous characters suffer through no 
fault of their own. Although he is remarkably sensitive to the role of luck in human endeavors, even 
Aristotle cannot abide the representation of good people suffering deeply as a result of bad luck— on his 
account such suffering gives rise not to pity, as we have noted, but merely to revulsion and disbelief. But 
perhaps he is simply noting that in general audiences react with disbelief when they see a good person 
suffer deeply. It is consistent with his definition of pity in the Rhetoric to say that audiences ought to feel 
pity in such cases, even though (and probably because they are, in some sense, in denial of the problem of 
luck) they do not.    
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pity, we come to see how this is possible. If we can feel pity for those who are not only 
morally equal to us, but are our moral superiors, and if in pitying them we do not assume 
that they have failed in any rich sense (by acting viciously, which would rightly lower our 
estimation of them), then it follows that in feeling pity we do not necessarily see others as 
lower than ourselves in any morally significant sense. True, we may perceive them as 
being less able to act (we might say less powerful) than we are, but where this status 
comes about for reasons beyond their control, as Aristotle suggests, there is nothing in 
our acknowledgement of their impotence that should cause us to believe their dignity is 
thereby diminished. This claim is commensurable with Aristotle’s acknowledgment, as 
mentioned in Chapter Two, that we can and often do continue to admire good people who 
have suffered tragic reversals.  
 There is something appealing about characterizing eleos as the most distinctive 
emotion involved in kind agency. Certainly, it is easy to imagine a kind person feeling 
eleos and certain situations, and equally easy to imagine an unkind or cruel person failing 
to experience it. But despite its moral import, eleos is too narrowly defined to capture the 
diversity of people toward whom kind agents feel certain positive feelings. After all, kind 
agents are presumably kind to their loved ones as well as to mere acquaintances, where 
eleos is only felt for the latter. Moreover, kind agents are often kind to those who are not 
suffering in any discernible way, and so presumably experience certain “kindly” feelings 
outside the context of witnessing suffering.53 More importantly, we feel eleos most 
deeply for those who are like us, and whose fates we fear we, too, might suffer. This begs 
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 Another possible objection, though one I am not wholly persuaded by, is that eleos presupposes 
membership within a given polis, and, not being extended to outsiders (xenos), is not inclusive of humanity 
in general. 
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the question of how similar we must be in order to feel eleos for another person. Can a 
man, for example, feel eleos for a woman who has lost a pregnancy? Can a civilian feel 
eleos for a soldier? Kindness would be of little value if, due to the limited nature of the 
feelings that help to constitute it, it could not be extended to those who are substantially 
different from ourselves. Despite these shortcomings, eleos might play a role in the 
inculcation of kind agency by causing agents to reflect on their own vulnerability and on 
human vulnerability in general. Absent such reflection, agents would arguably be less 
welcoming of others’ help and compassion, and less aware of others’ need for the same. 
Even this reflection, however, would be of little value unless coupled with (or unless it 
could somehow evoke) good will toward others, since it might simply or chiefly force the 
agent to be more fearful or self-protective.54  
 What is perhaps most useful about reflecting on the relationship between eleos 
and kindness is Aristotle’s appreciation of the intertwining of judgment and feeling. As 
Angela Curran points out, Aristotle’s “theory of the emotions is a cognitive one, 
according to which certain emotions like pity and fear are constituted by certain beliefs 
and judgments” (297). If Nussbaum’s claims about the meaning of katharsis are correct, 
then we may also point out how judgments may also be constituted (or at least made 
possible) by feelings such that certain emotional experiences, once reflected upon, have 
the power to produce to morally significant judgments. Not only, then, does Aristotle 
refrain from denigrating the emotions— which are, as we have seen, central to his 
account of human goodness— but he also rightly marks that they are rationally co-
constituted. This is in part, as Ruth Groenhout notes, why feminist scholars have begun to 
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 And it may evoke good will, as Koziak suggests. See “Tragedy, Citizens, and Strangers: The 
Configuration of Aristotelian Political Emotion,” in Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, ed. by Cynthia A. 
Freeland. Pennsylvaina: The Pennsylvania State University press, 1998.    
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see Aristotelian ethical and aesthetic theory as amenable to feminist philosophy, which in 
recent years has highlighted the intelligence behind women’s ways of affectively 
engaging others (182-3). We have said that the kind agent has certain feelings toward the 
people around her, and that she has certain beliefs about human vulnerability and need; in 
the light of Aristotle’s analysis of kharis and eleos, we may reasonably assume that these 
feelings and beliefs are intertwined in important ways.  
 
Suffering Kindness 
 In the previous chapter I claimed that kindness involves a certain kind of 
suffering. The experience of kindness is often poignant, both for the kind agent and for 
the recipient of kindness.55 Kindness fosters intimacies that we may be uncomfortable 
experiencing, as Phillips and Taylor rightly point out. Moreover, kindness painfully 
reminds us of our own fragility and interdependence. I tentatively claimed, therefore, that 
kindness requires courage. The experience of poignancy ought perhaps to be explored in 
the context of the affective dimensions of kindness, and in the case of the present project 
in the analysis above, but the courage that kindness requires on account of this poignancy 
is better understood within the context of virtuous praxis. In addition to being in some 
way painful, kindness is also, we may imagine, often pleasurable for both the kind agent 
and for the recipient of her kindness. For Aristotle, pleasure in virtuous activity is the 
very mark of genuine virtue. I will therefore consider the pains and pleasures of kindness 
as they manifest in virtuous activity. Virtue has to do, as we have noticed, both with 
feelings and with activity, and so in moving on to a discussion of the praxical elements of 
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 And, certainly, for one who witnesses kindness. Readers might here reflect on their own affective 
responses to the illustrations of kindness in the previous chapter. There is something deeply touching, and 
in some way unsettling, about kindness.  
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kindness as they appear in Aristotelian virtues, we are not so much turning away from the 
affective dimension of kindness as we are turning to it in a new way.   
    
Kindness at Work 
 To determine which of the moral virtues, in addition to courage, may manifest 
relevant elements of kindness we may recall the activities through which kindness is 
actualized. These include giving, the sharing of moral assessments, and cheering, which 
overlap in various respects with the moral virtues of generosity, friendliness, truthfulness 
and good humor.56 Another virtue that merits reflection is gentleness, on account of the 
common association of kindness with gentility.57 In addition to these virtues, we ought 
also to attend to the phenomenon of friendship, which, as noted in Chapter Two, though 
not itself a moral virtue strictly speaking, presupposes and facilitates virtue. 
  
Generosity 
 Money is a thing to be used, and with “all those things that have a use, it is 
possible to use them either well or badly” (1120a 4-5). The person who uses a thing best 
is virtuous in relation to it. Generosity is the virtue that has to do with money; says 
Aristotle, “It seems to be the mean condition that concerns money,” where “By money 
we mean all those things of which the worth is measured in monetary terms” (1119b 20-
21). The deficient condition of generosity is stinginess, or that state of character by virtue 
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 I omit hospitality in part because there is no virtue to which it directly corresponds, and in part because it 
is so rich and morally significant a phenomenon in the classical Greek worldview that I could not hope to 
do it justice here. I will, however, say a word on kindness vis-à-vis membership within the political 
community (polis), which is most  relevant to discussions of hospitality.  
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 We might note that the terms “kind” and “gentle” often appear together, as they do in the phrase “a 
kinder, gentler…” Perhaps this is not by coincidence.  
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of which one “takes money more seriously than one ought” (1119b 29030). The 
excessive condition of generosity is wastefulness, which Aristotle conceives of as 
destructiveness of one’s own property, and by extension a kind of self-destructiveness, 
since “the living of one’s life depends on these means” (1120a 1-4). Generosity is active 
in that it relates primarily to giving, and not to taking, even though we may think of those 
who take little as being in some way generous. Says Aristotle, “gratitude goes to one who 
gives, and not to one who does not take, and praise even more so” (1120a 16-17). 
Moreover, “not to take is an easier thing than giving, for people let go of what is their 
own too little” (1120 24). So praiseworthy is generosity that “generous people are loved 
practically the most of those who are recognized for virtue” (1120a 24-25).   
 There are, of course, many ways of giving. The generous person is she who gives 
in the right way, which is to say for the right reasons (“for the sake of the beautiful”), to 
the right people, at the right times, and, perhaps most importantly, with pleasure (1120a 
25-32). The generous person does not take wealth seriously as a means for her own 
flourishing, but instead takes it seriously as a means for the flourishing of others. She will 
therefore guard her wealth not out of greed, but because she “wants to assist some people 
by means of it” (1120b 4). But generosity is such that she will often fail to preserve 
wealth; “it is most definitely characteristic of a generous person to go to excess in giving, 
so that less is left for [herself]” (1120b 6-7). A mark of generosity, says Aristotle, is that 
the balance of concern is on the side of others: “for not looking out for oneself is part of 
being generous” (1120b 8).   
   There are two kinds of wastefulness, and where one of them is truly vicious, the 
other is almost virtuous. The first is characteristic of those who both take a great deal and 
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give a great deal. Such people are unconcerned with where their wealth comes from, and 
take no care in deciding who is worthy of receiving it, such that they often benefit the 
underserving (including people who are vicious) and often fail to benefit the deserving 
(people who are “of moderate character”) (1121b 8-9). The second is characteristic of 
those who take little but give much, and so easily “cure themselves” of the vice by losing 
all they have. This kind of wastefulness, says Aristotle, is merely foolish, and could even 
become virtuous if guided by right reasoning (1120b 20-25).  
 We have said that kindness is excessive in that the kind agent tends to do more 
than decency requires. Not only does she refrain from harming others, but she also 
actively seeks to benefit them. In order to characterize kindness as a moral virtue, we 
would therefore need to show that excess can be characteristic of a mean condition. The 
generous person often gives, says Aristotle, more than is needed. She gives, more 
importantly, for the sake of the people she benefits, and with little concern for herself. 
She has a tendency to go to extremes in giving such that she works against her own 
immediate interest, at least to the extent that she willingly (indeed joyfully) deprives 
herself of luxuries. Generosity, though a mean condition, is also inherently excessive. 
Aristotle recognizes, then, that the type of excess manifested in kind agency is 
coextensive with moral virtue. 
 There is much to appreciate in Aristotle’s account of generosity, but we would be 
right to worry over his apparent restriction of generosity to the distribution of wealth, on 
the grounds that generosity does include or ought to include other kinds of giving (the 
giving of time, the giving of attention etc.). We might further object that his view reduces 
generous giving to a kind of calculus, perhaps a calculus of just desert, which to some 
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extent undermines its commendably excessive character. Rosalyn Diprose echoes these 
concerns when she suggests that Aristotle’s account “tends to reduce the gift to a 
calculable commodity (money or goods) and generosity to the logic of an exchange 
economy” (2).58 She claims, contra Aristotle’s narrow conception, that generosity is, “an 
openness to others that not only precedes and establishes communal relations but 
constitutes the self as open to others” (2).  
 These concerns are commendable in that they express the desire for a rich 
conception of generosity, but they may stem from too shallow a reading of Aristotle’s 
ethical theory. Although generosity involves right reasoning, it is no mere calculus. Nor 
is generosity aimed at justice narrowly construed as fairness; as Diprose correctly notes, 
“bringing about a fair outcome is not a central feature of generosity” (3). Moreover, 
Aristotle does not understand generous giving as an economic exchange (in which one 
person gives wealth, and receives proportionate pleasure in return). Instead, and as 
Robert Bernasconi points out, the source of the generosity is the goodness of the giver, as 
manifested in goodwill toward the person she seeks to benefit. Thus the generous person 
“seeks to give more and without measuring this more by reference to what has been 
received,” where the gift “has the character of an excess (hyperbole) such that it cannot 
be measured by any calculation of its value” (267).  
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 Machan raises an interesting objection to welfare systems via Aristotle’s account of generosity, 
suggesting that Aristotelian generosity becomes impossible within a welfare state: “the cannot be,” he 
contends, “any generosity involved in a polity in which one is forced to share one’s wealth,” since 
generosity by definition involves the deliberate choice to give to those one deems deserving (61). As 
Diprose notes, “generosity, in Machan’s argument, would seem to run counter to social justice” (3). But the 
kind of liberal polity that Machan favors also runs counter to generosity, as Diprose notes, since it 
presupposes and encourages excessive self-concern. Since the virtues of character parallel just laws in 
important ways, one way to address these concerns might be to ask how generosity would be manifested in 
laws. It would be reasonable to claim, for example, that generous laws might distribute resources 
“equitably” (according to need and merit) rather than “fairly” (evenly), which is to say in ways that benefit 
those who the virtuous person would determine to be deserving.      
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 Diprose’s contention that generosity ought to be broadly construed so as include 
non-economic kinds of giving, and even a general openness to or feeling of kinship with 
others that transcends any ordinary sense of exchange, is an important one. This pro-
social openness and kinship belong, we may imagine, to kindness as well. For now we 
may say that Aristotle’s ethics does not preclude the possibility of valuing the general 
openness and the non-material kinds of giving that Diprose has in mind, even if it defines 
generosity rather narrowly. We may note that for Aristotle moral virtues generally relate 
to particular praxes, and though generosity explicitly pertains to the use of wealth, other 
virtues may pertain to praxes that have to do other kinds of giving. Moral virtue exists, by 
virtue of phronêsis, as a unity, so that the generous person will presumably be giving in 
other ways, too. Whether or not this is so according to Aristotle will be become apparent 
once we have addressed the other virtuous praxes related to kindness.  
      
 Friendliness  
 Kindness is often conflated, as we have noted, with niceness, which has 
something of the same surface appearance as kindness, but lacks its depth and rich moral 
significance. Even so, niceness, understood as a kind of cheerfulness or pleasantness 
aimed primarily at keeping the peace, may relate to kindness in important ways. There is 
an interesting parallel between the relation of niceness to kindness and the relation of 
friendliness to friendship. The moral virtue of friendliness, though not as morally 
significant in Aristotle’s view as moral friendship, may call for appreciation on account 
of its kinship with the latter. More importantly, reflection of the nature of friendliness 
may highlight important aspects of moral friendship. In the same way, thinking about 
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niceness in relation to kindness may help us to appreciate the former in a new way, and 
may cause us to better appreciate particular components of the latter. 
 Friendliness is one of the virtues that govern social conduct, and has to do with 
the sharing of “words and deeds” (NE 1126b 11). In relation to sharing opinions, says 
Aristotle, “some people seem to be obsequious, who compliment everything in order to 
please, and object to nothing, but believe that they must not be responsible for any pain to 
those they happen to be around” (1126b 12-13). There is something commendable in this 
excessive condition, as it involves a desire to refrain from causing others pain. What we 
might appreciate in this vice is similar to what we might appreciate in the behavior of 
people who are considered nice. Niceness generally involves a desire to spare others’ 
feelings that lets slide any number of comments that should by all rights cause the agent 
to feel indignant. The nice person is she who, in the course of a conversation, lets her 
interlocutors’ bigoted or false remarks go without criticism. But obsequiousness goes 
beyond even this (already less than virtuous) attitudinal posture, as the obsequious person 
goes about complimenting everyone simply in order to bolster their feelings with little or 
no concern for actual merit. Perhaps the intention of the obsequious person is to be well-
liked, but regardless of her intention the result of her behavior, says Aristotle, is to 
alienate her in general, and especially from those with whom she might have deep and 
meaningful friendships.59  
 The deficient condition of friendliness is perhaps more blameworthy than the 
excessive, since the latter at least betrays a sensitivity to others’ feelings. The 
cantankerous person objects “to everything,” says Aristotle, and does not consider at all 
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 In Book Nine he writes, “People who are friendly toward many and fall into familiarity with everybody, 
seem to be friends to no one, except as fellow citizens— they are called obsequious” (1171a 16-17).  
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the pain she causes others to feel (1126b 14-15). Instead of finding fault as she should 
with those things that are wicked, she finds fault with everyone and everything. She is, 
we might imagine, most difficult to get along with. Both the deficient and the excessive 
conditions of friendliness involve a certain failure to discern and/or express the proper 
regard for what is good and the proper derision for what is not. In order to be virtuous, 
one must not only know what is worthy of praise and what is worthy of blame, but one 
must also express praise and blame, and do so in the right way. There is no word for this 
mean condition, says Aristotle, but “it seems most like friendship. For it is the sort of 
person who is in accord with this mean active condition that we have in mind in speaking 
of a kind friend, though that also includes a feeling of affection” (1126b 20-22). What 
distinguishes the moral virtue of friendliness from friendship proper is that an agent 
manifests the former not on account of caring for the friend, but simply on account of 
whether or not the opinion or person in question is worthy of praise, such that “Such a 
person will do the same things towards those he knows and those he doesn’t,” though he 
will do them in a way that is appropriate to his level of familiarity with the people 
involved (1126b 24-25). A person who is friendly, then, says Aristotle: 
[W]ill associate with people as one ought, and having reference to what is 
beautiful and what is advantageous, will aim either at not causing them 
pain or at joining in their pleasure. For such a person seems to be 
concerned with pleasure and pains that turn up in social relations; in those 
situations in which it is not a beautiful thing, or is a harmful thing, for him 
to join in pleasing others, he will not take a hand in it. (1126b 32-34)  
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 Kindness is dismissed at times on account of its being conflated with mere 
niceness, where the latter has more the character of obsequiousness than of true 
friendliness. And if it is dismissed on account of its tendency to let pass unremarked 
statements that are untrue, unduly caustic, bigoted or otherwise blameworthy, then it is 
dismissed with good reason. The failure to express righteous indignation is a true moral 
failure, as Aristotle suggests. But kindness is not mere niceness, and here we begin to see 
why. Kindness would be a flawed virtue indeed if it was aimed at keeping the peace and 
bolstering agents’ feelings of self-worth only at the expense of expressing proper 
indignation and honestly assessing others’ characters. We may here refine our 
characterization of kindness by noting that the kind agent is she who shares her opinions 
in ways that express both positive feelings for her interlocutors and a proper respect for 
what is true and good.60 But making this claim opens up a certain difficulty, since 
honesty and the sparing of feelings are so often at odds. Moreover, we have thus far 
emphasized the latter and said little regarding the need for the former. To begin to explain 
how kindness can involve both good-will toward others and honesty, we may turn to the 
second of Aristotle’s virtues that govern social discourse, namely, truthfulness.  
 
Truthfulness 
  “By itself,” writes Aristotle, “what is false is base and blameable, and what is true 
is beautiful and to be praised” (1127 29). So, too, is the person who is truthful rightly 
praised, and the person who is untruthful rightly blamed. This is so in all cases, but 
perhaps especially in those situations in which nothing particular (such as some material 
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benefit) is at stake.61 For in these cases, Aristotle notes, the agent’s honesty is seen most 
clearly to flow from her stable character (1127b 2). Moreover, an honest person “seems 
to be a decent person,” since “someone passionately devoted to the truth, even in which 
telling the truth makes no difference, will be truthful still more in situations in which it 
does make a difference” (1127b 3-5). 
 The excessive condition relative to truthfulness is boastfulness, which involves 
the overstatement of one’s good qualities and accomplishments either for no end in 
particular (in which case it is “empty-headed rather than bad”), or for the sake of some 
end (which might include reputation or monetary gain) (1127b 12). Those who brag for 
the sake of their reputations are more to be forgiven, says Aristotle, than those who brag 
for personal gain, and both tendencies are quite common (1127b 23). The deficient 
condition, ironic understatement, is a kind of self-deprecation through speech. This 
tendency can even seem admirable, Aristotle notes, where it concerns “things that are in 
high repute,” as it did in the case of Socrates (1127 b 27). But where one deprecates 
everything about oneself, what appears to be modesty is in effect false modesty, since by 
making oneself appear to lack all good qualities, the contrast between presentation and 
reality is only too apparent. Even so, in Aristotle’s view the mean regarding truthfulness 
is closer to ironic understatement than to bragging such that one ought to display, if not 
feel, a certain sense of humility in relation to one’s attributes and accomplishments. 
 At first glance, the virtue of truthfulness seems to have little relevance to the 
discussion of kindness, as the former is primarily concerned with a certain self-relation. 
But if we extend the spirit of Aristotle’s account of truthfulness to the expression of 
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 The virtue of truthfulness pertains to just these situations in which nothing is at stake, where honesty 
regarding contracts and agreements is governed by justice.  
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opinions regarding others’ qualities, we come closer to understanding how the kind agent 
might navigate the tension between cheering others and being honest with them. I would 
like to suggest that whereas in relation to our own merits we ought to err on the side of 
self-deprecation, when it comes to acknowledging others’ qualities, we ought to err on 
the side of excessive praise, assuming that we do so for the sake of others and not for our 
own sake. This is, I think, consistent not only with the fundamentally excessive character 
of kindness but also with Aristotle’s acknowledgement of the responsibility we have to 
our fellow citizens, and especially to our friends, to bolster the feelings of self-worth that 
make them more efficaciously good. As Aristotle suggests, we have a special affection 
for those “who praise such good qualities as we possess, and especially if they praise the 
good qualities that we are not too sure that we do possess” (Rhetoric 1131a 36-37). 
 There is one other sense in which Aristotle’s account of truthfulness is relevant to 
the discussion of kind agency, and it is well worth marking here. Recall that Aristotle 
asks, in the course of his analysis of moral friendship, whether or not it is possible to be a 
friend to oneself. In a similar way, we may and must ask whether or not it is possible to 
be kind to oneself. If kindness has in part to do, as we have said, with acknowledging, 
helping, giving, cheering and morally assessing, then we may ask whether or to what 
extent and in what ways one ought to engage in kind praxes in relation to oneself. The 
praxis that most obviously pertains to self-relation is moral self-assessment. We may 
note, then, that the issue of self-kindness brings us to the very heart of the topic addressed 
in Chapter Three, namely, the often problematic nature of moral assessment. There I 
suggested that kind agents ought to foster deep remorse for their own flaws and acts of 
wrongdoing, but, where they encounter others who do the same, they ought to highlight 
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the ambiguity of moral responsibility by way of comforting and cheering those who 
suffer from regret and diminished feelings of self-worth (126). But if the kind agent 
ought to be kind to herself, then she ought to morally assess herself as she would others, 
emphasizing moral ambiguity and erring on the side of forgiveness in relation to her own 
faults and failures. But if we prefer to overturn the previous claim in favor of the latter, 
then we might worry, as Nagel would, about the potentially deleterious consequences of 
this self-kindness for moral seriousness. If we cannot deeply regret our moral faults and 
failings, then we might rightly worry about the dissolution of our values, since our 
feelings of regret are so often affirmations of the same. In relation to the present project, 
we should further worry that absent moral seriousness, it is more difficult to justify the 
need for kindness, which is so often aimed at ameliorating the suffering others feel on 
account of their moral faults and failures. I will return to these concerns in Chapter 
Seven, but at present it suffices to point out the aporia they comprise.     
  
  Good Humor 
 Humor is so often a comfort to those who are suffering, and those who are best at 
comforting others are very often people of good humor. Aristotle marks good humor as 
the moral virtue having to do with leisurely socializing. Good humor concerns not only 
what one says, but also how one receives what others have said. Its deficient condition is 
boorishness or rigidity, and is characteristic of those who never say anything humorous, 
and/or are disdainful toward those who do (NE 1128a 8-9). Its excessive condition is 
crudeness or buffoonery, and is characteristic of those who will say anything for a laugh, 
and laugh at anything. The agent with a proper sense of humor will not laugh at nor cause 
254 
 
others to laugh at someone else’s expense where such laughter causes pain, while the 
buffoon will do so without hesitation (1128a 8-10). 
 Aristotle likens good humor to generosity, and asks “Might one then define the 
person who is good at joking as saying what is not inappropriate to a generous spirit, or 
as not causing pain to one who hears it or even causing merriment [in the one made fun 
of]?” (1128a 27). He initially resists this definition, though, on the grounds that it is 
difficult to know what will cause listeners to feel pain. Good humor requires, he says, a 
kind of gracefulness in social situations: “Those who are playful in a harmonious way are 
called charming, as being readily flexible” (1128a 9-10). Moral virtue in general requires 
flexibility, he says, in the “motions that come from one’s character,” and this is especially 
true where humor is concerned (1128a 10).62 But this flexibility must be limited in ways 
that accord with decency, and “someone with a gracious and generous spirit will hold 
himself to such limits, being like a law to himself” ( 1128a 33-34).  
 Good humor is something like generosity, and something like proper flexibility. It 
is excessive, then, but only to a certain extent. We might say that it involves a generous 
willingness to accommodate others’ preferences, but only to the extent that goodness 
allows. Certainly we ought to say the same of kindness. Kindness would be robbed of its 
essential nature if it did not involve a generous responsiveness to others, but if that 
responsiveness had no limits kindness could too easily harm the kind agent. There are 
and ought to be limits to what the kind agent will do for others, and limits to what she 
will tolerate in and from them; the kind agent is sensitive and responsive, not 
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 This flexibility no doubt involves sensitivity to others’ feelings, including an ability to interpret their 
words and gestures. I do not doubt that kind agents possess the same sensitivity, which is so beautifully 
illustrated in the shopkeeper’s engagement with Octavia in Gaines’ story, and in Bienevnue’s dinner 
conversation with Jean Valjean in Les Misérables.   
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manipulable. That she must determine where to draw the line is only further evidence that 
kindness entails remarkable powers of judgment.    
 
 Gentleness and Indignation 
 We so often denigrate anger, but there are some things that ought to evoke anger, 
so much so that feeling anger is, in certain situations, something of a moral imperative. 
Those who do not get angry, for example, when they witness gross injustice most 
certainly merit censure. Kindness has come to be associated with gentleness, and 
gentleness with the absence of anger, and both to such an extent that we might wrongly 
believe that kind people do not or should not get angry at others. As Aristotle’s accounts 
of gentleness and righteous indignation reveal, virtuous comportment in relation to anger 
does not involve lacking anger altogether, but instead being angered for the right reasons, 
and expressing anger in the right ways.  
 Gentleness, says Aristotle, “is a mean condition concerning anger” (1125b 26-27). 
The excessive condition, which might be called irritability, involves a tendency to err in 
some way in relation to anger, whether by feeling it for the wrong reasons, or at the 
wrong times, or toward the wrong people, or for too long a time.63 The deficient 
condition, which is so rare as to be nameless, involves a tendency not to feel anger when 
one should. Although perhaps to a lesser degree than irratibility, the deficient condition is 
also blameworthy: “For holding back when one is being foully insulted, and overlooking 
it when it happens to those close to one, is slavish” (1126a 7-8). Gentleness is further 
from irritability than from the opposite, such that the mean condition may at times seem 
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 The excessive condition is nameless, and because it is expressed in different ways, is called irritability, 
hotheadedness, bitterness, etc., as befits the type of error involved. Aristotle does not believe that someone 
can err in all of these ways at all times, since such excess would destroy the agent (1126a 14-15). 
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like a deficiency. Aristotle remarks that the gentle person feels anger only “as reason 
prescribes,” and notes that “one who is gentle is not inclined to take revenge, but is more 
apt to forgive” (1126a 2-3).  
 But under what circumstances does reason prescribe anger? Aristotle answers the 
question most decisively in his discussion of the related pathos of indignation. In the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle defines indignation as the compliment of eleos; whereas eleos is felt in 
response to undeserved bad fortune, indignation is felt in response to underserved good 
fortune. “Both feelings,” he writes, “are associated with good moral character; it is our 
duty both to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at 
unmerited prosperity” (1386b 12-15). We feel indignation when we see someone with 
bad character enjoying those goods that ought by rights to go to people with better 
character, as, for example, when we see someone profit from another person’s suffering. 
All situations that merit indignation involve, then, some kind of injustice. Anger is 
properly felt for similar reasons. In the Rhetoric anger is defined, as Konstan points out, 
as the desire for revenge felt in response to a perceived slight (43). A slight (oligôria) is 
no mere insult, but is a gesture that denigrates the recipient’s worth, or implies that the 
recipient is worthless. To fail to feel and express anger when one’s worth is unjustly 
denigrated, or when another person’s (and especially a loved one’s) is so denigrated, is in 
Aristotle’s view a true moral failing. Anger, then, as Konstan points out, is closely related 
to indignation not only in terms of its felt quality but also in terms of the kind of moral 
evaluation that gives rise to it (68). 
 If we conceive of kindness as we should, in a rich way and not as mere niceness, 
then it is easier to appreciate how and why proper anger is an important component of 
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kind agency. The kind agent recognizes the intrinsic worth of the people around her, and 
will not stand by when they are treated unjustly, nor when their worth is denigrated. She 
also recognizes her own worth, and will not consent to the kind of treatment that 
compromises that worth or lowers her dignity. The kind agent, then, is both gentle and 
righteously indignant. 
 
 Courage  
 On the face of it, courage seems at odds with kindness. Courage is, in general and 
certainly in Aristotle’s view, the quintessentially masculine virtue, where kindness is so 
often perceived as feminine.64 But Aristotle so defines courage that our conception of 
kindness would not be complete without it.  
 Courage is, writes Aristotle, “a mean condition concerned with fear and 
confidence,” where fear is defined as “an expectation of something bad” (1115a 7). There 
are some such expectations that one ought to fear, such as the anticipation of losing one’s 
reputation, and to fear these is a sign of decency rather than cowardice. But other fears 
are assessed in relation to courage, and foremost among these is the expectation of 
serious harm to oneself. The paradigmatic case for Aristotle is that of the soldier, who 
must face the expectation of his own death. Although we fear death generally, often there 
is no call for courage, since there is no way to die “beautifully” in most situations. But in 
war there is a way to die well, and it stems from the for-the-sake-of-which of the 
situation, which is the preservation of one’s political community (polis). So, too, in all 
situations; courage is possible where there is a beautiful or good end worth suffering for. 
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 It is no coincidence that the word andreai literally means “manliness.” I return to the gendered division 
of the virtues in Chapter Six. 
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Courage involves the willingness to endure fear and pain for the sake of the beautiful and 
the good. Thus, as Sachs writes, courage is “An achieved condition by which one is apt to 
choose to endure frightening things […] when it is beautiful to do so” (203). The 
courageous agent will suffer willingly for the right reasons. And no reason is more noble, 
says Aristotle, than the preservation of the political community.  
  We have noticed that for Aristotle the very mark of virtue is that the agent enjoys 
being virtuous. But in some cases, the pleasure of virtuous praxis is mixed with pain, and 
this is especially true in the case of courage. Aristotle writes, “it is for enduring painful 
things, as was said, that people are called courageous. Hence courage too is painful” 
(1117a 33). Courage may be painful simply, such that we think “being at work pleasantly 
is not present in all the virtues,” but to whatever extent “one fixes one’s intent upon the 
end,” courage becomes pleasurable, too (1117b 17-18). The mark of the courageous 
agent is that she is not too deeply pained by her suffering, and even takes some kind of 
pleasure in it.   
 If kindness is a moral virtue, then in order to inculcate it we must learn to take 
pleasure in kind activity. But this is no easy task, because the pleasures of kindness are 
intrinsically mixed with pains. It is with good reason that we associate kindness with the 
saccharine sweetness of Hallmark movies. Kindness is poignant; it cuts through us with a 
pain not unlike that of Cupid’s arrow.65 And it is hard to know what to call this feeling, as 
it has neither the pure character of joy nor that of sorrow, but instead seems like a kind of 
painful joy, or joyful pain. But Phillip Hallie is right when he says that “painful joy can 
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 I will be accused of hyperbole here, but would point out that erotic love has long been characterized as 
involuntary (symbolized by Cupid’s arrow, and captured in the word Concupiscence), where philial and 
agapic love (the kind of love we rightly associate with kindness) have been construed as voluntary. In my 
view, the poignancy of kindness is due at least in part to the (involuntary) feelings it evokes in us.  
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be a reliable reaction to excellence,” and kindness is most certainly an excellence (3). If 
we are to become kind, we must learn to endure the pain of the uncertainty that belongs 
to every proffered gesture of kindness. We must to learn to endure the pain that comes of 
acknowledging our need for each other’s help and care, and even to take some kind of 
pleasure in both. So let us ask, with Hallie, “Why run away from what is excellent simply 
because it goes through you like a spear?” (3). We must learn to dwell in the bitter-
sweetness of kindness, which is the purest admission we can make of our fundamental 
interdependence. And to do so will require precisely the kind of courage— a willingness 
to suffer for the sake of the beautiful and the good— that Aristotle describes. 
    
 Friendship66 
 Above I argued that characterizing kindness as a virtue that in some way involves 
kharis is consistent both with Aristotle’s claim that kharis produces friendship and with 
his valuing of friendship. I suggested that the components of kindness may already be at 
work in the phenomenon of friendship, which is for Aristotle something distinguishable 
from but coextensive with moral (and intellectual) virtue, such that he need not identify a 
moral virtue of kindness external to friendship. I also argued that although the emotion of 
eleos has the potential to raise agents’ awareness of their own fragility, this awareness 
would be of little value unless it could either produce or join with goodwill, since absent 
goodwill a heightened awareness of human vulnerability might merely cause agents to 
become more self-involved and self-protective. In what follows I will work to bring these 
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 Given the richness of Aristotle’s account of friendship, I cannot explore every dimension of it in relation 
to kindness here, and so will speak only to one of the most significant. I return to the kinship between 
friendship and kindness in the following chapter via a discussion of Kantian moral friendship, which 
closely parallels Aristotle’s account of the same. 
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claims together in order to determine whether or not Aristotle’s moral theory can support 
the kind of universal goodwill that could motivate kind agents to work on behalf of 
humanity in general, effectively rendering them friends of humanity.  
 In his account of the best kind of friendship Aristotle describes the nature and 
acknowledges the significance of goodwill (eunoia). The grounding condition of genuine 
friendship, in his view, is nothing other than the mutual possession of eunoia, and it is 
this feeling which gives rise to the love (philia) that ultimately sustains friendships 
(Baracchi 280). We might note that Konstan’s objection to the translation of kharin 
echein as “having kindness” or “being kind” could be buttressed by the observation that if 
Aristotle had meant to refer to kindness in the Rhetoric, he would have used either the 
word philanthropia or the word eunoia, both of which indicate positive feelings for 
others.  Eunoia is so similar to kindness that it is often translated simply as kindness.67 
But where kindness, like moral friendship, entails activity, eunoia is by nature passive. 
One may feel eunoia on behalf of any number of people, says Aristotle, where “the 
number of friends is limited” (NE 1171a 1). In addition, one may feel eunoia even for 
those who are unaware of the same, or who are aware of but do not reciprocate it. In 
Aristotle’s view eunoia is a necessary condition for the best kind of friendship, but it is 
not and cannot be a sufficient one, since friendship is actualized in and through praxis. 
“Hence,” says Aristotle, “making a metaphor, one might say that goodwill (eunoia) is 
out-of-work friendship” (NE 1167a 10-11). As Baracchi points out, there is something 
paradoxical about the relationship between eunoia and friendship, since friendship 
requires the former, but overcomes it in being actualized as friendship (278-280). When 
one acts for the sake of the friend, one begins to actualize not eunoia (which by nature 
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 See, for example, Baraacchi, especially pp. 278-280.  
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cannot be actualized) but philia, which is the efficacious love that sustains (and simply is) 
genuine friendship.  
 Eunoia arises, Aristotle suggests, in response to the perceived excellence of the 
person toward whom it is felt (1167a 19-20). This explains why eunoia facilitates the 
emergence of genuine friendship, but not of the pseudo-friendships of pleasure and use; 
the former do not involve the agents’ goodness, whereas the latter necessarily does. But if 
eunoia can only be felt on account of perceived merit, then it will admit to limitation and 
constraint, just as eleos does. If neither pity nor eunoia extend to humanity generally, 
then were we to ground kindness in either it would be similarly limited. Something of the 
excessive nature of kindness would no doubt be lost if it could only be extended to those 
we believed were similar enough to us, or to those we determined to be as morally good 
or noble as we are. Certainly kind agents must judge who is worthy of kindness, but we 
ought to suppose that in making such judgments they would err on the side of excess, 
often intervening without hesitation on behalf of those who may or may not turn out to be 
“worthy” of their time and attention. We ought to hope, moreover, that kind actions may 
have an ameliorative effect on their recipients such that the worthiness of those who are 
helped is affirmed and increased in and through the help they receive.  
 I pointed above to an aporia regarding the degree of similarity required for the 
judgment of shared vulnerability that in part grounds the tragic emotion of eleos. 
Supposing we could form the latter judgment not in relation to some accidental quality 
like age, sex, or political status, but instead in relation to a fundamental human sameness, 
then we would be able to say that eleos should extend to any human being who suffers 
through no fault of her own. We are all alike in our vulnerability to luck, and this is a 
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truth that Aristotle appreciates. Vulnerability to luck, then, is most certainly a viable 
ground for universal eleos. If it is at least possible to extend eleos to humanity in general, 
then in order to pave the way for an Aristotelian notion of universal kindness we need 
only show that it is possible to extend the kind of good will that would join with eleos to 
motivate agents to intercede on behalf of others who are in need, and in general to work 
for the good of the people around them. Although eunoia in its richest sense extends only 
to those whom the virtuous agent deems worthy, Aristotle does speak to two another 
kinds of fellow-feeling that extend much further, while motivating the very species of 
other-centered activity that, in his view, makes political community and by extension 
human flourishing possible.  
 Aristotle observes that friendship “seems to be present by nature” among beings 
that are similar, and most of all among human beings (1155a 19-20). He points to a 
fundamental human sameness that potentially produces friendship, and on account of 
which “we praise those who are friends of humanity,” writing, “And one might see 
among those who travel that every human being is akin and a friend to a human being” 
(1155a 22). The ground of moral friendship, as we have seen, is the mutual reciprocity of 
goodwill that emerges on account of like moral goodness. Philanthropia and political 
friendship are structurally similar to moral friendship, but the goodwill by which they are 
characterized stems from something other than mutual goodness. The goodwill toward 
humanity in general by virtue of which people are called philanthropic  emerges on 
account of fundamental human sameness, where the more refined political friendship 
involves a goodwill toward fellow citizens felt on account of shared vulnerabilities, aims, 
and values. So vital are these feelings to the flourishing of communities that Aristotle 
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writes, “friendship seems to hold cities together, and lawmakers seem to take it more 
seriously than justice, for like-mindedness (homonoia) seems to be something similar to 
friendship, and they aim at this most of all” (1155a 22-23). 
 In Civic Friendship and Reciprocity in Aristotle’s Political Thought, Lorraine 
Pangle highlights the tremendous importance of the feelings that, for Aristotle, bind 
communities together. She notes Aristotle’s characterization of concord (homonoia) as 
that “goodwill and mutual affection that makes each citizen enter sympathetically into the 
concerns of his fellows and willingly exert himself on the whole community’s behalf” 
(1). As she rightly notes, for Aristotle the goodwill that is actualized in political 
friendship is even more essential to the sustenance of the polis than justice, in no small 
part because it motivates citizens to work together for each other’s good through shared 
political projects. What is especially remarkable about the relationship between 
homonoia and political friendship is that the two work synergistically. Although, as 
Pangel notes, homonoia may appear initially “as a simple alignment of interests,” through 
shared civic activity “each person’s concerns gradually begin to expand,” so that in time 
“they experience themselves as sharing the same ends and not just parallel ends” (5-6). A 
special feature of this process is that it breaks down the boundaries between self and 
other such that citizens “enter sympathetically into one another’s struggles and hopes, 
and the good that each makes his own aim comes to include the good of others” (6).68 By 
this description, homonoia sounds quite similar to the attitude of kindness, which we 
have said lovingly eschews the boundaries between self and other.   
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 Another remarkable feature of this process, as Pangle notes, is that for Aristotle “the goodwill that 
emerges in this way grows deeper the more people exert themselves to help one another” (6). By this 
description, shared political activity has something of the character of moral virtue, which grows through 
praxis.  
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 We may note, then, that for Aristotle goodwill can extend to fellow community 
members. This broadens the category of those for whose sake a kind agent might feel 
motivated to work beyond those who are deemed morally good. But if the goodwill 
embodied in homonoia and expressed through political friendship extends only to 
members of the same political community, then we should worry that it does not extend 
far enough. We may say again that something of the excessive nature of kindness would 
be lost if it did not extend to humanity in general. Kindness cannot be conditional upon 
membership within a given political community, unless that community is understood as 
inclusive of all people.  
 Perhaps goodwill can extend beyond the polis in the same way that it can extend 
beyond those deemed worthy of moral friendship. Claudia Baracchi points to the 
intertwining of eunoia and homonoia in Aristotle’s thought, noting that the two “are 
treated concomitantly and never sharply separated” (283). She observes, for example, that 
“While eunoia and homonoia do not exactly overlap, they similarly refer to a bond that 
can potentially be extended indefinitely, even to people far and unknown” (283). She 
further notes that “the basic awareness that there are others with whom I belong and, 
consequently, a common good with which I am concerned, casts light on the fact that 
friendship, which cannot be lived indefinitely many times, can nevertheless be 
universalized” (283). If eunoia is transposed, as she suggests, onto homonoia, then 
perhaps it can be transposed onto philanthropy as well (283).69 Our service to others can 
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 I am not making the strong claim that Aristotle believes eunoia or homonoia can extend or ought to 
extend to humanity generally. Certainly recognition within the political community is a central component 
of his ethical theory, and the moral virtues are understood as producing flourishing within and (to some 
extent) for the sake of the polis. But as I have pointed out, he recognizes the value of philanthropy, and as 
Koziak notes, he is critical of cruel treatment of strangers and non-citizens (263; see especially 
Nichomachean Ethics, Book Seven). It is therefore reasonable to suggest that a universal goodwill is 
commensurate with certain important Aristotelian values. If Aristotle had been able to imagine our present 
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only extend so far in practice, but our goodwill and the willingness it inspires to work on 
behalf of others may extend indefinitely such that we stand prêt-à-servir not only in 
relation to those who are similar enough to us, or who belong to our political community, 
but instead in relation to humanity in general. And it does, I believe, if we are kind.  
 
Kindness as a Moral Virtue 
 Aristotle’s ethical theory captures, as we have seen, many if not all of the 
important features of kindness. By attending to the rational, affective, and praxical 
components of virtue we have come not only to recognize new features of kind agency, 
but also to appreciate how the various elements of kindness intertwine such that kindness 
has every appearance of being a hexis. Because, as we have noticed, kindness is 
importantly marked by goodwill, it is reasonable to say that kindness occurs for the sake 
of others’ flourishing, which is a good and noble end. We have reason to conclude, then, 
that kindness is not only a hexis, but indeed, a moral virtue. More conservatively, we may 
say that it seems possible to construe kindness as a moral virtue, even though Aristotle 
did not.  
 Yet we must wonder, in the end, whether or not construing kindness as a moral 
virtue enhances our perception of its moral significance, since if it does not we are left 
with a coherent theoretical account of a thing of dubious worth. It does so, arguably, only 
to the extent that we accept Aristotle’s eudaimonic and teleological grounding of ethics. 
If we cannot grant Aristotle’s ethical axioms, then kindness might lose something of its 
importance. Where moral goodness is grounded in rationality, for example, as it is for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
age of globalization, I am quite certain he would have praised universal goodwill, and the kind of 
philanthropic work inspires. 
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Kant, the moral significance of a virtue like kindness is called into question. One thing a 
conceptualization of kindness as a moral virtue seems most in need of in the light of the 
analysis above is some ground that might render it prescriptively universalizable. This is 
a ground that Aristotelian ethics does not appear to offer— and may be incapable of 
offering— but that Kantian morality can offer in the guise of pure practical reason. 
Kantian morality, then, has the potential to “make a necessity of virtue.”70 Moreover, by 
emphasizing the principles that ground virtue the latter can potentially open up new 
reasons for appreciating kindness, reasons that would appeal to those who cannot accept 
Aristotle’s teleological eudaimonism. Perhaps there is a way to draw out of Kantian 
thinking a universal ground for kindness that is yet commensurable with, if not reliant 
upon, Aristotelian teleology. But this possibility can only be explored in the light of 
Kantian moral theory, to which we may now turn.  
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 To borrow a phrase from Nancy Sherman. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 KANT’S UNEXPECTED KINDNESS 
"A friend is one to whom one may pour out the contents of one's heart,  
chaff and grain together, knowing that gentle hands will take and sift it, 
 keep what is worth keeping, and with a breath of kindness,  
blow the rest away." 
-George Elliot  
 
Introduction 
 
 Immanuel Kant is hardly the first philosopher to come to mind when one reflects 
on the value of kindness, unless, of course, he does so as the embodiment of resistance to 
such reflection. Even in his earliest writings and lectures on ethics, where he appears 
most to be influenced by moral sentimentalists like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, 
Kant already places considerable restrictions the role of human feeling in the moral life, 
and on the kinds of virtue to be commended. The development of his moral thinking 
manifests an increasingly vehement rejection of feeling as a ground for human goodness, 
and a diminishing esteem for moral virtue. In his later ethical works the sentiments and 
virtues play at best a supporting role in the moral life, and this only insofar as they are in 
some way subsumed under Reason.  
 Surprisingly, Kant’s resistance to kindness is quite equivocal, as is evinced by his 
characterization of moral friendship and in particular by his prescriptions regarding 
friendly truth-telling. His reasons for appreciating gestures of kindness are at least as 
philosophically rich and intuitively appealing as his reasons for denigrating them. He not 
only recognizes the value of kindness as we have so far characterized it, but indeed sees 
kindness— as actualized within moral friendship— as an indispensible component of a 
moral life worth living. This valuing of kindness is most certainly at odds with the image 
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we have inherited of Kant, and as such would merit reflection even absent the distinct 
aims of the present project.  
 Kantian moral theory is justly praised on account of its elegant and compelling 
theoretical structure, and perhaps most of all on account of its capacity to universalize 
moral prescriptions. As was suggested in Chapter V, if we can find a way to reconcile 
what is strongest in Kant’s moral philosophy— including and especially its 
universalizability— with a proper valuing of kindness, we may find new and more 
comprehensive ways to justify normative claims about kindness.1  
 In this chapter I continue to develop and refine the characterization of kindness I 
began in Chapter IV by engaging Kant’s analyses of kindness-related phenomena.2 I 
begin by exploring Kant’s suspicions regarding the value of moral sentiments and virtues, 
placing a special emphasis on his gendered division of moral virtue in Observations of 
the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime. Next I turn to Kant’s account of moral 
friendship, and especially to tension between revealing and concealing truth that he 
expects friends to navigate, and that I interpret as a prescription for kindness between 
friends. I then work to build a tension between Kant’s prescribing of duties of kindness 
and his apparent preference for non-intervention in others’ affairs, highlighting the 
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 That is, we might then “make a necessity of virtue,” to borrow Nancy Sherman’s phrase.  
 
2
 The fact that there is no word in the German language that directly corresponds to “kindness” presents 
considerable difficulty here. In many English translations of Kant’s ethical works (including Goldthwaite’s 
translation of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Louis Infield’s translation 
of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics) the German words “Freundlichkeit” (friendliness) and “Leutseligkeit” 
(affability) are at times rendered as “kindness,” and the word “gutherzigen” (good-hearted) as “kind-
hearted.” Rather than assuming that “kindness” as it appears in Kant’s texts corresponds to the 
phenomenon that we are addressing here, then, I will bring the working definition of kindness thus far 
developed into dialogue with the beliefs, feelings and activities that constitute it as they appear in Kant’s 
ethical works. It is possible that kindness will appear in Kant’s philosophy in a way that parallels its 
appearance in Aristotle’s thought, which is to say not as a coherent concept but instead as a number of 
features disbursed among morally significant phenomena. 
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resistance to kindness that we as individuals so often experience. I end by asking to what 
extent certain elements of Kant’s morality might bolster the conceptualization of 
kindness as a virtue that was developed in the previous chapter.    
 
Feelings and Virtues in Kant’s Ethical Philosophy 
 Finer Feelings and Moral Virtue in the Observations 
 “Stout persons,” writes Kant, “whose favorite authors are their cooks […] will 
thrive on vulgar obscenities and on a course jest with just as lively a delight as that upon 
which persons of noble sensitivity pride themselves” (Observations 45-46). Theirs is a 
rough feeling, with no ground in what is finest about human nature. Those whose 
inclinations are instead fixed upon “high intellectual insights,” who delight most in the 
life of the mind, enjoy a feeling as “delicate” and ephemeral as the former is rough. 
Somewhere in between these extremes there is a feeling that one can enjoy at length 
“without satiation and exhaustion,” and that “presupposes a sensitivity of the soul, so to 
speak, which makes the soul fitted for virtuous impulses” (46). It is to this “finer feeling,” 
that Kant turns his attention in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime. 
  “Finer feeling,” writes Kant, “is chiefly of two kinds: the feeling of the sublime 
and the feeling of the beautiful. The stirring of each is pleasant, but in different ways” 
(46-47). When we stand beneath a great snow-capped mountain peak, or listen to the 
sounds of a raging storm, the pleasure we feel is bound up with a kind of horror, whereas 
when we look out on a flower-strewn meadow, or listen to a gavotte, our pleasure is 
“joyous and smiling.” Writes Kant, “in order that the former impression[s] could occur to 
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us in due strength, we must have a feeling of the sublime, and in order to enjoy the latter 
well, a feeling of the beautiful” (47). The sublime moves us, where the beautiful charms 
us; the sublime leaves us “rigid and astonished,” where the beautiful leaves us bubbling 
with mirth (47). Tragedies, then, have the character of the sublime, and comedies that of 
the beautiful.  
 The feelings of the beautiful and the sublime extend to our experiences of each 
other, such that certain human attributes are experienced as sublime and others as 
beautiful. “Understanding,” writes Kant, “is sublime,” whereas “wit is beautiful,” and 
“Veracity and honesty” are sublime, whereas “jest and pleasant flattery” are beautiful 
(51).3 Among the moral attributes, says Kant, “true virtue alone is sublime,” while the 
feelings that supplement virtue are in general (merely) beautiful. The feeling of the 
sublime has various facets, and two are especially characteristic of genuine virtue. The 
feeling we experience when standing beneath a waterfall is different in kind, says Kant, 
than the feeling we experience standing beneath a sky full of stars, or in the apse of the 
Sistine Chapel. The feeling of the sublime, writes Kant, “is sometimes accompanied with 
a certain dread, or melancholy; in some cases merely with quiet wonder; and in still 
others with a beauty pervading a sublime plan” (47-48). The first of these he terms the 
terrifying sublime, the second the noble, and the third the splendid. Genuine virtue, being 
noble, most resembles the second of these, but has also something of the quality of the 
first, as we will see.   
  We might wonder here what distinguishes virtue proper from something merely 
virtue-like. Kant acknowledges that “The judgment concerning this is subtle and 
                                                           
3
 Relationships, too, may be distinguished by the type of fine feeling which they embody, where friendship 
has the mainly character of the sublime, and romantic love mainly the character of the beautiful (51).   
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complex” (57). For it would be wrong to call a state of mind that accords with virtue, but 
only incidentally, virtuous. Here he turns to the virtue-resembling affections that seem to 
support and enhance human goodness: “A certain tenderheartedness, which is easily 
stirred into a warm feeling of sympathy, is beautiful and amiable,” for it shows an interest 
in others’ flourishing, to which principles might likewise lead (58). But this good-
naturedness is “weak and always blind,” and might even cause a agent to shirk her 
responsibilities (giving money to the needy out of compassion, for example, instead of 
paying off a debt as duty requires). “On the other hand,” writes Kant, “when universal 
affection toward the human species has become a principle within you to which you 
always subordinate your actions, then love toward the needy one still remains; but now, 
from a higher standpoint” (58). Universal affection here remains a ground of one’s 
attentiveness to the other, but now also grounds “the justice by whose rule” one must act 
(58). The feeling of affection subtly changes when it is universalized through a principle, 
says Kant, such that it becomes “sublime, but also colder” (58). This cooling of feeling is 
conducive to genuine virtue, which requires activity, since without it an agent would so 
swell with compassion that she would surely become “nothing but a tender-hearted idler” 
(59). Here Kant makes a remarkable observation. Although we may feel that something is 
lost in the “cooling” of fellow-feeling, we easily dismiss the fact that affection does not 
lead us to act in ways that honor the dignity of all people, but instead leads us to act in 
ways that honor the dignity of those whose suffering we actually witness:  
A suffering child, an unfortunate though upright lady will fill our hearts 
with sadness, while at the same time we hear with indifference the news of 
a terrible battle in which, obviously, a considerable number of the human 
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species might suffer undeservedly under horrible circumstances. Many a 
prince who has averted his face from sadness for a single unfortunate 
person has at the same time […] given the command to make war. Here 
there is no proportion in the result; how then can anyone say that the 
universal love of man is the cause? (59 n)          
As praiseworthy as sympathy might seem, then, it “does not have the dignity of a virtue” 
until it is universalized by way of a principle (59 n).  
 Sympathy is a beautiful inclination. But as mere inclination— that is, if left 
unregulated by rationally-derived principles— it is at best “trifling” (60). Thus, says 
Kant, “true virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, 
the more sublime and noble it becomes” (60). When expressed as virtues, the principles 
are no mere “speculative rules,” but are instead “the consciousness of a feeling that lives 
in every human heart” and extends beyond sympathy and complaisance (60). This 
feeling, says Kant, is nothing other than a certain consciousness of “the beauty and the 
dignity of human nature,” that grounds both universal affection and universal esteem 
(60). “Only when one subordinates his own inclination,” writes Kant, “to one so 
expanded can our charitable impulses be used proportionately and bring about the noble 
bearing that is the beauty of virtue” (60).  
 Nature has supplemented virtue, says Kant, with assisting drives, including 
sympathy. These drives are such that even without the aid of principles they may and 
often do inspire “beautiful deeds.” Kant therefore characterizes them as belonging to a 
certain species of virtue, namely, “adoptive” virtue, but opposes this to the kind of virtue 
that is grounded in principles, and which he terms “genuine virtue” (61). “The former,” 
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writes Kant, “are beautiful and charming; the latter alone is sublime and venerable” (61). 
A person with the first kind of disposition is called “goodhearted,” where a person with 
the second is called “noble” and “righteous” (61). Kant associates a goodhearted 
character with the sanguine temperament. The goodhearted person is affable, lively, a 
lover of change and variety, a friend to all (and thus a true friend to none), generous to a 
fault, and all-too-ready to laugh at the slightest amusement or to weep at the least 
inconvenience. Kant associates a noble frame of mind with a melancholy temperament. 
Here “melancholy” entails immutability, self-reliance, truthfulness, self-respect and 
respect for others, absolute freedom from the chains of convention, and considerable 
strictness in moral assessment such that the noble person is “not seldom weary of himself 
as of the world” (66).  
 Having addressed the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime as it 
appears in human character generally, in Section Three Kant turns to the same distinction 
as manifested in sexual difference. Although the association was already strongly 
suggested in the preceding sections of the text, as Cornelia Klinger notes “It is here that 
Kant explicitly associates the beautiful with femininity and the sublime with masculinity” 
(194). “Association” is perhaps too weak a term, though, as here human intellectual, 
moral and physical characteristics are wholly subsumed under the aesthetic, with a result 
that is anything but flattering to women.4 Woman’s “entire being” is understood via the 
                                                           
4
 Bonnie Mann points out Kant’s ambiguous characterization of women vis-a-vis the subject-object dualism 
in Women’s Liberation and the Sublime (Feminist, Postmodernism, Environment. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). She notes that Kant’s tendency to construe women as “thing-like”— which 
reaches its zenith in The Metaphysical principles of Virtue—  is already operating in this first of his 
aesthetic works.  The ambiguity of Kant’s account of women, which seems at once aimed at securing their 
status as subjects worthy of respect and at devaluing women in relation to men, is unsurprising given a 
similar tension at work in Enlightenment thought more generally. Here, Kant errs on the side of construing 
women as objects; as Mann writes, “Her subjectivity is in service to her primary role as an appearing 
object” (41).  
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category of the beautiful in order to be contrasted with that of man, which, cast as 
sublime, takes on by contrast the appearance of dignity and nobility (195). Nowhere is 
the contrast clearer than in Kant’s description of the intellectual capacities of the two 
sexes. 
 “The fair sex,” writes Kant, “has just as much understanding as the male, but it is 
a beautiful understanding, whereas ours should be a deep understanding, an expression 
that signifies identity with the sublime” (78). This sentence is quite remarkable. We 
should first note that Kant’s claim about women’s understanding is descriptive, whereas 
his claim about men’s is normative. Here as throughout the Observations, “One gets the 
distinct impression,” as Bonnie Mann observes, “that Kant is writing in order to shore 
something up” (40). We may note another contrast at work in the sentence, namely, 
between equality in terms of the quantity of understanding present in the two sexes, and 
inequality in terms of quality of the same. That the masculine understanding is superior to 
the feminine is already suggested by Kant’s associating it with the noble, and becomes 
only more apparent as he continues: 
Deep meditation and long-sustained reflection are noble but difficult […] 
Laborious learning or painful pondering, even if a woman should greatly 
succeed in it, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex […] A woman 
who has a head full of Greek […] might as well even have a beard […] A 
woman therefore will learn no geometry; of the principle of sufficient 
reason or the monads she will know only so much as is needed to perceive 
the salt in a satire. (78-79)  
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To which pursuits, we might ask, is the beautiful understanding suited, if not to the deep 
kind of reflection that characterizes scholarship? “Her philosophy,” writes Kant, “is not 
to reason, but to sense” (79). And what is true of intellectual pursuits is true of moral; the 
beautiful understanding gives rise to a quasi-morality grounded in feeling and yielding 
adoptive virtues, whereas the noble understanding gives rise to morality proper, founded 
on reason and yielding genuine virtues. 
 Kant maintains that the moral education of women must harmonize with their 
natural tendencies which are fundamentally affective rather than rational. One appeals 
here not to reason, but instead to sentiment and taste: “one will seek to broaden their total 
moral feeling and not their memory, and that of course not by universal rules […] Never 
a cold and speculative instruction but always feelings” (80-81). Women will avoid what 
is immoral not out of duty— indeed, says Kant, they find all principled constraint 
odious— but because it repulses them. The moral education of women must contain 
“nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of Obligation!” (81). As Kant quips, “I 
hardly believe the fair sex is capable of principles” (81). Thus the virtue appropriate to 
women is, “a beautiful virtue,” grounded in feeling, where the virtue appropriate to men 
“should be a noble virtue,” rooted in rationality (81).  
 Since for Kant the root of morality proper is reason, women do not in his view 
achieve full moral personhood. His solution to this problem is ultimately to characterize 
women as composing, with men and through the state of matrimony, a complete moral 
person: “In matrimonial life the united pair should, as it were, constitute a single person, 
which is animated and governed by the understanding of the man and the taste of the 
wife” (95). In a gesture that reflects the Enlightenment ideal of universal human equality, 
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Kant goes so far as to suggest that there is no question of rank within marriage: “In such a 
relation, then, a dispute over precedence is trifling […] If it comes to such a state that the 
question is of the right of the superior to command, then the case is already utterly 
corrupted” (96). Even so, one cannot help suspecting that women are effectively mere 
appendages within this scheme, since for Kant personhood is understood fundamentally 
in terms of rational capacity; the feeling which comprises woman’s essence is, if 
anything, a millstone around the neck of moral agency.5 This becomes only clearer as 
Kant’s ethical philosophy matures.   
 The Observations is a fascinating text in part because it contains, in germ, the key 
components of Kantian moral philosophy. But here Kant’s positions are crafted to 
dovetail with those that dominate the moral philosophical climate of the era. Thus there is 
a tension, for example, between Kant’s acknowledgement of the sentiments as an 
indispensible component of the moral life, and his devaluing of them relative to rational 
principles. This tension harmonizes with another, namely, Kant’s valuing of women as 
(almost) full moral persons and his devaluing of them in comparison with men. The 
harmony between these two tensions is not accidental, but rather indicates the climate of 
ideas within which the Observations emerged. As Klinger explains:  
With the growing success of modern rationalism and the revolutionary 
ideas of universal human freedom and equality, the application of the 
same principles to both sexes grew unavoidable. Nevertheless […] the 
majority of Enlightenment philosophers made every endeavor to find new 
                                                           
5
 Of course, the general devaluing of feelings within Kant’s ethical philosophy means that men do not fare 
altogether well in this scheme either. Says Kant, “A man must never weep but magnanimous tears. Those 
he sheds in pain or over circumstances of fortune make him contemptible” (82). 
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foundations for gender difference in order to legitimate the status quo of 
gender hierarchy. (195) 
Kant’s depiction of women in the Observations is perhaps not intended to be unflattering 
to “the fair sex,” and yet it strikes us as distasteful in the same way that Jim Crow laws 
do, and with good reason. Kant grants women subjectivity and moral personhood, and 
thus quasi-equality with men. But he characterizes their subjectivity as fundamentally 
different in kind than that of men. If Kant is attempting to find a new ground for gender 
hierarchy while maintaining the appearance of equality between the sexes, as Klinger 
suggests, he is at the same time drawing from a powerful metaphysical dualism that is 
perhaps as ancient as philosophy itself. This is the dualism in which femininity is bound 
up with nature and feeling, and masculinity with têchne and abstract thought. It is most 
certainly what Alison Jaggar has termed a “normative dualism,” and here masculinity is 
superior to femininity, and rationality superior to feeling (Moen 214).6 
 While Kant’s characterization of femininity in the Observations provides a new 
justification for the inferior social status of women, it also reflexively provides a new 
ground for resistance to sentimentalist morality. If the virtue of women is fundamentally 
pathological, and that of men rational, then virtues that are or appear to be overly 
sentimental will be devalued relative to those that are regulated by some principle.7 A 
                                                           
6
 Jagger is not the only philosopher to point to this fundamental dualism in historical philosophy. Hélène 
Cixous identifies several oppositional pairs that correspond to the “man/woman,” and these include 
Activity/Passivity, Culture/Nature, Head/Heart, and Logos/Pathos (Schott 11). Nussbaum explores similar 
a set of oppositions in The Fragility of Goodness. See especially pp. 20-21. 
 
7
 It is important, I think, to appreciate the psychological power of this move. In many or most cultures the 
greatest insult to a man is to denigrate his masculinity, and whereas women are generally deemed feminine 
by virtue of being female, masculinity is generally a thing that must be perpetually attained or defended 
(for a rich defense of these claims see David’s Gilmore’s Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of 
Masculinity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). Thus if kindness is even loosely associated with 
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distinct advantage of the scheme is that it allows Kant to maintain a place for the 
sentiments within his moral philosophy, which by all accounts he must do, while 
beginning to distinguish his moral system from the sentimentalist theories of thinkers like 
Hume. But here the break is so subtle that Kant seems almost to be a sentimentalist 
himself. As Lara Denis argues, “The influence of British sentimentalist ethics on Kant 
seems to have been strongest during the early to middle 1760’s,” during which period he 
wrote the Observations (4). We should note in particular his characterization of virtue as 
originating in feeling; the noble virtues differ from the beautiful in that the former have 
been brought under a principle, but the feeling that gives rise to a noble virtue is quite 
clearly antecedent to the principle through which it is universalized and “cooled.” 
 It is difficult to know how to situate kindness within the context of the system of 
virtues expressed in the Observations. In certain respects it appears to belong to the 
category of beautiful virtue. It bears, we might notice, an important resemblance to 
friendliness (Freundlichkeit) and affability (Leutseligkeit), both of which Kant explicitly 
associates with beauty and femininity (76).8 Moreover, kind agents feel very deeply for 
the people around them, and their responsiveness to others seems to stem at least in part 
from the depth of their feelings. Certainly it would be difficult to reconcile emotional 
callousness, or purely dispassionate moral judgment, to the picture of kind agency we 
have painted. But the feelings characteristic of kind agency also parallel those of noble 
agency in an important respect, since the kind agent feels kindly toward (and is disposed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
femininity (as it might be where we associate femininity with moral sentimentalism), then men will be 
under some pressure not to appear kind, or will at the very least be forgiven for failing to be.   
 
8
 Leutseligkeit is rendered as kindness in Goldthwaite’s translation; if “kindness” properly captures the 
German word, then we could simply claim that kindness is, for Kant, counted among the beautiful virtues.  
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to act on behalf of) humanity in general, and not simply toward those whose suffering she 
directly witnesses. Moreover, her feelings for others involve potentially universalizable 
judgments. Where these judgments have to do with the human situation itself, they might 
be called universal, and we might reasonably attribute her universal positive feelings to 
just these universal judgments. If the characteristic feelings of the kind agent are in some 
sense antecedent to her judgments about the human situation (that is, if she experiences 
some feeling like compassion for others even prior to reflection), and if the judgments 
that universalize these feelings are construed as moral principles, then kindness would 
take the form of a Kantian noble virtue, and would, for Kant, be a thing of serious moral 
worth.9    
 Unfortunately, the potential of Kant’s Observations to ground a universal virtue 
of kindness is matched by a certain tendency to rob kindness of its special character. 
Recall that for Kant a moral sentiment, once universalized through a rational principle, is 
in some way cooled. This cooling of virtue corresponds to the mien and disposition of the 
noble agent, which Kant characterizes as melancholy. The noble agent is hardly cheerful; 
he is silent and profoundly self-controlled, and is very often ill at ease (even “disgusted’) 
both with himself and with the people around him.10 Morality is for him a burden, and the 
                                                           
9
 It might be possible to reconcile Aristotle’s cognitivist account of the emotions with Kant’s 
characterization of the feelings that belong to noble virtue. In Kant’s mature ethical works morally 
significant feelings (most notably the feeling of respect) are always consequent to judgments, even though 
there are prereflective feelings that closely resemble them. These two kinds of feelings have different 
experiential characters, just as the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime do.  We might say that the 
feelings that characterize noble virtue are Aristotelian emotions properly speaking, where the prereflective 
feelings that belong to beautiful virtue are mere natural feelings, of the kind that infants and even animals 
might be expected to experience.  
   
10
 As Paul Arthur Schillp notes, Kant is known to have been melancholy as a youth, and given the 
(independently achieved) consensus of his autobiographers, “there is good reason to accept their combined 
judgment that Kant’s famous passage concerning the melancholy temperament is largely autobiographical” 
(4).   
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moral life anything but joyous.11 This image of agency is so at odds with our ordinary 
intuitions about kindness that even if it is possible to reconcile kindness with Kant’s 
characterization of noble virtue in the Observations, we might feel reluctant to do so.12 
 We might comfort ourselves by pointing out that the Observations is one of 
Kant’s earliest philosophical works, and by noting that the views expressed in it are 
rarely taken as belonging to his moral theory proper. Thus even if we find little evidence 
in this text in support of the claim that kindness is a thing of serious moral worth, we may 
yet hope to find such evidence in Kant’s mature ethical writings. But even though Kant’s 
moral theorizing evolves well beyond the rudimentary ethical claims of the Observations, 
it is useful to keep in mind the tensions raised and prejudices expressed in this early text, 
as they so often echo in Kant’s later work. Of particular significance are his suspicions 
regarding the potential of feelings to ground morality, and his uncertainty regarding the 
place of virtue within a system of ethics. We may here make a few observations 
regarding these themes as they appear in Kant’s mature ethical works, before moving on 
to a consideration of Kant’s account of friendship.   
 
 
 
                                                           
11
 Contrast this with the kind of happiness we might imagine for the Aristotelian kind agent. Even though 
kindness is sometimes painful, the kind agent, being also courageous, learns to take a kind of pleasure in it, 
or at least not to suffer too deeply on account of it.   
 
12
 Admittedly, this very resistance may arise due to a misconception about the nature of kind agency, or a 
tendency to conflate kindness with niceness. If the kind agent is, as was suggested in Chapter III, harsher is 
her judgments of herself than in her judgments of others, then because ethical failure is inevitable, she 
might well develop a rather melancholy inner state. This need not necessarily cause her to appear 
melancholy, nor to treat others unkindly. As Schillp points out, several of Kant’s autobiographers have 
tried to reconcile his characterizations of himself (as a person inclined to be melancholy and a harsh judge 
of himself) with his famous affability. Vaihinger suggests that the contrast between Kant’s inner state and 
his outward appearance is a testament to his masterful self-control (Schillp 5).   
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Feelings and Virtues in Kant’s Mature Moral Philosophy 
  In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant taxonomizes previous 
moral theories in order to contrast them with a morality the determining ground of which 
is pure practical reason (441-445).13 The principle division in his taxonomy of these 
“heteronomous” systems is between those that rest on subjective grounds and those that 
rest on objective grounds. Among the subjective grounds is a certain moral feeling, upon 
which the sentimentalist (or “moral sense”) theories of Hutcheson and Shaftesbury are 
founded. As Denis notes, “Kant displays some level of relative approval for the moral 
sense theories,” comparing them favorably, for example, to those theories founded on 
self-interest (4). Kant writes, “the principle of moral feeling is closer to morality and its 
dignity than the principle of one’s own happiness” (Groundwork 442). Even so, Kant 
finds sufficient reasons for rejecting it, as he does for all systems that rest on 
heteronomous grounds. No empirically-derived moral principle can be universally valid 
and binding, Kant maintains, and this is most certainly true of a principle derived from 
something as wildly variable as human feeling (Groundwork 442). As Kant explains in 
the Lectures on Ethics, there can be “no pathological principle in ethics because it laws 
are objective, and deal with what we ought to do, not what we desire to do (37). In order 
for a moral theory to bind all rational beings universally, necessarily and without 
qualification, Kant maintains, it absolutely must rest on a priori grounds. 
 We might suppose that moral feelings could play a supporting role in a moral 
theory founded upon rationally-derived universal principles. But, as Nancy Sherman 
                                                           
13
 Kant offers the following useful definition of heteronomy of the will: “If the will seeks the law that is to 
determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus 
goes outside itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, then heteronomy always results. 
The will in that case does not give itself the law, but the object does so because of its relation to the will 
(Groundwork 4:441). 
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writes, “the Groundwork is notorious for its warnings against mixing the a priori 
foundation of morality with contingent features of the human case” (127). Kant warns, 
for example, that “a mixed moral philosophy, compounded both of incentives drawn from 
feelings and inclinations and at the same time of rational concepts, must make the mind 
waver between motives that cannot be brought under any principle and that can only by 
accident lead to the good but can also lead to the bad (Groundwork 411). Moreover, Kant 
maintains that because the only thing that can be called good without qualification is the 
good will, moral feeling corrupts an agent’s moral constitution, such that: “everything 
empirical is not only quite unsuitable as a contribution to the principle of morality, but is 
even detrimental to the purity of morals” (426). It is important to note here Kant’s belief 
that a moral principle alone is sufficient to determine the will (Lectures on Ethics 36; 
Groundwork 411).14 Pathological feeling, thinks Kant, is thus utterly unnecessary for the 
determination of the will, in addition to being detrimental to the purity of that will, and a 
source of confusion and potential wrongdoing in the life of a moral agent.  
 One important aim of Kant’s moral project— and arguably its ultimate aim— is 
to purify moral theory of all empirical, merely anthropological content. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the Groundwork, where, as Sherman writes, “the underlying message is 
that a metaphysics of morality cannot be mixed. The authority of morality […] must 
come from reason alone” (128).   We might reasonably assume, then, that Kantian ethical 
theory can maintain no place for moral feeling, nor for moral virtue, which is virtually 
                                                           
14
 Writes Kant, “For the pure thought of duty and of the moral law generally, unmixed with any extraneous 
addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone (which first becomes aware hereby that it 
can of itself be practical) an influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives 
[…] that reason in the consciousness of its dignity despises such incentives and is gradually able to become 
their master” (Groundwork 2:411). One important conclusion of the Groundwork is that the (good) will is 
itself nothing other than pure practical reason (see 2; 441; 3:447-8). Of course, the subjective manifestation 
of pure practical reason is a feeling, namely, the feeling of respect.       
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unimaginable absent some affective content. But surprisingly, and as Denis notes, “moral 
feeling continued to figure in Kant’s moral thought long after he rejected moral sense 
theories as heteronomous” (4).  
 Feelings play several important roles in Kant’s moral philosophy, and these 
correspond to the sources of the feelings in question. First, those immediately felt or 
purely pathological sentiments that in some way compliment but are not derived from a 
priori principles are advocated as leading to inclinations that accord with the moral law. 
These feelings are to be inculcated in early youth as part of a comprehensive moral 
education. For example, the feelings of disgust and shame, says Kant, produce in children 
inclinations that accord with upright moral judgment. Thus, “From its earliest infancy we 
ought to instill in the child an immediate hate and disgust of hateful and disgusting 
actions; an immediate, not a mediated abhorrence” (Lectures on Ethics 46). By 
immediate, Kant intends that the disgust be associated with the action itself, and not 
merely with the punishment that might accompany it: “For instance, a child which tells 
lies should not be punished but shamed: it should feel ashamed, contemptible, nauseated 
as though it had been bespattered with dirt” (46). Immediately felt moral feelings take the 
place, says Kant, of the natural or instinctive virtues that human beings do not generally 
possess. By inculcating powerful associations of wrong actions with feelings of disgust, 
we “can produce a habitus, which is not natural, but takes the place of nature” (46). So 
important is the inculcation of proper moral feelings that Kant concludes, “Education and 
religion ought, therefore, to aim at instilling an immediate aversion from evil conduct and 
an immediate predilection for moral conduct” (49).        
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 In The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue Kant remarks on a second role for 
feeling in the moral life. He first draws a distinction between feeling that is merely 
pathological and moral feeling proper. He defines moral feeling as “the susceptibility to 
pleasure or displeasure merely from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement 
of our action with the law of duty” (399). Pathological feeling “precedes the 
representation of the law,” whereas moral feeling “can only follow the representation of 
the law” (399). There can be no duty, Kant holds, to have a moral feeling, since “all 
consciousness of obligation presupposes it” (399). But we do have an obligation to 
cultivate and strengthen our natural moral feeling by wondering “at its inscrutable origin” 
(400). This origin is the same, Kant suggests, as the origin of the uniquely human 
“susceptibility of free choice for being moved by pure practical reason (and its law),” 
such that this susceptibility simply is, says Kant, “what we call moral feeling” (400).  
 Some feelings arise, says Kant, through the agent’s enactment of moral principles, 
or performance of duties. These feelings might be said to embody the moral law. In The 
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue Kant separates the duties of love into the duties of 
beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy. All three duties are derived from reason, are felt as 
obligations, and once enacted bolster positive feelings in the agent. Although there can be 
no duty to love, for example, since love “is a matter of sensation” it is a duty to benefit 
others according to our capacity (402). Thus beneficence is a duty, action in accordance 
with which inculcates (or catalyzes) in the agent a feeling of benevolence. “When 
therefore it is said,” writes Kant, “‘thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ this does not 
mean you should directly (at first) love and through this love (subsequently) benefit him; 
but rather, ‘Do good to your neighbor,’ and this beneficence will produce in you the love 
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of mankind (as a readiness of inclination toward beneficence in general)” (402). 
Although in Kant’s view activity perfects the feeling of neighborly love, it is important to 
remember that the same feeling must exist prior to action, as it is in part by means of this 
feeling that one feels obligated to act beneficently.15         
 The most obviously important feeling in Kantian moral theory is respect.16 The 
feeling of respect, says Kant, is of a special kind, as it arises neither prereflectively nor 
through virtuous activity, but instead in response to the rational recognition of pure 
reason as legislative, which is to say the recognition of pure practical reason as such. 
Kant writes, “respect is a feeling […] that is self-produced by means of a rational concept 
[…] What I immediately recognize as a law for me, I recognize with respect; this means 
merely the consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation 
of other influences upon my sense. The immediate determination of the will by law, and 
the consciousness thereof, is called respect” (Groundwork 402 n14). There is a tension at 
work in the feeling of respect. On the one hand, respect is felt as a kind of humiliation, 
since in its issuing of moral laws pure practical reason is experienced as working against 
our natural inclination to self-love: “Respect,” writes Kant, “is properly the 
representation of a worth that thwarts my self-love” (Groundwork 402 n14). The 
consciousness of this thwarting of inclination, says Kant, “is called humiliation” 
                                                           
15
 I say “in part” because it appears that for Kant every feeling of obligation encompasses a feeling of 
respect for the moral law, as I will explain below. Kant explicitly states that neighborly love, like moral 
feeling, conscience and self-respect, is in general present in people by nature. If it were not, he suggests, 
agents would effectively be “morally dead” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 399).  
 
16
 In “Kant’s Impartial Virtues of Love,” Christine Swanton argues persuasively that love is at least as 
important a feeling as respect in Kantian moral theory, though its significance has been much neglected (in 
Perfecting Virtue: New Essays in Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, ed. by Lawrence Jost and Julian 
Wuerth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). It would be worthwhile to consider how, for Kant, 
the feeling of moral obligation that arises through love relates to the feeling of obligation as it arises 
through (or simply is) respect for the moral law.      
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(Critique of Practical Reason 75).17 On the other hand, because we recognize ourselves 
as issuing the very moral law that eschews self-love and all other inclinations, respect is 
felt as “something elevating” (Critique of Practical Reason 3:81). Respect is for us also 
self-respect, and respect for other moral agents, inasmuch as we respect in humanity the 
source of the universal moral law that binds us absolutely and necessarily.18  
 If Kant’s metaphysical moral project must be divorced to some extent from his 
practical ethical project, as suggested above, then respect seems to function as the 
intermediary between the two. That such an intermediary is needed is quite evident from 
the controversy surrounding Kant’s theory (or, as some contend, lack thereof) of moral 
motivation. As Iain Morrison asks, “how can Kant account for moral motivation while 
divorcing the basis of morality from the pathological, and therefore motivational, side of 
human agents?” (1). How, in short, does Kant think that we, as moral agents, can be 
“moved by moral considerations at all?” (1). Kant’s apparent response, as suggested by 
several passages above, is that respect is precisely that force that motivates agents to act 
according to the moral law. Because respect is a feeling of a special, non-pathological 
kind, its motivational role is consistent with Kant’s the rejection of (pathological) feeling 
as a ground for moral comportment.19 What Morrison’s question fails to consider is that, 
                                                           
17
 Here the moral law itself is not producing a feeling of respect (“for this law there is no feeling”), Kant 
argues, but instead influencing existing feeling in a way that in turn produces respect. The consciousness of 
inclination being reduced on account of the supreme power of the moral law is felt by us as a humiliation, 
and this humiliation is the negative aspect of the feeling of respect. In the Groundwork Kant likens this 
negative aspect to the feeling of fear, whereas he claims that the positive aspect is akin to inclination. See 
Groundwork 1:402 n14. Taken together, these aspect form the feeling that “can also be called a feeling of 
respect for the moral law,” given its origin (Critique of Practical Reason 3:75, emphasis mine).  
 
18
 I return to the feeling of respect as it is directed at humanity in the section that follows.  
 
19
 This, of course, does not explain how, precisely, respect motivates agents. Morrison writes, “to get to the 
heart of the matter, it has proven extremely difficult for readers of Kant to grasp the precise nature and 
function of this bridging feeling of respect” (1).  
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as we have noticed, for Kant morality has both an objective and a subjective aspect, and 
the subjective aspect is precisely the feeling of respect as a moral motivation. Absent our 
capacity to be moved by the feeling of respect, we would simply act from inclination.20 
 Some interpreters of Kant refuse to grant that respect, qua feeling, can motivate 
action in a way that is consistent with Kant’s rejection of feeling as a ground for morality. 
In Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect, Richard McCarty refers to this 
position as the intellectualist view of Kantian moral motivation (423). Respect has, the 
intellectualists contend, a purely cognitive aspect in addition to a felt aspect. As Morrison 
notes, “Most commentators argue that, in fact, respect is only a moral motive insofar as it 
has a nonfeeling dimension” (1).21 Their claim is that respect, taken purely as 
consciousness of moral law, is sufficient to motivate agents to act such that we need not 
include a feeling of respect in Kant’s account of moral motivation (1). I reject this view 
in favor of what McCarty terms the affectivist position, in part because Kant is quite 
explicit in assigning the affective dimension respect a motivational role (intellectualists 
tend, as McCarty notes, to dismiss passages such as those cited above as “embarrassing” 
blunders), and in part because it is an abundantly more appealing and commonsense 
explanation of how we are able to be moved to act according to principles despite 
competing inclinations.   
                                                           
20
 This claim is relevant to Kant’s discussion of weakness of the will, in which agents have a good will, but 
fail to act according to its dictates. I suggest that weakness of will is a failure of the subjective aspect of the 
will (Willkür) that stems from the agent’s undeveloped or underdeveloped capacity to be moved by respect 
for the moral law.   
 
21
 We might here reflect on Kant’s claim that “respect for the moral law is not the drive to morality; it is 
morality itself, regarded subjectively as a drive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all the rival 
claims of self-love, gives authority and absolute sovereignty to the law” (Critique of Practical Reason 
3:76).   
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 It is difficult to reconcile the intellectualist position with Kant’s explicit claim that 
respect can only be experienced by sensuous beings, by virtue of the moral law’s running 
counter to their sensuous inclinations (Critique of Practical Reason 76). Law is by nature 
obligatory, and the feeling of obligation can only be experienced, says Kant, by beings 
whose inclinations tend to work against and so necessitate the existence of law as such.22 
Consciousness of law itself has, then, an important affective dimension.23 It is difficult to 
see how we can (and why we should) abstract a purely rational dimension from the 
feeling of respect. But perhaps there is no need to. If we attend to the principle reasons 
for Kant’s rejection of feeling as a ground for universal morality— namely that feeling 
itself is widely variable, and “has only a private validity”— then if it could be shown that 
respect (or any feeling) has a kind of universal validity, such a feeling could, even qua 
feeling, arguably play a central role in universal morality. That respect has, for Kant, such 
validity, and that it does, in fact, play an important role in his moral philosophy will 
become clearer in the section that follows.24    
 There is some consolation in the fact that Kant himself recognized both the 
importance and the difficulty of reconciling the “pure” or metaphysical side of his moral 
theory with the need for some kind of affective motivation.25 As Morrison notes, Kant 
even referred to the incentive that moves the will as the “philosophers’ stone” (1). I do 
                                                           
22
 Writes Kant, “in the case of the Highest Being, practical necessity does not constitute an obligation […] 
We do not say that God is obliged to be true and holy” (Lectures on Ethics 15).  
 
23
 Kant says so explicitly in The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: “Respect for the law, which in its 
subjective aspect is referred to as moral feeling, is one and the same with the consciousness of one’s duty” 
(2:464, emphasis mine). 
 
24
 We will also see how love approaches the universal validity of respect, and plays a role in the moral life 
that is (at the very least) almost as important as the role of respect. 
 
25
 He writes, for example, that “Man is not so delicately made that he can be moved by objective grounds” 
(Lectures on Ethics 46).  
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not pretend to have offered a satisfactory solution here, but have instead highlighted a 
fundamental tension in Kant’s moral theory between an acknowledgement of both the 
need for and the value of moral feeling, and a resistance to placing moral feeling at the 
center of an objective universal morality. Regarding the place feelings in the moral life, 
Kant is almost passionately ambivalent. This is perhaps most apparent in his account of 
virtue, to which we now turn.  
  
 Kant on Virtue 
 Kant firmly rejects the Aristotelian notion of virtue in favor of something that 
looks more like Aristotelian restraint or self-control (enkrateia). For Aristotle, the self-
controlled person has correct knowledge of the good, but because her desires have not 
been brought into accordance with virtue via praxis, she must in every case resist her 
improper desires. She differs from the morally weak (akratic) agent in that she is often 
able to resist her desires, but she is not yet virtuous, as in the virtuous agent there is not 
internal conflict. The difficulty of reconciling Kant’s account of virtue as strength of will 
with Aristotle’s account of self-control is that, as Hill notes, for Kant the virtuous agent 
has no inner conflict when it comes to doing her duty; it is as if she cannot act in 
violation of duty (147). Kant writes, “Virtue in its whole perfection is therefore to be 
represented not as if a man possessed virtue, but as if virtue possessed man” (The 
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 406). Yet strength of will presupposes conflict, since 
there is strength only where there is resistance. We might note that Kant praises as 
virtuous those who most of all overcome the resistance of sensuous inclination, and recall 
that he rejects the designation of social virtues as virtues proper on the grounds that they 
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require no resistance (Lectures on Ethics 236). It is either the case that the strong-willed 
or virtuous person’s desires align perfectly with duty, or that they do not, but she has 
fostered (some accessory) ability to overcome her immoral inclinations. Or perhaps, for 
Kant, either one of these is a way of possessing strength of will, which is to say of being 
virtuous. As Hill points out, Kant offers no satisfactory explanation of how weakness of 
will is possible, or how strength of will comes about. “[B]ut this fits,” Hill suggests, 
“with Kant’s view that ‘the will’ is ultimately beyond explanation of the kinds natural 
science or critical philosophy can reasonably hope for” (128). 
 Kant’s account of virtue, like Aristotle’s, involves desire and choice in some way. 
But whereas for Aristotle virtue entails having the right kinds of desires, for Kant virtue 
instead seems to entail the diminishing of the force of (pathological) desires that could 
oppose the legislation of reason (Wille). Kant suggests that virtue presupposes apathy, 
and that “The true strength of virtue is a mind at rest, with a deliberate and firm 
resolution to bring its law into practice” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 409). 
Noble character belongs to one who is “lord over oneself,” which is to say “able to 
subdue one’s emotions and to govern one’s passions” (408).26 What’s interesting is that 
Kant suggests, as Aristotle does, that “time and practice are required to develop virtue” 
(Hill 150). Kant’s view seems to be that ideally, over time and through virtuous practice, 
our inclinations would come to accord perfectly with the moral law, which is to say offer 
no resistance. But for Kant, “Virtue implies ability and readiness to overcome our 
                                                           
26
 I would like to suggest that here, as with akrasia, governing desire has to do with introducing a new 
desire that is powerful enough to compete with the improper one. For Kant, that new desire (to act from 
duty and not from inclination) stems from a capacity to be moved by the feeling of respect. It is possible to 
foster the feeling of respect, thinks Kant, by contemplating the beauty and mystery of the moral law. 
Perhaps this is why Kant believes that it takes time and experience to develop virtue; we need time to 
reflect on the nature of morality, and, perhaps, to appreciate how it actually functions in our lives.   
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inclination to evil,” and this inclination will always be present: “Be a man ever so 
virtuous, there are in him promptings of evil, and he must constantly contend with these” 
(244-245). Even if we could cause our inclinations to accord perfectly with the moral 
law, we would not yet be truly virtuous; writes Kant, “A kind heart does not necessarily 
imply a virtuous character. Virtue is good conduct not from instinct but on principle, 
while a kind heart is in instinctive harmony with the moral law” (245).27  
 Virtue is, says Kant, an Idea, such that “No man can be truly virtuous. A virtuous 
man, like a wise man, is a practical impossibility” (Lectures on Ethics 244). But like the 
Idea of friendship, virtue is useful the sake of reflection, and in Kant’s view we ought 
ever to strive to approximate it. “Virtue,” he writes, “is always in progress and yet always 
begins at the beginning” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 409). That is, even if we 
adopt the right maxims “once and for all,” virtue will still be necessary in every particular 
situation, since the inclinations will ever be present (409). Virtue entails, for Kant, 
perpetual striving; it is both impossible and necessary.   
 Kant’s account of virtue admittedly lacks the richness of Aristotle’s, and this 
primarily on account of Kant’s failure to properly explain the place of feelings within it. 
That virtue must for Kant have some affective component seems clear. As Sherman 
writes, “Kant recognizes the duty to develop emotions as part of our duties of virtue. We 
have a duty to habituate empirical character and, in some sense, a duty to diminish the 
merely accidental natures of our nature. Our agency extends deeply to the cultivation of 
                                                           
27
 He even goes so far as to suggest that exercising maxims ought not to become habit, since “the subject 
would thereby lose the freedom of adopting his maxims” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 409). 
Matters are complicated by the fact that he directly contradicts this claim in his discussion of love in the 
Lectures on Ethics (197), as Sherman points out (156).    
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our passional selves” (125).28 But Kant is also deeply reticent to assign any real moral 
worth to even the most cultivated emotions, even he though he advocates their active 
cultivation. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Kant’s explicit 
claims regarding the proper role of emotions in the moral life with his emphasis on the 
primacy of reason and duty, or with the belief that pure practical reason alone suffices to 
determine the will, or with his characterization of emotions as mere sensations or 
perturbations of the body (178).29  
  Aristotle is indisputably the virtue ethicist par excellence. But despite its lack of 
theoretical richness, there is also something valuable about Kant’s account of virtue, and 
this is certainly so in relation to the present project. First, because as ideal virtue is at best 
a perpetually becoming, virtuous requires ongoing activity. One swallow does not a 
summer make, and this is perhaps truer even for Kant than it is for Aristotle. In relation to 
kindness, it cannot suffice for an agent to consider herself kind on the grounds that she 
has in the past behaved in kind ways. One must always be, for Kant, becoming kind, 
which is to say making specific choices in particular situations, and intentionally 
removing the affective obstacles to duties of kindness. This point relates to a second, 
namely, that for Kant virtue entails a certain readiness to act for others’ sake on account 
of being well-disposed towards humanity in general. Whereas for Aristotle we must 
imagine some ground for the universalization of goodwill, for Kant that idea that good 
                                                           
28
 Elsewhere Sherman writes, “To fail to cultivate affective sensibilities that support duty is, as Kant says, 
to neglect something ‘meritorious end exemplary’ in the moral response. It is a kind of moral weakness” 
(182; see also The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 485).  
 
29
 The frustrations endemic to any attempt to explain the role of feeling in Kant’s account of virtue is 
symptomatic, it seems, of a larger problem within Kant’s moral theory. There is, as Sherman notes, “a 
certain instability in Kant’s views when it come to the emotions” (180). “The rhetorical and desultory style 
that characterizes his discussion of the emotions,” she writes, “is perhaps a telltale sign of his own lack of 
systematization here” (182). Sherman suggests that an “intentional or evaluative view of the emotions 
would better cohere with his appreciation of their epistemic function” (180). But he offers no such view. 
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will is universal is built into the concept itself.30 As Sherman writes, “The idea of being 
morally interested in person, simply as such, in view of a source of value that is not 
dependent on circumstance or shared context, is […] at the heart of Kant’s break with 
Aristotle” (186). Third, like Aristotle, Kant appreciates that virtuous activity involves 
particulars. For Aristotle, the phronetic agent knows best when it is appropriate to 
intervene. For Kant, too, in every case the moral agent must judge whether or not it is 
appropriate, for example, to act beneficently.31 Fourth, even if the formulation of a 
Kantian virtue of kindness cannot approach the richness of an Aristotelian formulation of 
the same, it would necessarily entail a good will, and this is the element that was most 
lacking in Aristotle’s account of moral virtue.  
 Despite these strengths, there are at least two rather obvious obstacles to the 
construction of a Kantian virtue of kindness. First, Kant’s theory of virtue may not allow 
an adequate place for moral feelings, where kindness seems unimaginable absent a 
pervasive affective quality. Second, the feelings with which we intuitively associate with 
kindness seem more akin to love than to respect, where Kant seems to strongly prefer the 
latter, and to be deeply suspicious of the former. Nowhere are these predilections more 
evident that in his characterization of moral friendship, to which we may now turn.  
 
                                                           
30
 As is suggested by the Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. The good will is the will to 
act out of respect for the moral law. Inasmuch as human beings, as autonomous (literally being that give the 
law to themselves), embody that law, we must also act out of respect for humanity. Because “rational 
nature exists as an end in itself,” it is imperative to “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a 
means” (Groundwork 2:429).    
  
31
 Kant’s definition of beneficence is worth noting here: “It is a duty if every man,” he writes, “to be 
beneficent, i.e., to be helpful to men in need according to one’s means, for the sake of their happiness and 
without hoping for anything thereby” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 23:453).  The parallels 
between this definition and Aristotle’s definition of kharis are quite striking.  
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Kantian Friendship and Kindness 
 The Idea of Friendship 
 “There are,” writes Kant, “two motives to action in man” (Lectures on Ethics 
200). The first motive is self-love, which is derived from man himself, and has at best the 
sanction of the moral law. The second is love of humanity, which is derived from others, 
and is, says Kant, “the moral motive” (200). “In man,” he continues, “these two motives 
are in conflict” (200). We recognize that the love of others is most meritorious, yet “we 
attach particular importance to whatever promotes the worth of our own person” (201). 
We are inclined, in other words, to be selfish despite our better judgment. How, asks 
Kant, are we to resolve the conflict between these two motives? “Here,” he responds, 
“friendship comes in” (200). 
 To understand the power of friendship to work against self-love, Kant asks us to 
imagine a world in which all people were motivated by the love of others. In such a world 
of other-minded individuals, the welfare of each would be secured by the care of the 
others. If we could but trust that others would care for us, Kant argues, “there would be 
no reason to fear that we should be left behind,” and thus no place for the motive of self-
love (201). “This,” writes Kant, “is the Idea of friendship, in which self-love is 
superseded by a generous reciprocity of love” (201). Mindful of the ancient saying, “Oh 
my friends, there is no friend,” Kant describes Ideal friendship as follows:  
I care only for my friend’s happiness in the hope that he cares only for 
mine. Our love is mutual; there is complete restoration. I, from generosity, 
look after his happiness and he similarly looks after mine; I do not throw 
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away my happiness but surrender it to his keeping, and he in turn 
surrenders his into my hands (203)  
But in practical life, thinks Kant, such things never occur. Friendship must be an Idea, 
since it “cannot be derived from experience,” all empirical examples of it being 
“extremely defective” (202). The most we can possibly love another, says Kant, is as 
much as we love ourselves. The Idea of friendship marks precisely this limit, as it 
embodies “the maximum reciprocity of love” between two persons (201).  In reality we 
cannot love others completely since we cannot ensure that our love will be reciprocated.32 
The Idea of friendship is imperative, though, as a standard of perfection according to 
which we measure our own friendships to see to what extent they are lacking. Friendship, 
like virtue, is for Kant both impossible (as a practical achievement) and necessary (as an 
Ideal we perpetually strive to approximate).        
 One (theoretical) check on the maximum love we can have for others is the love 
we can have for ourselves, and another (practical) is the fact that we cannot abandon self-
care. Given the kind of beings we are, friendship and self-love, says Kant, must be 
combined: “Man cares for his own happiness and for that of others also” (203). But there 
is no precise formula for balancing the two motives, since “the point at which (my) 
satisfaction of needs should give place to friendship is indeterminate” (203). How many 
of our own needs, or invented needs, we will sacrifice for the sake of friendship reveals 
                                                           
32
 On the face of it, this is a very odd claim, especially in the light of Aristotle’s assertion that between 
friends there is no need for justice. But Kant’s contention is reasonable if we accept his initial claim that 
people always look either to their own care or to the care of others. Where the relation of self-care and care 
for others is inverse-proportional, to whatever extent we work for the happiness of our friends we fail to 
work for our own. In that case, and assuming that we all need the same degree of care, we would need our 
friends to look after us to just the same extent that we look after them.       
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something important about the kind of friend we are, or, in Kant’s view, the kind of 
friendship we are engaging in. 
 
 Kant’s Tripartite Division of Friendship    
 Having characterized (perfect) friendship as an Idea, Kant describes the types of 
friendship that do occur in practical life. Here he imports, roughly, the tripartite 
Aristotelian division of friendship, writing: “There are three types of friendship, based 
respectively on need, taste, and disposition” (Lectures on Ethics 203).33 Like Aristotle, 
Kant’s analysis of the types of friendship ultimately reveals that the first two are pseudo-
friendships, while the third is friendship properly speaking, and a thing of tremendous 
moral worth.  
 This third type of friendship is that of disposition or sentiment, and “is friendship 
in the absolute sense” (203). “There are,” writes Kant, “dispositions of the feelings which 
are not dispositions to actual service; on these the friendship of sentiment is based” (205). 
This friendship embodies a striking tension between the disposition to service that 
characterizes the friendship of need (we might say, a mutual prêt-à-servir attitude), and 
the absence of any actual demand of service on the part of the friends. And this is but one 
of the many related tensions by which genuine friendship is defined. There is further a 
tension between love and respect, which is often manifested in a tension between 
revealing and concealing truth. The best kind of friendship is, for Kant, a delicate balance 
of sets of competing values that is as excellent as it is rare.  
 
                                                           
33
 Note the similarity between this description of the friendship of need and Aristotle’s description of 
homonoia (see pages 246-247). 
 297 
 
 Moral Friendship: A Delicate Balance of Love and Respect 
 “In ordinary social intercourse and association,” writes Kant, “we do not enter 
completely into the social relation” (205). We are constrained; the greater part of our 
disposition, opinions and sentiments is withheld. We are prudent, rather than honest, 
voicing “only the judgments that are advisable in the circumstances” (205). We hold back 
out of mistrust, and a fear of being judged harshly, since to reveal the whole of what we 
are is also and necessarily to reveal our weaknesses. But we all long, says Kant, to 
“unburden our heart to another” (205). To do so would be to enter wholly into the social 
relation, or to experience what Kant terms “communion” (205). “That this release may be 
achieved,” he writes, “each of us needs a friend, one in whom we can confide 
unreservedly,” to whom we can reveal all of our opinions and judgments, and “to whom 
we can communicate our whole self” (206-7). Only within this kind of friendship can we 
achieve the true “end of man,” which is the loving correction of our own judgments by 
another who is in a position to see and to forgive them.34 On this ideal of absolute 
openness rests the friendship of disposition, or moral friendship properly speaking.  
 That it is an ideal is clear from the fact that we, being human and thus necessarily 
flawed, must ever conceal something of our true selves. “Even to our best friends we 
must not reveal ourselves, in our natural state as we know it ourselves. To do so would be 
loathsome” (206). Friendship is for our moral amelioration, so exposing those 
inclinations or vices that work against virtue would undermine its purpose.35 This 
                                                           
34
 Kant would seem to join with Emerson in holding that ‘man is for the melioration.’ Here for has the 
double sense of (first) being by nature in need of amelioration, and (second) being by nature capable of 
ameliorating himself and others.  
 
35
 Kant is of the opinion that social intercourse tends to spreads vice. He assumes a considerable amount of 
weakness in human nature such that, if we do not conceal our faults, others will too easily adopt them: “Our 
proclivity to reserve and concealment in due to the will of Providence that the defects of which we are full 
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concealment for the sake of moral amelioration plays out not only in the special 
friendships of individuals, but in social intercourse generally: “If all men were good,” 
Kant writes, “there would be no need for any of us to be reserved; but since they are not, 
we have to keep the shutters closed” (225). The friendship of disposition is that 
relationship in which we are most able to reveal ourselves, and here the degree of 
unconcealment is determined to a great extent by how good we actually are.36 Thus Kant 
shares Aristotle’s view that genuine friendship presupposes the mutual goodness of the 
friends. We all long for friendship, and so we make ourselves good in order to make 
ourselves worthy of friendship. Friendship develops, thinks Kant, the virtues, including 
“Uprightness of disposition, sincerity, trustworthiness, conduct devoid of all falsehood 
and spite, and a sweet, cheerful and happy temper” (207). Thus aiming at friendship is 
not only a duty, “but rather an honorable one proposed by reason” (Metaphysical 
Principles of Virtue 465).   
 In the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue Kant again characterizes friendship as an 
Idea, but here his claim is grounded primarily in the metaphysical nature of friendship. 
Friendship is, says Kant, a tension or balance between the opposing forces of love and 
respect, where “Love can be regarded as attracting and respect as repelling” (470).37 The 
principle of the first “bids an approach,” where that of the second “demands that the 
friends halt at a suitable distance from one another” (470). Love demands perfect 
                                                                                                                                                                             
should not be too obvious” (224). Politeness, which involves a tendency to dissimulate, is therefore in 
service of morality, since by appearing good we encourage the people who see us to become truly good.   
 
36
 Moral friendship proper is a friendship of disposition between two genuinely good agents. Kant concurs 
with Aristotle that such friendships are also possible between people who are equally bad. 
 
37
 It is revealing that Kant heads this section of the text On the Most Intimate Union of Love with Respect in 
Friendship. 
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unconcealment, including the revealing of both our own flaws and our awareness of our 
friend’s flaws. Respect demands a degree of concealment and pretense, including the 
concealment of everything shameful about ourselves and the pretense that we see no 
flaws in our friend. Love requires us to work for the good of our friend, but respect (more 
precisely the preservation of her self-respect) requires that we do her no actual service. In 
all of these senses, thinks Kant, love is a disruptive force and respect a stabilizing one. 
Love threatens to introduce the kinds of inequality that necessarily destroy friendships, 
where respect preserves the essential equality upon which all genuine friendships are 
premised.   
 That Kant wishes friends to err on the side of respect is evinced by his 
characterization of friendship as a relation of absolute equality, and by his repeated 
warnings against violating the appearance of respect.38 He contends, for example, that 
although it is a moral duty to point out a friend’s faults, doing so is to be avoided since 
such a gesture leads the friend to believe he has lost or is in danger of losing our respect 
(470). Even the slightest excess of loving activity, thinks Kant, threatens to disrupt the 
delicate balance between love and respect and so terminate the friendship. Because we 
are inclined in our affections toward communion, or toward the “sweetness of the 
sensation arising from that mutual possession which approximates a fusion into one 
person,” the balance by which our friendships are defined absolutely requires the 
presence of principles (471). Friendship, says Kant, is “something so tender (teneritas 
                                                           
38
 Regarding the latter, see, for example, the Lectures on Ethics p. 207.  
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amicitiae), that if is it left to rest upon feelings […] then it is not for a moment secure 
against breeches” (471).39  
 One important principle underlying friendship is that which governs the keeping 
of secrets. We are inclined to secrecy in part, thinks Kant, because we fear that our faults 
might be used against us. We are perpetually on guard against potential enemies. If we 
can find a friend who seems worthy, by his principled tendency to keep others’ secrets, of 
our confidence, then we can unburden ourselves to whatever extent decency allows. This 
kind of principled openness is the very mark of moral friendship, which Kant defines as 
“the complete confidence of two persons in the mutual openness of their private 
judgments and sensations, as far as such openness can subsist with mutual respect for one 
another” (471). But even here there is a question as to how open the friends ought to be, 
and for two reasons. First, even in our most intimate friendships we ought never to reveal 
something that might be used against us should our friendship dissolve into enmity.40 
Second, we must be extremely careful in sharing our judgments about our friends with 
them, since our words have the power to morally ameliorate our friends, and to increase 
or decrease their feelings of self-worth. The latter reveals a surprising tension within 
Kant’s ethics between a call for principled truthfulness and a call for principled 
concealment. The navigation of this tension is perhaps the most difficult task of 
friendship, and of social life in general. It is, moreover, one of the principle tasks of kind 
agency.    
                                                           
39
 Teneritas amicitiae means “(the) tenderness of friendship.” 
 
40
 This is a strikingly cynical claim. How odd it is that, for Kant, friendship in some way anticipates enmity. 
This is the equivalent, I think, of requiring spouses to treat each other in ways that anticipate or imagine 
divorce. It is hard to reconcile Kant’s concern about future enmity with the kind of trust that seems to give 
deep friendships their special worth.     
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 Honesty in Friendship: When Words Are Both True and Kind     
 “Of all the great philosophers,” H.J. Patton writes, “Kant suffers most from 
having manifestly ludicrous doctrines attributed to him” (190). Foremost among these is 
the doctrine through which Kantianism is often and reduced to an absurd caricature, 
namely, that it is never permissible to lie.41 I cannot here enumerate the reasons why this 
view is mistaken, but will note that Kant’s discussion of honesty between friends offers a 
glimpse into the complexity of his conception and moral evaluation of truthfulness. More 
importantly, it reveals that the tension within moral friendship between openness and 
concealment is symbolic of a larger tension within Kant’s ethics between duties of love 
and duties of respect. Through friendship, we learn how to bring these duties into 
harmony. Kindness is akin to perfect moral friendship inasmuch as kind agents know best 
how to navigate the (potentially competing) duties born of love and respect for others in 
particular situations. Kindness, like moral friendship, involves a posture of respectful 
love, or loving respect. But the kind agent maintains this posture  not only in the presence 
of those she deems worthy of her confidence, but instead in relation to humanity in 
general. 
 One thing that is remarkable about Kant’s moral philosophy, and strikingly at 
odds with the image of cold rationality with which we tend to associate it, is Kant’s 
repeated insistence that we refrain from passing moral judgment on others. He writes, for 
example, “We must proceed from the assumption that humanity is loveable, and, 
particularly in regard to wickedness, we ought never to pronounce a verdict either of 
condemnation or of acquittal” (Lectures on Ethics 231). Elsewhere he advises us to “cast 
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 In my master’s thesis I sought to explain how we have come to inherit this view, and why it is flawed. I 
appeal in particular to Kant’s account of friendship, as I do here. See In Amicitia Veritas: On Truth and 
Friendship in the Ethics of Immanuel Kant.   
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the veil of philanthropy over others, not merely by softening but also by silencing our 
judgments” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 467). Nowhere is this prescription 
more essential than within friendship. The high degree of intimacy and unconcealment 
with friendship means that as friends agents are ideally situated to see each other’s faults. 
No one knows our imperfections so well as our friends, yet we expect that our friends 
will refrain from drawing our attention to them, and rightly so. “To point out a friend’s 
faults,” writes Kant, “is sheer impertinence; and once fault-finding begins between 
friends their friendship will not last long” (232). What is interesting is that Kant asks that 
we extend this friendly consideration to humanity in general. He not only asks that we 
“turn a blind eye” to others’ faults, but even suggests that we refrain from revealing our 
unflattering but true opinions when they are elicited by another person, since “even if he 
asked me to do so [point out his faults] he would feel hurt if I complied” (232). We may 
also resort, if someone elicits an opinion that we are reluctant to give, to equivocation, 
using our speech and gestures in ways that allow others to think, more or less, what they 
will (229). How are we to reconcile these decidedly evasive behaviors with Kant’s 
infamous valuing of honesty, and with his characterization of friendship as that 
relationship which allows for the maximum degree of unconcealment?  
 Before testifying in a court of law, a witness swears “to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth.” We might wonder why the honesty of witnesses isn’t 
assumed, given the context within which they speak. The act of swearing in establishes in 
no uncertain terms the intention of a witness to tell the truth. If she proceeds to lie, her lie 
becomes something more serious than a lie told, for example, to a friend who has asked 
for her opinion on some trivial matter. It becomes what Kant identifies as a formal lie. 
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“Not every untruth is a lie:” he writes, “it is a lie only if I have expressly given the other 
to understand that I am willing to acquaint him with my thought” (228, emphasis mine). 
When we take an oath, our expressed intention establishes in the minds of those present 
that what follows will be the truth.  Where we do not express such an intention, and even 
more so where the listener has no right to our opinion (as, for example, the thief has no 
right to ask if we have any money), if we conceal or mislead our action is something 
other than telling a lie formally speaking.42 But Kant is aware that we often express our 
intentions in ways that do not involve speech; we rely, for example, on body language 
and facial expressions to reveal our sincerity. He is also aware that we may mislead 
people though gestures as well as through speech, so that a formal lie need not involve an 
oath to tell the truth, nor a verbal expression of any kind. Since friendship is the relation 
in which openness is most complete, we might assume that even absent any expressed 
(verbal or nonverbal) intention to be honest, between friends there is an implicit, ongoing 
mutual agreement to be completely honest. We may assume, moreover, that friends are in 
some way entitled to the truth from each other. But for Kant, this turns out to be true only 
to an extent. Friends are entitled to precisely that truth that preserves the friendship and 
buttresses the mutual moral goodness by virtue of which they  are worthy of it.  
     That we must refrain from passing ultimate (moral) judgment on other people, 
thinks Kant, need not prevent us from passing judgment on their actions. “We cannot 
judge,” he writes, “the inner core of morality: no man can do that; but we are competent 
to judge its outer manifestations” (230). This is a thing we do, says Kant, by nature. 
Surprisingly, it is also a thing that serves our moral amelioration: “nature […] has 
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 Kant characterizes it as a “white lie:” “If all men were well-intentioned,” he writes, “it would not only be 
a duty not to lie, but no one would do so because there would be no point in it” (228). But we cannot deny, 
he maintains, that “men are malicious,” such that to be wholly honest is “often dangerous” (228).       
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ordained that we should judge ourselves in accordance with judgments that others form 
about us” (230). And we are most fortunate that this is so, as others give us a much 
needed external perspective that can help us to correct problematic behaviors. The person 
who “turns a deaf ear” to other people’s opinions is, says Kant, “base and reprehensible” 
(230-231). But here not all opinions are equally valid. The opinions of the greatest worth 
are those of the people who know us best, and these, thinks Kant, are our closest friends: 
“Those who judge our conduct with exactness are our best friends” (231). We therefore 
turn to our friends for honest judgments about our behaviors and accomplishments. But 
for Kant the “honesty” of these judgments is of a special kind, in that it is aimed 
primarily at bolstering our feelings of self-worth. 
 What are we to do when we see our friend make a mistake, or when we see in her 
the signs of some vice? It is a duty of love, as we noted above, to show friends those 
faults which they ought to correct, as the mutual moral amelioration achievable within 
friendship is the whole end of man (Lectures on Ethics 206). But to point out such faults 
runs the risk of ruining the friendship, which is premised (at least) as much upon mutual 
respect as it is upon mutual love. Determining how to balance these obligations is 
incredibly difficult, but Kant believes it is possible to do so.43 When someone errs in her 
thinking, says Kant, we must never censure her errors “under the name of absurdity, inept 
judgment, and the like” but must instead “suppose that in such an inept judgment there 
must be something true, and seek it out” (463). We ought to look for the truth within 
every false judgment, and this because we assume that there is intelligence (and, we 
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 Just as he believes that genuine moral friendship is in fact possible: “This (purely moral) friendship is no 
mere ideal, but (like the black swan) actually exists now and then in its perfection” (The Metaphysical 
Principles of Virtue 2:472).  
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might add, good will) behind it.44 It might here be objected that in using the friend’s 
mistake as an indication of her intelligence we are in essence lying to her, naming 
carelessness or stupidity as intelligence. Not so; Kant is correct to suggest that there is 
intelligence behind every rational error, such as the “superstitious” errors that stem from 
ignorance of alternative causal explanations. Out of loving respect we have as much of a 
responsibility to highlight the intelligence behind an error as we do to point out the error 
itself.  
 Kant asks that we extend this charitable approach to the publicizing of our moral 
judgments. Reproach to vice, he says, must never express “complete contempt,” nor 
“deny the wrongdoer all moral worth” (463). Such unadulterated reproach would produce 
in the mind of the recipient the belief that she is beyond redemption. On that hypothesis, 
thinks Kant, she “could never be improved,” and this view is “incompatible with the idea 
of man, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose all predisposition to good” (464). 
When we show someone her moral error, we must do so in a way that highlights her 
intrinsic goodness or capacity for goodness. Here again, we might worry that we are in 
essence deceiving someone if we couch our judgments in such positive terms. But with 
moral error as with rational error, there are very often good intentions (and we, might 
add, elements beyond the agent’s control) behind mistakes. In Kant’s view we must 
always judge humanity lovingly, and so assume the very good will that our judgments 
have some power to produce: “If we must blame, we must temper the blame with a 
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 Which is a reasonable addition, given that Kant has stressed that we must judge each other lovingly.  
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sweetening of love, good-will and respect. Nothing else will avail to bring about 
improvement” (Lectures on Ethics 232).45           
 It is here worth returning briefly to Kant’s assessment of politeness, since the 
dynamics of politeness play out in a special way within friendship. Politeness is, we may 
recall, a social (quasi) virtue, on account of which we create the appearance of being 
good, whether or not we actually are. It is, thinks Kant, a kind of simulation or play-
acting. But it is a morally ameliorative one. When we see others who are (or who we 
believe to be) better than we are, we strive to achieve their level of goodness. If we could 
not believe that anyone was better than we are, then, says Kant, “we should become 
neglectful” (225). We all need models, and in a world with a dearth of genuine goodness, 
it is fitting that we should publicly affect that goodness for the sake of others. We need 
also to habituate ourselves to the kinds of activities that belong to virtue proper. We 
accomplish both of these aims through “social graces,” or gestures of politeness. Such 
graces are, says Kant “small change indeed,” yet they promote moral feeling “through the 
endeavor to bring appearance as near as possible to the truth” (The Metaphysical 
Principles of Virtue 473). At the same time, such gestures obligate others to act likewise 
(473). Thus the mere appearance of goodness in others makes us strive to be truly good, 
and the mere approximation of goodness through polite gestures both habituates us to 
                                                           
45
 In Character as Moral Fiction Mark Alfano argues that we ought to attribute positive character traits to 
others, even though (or rather because), in his view, character is essentially a fiction. His contention is that 
when we tell someone they are good (though we may not believe them to be), the lie is justified since such 
judgments tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies. I certainly agree with Alfano that we owe others a 
charitable reading, and I strongly believe that when we morally judge others we inform their behaviors in 
important ways. But I reject his contention that moral character is a mere fiction, and his belief that when 
we judge another kindly we are effectively lying to them. I instead espouse the view that when we judge 
others kindly (with both honesty and forgiveness) we contribute to what Derrida terms a “truth-becoming,” 
since both our negative and our positive moral assessments have the power to inform their stable character, 
which is by its very nature always developing or “becoming.”  
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being truly virtuous and obligates those around us to behave in similar ways. Politeness 
is, we might say, goodness-becoming.  
 By bringing together these claims about friendship, truth-telling and politeness, 
we get a better picture of the role and value of the sharing of moral judgments within 
friendship. The claims are, again, first, judging ourselves from the perspective of others is 
morally ameliorative; second, since our friends know us best we ought most of all to take 
their perspective when judging ourselves; third, our friends ought not to share 
unflattering opinions about us, lest we feel we have lost their respect, fourth, in judging 
others’ actions we must always emphasize their potential for goodness, as well as 
whatever goodness was actualized in their actions, and fifth, by endeavoring through 
gestures of politeness to appear good we become better, and cause others to do the same. 
What emerges from these views is a vision of friendly truth-telling as what Jacques 
Derrida terms, in the Politics of Friendship, a “truth becoming.” Our friends are entitled 
to some kind of truth from us, but the truth we are obliged to give is one that will 
preserve their dignity and worth, and so preserve the friendship. It is, moreover, a truth 
that will help them to become good. When we judge our friends, and when we share our 
judgments with them, thinks Kant, we must do so with kindness.46  
 There is something surprising, even moving, in Kant’s prescription for friendly 
truth-telling. But if this prescription does not extend beyond relationships of moral 
friendship (which are, in his view, “black swans”), then it is difficult to incorporate it into 
our account of kindness, since we have said that kindness must be extended to humanity 
                                                           
46
 This follows from the definition of kindness developed in Chapter IV, which included the claims that the 
kind agent “is careful not to touch others’ “sore spots,” nor to point to their moral defects. When sharing 
her judgments, she emphasizes others’ intrinsic worth, goodness, or potential for goodness. She actively 
searches for others’ positive character traits and praiseworthy acts” (180).  
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in general. Moral friendship is for Kant that relation in which love and respect are most in 
balance, and within which unconcealment is as complete as possible. It is, as such, (and 
as was the case with Aristotelian friendship of virtue) the model for all social 
relationships, within which we must strike an appropriate balance between love and 
respect, frankness and concealment, judgment and compassion, all with a view to mutual 
moral amelioration.47 This balancing of moral goods governs not only moral assessment 
and the publicizing of such assessment, but all moral comportment. The see why this is 
so, we may turn to Kant’s taxonomy of duties.  
  
 Duties of Love and Duties of Respect 
 So peculiar is Kant’s claim that love and respect are at odds, that were it only to 
appear in his account of moral friendship we might dismiss it as an anomaly rather than 
work to reconcile it with his larger ethical project. But the claim appears also at a pivotal 
moment in The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, where it is invoked to ground a 
fundamental division between two kinds of duty towards others. Writes Kant: 
When the laws of duty (not laws of nature) concerning the external 
relationships of men to one another are under consideration, we regard 
ourselves as being in a moral (intelligible) world in which, by analogy 
with the physical world, the association of beings (on earth) is effected 
through attraction and repulsion. According to the principle of mutual love 
                                                           
47
 This “appropriateness” admittedly has something to do with relative levels of power or authority. Kant 
believes that in relations of superior and inferior (among which he counts, unsurprisingly, the relation of 
husband and wife), it is acceptable to point out errors. Even in such relations, however, judgments must be 
tempered with compassion: “Thus a husband is entitled to teach and correct his wife,” Kant writes, “but his 
corrections must be well-intentioned and kindly and must be dominated by respect” (Lectures on Ethics 
232).     
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they are directed constantly to approach one another; by the principle of 
respect which they owe one another they are directed to keep themselves 
at a distance. Should one of these great moral forces sink, “so then would 
nothingness (immorality) with gaping throat drink up the whole realm of 
(moral) beings like a drop of water.” (449)48    
 Love and respect are feelings, but in practical life, says Kant, they must be 
thought of as maxims. The feeling of love corresponds to the maxim of benevolence, and 
benevolence gives rise to the further maxim of beneficence (449).49 Thus the duty to love 
one’s neighbor, writes Kant, “can also be expressed as the duty to make the ends of 
others (so long as they are not immoral) my own” (450). The feeling of respect must be 
understood “as the maxim that limits our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in 
another person” (449). The duty to respect one’s neighbor, thinks Kant, “is contained in 
the maxim, degrade no other man merely as a means to personal ends” (450, emphasis 
mine). Duties of love and duties of respect are fundamentally different in kind, and this 
will become clearer if we consider Kant’s famous taxonomy of duty in the Groundwork.   
 In the Groundwork Kant derives a basic classification of duties of virtue by 
applying the Categorical Imperative to four hypothetical situations.50 These are Kant’s 
famous (or infamous) four examples, which represent perfect and imperfect duties to 
oneself and to others. The duties to oneself (namely the preservation of life and the 
                                                           
48
 Kant is here adapting Albrecht von Haller’s poem, Concerning Eternity (1736). 
 
49
 Since, as we noticed in Chapter IV, it does not suffice to passively wish for others’ good; if we are 
genuinely virtuous, we will actively work to secure others’ happiness.  
 
50
 Duties of virtue, also called moral duties, are distinguished from juridical duties. The former necessarily 
involve agents’ intentions, while the latter need not. This is roughly the distinction between moral and legal 
obligations.    
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fostering of talents) need not concern us here, as the division between duties of love and 
duties of respect applies only to our duties to others.51 Kant’s second example, that of the 
“lying promise,” is used to derive perfect duties to others. Our duty to another person is 
perfect if violating it would involve a logically contradictory maxim. I cannot universally 
will that people should make lying promises, since doing so would work against the very 
nature of promise-making. Thus I have a perfect duty (to others) not to make lying 
promises. This duty is unconditional, which is to say there is no situation in which it does 
not bind me. Here my role as moral agent is simply to obey.  
 Kant’s fourth example, which he uses to derive imperfect duties to others, tests 
the maxim that one ought to contribute nothing to others’ flourishing. Unlike the maxim 
of the lying promise, here the maxim entails no internal contradiction. But in the light of 
the Law of Nature formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which states: “Act as if the 
maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature,” the 
maxim of non-intervention becomes problematic (421). “For a will which resolved in this 
way would contradict itself,” writes Kant, “inasmuch as cases might often arise in which 
one would have need of the love and sympathy of others” (424). I cannot consistently 
will a world in which I would, by a law of nature springing from my own will, deprive 
myself of the very help I might need. We have then, thinks Kant, an imperfect duty to 
contribute to others’ well-being. As an imperfect duty, the duty of beneficence is 
conditional; we must judge when and how to fulfill it. Certainly we cannot devote all of 
our time and energy to helping others, and we must determine whether or not help is in 
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 As Marcia Baron notes. The duties to oneself are divided, as are the duties to others, between perfect and 
imperfect ones. But that division only corresponds to the division between duties of respect and duties of 
love where others are concerned: “No surprise…” writes Baron, “self-love, unlike love of others, is not 
morally enjoined” (30).  
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fact needed in particular cases, and what kind of help we ought most to offer in each 
situation.    
 Duties of respect to others are perfect duties, and are roughly reducible to the 
maxim I ought never to use another person merely as a means. There are no exceptions 
to our duties of respect to others, as they are duties we owe to all people at all times.52 
Foremost among these failures is the vice of contempt, which is the outward 
manifestation of disrespect for another person. Any action, even a legally permissible 
punishment, that degrades the dignity of another person is for Kant in violation of the 
perfect duty of respect. Duties of respect are always in some way limiting; they are duties 
to refrain from certain behaviors, including, as Marcia Baron notes, “defamation, 
backbiting, wanton-faultfinding, ridicule, mockery, [and] arrogance” (35).53 As duties 
that impose limitations, duties of respect are for Kant always negative.54 As Baron notes, 
this view allows Kant to claim that the failure to fulfill a duty of respect is always and 
necessarily vicious; it is a moral failure properly speaking, just as the failure to fulfill any 
strict of perfect duty is (31). The same does not hold, as we will see, for duties of love.  
 Duties of love are imperfect, meritorious and positive. They tell us not what we 
must refrain from doing to others, but rather what we ought to do for them. Here, as with 
any imperfect duties, we must exercise our judgment. Duties of love involve making 
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 Including those we do not “respect” in the sense of morally approving of, as Baron notes (34). We owe 
all people a minimal degree of respect, thinks Kant, whether or not they are good. This degree of respect is 
sufficient to ground our perfect duties to them.  
 
53
 Baron objects to Kant’s claim on the grounds that some of these negative obligations seem to have a 
positive or constructive facet. For example, Kant’s injunction not to disrespect others when they make 
rational errors, which was mentioned above, includes a prescription for affirming others’ rational nature by 
pointing to the intelligence behind their mistakes. But here I agree with Kant that the underlying principle 
is negative, namely, “Call no man a fool” (to paraphrase a biblical injunction; see Matthew 5:22). 
 
54
 Which was already suggested by Kant’s claim that in our practical bearing respect is “to be understood as 
the maxim of limiting our own self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person” (449).  
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others’ ends our own, and we must determine which people to assist, which of their ends 
we ought to take up, and how best to further those ends once we have adopted them as 
our own. Whereas duties of respect, as strict negative duties, are assessed exclusively in 
relation to blame (we do not praise people for refraining from stealing, for example), 
duties of love are assessed exclusively in relation to praise.55 Agents are not obligated to 
help all people at all times, so we do not blame them for any particular failure. Instead, 
we praise them for those actions that in some way fulfill a duty of love.  
 For Kant, the meritorious nature of duties of love introduces a problem, by virtue 
of which he is able to characterize duties of love and duties of respect as in some sense 
opposed to each other, rather than simply or wholly complimentary. Although we have a 
broad duty to help those in need, we do not have a strict duty to help every person in 
every case. Thus when we elect to help a particular person in a particular situation, we do 
for her more than morality strictly requires of us. Thus, as Baron writes, “if you choose to 
aid me, it is not an instance of rendering something you owe me. Because of this, I should 
be grateful to you; I owe you a debt of gratitude” (31). Indeed, for Kant duties of love by 
nature impose on others in some sense: “When I exercise the duty of love toward 
someone,” he writes, “I at the same time obligate that person; I make myself deserve well 
from him” (450). Whereas respect entails a certain preservation of the boundaries 
between ourselves and others, acts of love disrupt those boundaries by undermining the 
autonomy of the agents helped (by dictating a duty toward their benefactors that they did 
not ask to have). Love is, then, for Kant a kind of invasion.      
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 This claim should be qualified. We may note that Kant does associate some vices (including envy, 
ingratitude and malice) with the failure to be loving, but such vices involve more than a failure to act in 
meritorious ways; they involve or reflect overt “Hatred for Men.” Indifference, then, is not vicious in the 
same way that disrespect (always and necessarily) is.  
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 A cynical reader might here suggest that since Kant has rendered love 
disrespectful, and since we must never disrespect someone, we ought never to act out of 
love for others. But his view is not so dark: “Love and respect […] are basically,” he 
writes, “according to the law, always combined in one duty, although in such a way that 
sometimes the one duty and sometimes the other is the subject’s principle, to which the 
other is joined as accessory” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 448). Where my 
principle is not to make a lying promise, for example, the feeling of benevolence is also 
at work, even if it does not rise to the level of a rational principle.56 When, acting on the 
principle of beneficence, I help someone who is in need, I am obliged to do so in a way 
that preserves her dignity.  
 If human behavior suggests to us a dearth of love, we might comfort ourselves by 
noting that people often refrain from intervening on another’s behalf not out of 
indifference or cruelty, but instead out of respect.57 Certainly, we are steeped in the belief 
that, as Kant puts it, “Alms degrades men” (Lectures on Ethics 236). We do not want to 
humiliate those who seem in need of help, and perhaps fear that the mere 
acknowledgment of their need would be experienced by them as a humiliation. For most 
of us, I think, autonomy entails more than rational self-regulation; it means also the 
freedom to bring our own projects to completion in the ways that we see fit. Hamrick’s 
decision to shovel his neighbor’s walk may have been well-intentioned, but it failed, 
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 So Kant contends, but I agree with Baron that the relation of love-respect seems asymmetrical here, 
inasmuch as love seems more in need of respect, in Kant’s view, that respect seems in need of love. We 
might even argue that the feeling of benevolence in some way undermines the principle of honesty, given 
Kant’s comments on the purity of the will in the Groundwork, mentioned above.    
 
57
 It is unfortunate that the “bystander effect” is so often interpreted as evidence of a widespread lack of 
compassion and/or a tendency to engage in “group think.” Another possible reason for our non-intervention 
is respect for others’ boundaries, which tends to involve a respectful reticence to interfere in their affairs. 
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arguably, to respect his neighbor’s autonomy. Gestures of kindness must involve both 
love and respect, which is to say a readiness to take up others’ ends when and if they 
welcome us to do so, and in ways that they do not find degrading.  
 Although Kant admittedly seems inclined to privilege respect over love, he 
believes it is possible to fulfill out duties of love in ways that are respectful.58 Here the 
special worth of our action derives not only from what we do, but also from how we do it. 
For example, we are obligated, says Kant, “to be beneficent toward a poor man,” but we 
know that “this kindness also involves a dependence of his welfare upon my generosity, 
which humiliates him.” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 448). Therefore, when we 
come to someone’s aid, “it is a duty to spare the recipient such humiliation and to 
preserve his self-respect by treating this beneficence either as a mere debt that is owed 
him, or as a small favor” (448).   
 When we live in way that reflects deep respect for all people, our loving gestures 
will always be tempered by that respect. When we morally assess someone’s actions, or 
give something to someone in need, or help someone who is struggling, because we 
respect every human being we will attend both to what we do and to the way in which we 
do it. If our gesture fulfills a duty of love, the attitude with which we perform it will also 
involve respect. Such an attitude is possible if we inculcate in ourselves the belief that 
every person has intrinsic value, and is therefore worthy of our respect. Kant describes 
this charitable attitude of quite beautifully: “Charity to one’s fellows should be 
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 The latter claim is so widely accepted that perhaps it needs no defense. If it does, however, we would do 
well to note Kant’s obvious preference for respect over love within moral friendships. He goes so far as to 
suggest that a friend ought to hide his problems, lest he impose on his friend an obligation to help. 
Friendship requires equality, and where one friend becomes a benefactor and the other a beneficiary, that 
equality (more specifically the equality of their mutual respect)  is disrupted (Metaphysical Principles of 
Virtue 471).   
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commended rather as a debt of honor than as an exhibition of kindness and generosity. In 
fact it is a debt, and all our kindnesses are only trifles in repayment of our indebtedness” 
(Lectures on Ethics 236).     
 
 Respect and Freedom  
 Kant is quite right to suggest that gestures of love ought generally to be 
complimented by an attitude of respect. If this was not so, then benevolence might 
devolve into a kind of self-edification in which others function for us merely as means.59 
But we may worry, as Baron does, about the way in which Kant separates love and 
respect, and further about his obvious privileging of the latter. We might ask, as Derrida 
does, “Why, in sum, is Kant so suspicious of tenderness and gentleness, of teneritas 
amicitiae?” (256). It is only by noting the metaphysical basis of Kant’s moral system that 
we can properly address these concerns. This turn is at the same time a turn to Kant’s 
account of freedom of the will, which has, as we will see, every appearance of being a 
bulwark erected in some desperation against the otherwise overwhelming force of luck.     
 The will of a rational being is determined not within the realm of the merely 
sensible, says Kant, but instead in the realm of the intelligible. When a human being 
“thinks of himself as intelligence endowed with a will and consequently with causality,” 
he no longer perceives a contradiction in his belonging at once to the phenomenal realm 
(which is governed by natural laws) and to the realm of intelligibility, since anything is 
“independent of those laws when regarded as a being in itself” (Groundwork 457). It is 
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 This provides Kant a nice way to respond to Nietzsche’s objection that charity is merely the means by 
which weak people recover their (moral) power. It also helps to flesh out Douglas’s characterization of the 
cruelty at work in slave master’s supposed kindness. Douglas’s was keenly aware that his master’s 
“charity” served only to ease the latter’s conscience, such that he was reduced in the exchange to a mere 
means.     
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via this world of pure intelligibility, of the in-itself, of the noumenal, that Kant preserves 
the will as a site secure from sensuous determination. The idea of freedom, writes Kant, 
“can never admit of comprehension or even of insight” (Groundwork 459). But it is this 
idea alone that secures morality, by securing the will from determination by the causal 
laws that govern the phenomenal realm. Hence, we must postulate freedom: “To 
presuppose this freedom of the will […],” writes Kant, is “necessary for a rational being 
[…] as he makes such freedom in practice, i.e., in idea, the underlying condition of all his 
voluntary actions” (461). It is useful in practical life, thinks Kant, to have before our 
minds the idea of our moral freedom. This moral freedom Kant terms the autonomy of the 
will, which is simply “The concept of every rational being as one who must regard 
himself as legislating universal law by his will’s maxim” (433).  It is further useful to 
have before our minds an image of what we, as a community of autonomous moral 
agents, are, and the image he proposes is that of a kingdom of ends. “By ‘kingdom,’” 
writes Kant, “I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through 
common laws” (433). The kingdom of ends includes every moral agent as an end-in-
herself, as well as every particular (morally legitimate) end that each agent sets for 
herself (433).  
 Every member of the kingdom of ends is intrinsically invaluable. Whereas 
“Whatever has reference to general human inclinations and needs has a market price,” 
that which constitutes something as an end-in-itself has instead “an intrinsic worth, i.e., 
dignity” (434-5). Thus morality and humanity, “insofar as it is capable of morality,” 
alone have dignity. It is only by virtue of her moral autonomy, through which she is a 
legislator of the very universal moral law that binds her, that an agent may be said to be 
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moral, hence “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature” (436). The 
Levinasian idea of the Other as an infinity captures something of the magnitude of the 
other’s autonomous nature and moral worth. The same feeling of humiliation that, as we 
said, comprises the negative aspect of respect, belongs also to our encounters with other 
moral agents, who by virtue of their dignity ought never to be reduced to mere means. 
We may here recall that for Kant respect is that maxim that “limits our self-esteem by the 
dignity of humanity in another person” (2:449).  Their morally legitimate ends, too, must 
keep our own in check; the kingdom of ends is a kingdom of boundaries between self and 
other that must be respected. 
 Kant is aware that the concept of freedom of the will is, prima facie, at odds not 
only with the casual laws of the natural world but also with our ordinary moral 
experience. We often feel as if our actions are inevitable, as if our choices stem from 
circumstances beyond our control. Hence we tend to take refuge, he notes, in our bad 
luck. But where we treat human action as the result of natural causal laws, moral 
judgment is unjustified, and wholly incapable of affecting change in human behavior: 
“Without transcendental freedom in its proper meaning, which alone is a priori practical, 
no moral law and no accountability to it are possible” (Critique of Practical Reason 97). 
Autonomy of the will, which preserves the very possibility of morality, also yields the 
dignity of moral agents and thus the necessity of our respect for them. But that autonomy 
is only ever assumed. The whole of morality has, then, an as if quality. We must act as if 
we are free. We must respect others as if they are free. We must judge our actions and the 
actions of others as if they were free.  
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 The role of respect for others is absolutely essential here, since it is primarily 
through gestures of respect that we “act out” human freedom. In the same way that we 
obligate others through gestures of politeness to act in similarly polite ways, creating a 
morally useful collective pretense, through gestures of respect we act out (or enact) the 
autonomy and dignity of ourselves and the people around us. Respect is that force that, in 
everyday life, most of all preserves the moral life from the being swallowed up by the 
forces of luck. It is primarily through gestures of respect that we actualize, to whatever 
extent possible, the ideal kingdom of ends. No wonder, then, Kant tends to privilege 
respect over love. No wonder that in his view a violation of respect is always and 
necessarily vicious, where a violation of love is at worst merely less-than-meritorious.  
   But Kant does not wholly neglect love, as we have said. It is, after all, the other 
great force without which the whole moral universe would collapse. We should here note 
how Kant’s acknowledgment of the necessity of love (which yields the duty of 
beneficence) is at the same time an acknowledgement of human vulnerability and need. It 
is precisely because I understand that I am sometimes in need of others’ help that I can 
have a duty of beneficence, which is the practical manifestation of love (The 
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 449). I cannot will that when I am in need no one 
should come to my aid, thus I cannot without contradiction will that I should fail to come 
to the aid of others who are in need. But for Kant every gesture of love, as Christine 
Swanton notes, must be limited by respect: “In coming close to another in beneficence, 
one must also keep a suitable distance, respecting his autonomy” (243). Thus even 
though Kant acknowledges love, and indeed speaks as if the dependence of respect on 
love is symmetrical with the dependence of love on respect, it is difficult to think that 
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love has for him the moral worth or magnitude of respect (Baron 33). As Baron remarks, 
in general “respect does not require love,” and for Kant, if respect needs love at all, it 
certainly “does not need love in the way that love needs respect” (33). If love and respect 
comprise for Kant a tension, it does not appear to be a symmetrical one. This is 
unsurprising, given the role of respect in preserving the very possibility of morality. 
Kant’s metaphysical commitments mean that he has inevitably to worry more about 
respect than he does about love, even though he can and does provide a rational ground 
for duties of love. But must we also privilege respect over love, or the (negative) duties of 
respect over the (positive) duties of love? 
 
 Kindness as Loving-Respect or Respectful Love 
 We now have a rich answer to Derrida’s question: “Why, in sum, is Kant so 
suspicious of tenderness and gentleness, of teneritas amicitiae?” (256). Gestures of love 
fail to actualize the respect that enacts, in a way that love never can, the autonomy upon 
which morality is premised. When untempered by respect, loving acts also undermine 
others’ autonomy by imposing obligations of gratitude. It is only when we treat our 
gestures of love as trifles, as already owed, that we subvert this threat. But to treat 
another person as if she deserves well of us, as if, by virtue of her intrinsic worth, our 
help is simply what is due to her, seems to be a profoundly loving thing. Thus what Kant 
characterizes as the tempering of love with respect seems instead to be a tempering of 
love (beneficence) with love (a profound regard for another person based on her special 
worth). Baron is right, it seems, to object to Kant’s too-sharp distinction between love 
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and respect: “love and respect are less different,” she argues, “and less opposed than Kant 
suggests” (42).  
 Even so, there is a great deal to appreciate in Kant’s characterization of the 
relationship of love and respect. He is right to suggest that we do and should regard 
others always in two ways, first “as agents whose freedom and self-direction are to be 
honored,” and second, as beings that are “needy and vulnerable and decidedly  not self-
sufficient” (41). Kindness necessarily involves both of these attitudes; where we regard 
others as wholly self-sufficient there is no need for kindness, and where we regard others 
as lacking self-determination we almost inevitably fail to properly respect them. 
Certainly, we ought never to apply the name kindness to a gesture that uses others as 
means to our moral self-edification or self-aggrandizement, and Kant is right to make us 
mindful of this.60 By calling us to reflect on our own vulnerability, Kant gives us a new 
way to appreciate the need for kindness, and a new way to inculcate in ourselves the 
sense of a duty or obligation to be kind. By calling us to assume the dignity and worth of 
others, he cautions us against mistaking spurious gestures of kindness for the real thing. 
Reflecting on Kant’s characterization of the tension between love and respect teaches us, 
in a way that perhaps no other moral idea could, that kindness is at heart an attitude of 
loving-respect, or respectful-love, the special value of which stems from its enactment of 
the belief that human vulnerability and human dignity are coextensive.  
On the Value of a Charitable Reading 
 Kantian philosophy is very much a product of the Enlightenment conviction that 
the whole of human knowing may and should be tidily divided into comprehensive 
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 Which is precisely the mistake Philip Hallie makes when he applies the term to the actions of Douglas’s 
master, and that we would make were we to call the Meagleses’ treatment of Tattycoram “kind.”  
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theoretical and practical systems. But moral existence tends to resist the systemization 
befitting an “exact” science like physics, and even more so the abstraction of a purely 
theoretical system. Nowhere is this more evident than in Kant’s moral theory. Kantian 
moral metaphysics has, we must admit, a bizarre quality; the idea of a noumenal realm 
that parallels the phenomenal feels to us, if not absolutely silly, then at least unnecessary. 
The denigration of feelings that Kantian moral metaphysics seems to require probably 
strikes us, moreover, as a great mistake, and fundamentally at odds with our moral 
experience. And if all of this were not enough to make us discount Kantian ethics, we 
have also to note that Kant’s system relies (sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly), 
on a decidedly problematic gendered metaphysics. Why, then, is it worth our time to turn 
to Kant when attending to a moral phenomenon like kindness? Even the faults we find in 
Kant’s moral thinking reveal important insights about the nature and significance of 
kindness. But his philosophy has more than a negative usefulness in relation to the 
present project. I will end by reflecting on the unique insights that Kantian moral thought 
offers to the exploration and valuing of kindness.  
 I framed this chapter by suggesting that by understanding Kant’s resistance to 
kindness we may gain important insights into the nature of kindness, the historical 
neglect of kindness, and the resistance that we as agents so often feel to being kind or 
welcoming the kindness of others. We have already noted that Kant’s resistance to 
kindness is not so much to kindness as we have characterized it as it is to a spurious 
kindness that would reduce others to mere means. If kindness is fundamentally an attitude 
of loving-respect or respectful-love, then Kant already values it, although he may value it 
more on account of its embodiment of respect than on its embodiment of love. That he 
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values such an attitude is clear from his account of moral friendship, which is precisely 
the harmonization of love and respect, and is, in his view, the model of all moral 
relations.  
 Regarding historical philosophy’s neglect and misrepresentation of kindness, we 
would do well to reflect on Kant’s tendency to delegitimize feelings as a source of 
morality, and to associate sentimentalism with femininity and weakness of will. Kant 
both takes up and reifies a fundamental metaphysical dualism in which rationality and 
feeling are understood as masculine and feminine, respectively. We must not 
underestimate the power of such a division to impact our commonsense moral intuitions; 
it would not be difficult to show that the popular imagination associates kindness more 
with femininity and feeling that with masculinity and reason. Reflecting on Kant’s 
gendered metaphysics of morals reminds us to attend to the prejudices we have inherited 
from historical philosophical thinking, which in the case of kindness means attending to 
the view that kindness is a virtue appropriate only to women, and which has more to do 
with feelings than with reason.  
 Although we may occasionally fail to intervene on another’s behalf on account of 
callousness or selfishness, Kant reminds us that sometimes we do so out of a sense of 
respect. We value the boundaries between ourselves and others because we believe in and 
value the autonomy upon which they are premised. We respect others’ agency to such an 
extent that we often worry that a gesture of helpfulness will offend another person’s sense 
of autonomy. And it is right that we should worry about overstepping boundaries, just as 
it is right that we should respect other people and their morally legitimate ends. This 
respect often takes the form, as Kant suggests, of non-interference. But Kant also gives us 
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reasons to value helpful intervention, and so to question the reticence we so often feel to 
intervene on someone else’s behalf. More importantly, he reminds us that moral 
comportment requires both respect and love, and that where we “interfere” we must do so 
for the right reasons and in a way that is both loving and respectful.  
     Kindness is, as we have said, fundamentally excessive, and there are two useful 
ways to bring Kant’s division of love and respect to bear on this excessive character. The 
first of these is to join Kant in appreciating and prescribing the attitude of loving-respect 
or respectful-love, but to add that kindness is an attitude that errs on the side of love. If 
the kind agent must fail, she will fail by doing too much for others, and not by doing too 
little. Not only is this view consistent with the nature of kindness, but it is also consistent 
with the nature of friendship which, as we have said, is for Kant the ideal human 
relationship. Pace Kant’s fear that, as Derrida says, attraction leads to rupture, we are 
more likely to forgive our friends for doing too much on our behalf, or for wanting to 
grow too close to us, than we are to forgive them for failing to help us when we are in 
need, or for psychologically distancing themselves from us (Politics of Friendship 256).  
 A second way to appreciate the excessive quality of kindness is to situate it within 
Kant’s division between negative duties (of respect) and positive duties (of love), on the 
side of the latter. We might worry that characterizing kindness as a duty would rob it of 
its special moral worth, but this is not so if we characterize it as a duty of love; what is 
appealing about Kant’s account of positive duty is that it prescribes meritorious actions 
while preserving their excessive quality. We have, as noted above, a rationally-derived 
duty to help those who are in need. Yet every time we help a particular person we do 
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something excessive in relation to her. Even if we have a duty to be kind, then, because 
that duty is imperfect, every particular act of kindness has a special praiseworthiness.61  
 It is useful to recall here Kant’s view that in practical life love and respect are 
basically  “always combined in one duty, although in such a way that sometimes the one 
duty and sometimes the other is the subject’s principle, to which the other is joined as 
accessory” (The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue 448). If kindness is an attitude of 
loving-respect in which love is privileged, we might say that kind agency operates on the 
principle that (because we are all vulnerable and in need of each other’s assistance) we 
ought to help those in need, and to make their ends our own as far as we are able. This 
principle will be combined with “accessory” respect, which will serve to check excessive 
intervention, or intervention for the wrong reasons. The result is a vision of kindness as at 
once a universal duty, and a thing of special (meritorious) moral worth.      
 Perhaps the greatest contribution Kantian moral theory can offer to the present 
project stems from Kant’s surprising views on moral assessment. The essence of human 
subjectivity, the will (Wille) that is untouched by natural causality, is a mysterious thing, 
and cannot be made transparent to us. We can never know others’ true motives, thinks 
Kant, thus we cannot morally assess them. We do not judge, then, persons as such, but 
must instead assume their goodness. But it is fitting that we should judge each other’s 
actions, and this because moral judgment has a certain ameliorative power. We are 
predisposed to care, as Kant is right to point out, what others think about us, and we 
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 The danger of characterizing kindness in this way, as Baron might point out, is that it does not allow us 
to call the failure to be kind out of indifference a vicious failure, since for Kant the failure to actualize a 
duty of love is only vicious if it stems from hatred or some related feeling. Indifference is at most not 
meritorious, where we might prefer to characterize it as a moral failure properly speaking. Perhaps if we 
could combine the above view of kindness as an attitude of loving-respect or respectful-love that errs on the 
side of love, we might develop a way to preserve the meritorious quality of kindness while characterizing 
indifference as truly blameworthy.  
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change our behaviors based on others’ expressed perceptions of what we are like. We 
have a responsibility to attend to others’ judgments of our actions, and a responsibility to 
judge the actions of others. But what is most surprising about Kant’s account of moral 
judgment is that he prescribes charity in the way we judge. We must only ever judge 
others with love and respect, framing even our criticisms in ways that emphasize their 
capacity for goodness. When we judge, we must have as our aim the loving moral 
amelioration of the people around us. We must choose our words with care, balancing the 
duty to be as honest as decency permits with genuine kindness, or loving-respect. 
Through our kind assessments we foster others’ goodness, and this, thinks Kant, is in 
keeping with the whole end of man, which is fundamentally ameliorative.  
 Where we construe kindness as loving-respect, or principled love checked by a 
feeling of respect, kindness involves both a what (is done) and a how (it is done). This 
view harmonizes quite beautifully with the hypothesis about kindness that frame the 
present project, namely, that there are ways of speaking, helping, and giving that are kind, 
those these activities may also fail to be actualized in a kind way. In the light of Kant’s 
moral theory we may now say that kindness is the enactment of an attitude that 
transmutes other-centered activity into activity with genuine moral worth.  It is in and 
through kindness that mere giving becomes genuine charity, mere speaking becomes 
cheering, mere criticism becomes ameliorative judgment, and mere intervention becomes 
genuine helping. Absent kindness, other-centered activity loses much or most of its 
special moral worth.  
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The Limits of Charity 
 There is a great deal to appreciate in Kant’s moral system, and this is especially 
true in relation to the present project. But we might wonder if we are entitled to importing 
into our vision of kindness anything that belongs to a system that is fundamentally 
flawed. If we share Nietzsche’s very just belief that those who cannot accept the 
metaphysical grounds of a moral system are no longer entitled to the morality itself, then 
(assuming we cannot adopt the “pure” metaphysical elements of Kantian moral theory) 
we would have to conclude that we are not entitled to accepting the moral insights that 
have here enriched our conception of kindness. If we cannot accept Kant’s God, so to 
speak, what gives us the right to accept His edicts? If we cannot embrace Kant’s 
gendered dualism, then by what right do we import the concepts of love and respect 
which are its vehicle? I cannot offer a satisfying answer to these questions, but can only 
say that Kant’s insights align so well with our intuitions about kindness, and with the 
characterization of kindness developed in the preceding chapters, that it would be a 
shame to discount them completely. Even if Kant’s normative prescriptions ultimately 
appeal in spite of the moral metaphysics that was meant to serve as their ground, we 
would yet do well to appreciate them.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 KINDNESS IS POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY 
“We have a great deal more kindness than is ever spoken”  
-Emerson 
Introduction 
 Where do we find ourselves, after all of this reflection on kindness? If kindness is 
a stable, inclulcatable virtue involving an attitude of loving-respect for humanity in 
general, then it is yet subject to the very luck which it was meant to remedy. For even 
assuming that an agent possesses the kind of rationality and emotional sensitivity that 
makes such a moral virtue possible, she must yet enjoy a degree of good luck if she is to 
become kind. As is true of any moral virtue, kindness presupposes the proper education 
and adequate opportunities for virtuous praxis. By what right, then, may we prescribe a 
virtue of kindness as the remedy for the fundamental problem of ethics? This is the first 
question we must contend with before drawing any final conclusions about the value of 
kindness in a world of contingency. And it relates to a second. 
  As William Hamrick notes in Kindness and the Good Society, kindness has often 
been overlooked by philosophers who find reflection on justice more worthwhile (xiii). 
What is kindness but a bit of gauze on the open wound of widespread inequity? Kindness, 
they assume, is impotent in the face of institutionalized cruelty and injustice. In Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, Harriet Beecher Stowe aptly expresses this suspicion:  
[O]ver and above the scene there broods a portentous shadow, — the 
shadow of law. So long as the law considers all these human beings, with 
beating hearts and living affections, only as so many things belonging to a 
master,— so long as the failure, or misfortune, or imprudence, or death of 
328 
 
the kindest master may cause them any day to exchange a life of kind 
protection and indulgence for one of hopeless misery and toil,— so long is 
it impossible to make anything beautiful or desirable in the highest-
regulated administration of slavery. (19)     
Stowe’s point is that in a world in which slavery is legally permitted, a master’s kindness, 
no matter how exceptional, can be for the slave nothing but a contingency— a matter of 
luck. Rather than inculcating kindness in slave masters, we must obliterate the institution 
that makes the flourishing (if I may even use such a word in this context) of slaves 
contingent on the kindness of particular owners. We need justice here, she claims, and 
not a proliferation of kindness. And certainly we must agree with Stowe on this point. 
 But the problem of finding a place for kindness in an unjust world runs even 
deeper than Stowe realized. For in a broken world, a world rife with injustice, kindness 
threatens to innure the oppressed to their suffering, and to serve as a substitute for a more 
fundamental kind of dignity that only social equality (say, the legal status of full 
personhood) can grant.1 It is useful to think here of the dynamic of domestic abuse, in 
which the chronic apologies and redemptive gestures of the abuser sufficiently enable the 
victim to cope with her situation, and thereby to inure herself (over time, through 
habituation) to her own suffering. Thus we meet again Philip Hallie’s contention that 
what is needed in cruel or unjust situations, whether particular or institutional, is not 
kindness, but rather liberation from the oppressive relation. In the light of this claim, 
kindness— at least as it has conventionally been construed— seems at best a small and 
impotent thing, and at worst a boon to cruelty. But philosophers have so rarely 
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 There is an analogy here, I think, between kindness as a substitute for justice and (mostly religious) 
charity as a substitute for social welfare programs that is so much in favor among contemporary 
Republicans. I will leave it to my readers to elaborate on this possibility.    
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understood the true nature of kindness, and now that we have begun to, we have a way to 
open up a case for kindness in an unjust world. And it begins by understanding that 
kindness is not only not opposed to justice, but is also a powerful vehicle for its 
proliferation.  
 In this chapter I briefly address the related concerns that, first, it is paradoxical to 
prescribe kindness as a remedy for luck when, qua virtue, kindness is itself somewhat 
contingent, and second, that kindness has a problematic relation to justice. I then return to 
a difficulty opened up in Chapter IV by asking whether or not the kind agent ought to be 
kind to herself by morally assessing her own actions in the same way she morally 
assesses the actions of others. I end by commenting on the special value of the virtue of 
kindness.    
 
The Paradox of Kindness 
  The paradox of kindness as a response to the problem of moral luck may be 
stated as follows: since kindness is a virtue, it is contingent upon the very luck it was 
meant to ameliorate. If the paradox admits of no resolution, then it would be logically 
problematic to prescribe kindness as a remedy for moral luck, and equally problematic to 
praise or blame agents for being kind of for failing to be. If we are to begin to resolve the 
paradox of kindness, we need an account of moral agency that both acknowledges the 
power of luck and leaves room for some measure of moral responsibility.2 We find such 
an account, as was noted in Chapter II, in the ethics of Aristotle. In Aristotle’s view, we 
are responsible precisely for those actions that stem from our stable character, whether 
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 Since absent an acknowledgement of luck, there is less reason to value kindness, and absent some degree 
of moral responsibility, there is no reason to prescribe kindness (or any other virtue), and no justification 
for praising it. 
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virtuous or vicious. These actions are to be assessed, and such assessment (and the 
rewards and punishments that accompany it) is aimed primarily at the amelioration of 
character.  
 There is much to appreciate in Aristotle’s solution. It acknowledges the obvious 
fact that who we are is not entirely up to us, but also does justice both to our intuitive 
sense that we are, in some sense, responsible for what we do, and to the commonsense 
belief that moral assessments maintain their ameliorative potential  only if we hold 
ourselves and each other responsible. Even so, there is no denying that the Aristotelian 
solution is itself paradoxical, since it holds that we are responsible for the actions that 
originate from the moral character that we are not (wholly) responsible for. Aristotle is 
aware of this paradox, though, and offers a remedy. 
 Every agent is, for Aristotle, an archē kinēsēos (source of action). But every 
agent, understood as source, has a source of her own, which is just the concatenation of 
the biological, social, and political forces that inform her being. The moral life is, then, 
fundamentally ambiguous. We are responsible for our virtuous and vicious actions, but 
we are largely not responsible for the characters that produced them. And it is for this 
reason, thinks Aristotle, that ethics must culminate in the political. The human drive to 
flourish, which entails for Aristotle virtuous praxis, cannot be satisfied outside of the 
political community. In order to live an excellent life an individual needs the right kind of 
upbringing and education, opportunities to form meaningful relationships, and the chance 
to do meaningful work. And she cannot provide these for herself. Human flourishing 
requires not only that we live in communities, but also that these communities be 
adequately just, consisting of the kinds of institutions that produce excellent character in 
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all citizens. Aristotle effectively tells us that if we want better people, we must first build 
more just communities. And this is the work of politics. 
 What, then, of the paradox of kindness? Aristotle overcomes the paradox of moral 
responsibility by setting his sights on the political. So, too, must the kind agent. The very 
commitments that lead her to actualize kindness in relation to the individuals she 
encounters will prompt her also to care about the institutions that detract from or 
contribute to the flourishing of agents generally, and especially of those upon whom bad 
moral luck weighs more heavily. Kindness involves the active removal of obstacles to 
human flourishing, thus the work of kindness can take place at the level of individuals or 
at the social and political level. Kindness is not opposed to justice, but is instead an 
important subjective motivation behind efforts at achieving the same. If we would make a 
better world, which is to say a world of happier, more virtuous moral agents, then we 
must be prepared to contend not just with our own (heavily conditioned) moral flaws, but 
also and especially with the social and political institutions that contribute to the 
formation of character. And in achieving both of these aims, we would do well to turn to 
kindness.   
 In Chapter I I suggested that kindness can be actualized in institutions, in much 
the same way that cruelty can be and has too often been. Whereas cruel institutions are 
those that reify the purported inferiority of some group or groups of people, kind 
institutions are just those that embody the intrinsic dignity of all people, and universalize 
the principled attitude of loving-respect that acknowledges need without undermining 
autonomy. Although I cannot elaborate on these claims at length here, I will suggest that 
such institutions might include domestic social welfare programs and intergovernmental 
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aid programs aimed at empowering, for example, economically disadvantaged and 
socially disenfranchised people.3 Kind institutions would aim to inculcate in their 
beneficiaries a sense of their own worth, and to remove or mitigate obstacles to their 
flourishing while opening up opportunities for purposive, autonomous activity. We might 
even say that one measure of the moral worth of domestic or international welfare 
programs is the extent to which they embody the values that we have here associated with 
kind agency. These kind institutions would in turn enable the personal kindness of their 
beneficiaries by, for example, meeting their basic needs such that they may turn their 
attentions to others, and encouraging them to take up projects aimed at improving their 
own and their fellow citizens’ social and economic situations.   
 Kind agency may then involve active efforts to contribute to just political 
institutions, and these institutions may in turn enable the personal kindness of their 
beneficiaries. But whether kindness is actualized at the level of the individual or at the 
social and political level, the suspicion that it might innure oppressed people to their 
suffering remains. If kindness is put forth as an alternative to more fundamental changes 
such as liberation from oppressive relations, then we may worry that it will serve 
primarily to dull recipients’ awareness of the injustices that undermine their autonomy or 
dignity, or simply innure them to the same. We might reasonably fear that acts of 
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 The Family Independence Initiative is an excellent example of the first of these. The CEO and founder, 
Maurice Lim Miller, originally developed the program at the prompting of then-Mayor of Oakland Jerry 
Brown, as an alternative to conventional social welfare programs that, in Miller’s view, tend to disempower 
and socially alienate their recipients while undermining their sense of dignity. Miller’s initiative is based on 
the premise that “mutuality and self-determination are key in achieving self-sufficiency.” An excellent 
example of an intergovernmental institution of kindness is the United States African Development 
Foundation (USADF). The USADF is in independent federal agency “established to support African-
designed and African-driven solutions that address grassroots economic and social problems in post-
conflict communities.” The USADF provides grants directly to marginalized communities. Grants are 
aimed primarily and creating and sustaining jobs and contributing to community development projects. 
Both organizations measure their success in terms of perceivable improvements to the overall quality of life 
of their beneficiaries.       
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kindness will give oppressed agents just enough help and comfort to endure the status 
quo, rather than actively striving to improve their situations. Such a dynamic could play 
out between two individuals (an employer and employee, for example), or between the 
state and the recipient of social welfare, or between a beneficent nation and its 
beneficiary. In any of these cases, we would be right to worry that kindness could reify 
the oppressive power relations that Hallie correctly associates with institutionalized 
cruelty.4  
 There are several ways to address this concern. The first is to emphasize the claim 
of Chapter V that the virtue of kindness involves activity for the proper reasons. An act is 
not genuinely kind if it is not done for the sake of its beneficiary, and more specifically 
for the sake of her flourishing. Thus the so-called kindness of the slave master that Hallie 
refers to in his criticisms of kindness is something other than kindness, and is at best less 
than praiseworthy.5 Kant emphasizes a similar point when he suggests that beneficence 
must always be tempered with respect, or the active conviction that the recipient has a 
special worth that must not be diminished, and personal autonomy that must not be 
violated. We must treat others, thinks Kant, as if they deserve well from us, and when we 
do we enact their moral worth. As we have said, kindness involves both a what, or action 
for the sake of some other, and a how, which is to say an attitude with which the action is 
performed. The how of kindness is the attitude of loving-respect, which is also the 
animating force behind every act of kindness, and an important source of its special 
                                                           
4
 A related concern that I can only mention here is Nietzsche’s contention that kindness belongs to the 
“slave morality,” both in that it is a suitable virtue for the oppressed (who value any help they can get), and 
in that it gives oppressed peoples the “moral high ground” that innures them to their inferior position.   
 
5
 We might say the same of a nation’s extension of foreign aid to another nation for the sake of securing 
political or economic influence. 
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moral worth. This attitude is radically at odds with the entitled attitude of institutionalized 
cruelty. We must, I think, eliminate from our conception of kindness any act or institution 
aimed not at removing obstacles to agents’ autonomy and flourishing, but rather at 
actively maintaining or buttressing problematic power dynamics.6   
 It is difficult to see, then, how a genuinely kind gesture, as opposed to a 
spuriously kind one, could either contribute to the reification of unjust power dynamics or 
inure members of oppressed groups to their own suffering. If anything, gestures of 
kindness have the power to remind agents that they have intrinsic value, that their 
flourishing is just as important as anyone else’s, and that they have a right to exercise 
autonomy. We would do well to recall Douglas’s claim that “The thought that men are 
for other and better uses than slavery throve best under the gentle treatment of a kind 
master” (155). As Douglas attests in his autobiographies, and as noted in Chapter IV, 
Lucretia Auld’s acts of kindness were experienced by him as genuine, and helped to 
instill in him a sense of his own worth. I will not make the strong claim that Douglas 
could not have empowered himself to fight his enslavement absent these gestures, but 
will say that in his case as in any, it is easier to fight oppression if one has a strong sense 
of self-worth. That our feelings of self-worth are heavily informed by the way others treat 
us is, I think, hardly worth debating.   
 I will not deny that discrete gestures of kindness seem inadequate to address 
institutionalized oppression. When the prison guard gave Viktor Frankl his ration of 
                                                           
6
 A difficult case is that in which it is not possible to liberate another person from her situation, or to 
obliterate one’s position as superior. We might think here of the relationships between prison guards and 
inmates. Certainly it is possible for prison guards to be more or less kind to inmates, and certainly it is 
possible for guards to treat inmates in ways that dehumanize them, or rob them of whatever dignity their 
situation permits. I do believe that genuine kindness is possible despite power differentials like that 
between the prison guard and inmate, and take those who are locked by circumstance into a position of 
superiority to have a special responsibility to preserve the dignity of those in their charge, by, for example, 
making an effort to treat them with kindness. 
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bread, he did not thereby cause the upheaval of the Nazi regime. But he did do something 
meaningful for another human being. Such acts have positive moral significance, and are 
not to be discounted. We ought not to assume, moreover, that they have no part to play in 
institutional reform. We must not underestimate, for example, the power of gestures of 
kindness to cut across (socially constructed) difference, and this is an insight that the 
kindness of children keeps us mindful of.  
 Kindness among members of oppressed groups may have a special role to play in 
social reform. As Claudia Card argues in The Unnatural Lottery, oppressed groups 
cannot engage in collective resistance until they overcome their internalized oppression, 
which often finds expression in “internal hostilities,” or those hostilities that members of 
an oppressed group have and express towards each other (42). Card writes, “Establishing 
internal bonds requires members of the group to discover what is of value in themselves” 
(42).7 It is difficult to dislodge the internalized prejudices that prevent collective action if 
we cannot first see ourselves as intrinsically valuable. A woman who has internalized 
sexism, for example, will be unlikely to value herself or other women in a way that 
enables collective resistance to sexist oppression. But where she becomes aware of her 
own worth, and her worth qua woman, she begins to dislodge the prejudices that prevent 
her from valuing other women. And she may first become aware of her worth through the 
kindness of another person. Gestures of kindness enact the dignity and worth of their 
recipients, and so have some power to open up sites of resistance to oppression within 
                                                           
7
 Ideally, this awareness would arise spontaneously, say, when agents take the time to reflect on the forces 
that inform their identities and social positions. But often an outside perspective is needed, and this outside 
perspective may belong to someone who enjoys the privileged position of, well, privilege.     
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individuals, and by extension within communities of oppressed or disenfranchised 
peoples.  
  Ideally, it would be possible to inculcate kindness within ourselves, without the 
benefit of an ideal moral education or the kind treatment of others. If such a thing were 
possible, then members of oppressed groups could inculcate kindness in themselves, and 
of their own volition engage in the activities that remind peers of their worth, and so 
foster communities of collective resistance.8 In the light of the problem of luck, it is 
difficult to think that any moral virtue can arise without some measure of good luck. But 
kindness, more than any other virtue, has the potential to arise despite (or rather on 
account of) bad luck. Because we have some power to inculcate kindness in ourselves by 
actively reflecting on human vulnerability and interdependence, those of us who are (as a 
result of bad luck) most vulnerable may be more aware of the role of luck and thus of the 
need for kindness. If our bad luck includes having suffered at the hands of the unkind, 
then we will perhaps be even more appreciative of the fact that we are, very often, each 
other’s best and worst luck. If our bad luck includes having suffered the effects of unjust 
institutions, then we will perhaps be even more aware of how institutions contribute to 
and detract from human flourishing. In either case, it is only reasonable that we should 
therefore feel more indignant in the face of individuals and institutions that produce or 
fail to prevent bad moral luck, and therefore more inclined to contribute to others’ good 
moral luck.9   
                                                           
8
 We have seen, in the story of Steven Biko, one example of this “ideal” process. It would be most 
worthwhile to look for other examples, and to search for the psychological or other features that allow 
individuals to begin to resist internalized oppression in way that opens the door for social movements. 
 
9
 All of this assumes, of course, that we value ourselves enough to resist the temptation to believe we 
deserve our suffering. And unfortunately, the latter belief too often takes root in the psychology of 
internalized oppression. It further assumes that we are not too physically and psychologically exhausted to 
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Kindness to the Self 
 I have argued that kind agency has the power to ameliorate both facets of the 
problem of moral luck. Regarding the problem of tychē, kindness involves the active 
amelioration of those forces that are experienced by others as bad luck, and the active 
contribution to what others experience as good luck. Kind agents are motivated to work 
for the good of others at the level of the individual, through discrete acts of personal 
kindness, and at the level of institutions by working to inform and support kind intuitions 
and institutions that enable kindness. Ameliorative moral assessment is one of the most 
important components of kind agency. In relation to the problem of moral luck, I have 
claimed that the kind agents adopt an approach to moral assessment that dissolves, to a 
great extent, the problem of moral luck. In Chapter III I argued that the kind agent is 
sensitive to the role of luck, and will therefore judge others within the context of their 
luck, to the best of her knowledge. I suggested that she will be inclined to forgive others 
for their character flaws, and that she will also work to ameliorate those flaws by praising 
and blaming others in the most constructive way possible.10 In her assessments of others 
the kind agent will emphasize personal responsibility to the extent that it reminds agents 
of their own values and motivates them to work for their own amelioration. She will 
emphasize contingency to the extent that it prevents those she assesses from falling into 
despair or from disregarding the power of luck (and especially of the institutions that 
contribute to luck) to inform every agent’s being. If moral assessment is construed as a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be capable of positively contributing to others’ flourishing without doing serious harm to ourselves. Where 
we ask those who have suffered much to be kind, we ask a great deal indeed; perhaps more than we have 
any right to ask. 
 
10
 A claim I further developed in Chapter VI.  
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tension between emphasizing luck and emphasizing responsibility, the kind agent will err 
on the side of emphasizing luck where others are concerned, and this both because she 
assumes others’ good intentions, and because she understands that positive assessments 
of others have tremendous ameliorative power.11   
 We may now ask how much responsibility the kind agent ought to take for her 
own actions and character, and whether or not she ought to judge herself kindly, which is 
to say in the same way that she judges others. Here we must proceed with care, since if 
we claim that agents ought to be inclined to emphasize luck over responsibility in their 
own self-assessments, the role of personal responsibility that is so central to most visions 
of ethics is to some extent undermined. If we instead say that kind agents ought to be 
harsh in their self-assessments, we would rightly worry about the psychological toll of 
such assessments. The moral life is one of difficult choices, and where agents are harsh in 
assessing their own choices, they may be inclined to fall into despair. It is difficult to 
think that an agent who perpetually despairs is capable of the virtue of kindness, which is 
fundamentally other-oriented, and requires considerable psychic effort.   
 The most promising way to preserve the moral life from the assaults of luck is not 
to judge others according to a hyperbolic notion or moral responsibility that effectively 
denies the power of luck, but instead to take what responsibility we can for our own 
beliefs and actions. As noted in Chapter III, one important criticism of the literature on 
moral luck is that it takes too little account of the moral assessments we make of 
ourselves, despite the fact that such judgments are central to our notions of moral 
responsibility. Another criticism, which as we will see relates to the first, is that moral 
                                                           
11
 This, again, is one of Mark Alfano’s important claims in Character as Moral Fiction, and I view I 
espouse wholeheartedly.  
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luck theorists tend to neglect forward-looking responsibilities, or those responsibilities 
we voluntarily take up to contribute to others’ flourishing. Kindness involves both kinds 
of responsibility, but more so the second. We may then say that the kind agent must 
foster a sense of her own moral responsibility, and especially of her positive 
responsibility to help and comfort the people around her. She must see herself as 
responsible for the way she treats other people, and must also learn to recognize and 
mourn lost opportunities to actualize kindness. By holding herself responsible for, and 
critically reflecting upon, past failures to be kind, she will better foster her sense of 
forward-looking responsibility.  
 But in making these claims we again run into the problem of despair. The world 
will inevitably afford more opportunities for kindness than any agent can reasonably be 
expected to take advantage of. Kindness is often psychologically and materially 
demanding, and renders kind agents vulnerable in a number of ways, as we have seen. 
We cannot therefore reasonably expect even the kindest agent to intervene at every 
opportunity. Kindness is, as we have said, a mean, and it would be excessive for any 
person to do more than decency requires in every situation. But if the kind agent is 
especially aware of her positive responsibilities to others, and especially inclined to regret 
missed opportunities for kindness, then the life of kindness seems also to entail the 
persistent regret and remorse that might render agents less capable of kindness. It is of the 
utmost importance that the kind agent judge herself in a way that preserves her sense of 
responsibility without leading to the kind of despair that undermines kind agency. But 
what would such judgment involve, and how would it differ from the judgment she 
enacts in relation to others?  
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 Here Aristotle’s preservation of (ambiguous) moral responsibility may be of some 
use. Certainly, it captures the sense we generally have of ourselves as agents, a sense we 
retain despite our awareness that we are not self-created. As John Martin Fischer writes, 
“Intuitively speaking, I am not ‘ultimately responsible’ for my particular psychological 
traits or even for my very agency. We are not ‘ultimately responsible’ for ‘the way we 
are,’ and yet it just seems crazy to suppose that we are thereby relieved of moral 
responsibility for our behavior” (113). Whether or not we can ultimately justify the fact, 
we tend to admire those who err on the side of taking too much responsibility for their 
actions, and to disdain those who err on the side of taking too little. There is something 
appealing about suggesting that kind agents, being people who possess moral virtue in 
general, will err on the side of taking excessive responsibility. They will then, 
presumably, feel substantial remorse when they fail to be kind to another agent. But the 
feeling of remorse, like all feelings, must be regulated by virtue if it is to function well.   
 How we feel about our actions reminds us of the values that they actualize or fail 
to actualize; if we feel deep remorse for having lied to someone, for example, we will 
feasibly be less likely to lie in some similar situation in the future. If we feel deep 
remorse for failing to be kind, or for having failed to recognize an opportunity for 
kindness until it was too late to act, then we will be more likely to recognize and take up 
opportunities for kindness in the future.  
The kind agent will take the time to reflect on missed opportunities for kindness, and will 
acknowledge, in a rich way, her feelings of remorse. But only for a time. For she will 
easily recognize that excessive remorse has an enervating effect, preventing the other-
minded attitude that is at the very heart of kindness. Excessive remorse is, to put it 
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otherwise, a kind of selfishness that undermines kind agency. If the kind agent is inclined 
to mourn her failings for too long, which she may be given how deep her values run, then 
we can only hope that another kind person may offer her comfort, reminding her of the 
forces that were beyond her control, and reminding her of her good will and great 
capacity for future kindness. The inculcation of a proper relationship to remorse belongs 
properly, then, to kind agency. But even this does not render the kind agent immune to 
the need for others’ kindness.  
  
Concluding Thoughts 
 I have very often thought that the fundamental problem of ethics stems from 
philosophers’ desire to cut the human species off from the nature which constitutes it. 
The problem of moral luck arises from an already hyperbolic notion of agency that denies 
of the ways in which we belong to a world that we cannot wholly control. The fear of so 
many moral luck theorists is that if we admit the great extent to which we are not up to 
ourselves, then we will lose the strong notion of responsibility that grounds most moral 
systems. But reflection on the existence of luck needn’t comprise a slippery slope that 
ends in the total dissolution of morality, and Aristotle shows us why.   
 By appreciating the ways in which we belong not only to nature but also to 
particular social and political institutions, Aristotle acknowledges the profound 
importance of luck. But he does so while preserving the robust sense of moral agency that 
we experience every day when, for example, we choose to do something kind. Because 
for Aristotle every person is an archē with an archē of her own, ethics must exceed itself 
by culminating in the political. We must, thinks Aristotle, take sides with luck by actively 
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contributing to the institutions that are experienced by others (and ourselves) as good 
luck. And this is ultimately the way that kind agency overcomes, to the extent possible, 
the problem of luck. The world is not simply up to us, but we do have some power to 
improve it. We are not simply up to ourselves, but we have some power to adopt the right 
kinds of beliefs and to foster the right kinds of habits. Other people are not simply up to 
us, but we do have some power to better their lives. Kindness is, at heart, a recognition of 
the ambiguity of human agency and hence of the moral life. But it is more; kindness is 
the enactment of a fundamental truth of human existence, which is simply that we are 
each other’s best and worst luck.  
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